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n Defining the Problem 
1.1. The state of research 
The role of business has been central in the transformation of 
American society. Since the very beginnings of the nation, it has 
raised emotions, either in support or opposition. To Thomas 
Jefferson, the future of the United States was agricultural: "for the 
general operations of manufacture, let our work-shops remain in 
Europe". Similarly, John Adams declared: "...America will be the 
country to produce raw materials for manufacture; but Europe will 
be the country of manufactures." In the same spirit, too, Benjamin 
Franklin observed, "The great business of the continent is agriculture. 
For one artizan, or merchant, I suppose we have at least a hundred 
farmers."' 
The history of the United States has proved these prophecies of 
the founding fathers only partly true. For the most part of the 19th 
century, the country remained agricultural; but alongside agriculture, 
the new technology, and industry based on it, developed rapidly. 
Essential for the development of the U.S. economy were the British 
investments that flowed into the country. Britain was a major capital 
exporter, while the United States was the world's largest market. 
Sterling found its way into the various applications of steam to land 
and sea transport. In the long run, railroads lowered transport costs 
and integrated the vast country economically and politically into one 
entity. Although not as dramatic and rapid, there was a similarly 
far-reaching change in sea transport when steam replaced sail, at 
first on short routes in the 1850s and 1860s, and thereafter gradually 
on the long routes towards the end of the century. For business, 
one of the effects of this development was that it became possible 
to have meaningful coordination, control, and influence over long 
distances and even over international frontiers.2 
The second great change in American life and society was the 
rapid growth of manufacturing industry. Machines replaced 
1 Kasson 1988, 14-17. 
2 Foreman-Peck 1983, 33-35; Harley 1970, 216-217, 219, 222-223, 227; Wilkins 
1986, 86-87; Wilkins 1988, 8-9. 
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handicraft labor, new raw materials and sources of power gained 
importance, and workers became concentrated in factories. 
Alongside this process, there began to develop a new approach to 
the entire manufacturing process, the American System of 
Manufacturing, part of which was the concept of interchangeability 
of parts. Big business developed in American industry when the new 
national market created by railroads and improvements in technology 
combined with the impact of mass production and mass distribution 
after the Civil War.3 The American economy expanded beyond its 
borders. During the period extending from 1871 to 1895 the 
expansion of American exports to Europe consisted mainly of 
foodstuffs, wheat being the major article. From 1895 to World War 
I, the paramount feature was the spectacular rise of the exports of 
semifinished and finished manufactures. By the last third of the 
century Britain was faced with a new situation; its industrial 
monopoly had given way to competition.4 
The third big revolution of the period occurred in agriculture. 
Taking the prairies of the Mid-West and great plains under cultivation 
more than doubled wheat output alone from 1859 to 1880. This 
dramatic growth was based on new technology and increased 
acreage. The advance of refrigeration into railroad cars and 
steamships in the 1880s gave a further impetus to agriculture, but 
also caused a major crisis for European farmers. During the 1870s 
and 1880s, the cost of transporting wheat from New York to 
Liverpool was cut by about half, and consequently American grains 
and other foodstuffs began to flood into Europe. The collapse of 
wheat prices drove some Continental countries to protect their 
agriculture, while others changed their production structure.5 
These changes, in connection with social changes that were 
occurring simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, are a 
necessary precondition for an understanding of the growth of 
American big enterprise. The focus of the present study is on the 
McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, as an example of a large 
company. 
In Cyrus Hall McCormick's personality merge many fundamental 
features of the American nineteenth-century revolutions. He was an 
inventor, entrepreneur and a hardboiled business man. During his 
life time he turned his tiny blacksmith shop in Walnut Grove, 
Virginia, into the leading harvesting machine company in the world 
3 Blackford-Kerr 1986, 84, 98, 102, 105, 152-153, 164. 
4 Simon-Novack 1964, 592-593, 599-602; Landes 1989, 239. 
5 Hughes 1987, 276-277; Tracy 1966, 100-103. 
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at the time of his death in 1884.6 McCormick's reaper opened up 
one of the bottlenecks in American agriculture. After purchasing the 
reaper, farmers were able to extend their acreage and their 
dependence on casual labor was reduced.' 
The most comprehensive study on McCormick has been produced 
by William T. HUTCHINSON.8 Hutchinson was able to spend eight 
years writing his detailed, exactly documented work, over 1,200 
pages long, on the invention of the reaper, its further development, 
the formation of big business, and the personal and family history 
of Cyrus McCormick. It is no wonder that all later researchers in 
this field have used his research as a cornerstone in their own work. 
Before Hutchinson's monumental study, the question of the role 
of Cyrus McCormick as the inventor of the reaper had aroused hot 
debate. Relations between Cyrus McCormick and his younger 
brother Leander J. McCormick had gradually deteriorated from the 
1860s until the final breakdown in 1880, which led to the resignation 
of Leander as the vicepresident of the McCormick Company. In the 
aftermath of the controversy, Leander tried to prove his brother's 
claims to the invention of the reaper false, and instead attributed 
the honor to their father, Robert McCormick.9 
Herbert F. CASSON's "The Romance of the Reaper" 10 is a 
representative model of older business history in its romantic and 
heroic description of the McCormick and Deering Companies. It 
belongs to a series of romances written about numerous persons 
and subjects at the turn of the century in the United States. Casson's 
approach remains the same in his "Cyrus Hall McCormick. His Life 
6 Hutchinson 1935, passim; Carstensen 1984, 107-118. 
7 Rogin 1931, 79-82, 91-94, 125-141. 
8 HUTCHINSON: Cyrus Hall McCormick. Seed time, 1809-1856. New York 1930; 
HUTCHINSON: Cyrus Hall McCormick. Harvest, 1856-1884. New York 1935. 
9 Hutchinson 1930, 101-108; Directors meeting 6.4.1880. Mss M/I, box 17. 
Neither the original book of 1885 nor the reprint of 1898 of "Memorial of Robert 
McCormick, Being a Brief History of His Life, Character and Inventions, Including the 
Early History of the McCormick Reaper" have been available for the writer. 
Information on this part is thus based on Hutchinson's research. Hutchinson 1930, 
8-9 footnote 14, 99 footnote 1. 
The second round of the game began in 1910, when the son of Leander McCormick, 
Robert Hall McCORMICK, and his nephew James Hall SHIELDS published their 
compilation of statements in homage to Robert McCormick: The Life and Works of 
Robert McCormick, Including His Invention of the Reaper. Chicago 1910. The 
question was reheated by John F. STEWARD: The Reaper. A history of the efforts of 
those who justly may be said to have made bread cheap. New York 1931, and N. 
LYONS: The McCormick Reaper Legend. The true story of a great invention. With a 
foreword by Robert Hall McCormick III. New York 1955. 
10 New York 1908. 
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and Work."11 
After Hutchinson, the first time the foreign business of the 
McCormick Harvesting Machine Company attracted attention was in 
the doctoral dissertation of George G. QUEEN.12 
 Although he 
concentrates on economic relations between the U.S. and Russia, he 
takes harvesting machines as an example of American machinery in 
Russia. In this connection he has mostly used Hutchinson as his 
source, but he has also made use of some primary material in the 
McCormick Collection. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a couple of graduate theses 
examined McCormick's foreign activities.13 A new approach to the 
11 Chicago 1909. In reading both of Herbert Casson's books, there have to be kept 
in mind his contacts with the McCormick family, which render the validity of some 
of his statements suspect. Both Nettie F. McCormick, wife of Cyrus H. McCormick, 
and their son Harold F. McCormick made comments on Casson's manuscripts. Harold 
McCormick, for example, demanded "It is desired that all reference to Mr. Rockefeller 
be cut out". Besides, he made numerous corrections in details concerning the 
McCormick Company. In addition, he wanted Casson to contact his brother, Cyrus 
Jr., because "I would not like to pass on this unless it is necessary". Nettie McCormick 
for her part had very carefully read Casson's manuscript and dictated her suggestions 
for changes. "Page 36: Last six lines - Beginning with "Hussey's had a better cutting 
apparatus". Are these words historically true? I think not." Unfortunately it is not clear 
to which one of Casson's books these comments refer. Criticism of H.F. McCormick 
to the third chapter of Mr. Casson's article. 9.26.1907. Mss 6c, box 30; Suggestions 
for changes in Mr. Casson's book, made by Mrs. McCormick, which she would like 
to have presented to Mr. Casson by Miss Smith. No date. Mss 6c, box 30. 
12 QUEEN: The United States and the Material Advance in Russia, 1881-1906. Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Illinois. Illinois 1942. All of the data concerning the amount of 
sales by the McCormick Co. in Russia are subject to inaccuracies. For example Queen 
has found in 1894 McCormick's sales to be only 132 machines, whereas in the 
accounts of George A. Freudenreich the figure given is 1050. Queen 1942, 140; 
Recapitulation of all sales of machines made in Russia and Roumania during the 
season of 1894. Geo. A. Freudenreich. Genl. Agt. Mss 2x, box 235; Material for the 
previous years shows a similar error in Queen's calculations. Sales of the Odessa 
agency for the last 14 years. Mss 2x, box 235. 
13 All of these works are limited in their scale and scope. When foreign trade finally 
was explored as an independent topic, all the other aspects were left aside, and the 
necessary context for the whole phenomenon was thus forgotten. 
The first in the series of three works was Eugene SHAPIRO: Expansion of the foreign 
market, 1898-1902. Inaugurating the Branch House System. Unpublished seminar 
paper, University of Wisconsin. Wisconsin 1958. He was followed by Eugene A. 
MANNING: Foreign Business of the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, 
1885-1902. Unpublished seminar paper, University of Wisconsin. Wisconsin 1961. 
Shapiro and Manning were the first who entirely concentrated in these papers on 
the McCormick Company's foreign business. Shapiro's aim was to figure out the main 
lines of the last phase of the McCormick Company's foreign organization. Manning, 
on the other hand, widened his scope also to include the earlier years of foreign 
sales. Both of them used Hutchinson and Queen as their sources, but also extended 
their research to the primary material. Besides, Manning owes a lot to Shapiro. 
The next phase in the research was the graduate thesis of Howard Bernard 
SCHONBERGER: The Foreign Business of the McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Company. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Wisconsin. Wisconsin 1964. 
Schonberger also found and used the works of previous researchers, but fails to 
understand the continuity of the business from Crystal Palace. Besides, in spite of the 
use of original material, he tried to explain the operations of the McCormick Company 
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theme was found by Fred V. CARSTENSEN14 in his doctoral 
dissertation, which was later published as "American Enterprise in 
Foreign Markets. Studies of Singer and International Harvester in 
Imperial Russia". Carstensen focuses his research on the Russian 
operations of the International Harvester Company, thus either 
omitting or only briefly mentioning the early phases of McCormick's 
foreign trade. His main emphasis is thus on the role of the 
International Harvester Company, and not on the McCormick 
Company. 
The latest study that deals with the McCormick Company was first 
published in 1984 by David A. HOUNSHELL.15 Hounshell 
concentrated in this thorough investigation on the technological and 
managerial sides of the central manufacturers in American business 
history. He has shown how primitive and simple methods continued 
to be used even in highly respected firms such as the McCormick 
Co. up to the beginning of the 1880s. He has also demonstrated the 
significance of organization and technology for the growth of an 
industrial enterprise. 
The establishment of the International Harvester Company in 1902 
ended the independent existence of the McCormick Company. That 
event has produced some seminar works and articles, too, but still 
awaits more comprehensive examination.16  
by outside economic forces. While totally failing to formulate the crucial question, 
Schonberger frequently concentrates on details, like the Chicago World Fair or the 
debate on tariffs in the US Senate. Consequently, he has totally omitted effects arising 
within the company and the harvester business. 
14 CARSTENSEN: American Multinational Corporations in Imperial Russia; Chapters 
on Foreign Enterprise and Russian Economic Development. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Yale University. Yale 1976; Chapel Hill 1984. 
15 HOUNSHELL: From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932. The 
Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States. Baltimore 1984. 
16 In the research this event was first handled by Howard William BENSON: 
Organization and first years of the International Harvester Company. Unpublished MA 
thesis, the University of Chicago. Chicago 1936. Benson had to rely in his study on 
newspapers and other descriptive sources. The next development in the field was 
Helen M. KRAMER's master's thesis: Harvesters and High Finance: Formation of the 
International Harvester Company. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Wisconsin. 
SA. She had access to archival material, and was able to concentrate her interest on 
International Harvester's formation process. Unfortunately it has been impossible to 
find the original work, in spite of numerous efforts on the part of the writer, 
Wisconsin University Library, and the Wisconsin State Historical Society's personnel. 
Only the revised version of it has therefore been used in this study, together with 
the article published under the same title in Business History Review 3 (1964), 
283-301. Barbara MARSH's A Corporate Tragedy. The Agony of International Harvester 
Company, New York 1985, deals more with the company's later development until 
its financial difficulties in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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The development of administration and professional managers as 
a decisive factor in the evolution of the modern firm was first 
demonstrated by Alfred D. CHANDLER, in his pathfinding studies 
"Strategy and Structure. Chapters in the History of the Industrial 
Enterprise"," and "The Visible Hand. The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business".18 Chandler located the emergence of big 
American enterprise in the post bellum years as a result of integrated 
mass distribution and mass production. According to Chandler, 
"modern business enterprise took the place of market mechanisms 
in coordinating the activities of the economy and allocating its 
resources".19 He argues that as modern business enterprise became 
the most powerful institution in the American economy, its managers 
became the most influential group of decision-makers. A chandlerian 
firm contains several distinct operating units, and is managed by a 
hierarchy of salaried executives. Chandler shows how the emergence 
of big business demanded new kinds of talents to manage it. This 
process gave birth to the professional, salaried manager, who was 
in contrast to the traditional single-unit firm operated by an 
individual or a small number of owners.20 In "Scale and Scope. The 
Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism"21 Chandler applied his model to 
17 Cambridge, Massachusetts 1962. 
18 Cambridge, Massachusetts 1977. 
19 Chandler 1977, 1. 
20 Chandler's thesis was soon attacked by a number of researchers. DUBOFF and 
HERMAN accept the merits of Chandler's approach to business history, but want to 
show its serious failings as well. The interplay between politics and business is almost 
totally ignored, as is also the social significance of oligopoly. The power of large firms 
is a result of their growth. The writers make the further criticism that Chandler's 
managers are presented as neutral, living in a vacuum, and that he thus fails to 
understand the goals these managers pursue. Duboff, Richard; Herman, Edward S.: 
Alfred Chandler's New Business History: Review. Politics and Society 10 (1980): 
87-110. 
Jeremy ATACK tests Chandler's basic concept of the evolution of the large business 
firm. By comparing companies before the Civil war and again at the turn of the 
century, he shows that there was no such radical change visible in the firms as 
Chandler states. The forces put in motion between 1850-1870 were rather an outcome 
of long-run developments. Atack, Jeremy: Industrial Structure and the Emergence of 
the Modern Industrial Corporation. Explorations in Economic History 22 (1985):29.52. 
Naomi LAMOREAUX condemns the Cliometricians for passing over, with a couple of 
exceptions, the era of big business and the great merger movement. For the 
Cliometricians the merger movement was unimportant, since they believe that 
industrial concentration has not resulted in significant deviations from competitive 
pricing. An important point for the present study is her argument that mergers were 
a conjunction of particular circumstances. The simultaneous rapid expansion of many 
capital-intensive industries in the early 1890s, followed by the deep depression of 
1893, gave rise to abnormally serious price wars and consequently to the great merger 
movement. Lamoreaux: The great merger movement in American business, 1895-1904. 
New York 1988. 
21 Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990. 
16 n DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
European countries, by comparing US firms with British and German 
companies. Chandler introduced the idea of a crucial three-pronged 
investment - in machinery, management, and marketing. By utilizing 
these investments modern enterprises grew by taking advantage of 
the economies of scale, but also of those of scope by extending the 
range of products manufactured and marketed. In spite of great 
merits, Chandler's ideas have not met with unanimous acceptance, 
however. Although his basic concepts have survived under the 
critical eyes of economists, criticism has been raised because of the 
omission in analyses of such central factors as labor and industrial 
relations, business-state relationships, and legal and educational 
environment.22 
The multinational enterprise can be seen as one phase in the 
development of big business. The most comprehensive picture of 
the American multinationals23 before World War I can be found in 
Mira WILKINS' "The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: 
American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914".24 Wilkins 
only scrutinizes those companies that made direct investments25  
abroad. One of her objectives was to find out when, why, how, and 
where early American business went into direct foreign investments. 
In her later articles, Wilkins has broadened her field to embrace 
22 Barry Supple: Scale and scope: Alfred Chandler and the dynamics of industrial 
capitalism. Economic History Review 44 (1991): 500-514 and William N. Parker: The 
Scale and Scope of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. Journal of Economic History 51 (1991): 
958-963. 
23 The literature on multinational enterprises is manifold and it is beoynd the scope 
of the present study to discuss this in detail. Among the general works of the older 
generation, however, note should be taken of those of Frank A. SOUTHARD and 
Cleona LEWIS. Southard: American Industry in Europe. New York 1976. Originally 
published in 1907. Lewis: America's Stake in International Investments. New York 
1976. Originally published in 1938. 
On American firms, important information can also be obtained from reports by 
various authorities. These include the US Senate: American Branch Factories Abroad. 
Washington 1931. The US Department of Commerce: American Direct Investments 
in Foreign Countries. Washington 1930. The US Senate: Letter from the Secretary of 
Commerce. Washington 1933. 
Lawrence G. FRANKO'S "The European Multinationals. A Renewed Challenge to 
American and British Big Business". London, New York 1976, was one of the first 
works on the development of the Continental multinationals. His work also helps to 
evaluate the role and size of the American multinational enterprise. His theories have 
been modified by many subsequent researchers. One of the most significant works 
is "The Rise of Multinationals in Continental Europe", edited by Geoffrey Jones and 
Harm G. Schröter. Bodmin 1993. Notice should be also taken of Mira Wilkins' 
"European and North American Multinationals, 1870-1914: Comparisons and Contrasts" 
in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines and Geoffrey Jones (eds.) "The End of Insularity, London 
1988 and of Charles Wilson's "The Multinational in Historical Perspective" in Keiichiro 
Nakagawa: Strategy and structure of big business. Tokyo 1974. 
24 Cambridge, Massachusetts 1970. 
25 Wilkins 1970, ix-x, 19, 29. 
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Continental multinationals and their expansion in America as well, 
and she has contributed valuable new theoretical and methodical 
tools to research.26 
1.2. The Central Questions 
The main object of the present study is the foreign business of the 
McCormick Harvesting Machine Company during the period 
1878-1902. This research is based on primary material collected in 
the McCormick Collection in the State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin Archives. Through this source material, for the most part 
previously unused, the present study offers new information as to 
why and how the McCormick Company extended its operations on 
the foreign field and turned into a multinational company. The 
primary information has been complemented by the existing 
research. 
The foreign business of the McCormick Company has not 
previously been comprehensively examined, and the present study 
aims to fill this gap. This scrutiny of the McCormick Company has 
been broadened to include the whole harvesting machine sector in 
America and its expansion abroad, and the subsequent on-going 
competition in Europe. The importance and value of the agricultural 
machine trade becomes evident when it is compared with other 
sectors of industry. In 1917 the International Harvester Company, 
successor of the leading harvester companies, was in the U.S. ranked 
seventh by its assets ($m264.7).27 
Comparison of the sales methods used in Europe with American 
business practises further widens the range of the present study to 
address the state of the European agricultural machine industry28 
26 WILKINS, Mira: Defining a Firm: History and Theory (Peter Hertner and Geoffrey 
Jones (eds.): Multinationals: Theory and History). Shaftesbury 1986; WILKINS, Mira: 
European and North-American Multinationals, 1870-1914. Comparisons and Contrasts 
(R.P.T. Davenport-Hines and Geoffrey Jones (eds.): The End of Insularity. Essays in 
Comparative Business History). Chippenham 1988; WILKINS, Mira: Comparative 
Hosts. Business History 36 (1994): 18-50. 
27 Chandler 1977, 510. Behind the International Harvester were such companies as 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (8./$m263.3), U.S. Rubber Co. (9./$m257.5), General 
Electric Co. (11./$m231.6), Singer Mfg.Co. (15./$m 192.9), and Ford Motor Co. 
(16./$m165.9). Ibid. 503-512. 
28 In Europe, mechanization of agriculture has attracted some interest among 
agricultural historians, but less interest has been shown in the agricultural machine 
industry. Among the basic works are G.E. FUSSEL's "The Farmer's Tools. The history 
of British farm implements, tools and machinery before the tractor came". London 
1952, and Albert Eskeröd's "Jordbruken under femtusen år. Redskapen och 
maskinerna." Borås 1973. 
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seen through the material found in the McCormick collection. One 
of the key problems of the present work is also how the McCormick 
and other American companies were successful in conquering the 
European harvesting machine markets. 
The present study is not the last word on this complex matter, 
but it does offer material, ideas and new facts for future studies. It 
should also be recognized that the approach chosen concentrates 
on only one aspect of the many activities of a large company, and 
other aspects have been taken into account only insofar as was 
necessary for clarification of the foreign business. 
In the present study, many strong personalities emerge and are 
discussed in detail. It must be borne in mind that, although in 
business the actor is nominally the firm, behind corporate decisions 
there are always individual minds. Consequently, the meaning of 
family and company archives such as the McCormick Collection 
should be underlined. 
Although the focus of the study is mostly on economic 
considerations, this is, nevertheless, historical research, carried out 
with the tools and methods of historiography. The new basic 
material and conclusions do, however, also offer possibilities for use 
by economists too. 
The subject matter has been approached from four dimensions. On 
the personal level, Cyrus McCormick, his family and his company are 
at the center of the research: they are the actors in this game. When 
the investigator widens his scope from that level to business 
transactions, he ends up in the field of business history. The rapid 
expansion of American business led to the birth of giant corporations 
that expanded their operations abroad. The third starting point for the 
present study is therefore the multinational enterprise, and agriculture 
on two continents provides the necessary context for the study. 
Foreign markets were opened to Cyrus McCormick after the Great 
Exhibition of the Works of All Nations in Crystal Palace in 1851. 
McCormick was, nevertheless, unable to maintain his dominant 
position in the European markets, and his name almost faded away 
from European farmers' awareness until in 1878 he displayed his 
new machine, the wirebinder, at the Royal Agricultural Society 
Show in Bristol. From this point on, foreign business began to 
Paul A. DAVID's "The landscape and the machine: technical interrelatedness, land 
tenure and the mechanization of the corn harvest in Victorian Britain" (Donald N. 
McClosky: Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840. Papers and Proceedings 
of the Mathematical Social Science Board Conference on the New Economic History 
of Britain, 1840-1930, held at Eliot House, Harvard University, 1-3 September 1970), 
London 1971, is an attempt to describe adaptation of machines in England to the 
nature of the fields. 
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develop rapidly, and was made an integral part of the McCormick 
Company's activities.29 This event has been taken as a starting point 
for the present study. Although the emphasis is on the McCormick 
Company stage, the foreign activities preceeding 1878 have been 
included as a necessary background. 
The merger of the large harvesting machine companies to form 
the International Harvester Company in 1902 ended the history of 
the McCormick Company as an independent enterprise. In the new 
company, the role of foreign business was re-evaluated. Some of the 
former structures and strategies were continued in International 
Harvester, including the development of European branch houses 
and sales companies; but there were also drastic changes. The most 
crucial departure from the earlier period was the extension of 
manufacture to Europe, when International Harvester's first foreign 
factory was established in 1905 in Sweden; and in 1908, the board 
of directors of International Harvester approved plans to establish 
factories in France, Germany and Russia. These were in operation 
by 1910. In addition, International Harvester rapidly added new 
production lines to its structure, and was developed into a full-range 
agricultural machine manufacturer.30 Consequently, the formation of 
International Harvester is a logical end for a study on the McCormick 
Harvesting Machine Company. 
BLACKFORD and KERR explain that, although business history is 
closely related to economic history, economic historians concern 
themselves with larger forces that shape the formation of material 
wealth. "Those forces are the settings in which business firms arise, 
mature, and decline." By contrast, business historians examine 
individual institutions, not larger economic forces.31 Consequently, 
these larger forces have been examined in this study only as creators 
of the context for individuals and firms. Behind all business 
transactions, there is always the driving force of an inventive mind; 
and that is why this work also deals with the history of entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurship. 
When the focus of the research is on the development of American 
big enterprise, Alfred D. Chandler's name towers over all others. In 
the present study, Chandler's approach has been enlarged to 
incorporate its possible implications for foreign business. An 
important, but too often neglected side of this process is the 
29 Hutchinson 1930, 380-405; Hutchinson 1935, passim. 
30 Carstensen 1984, 134-135, 145-146; The International Harvester Co. 1913, 
141-147, 
31 Blackford and Kerr 1986, 2. 
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evolution of production technology and improvements in the factory 
set-up. Both of these factors have here been taken into account. 
The abundance of theories on multinational enterprises offers the 
researcher many competing approaches to select from. Alfred 
Chandler's extension of his theory of big companies to multinational 
enterprises has offered the necessary concepts for the present 
study.32 For Chandler, one defining characteristic of a multinational 
is direct investment abroad. The foreign facilities of a multinational 
were administered from the central home-office and were 
administratively integral parts of the managerial hierarchy. Instead 
of economic analyses of the various theories of multinational 
enterprises, Chandler suggests a historical framework. He especially 
stresses the significance of long-term profit gained by reduction of 
unit costs, achieved by improving both technology and organization 
in the units of the multinational enterprise. The decisive factor in 
determining costs and profits in his analyses is throughput, the 
amount of output processed during a single day or other unit of 
time.33 
To Chandler, multinationals were one stage in the development 
of big enterprises. They were born in the 1880s and 1890s, 
continued to grow in industries with similar technologies of 
production, and finally expanded their activities in the same manner. 
In the first stage, they replaced the wholesaler by investing in 
marketing and distribution, and purchased facilities and personnel. 
In the second phase, they acquired units producing raw and 
semifinished materials, and invested in research and development. 
Many of these companies became multinationals by investing abroad 
first in marketing and then in production.34 
In addition to the outlines offered by Alfred Chandler, the works 
of Mira Wilkins have been of importance for the present study by 
offering central concepts for handling multinational companies.35 
32 Use of the name 'multinational enterprise' can be traced to David E. Lilienthal's 
article "Management and corporations" in 1960. Since then, the theory of 
multinationals has passed through numerous stages, but has finally ended up with a 
conclusion that the concept of the multinational company itself has proved stimulating 
but in many respects misleading. "Multinational is merely shorthand for a wide range 
of capitalist enterprises which share only one common and non-definitive feature: 
that beyond there is fundamental diversity camouflaged under an umbrella term." In 
the current situation the conclusion to be drawn is that no single theory of 
international production can be found. What remains is that a multinational enterprise 
is a business enterprise which owns and controls income-generating assets in more 
than one country. Fieldhouse 1988, 1-26. 
33 Chandler 1988, 30-31, 38-39. 
34 Chandler 1988, 31-34. 
35 The selection of Chandler's and Wilkins' theories as basis for the present study 
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Although foreign trade is not a new field of research, as Wilkins 
notes, "...studies of U.S. foreign investment ignore the evolution of 
business abroad and neglect the growth of the sales establishments... 
it was from such initial forays that there grew the large contemporary 
international investments."36  
Wilkins included in her work only those companies that made 
direct investments37 abroad. Direct investment is also to her one of 
the basic characteristics of a multinational company. Besides, she 
defined an American multinational enterprise as a US-based company 
that does business in two or more foreign countries.38 This definition 
also embraces the first small-scale enterprises that involved only a 
minor amount of American capital. 
Wilkins has shown that a feature common to most American 
multinationals was that the sales of goods was based on new 
technology, and that many of them were also trademarked. Many of 
these firms expanded abroad either to reach new markets or to 
obtain sources of supply. Besides, American companies substituted 
capital for labor, which enabled the use of unskilled labor. Wilkins 
also stresses the pressures of domestic economic and legal 
conditions forcing firms into foreign expansion. Trade rules 
encouraged mergers, and integrated business abroad was therefore 
simply a natural extension. Nevertheless, foreign business was in 
many cases only complementary to domestic business, and, crucially, 
all companies with business investments abroad are and have been 
shaped by economic and other conditions in their homeland 39  
Wilkins has also formulated five parameters relating to 
multinational enterprise decision-making. The opportunity parameter 
obtains futher justification from the latest works on multinational companies. 
According to JONES and SCHROTER, "the development of such organizational 
capabilities, which are stressed by Chandler as the core issue for international 
competition, were more important than lowering transaction costs by internalization." 
Jones-Schröter 1993, 17. 
36 Wilkins 1970, 46. 
37 Wilkins 1970, ix-x, 19, 29. 
John H. DUNNING has found two distinctive features in direct foreign investment. 
Firstly, it embraces the transfer of equity capital, knowledge, entrepreneurship and 
sometimes goods as well. Secondly, the resources which are transfered between 
countries are not traded, they are simply moved from one part of the investing 
enterprise to another. Dunning 1971, 15-17. 
38 In her early models, the distinction between a multinational enterprise and direct 
foreign investment was not yet clear, but in her later articles she explains the 
relationship as follows: "multinational enterprise make foreign direct investments -
and carry on other tasks as well". Wilkins 1970, x; Wilkins 1988, 8; Wilkins 1994, 
18-19. 
39 Wilkins 1988, 8, 22-25, 31. 
22 n DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
concerns the various prospects in markets, raw materials etc. The 
political parameter takes into account the political and legal 
environment both at the domestic and international levels. The third 
parameter is familiarity: a multinational is more likely to decide to 
invest in familiar conditions. The third-country parameter means that 
multinationals not only see in a host country opportunities, but also 
recognize third-country conditions. Finally, the corporate parameter 
relates to companies' internal decisions and experiences.40 In the 
present work the definition of multinational enterprise has been 
understand in the way formulated by Chandler and Wilkins. 
The agricultural implement industry can also be approached 
through innovation theories, as Jan KUUSE41 has done. The typical 
central point in traditional innovation theories is the diffusion of 
ideas or implements in a society, and Kuuse's main interest lies, 
accordingly, in the development of the agricultural machine industry 
and its dependence on the development of agriculture. This basic 
idea is mounted in the process of diffusion of innovations. Kuuse 
has classified farmers who bought machines as pioneers, early 
adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards.42 In the diffusion 
process he separates the following stages: information - awareness - 
interest - deliberation - attempt - adaptation. Using this division, he 
produced for the United States a model of adaptation of various 
harvesting machines, shown in Figure 1. Kuuse's research has been 
taken as an example here because of his connection with the 
40 Wilkins 1994, 25-27. Multinational enterprise has also been explained by an 
eclectic paradigm. Behind this model is the idea that a multinational needs an 
advantage to compete and produce in an unfamiliar environment. There have been 
defined three conditions under which foreign companies would engage in foreign 
operations: There must be a location advantage compared with exporting to the host 
country; Multinationals have also ownership advantages compared to other firms 
supplying the same market; Finally there are internalization advantages which refer 
to economies of integration within the firm. Dunning-Cantwell-Corley 1986, 19-20; 
Jones-Schröter 1993, 5-6. 
41 KUUSE: Interaction between agriculture and industry. Case studies of farm 
mechanisation and industrialisation in Sweden and the United States 1830-1930. 
Publications of the Institute of Economic History of Gothenburg University, 34. 
Göteborg 1974. 
Everett M. Rogers, in his Diffusion of Innovations. New York 1962, together with F. 
Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations. A Cross-cultural Approach. New 
York 1971, has compiled and modified the main innovation theories. Although these 
works are certainly not the first volumes, they have been models for many later 
publications. 
42 Gould P. Colman did not accept the traditional classification by the sociologists. 
He argues that in the evaluation of technological change there should also be taken 
into account, in addition to economic, social, and psychological chararacteristics, 
factors such as the soil, climatic conditions, and accessibility to markets. Colman 
1968, 174. 
See also David Grigg: The Dynamics of Agricultural Change. The Historical experience. 
Tiptree 1982. 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM n 23 
Combine 
machine 
McCormick Company 
contrast to traditional 
the supply side of the 
Figure 1. Adoption of 
1840-1900.43  
and the agricultural machine industry. In 
diffusion studies, he also takes into account 
phenomenon, although only implicitly. 
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Source: Kuuse 1974, 256. 
Johan GALTUNG44 introduced a new approach with his theory of 
foreign policy attitudes and social position. He divided society into 
the center, periphery and extreme periphery. In the center, 
information, new ideas and attitudes spread rapidly, in contrast to 
the periphery, where the population wish to preserve the status 
quo. In other words, the center is a reformer and innovator, while 
the periphery tends toward preserving and defending the old. 
Consequently, information flows from the center to periphery. 
Galtung's theory has been transferred outside his own discipline, 
especially among ethnologists, and among the numerous researchers, 
Veikko ANTTILA45 has modified Galtung's model in innovation 
studies. In his study on the diffusion of agricultural innovations in 
Finland, he shows how innovations spread sooner in western and 
southern than in eastern and northern Finland, and that the areas 
especially receptive to changes were those surrounding towns in 
southern Finland. 
43 Unfortunately, Kuuse has omitted the quantity scale from his figure. 
44 GALTUNG: Foreign policy opinion as a function of social position. Journal of peace 
research 1 (1964): 206.231. 
45 AN7TILA: Talonpojasta tuottajaksi. Suomen maatalouden uudenaikaistaminen 
1800-luvun lopulla ja 1900-luvan alussa. Helsinki 1974. 
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Albeit the meaning of the present study is not to evaluate various 
innovation theories, this situation tempts the researcher to survey 
these ideas from the perspective of a large enterprise expanding and 
seeking for new markets. How relevant are Galtung's and Anttila's 
models in such an environment, where competing companies resort 
to aggressive marketing to increase and create demand where it does 
not yet exist? 
The concept of the company leads the researcher in the footsteps 
of Joseph SCHUMPETER,46 who stressed the impact on the develop-
ment of the national economy of the entrepreneur. Schumpeter's 
entrepreneur was a creator of new things, an innovator who with 
his creative energy pushed ahead the whole society. Was Cyrus 
McCormick the man who saved the world from starvation, as was 
stated?4' 
As a harvesting machine manufacturer, the McCormick Company 
was closely tied to the development of agriculture. In this study, 
agriculture is, however, merely the context for a case study of the 
operations of one company. Consequently, it has been possible to 
pay attention to agricultural phenomena only in such places where 
they were of importance for the spread and marketing of harvesting 
machinery, which is the focus of the present study. 
1.3. The use of original material 
The cornerstone of the present work is the McCormick Collection 
at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Any historian who works 
with primary material is of course interested in the origin and 
formation of his sources, because it decisively conditions the results 
of the research. This question is closely connected to the reliability 
of the material, but is at the same time a methodological question 
also. 
The foundations for the McCormick Collection were laid already 
after the death of Cyrus McCormick Sr. in 1884, when his widow 
and children employed personnel to collect and organize material 
relating to him. This material was placed in 1951 in the hands of 
the Wisconsin State Historical Society, and was later enlarged with 
the papers of Cyrus' widow, Nettie Fowler McCormick, and his 
46 SCHUMPETER: The Creative Response in Economic History. Journal of Economic 
History 2 (1947): 149-159. 
47 Casson 1909, 46-47. To Casson, McCormick was a hero who "did more than any 
other member of the human race to abolish the famine of the cities and the drudgery 
of the farm - to feed the hungry and straighten the bent backs of the world." 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM n 25 
children. The last additions were deposited in 1971. The 
International Harvester Company, successor of the McCormick Co., 
began in 1959 to deposit its material in the McCormick Collection, 
and continued to do so up to 1991, when the company's Russian 
collection was also sent to Wisconsin.48  
The McCormick Collection consists of numerous overlapping 
segments which contain hundreds of archive boxes. The first 
shipment from International Harvester, for instance, included 
nineteen tons of financial ledgers.49 Consequently, the collection 
covers a wide range of subjects. For the researcher, problems arise 
from the fact that the material has been acquired over a long period 
of time, and has been processed by many persons, often obscuring 
the provenance and leaving the organization of the material in some 
parts imperfect. This situation raises questions concerning possible 
gaps in the material. Had the company or some individuals any 
reasons to keep material out of the hands of outsiders? Is it certain 
that no material was lost during the formation of the collection? 
The McCormick Collection is divided into five main segments: the 
McCormick Family Papers, the McCormick Company Papers, the 
McCormick Historical Records, Collateral Papers and Non-Manuscript 
Materials. Each segment is further divided into smaller parts by the 
name of family members and other agents. Basically letters are filed 
chronologically by year and alphabetically within the chronology by 
name of author. A guide, edited by Margaret R. HAFSTAD, gives an 
overview of the collection and facilitates the understanding of at 
first sight an endless mass of letters. 
Sections of the collection can be identified by a number and letter 
code. The Cyrus Hall McCormick Papers form the A series, which 
comprises eight segments. For example, the series Mss la covers 
the years from 1788 to 1939 and comprises the main section of the 
Cyrus H. McCormick Papers. It consists of 125 boxes and contains 
correspondence received by Cyrus McCormick, his wife, his son 
Cyrus Jr., and other persons associated with the McCormick 
Company. The subjects covered are numerous, ranging from the 
development of the reaper to politics and Presbyterian Church 
activities. Series Mss 2a is the subject file in the Cyrus H. McCormick 
Papers.50 The Nettie Fowler McCormick Papers" form the B series, 
48 Hafstad 1973, v-vi. 
49 Ibid, vi. 
50 It consists of 57 boxes and 5 volumes and covers the years 1811-1884. In its 
chronological part, the emphasis is on business and economic affairs. Essential for 
the understanding of the integrity of the Cyrus H. McCormick Papers are the Mss 3a, 
which contain 24 volumes and 6 boxes of letterpress copy books (hereafter in this 
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which contains eight segments. The C series comprises the main 
section of Cyrus Hall McCormick Jr.'s correspondence.52 In addition 
to the McCormick Family Papers, the McCormick Company Papers53 
have been essential for this research. The McCormick Estate Papers,54 
series Mss M/I, provided a positive surprise during the collection of 
material. 
Although all of the family series are divided between outgoing and 
incoming letters, the division is not watertight. In many cases it has 
been impossible to find a reply to a letter, or an answer has been 
found but not the original to which it was a response. In some cases 
the reply has been found in a totally different series. 
The McCormick Collection is a large archive, and the question 
therefore remains whether all the necessary material has been found 
and all the relevant sources examined. In the present study, the 
emphasis is on the McCormick Company's foreign business and 
related questions; consequently, the collection of source material 
has been based on that assumption. Forces have been concentrated 
on those parts of the McCormick Collection where foreign affairs 
are dealt with. For the remaining parts of the Collection, a sampling 
method has been used. Samples have been taken on the basis of the 
name of actors at critical points of the McCormick Company's 
study: LPCB) of letters sent by Cyrus McCormick, his wife, Cyrus Jr., and the company 
personnel. This series has been used also to find replies to letters in other series. 
51 The Mss lb consist of 26 of boxes letters sent by Nettie McCormick. The Mss 2b 
contain 202 boxes of letters received by her. Equally important has been Mss 3b, 
which are in a similar way arranged chronologically by years and alphabetically by 
subject or author within the chronology. Altogether the Nettie Fowler McCormick 
Papers contain 453 boxes and 44 volumes of papers. 
52 Series lc consists of both incoming letters and outgoing responses and other 
letters. In series Mss 2c, there can be found part of the financial records of the 
McCormick Company, as well as papers concerning the foundation of the 
International Harvester Company. The Cyrus Jr. Papers contain 599 boxes and 268 
volumes of letters and other material. 
53 Series lx contains 454 copies of letter press copybooks on domestic 
correspondence, covering the years 1856 to 1902. Sixteen more deal entirely with 
foreign trade from 1879 to 1902. Information on foreign business is supplemented 
with series 2x, which contains the McCormick Company's incoming letters. The series 
are not, however, overlapping and it is not possible in every case to find a reply in 
incoming letters to one in the outgoing communications, or vice versa. Series 2x 
consists of 420 boxes, in which the order of the letters is difficult to work with. The 
material is not in true chronological order, but is grouped by years. Besides, foreign 
correspondence is not stored separately, which is of course confusing for the 
researcher and entails a lot of extra work. 
54 The 130 boxes and 87 volumes have offered new information not only on foreign 
business but also reports to general agents, the President's annual reports to 
stockholders, and material concerning the economic state of the company: profits, 
revenues, sales, costs, dividends and investments. 
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foreign operations as defined in the other material. 
Entrance into a private archive opens huge opportunities for 
researchers, but on the other hand, they face equally great demands. 
They must be extremely careful with source criticism, both internal 
and external. 
The correspondence of the McCormick Company contains 
messages sent and preserved by the company officials. Some of them 
are very confidential discussions between officials and family 
members; in other cases, they deal with daily company affairs or are 
reports of sales, accounts or other analyses. A material of especial 
interest and importance for this study is the correspondence 
between company officials such as the general manager E.K. Butler, 
and the European agents. There is hardly any reason to doubt the 
authenticity of this material. Where grounds for suspicion arise, 
however, material can to some extent be cross-checked, although 
the outgoing and incoming correspondence is far from overlapping. 
A more problematic question for the present study has proved to 
be the internal criticism of sources. Are the sources reliable? Do they 
speak the truth in a certain question? Has the author had any reason 
to change the truth? 
The situation is especially complex in the foreign material. At first, 
Cyrus McCormick Sr., and subsequently Cyrus Jr. were in charge of 
the foreign business. Consequently, they also took care of the 
correspondence. A major change in the Company's organization was 
made in 1886, when the General Manager, E.K. Butler took foreign 
business under his control." Thereafter he or his subordinates took 
care of the ordinary daily foreign letters. 
Correspondence between the two Cyruses and their 
representatives was confidential and private. With the takeover by 
a professional manager, there can be sensed a change in the way 
the agents are approached. At certain critical points in the history 
of the McCormick Company, such as the first attempt to merge the 
interests of the harvester manufacturers in 1890,56 it was far from 
self-evident that all details were explained to agents. Such behavior 
can be explained in many ways, but leaves behind uncertainty on 
the reliability of the content of the letters. Can this material be used 
in explaining activities of the McCormick Company, or do they tell 
about activities of the General Manager? On the other hand, the 
function of the letters should also be remembered, since this 
explains their contents too. 
55 Cyrus Jr. to E.K. Butler 8.24.1888 Mss 2c, box 112; Butler to Cyrus Jr. 8.28.1888. 
Mss 3b, box 9. 
56 Benson 1936, 3-7; The International Harvester Co. 1913, 57-58. 
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First, it has to be noted that E.K. Butler was a manager in a family 
firm, the leading owner of which was also the President of the 
Company. This situation does not leave much room for personal 
operations, and consequently decisions of the General Manager were 
also decisions of the McCormick Company. Secondly, if something 
was omitted from letters to foreign agents, this merely illustrates the 
ways foreign business was dealt with, and is therefore also useful 
for the completion of this study. 
In the McCormick Collection, as is often the case in the use of 
primary material, the information in the letters or other documents 
is not readily accessible. The researcher often has to read numerous 
documents, and assemble information, in order to obtain an overall 
view. On the other hand, within one letter European agents or a 
European manager might handle many different matters. The 
numerical material produced by the McCormick Co. personnel on 
sales, economic state and other related matters has also generated 
difficulties during this research. The statistical systems changed 
during the lifespan of the company and it has been difficult to render 
the surviving data commensurable. For this reason, the numerical 
material gives a good basis for qualitative examination, but is not 
reliable enough to give a reliable timeseries of the McCormick 
Company's sales and exports. 
There still remains the possibility that the available material was 
originally collected and organized with future publicity in mind. In 
the case of the McCormick Company Papers, however, this is very 
unlikely; on the contrary, these papers represent the Company's 
private, confidential exchange of information. Nonetheless, it is of 
course possible that aspects prejudicial to the Company's interest 
may have been excluded from the archival material. 
Perhaps the greatest risk for the reliability of the results of the 
present study lies in the one-sidedness of the material. The risk of 
bias has been taken into account during the various stages of the 
research; sources in the McCormick Collection have been compared 
for verification with other materials whenever that has been 
possible, e.g. with US consular reports, which have been of great 
value in estimating the state of business and competition in Europe 
as well as tariff and other restrictive methods used against American 
exports. 
The formation of the International Harvester Company in 1902 
soon raised the question of whether this was a monopolistic, 
unlawful trust in the sense of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. 
International Harvester was the world's largest farm machinery 
maker, with its 85 percent share of the harvesting machine markets. 
The United States Bureau of Corporations launched in 1906 an 
investigation of the new company, which led in 1912 to the filing 
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of a suit against International Harvester by the Justice Department.57 
On the basis of its investigation, the Bureau of Corporations58 
published a report which has offered valuable information and 
comparative material for this study. 
The lawsuit against International Harvester also produced 
hundreds of pages of legal materia159 which was later bound and 
preserved in the Company archives. This material has been an 
invaluable source and has also offered new information. 
Complimentary material has been difficult to find in printed 
sources. One of the few such examples are the sales catalogs, which 
are preserved in Series 4z. Until now this material has been mostly 
unused. From these catalogs, it has been possible to scrutinize the 
distribution of agents and machine prices. Many catalogs also contain 
both extensive descriptions of the history of the Company, and 
numerous technical details. The Farm Implement News, a magazine 
for dealers and other agricultural implement specialists, also provides 
important information, but has to be approached with caution, since 
there remains always a chance of biased articles. 
Former research has not been of great value in the verification of 
the source material here. Ml the earlier historians have used the 
McCormick Collection without questioning its reliability. 
Furthermore, location of the sources that have been used has proved 
to be problematic because of inadequate references.60 
The best comparative source for this study would be the archives 
of another, competing company. Acquisition of such material has 
been attempted, but the results have been discouraging. Most of 
McCormick's competitors are no longer in existence, and have left 
behind them no archives; on the other hand, the surviving 
competitors were not engaged in the same line of business during 
the period under investigation. Some material was found, however, 
in the archives of Historical Societies in the Mid-West. Especially 
interesting sources for future study could be the Historical Society 
of Minnesota, and the catalog collections at the Agricultural History 
Center in Davis, California. 
57 Marsh 1985, 4749. 
58 The United States: Department of Commerce and Labor. Bureau of Corporations. 
The International Harvester Co. 1913. Washington 1913. 
59 No.624. In the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. 
The United States of America, Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company and 
others, Defendants. s.a., s.l. 
60 This comment applies to the works of Eugene Manning, Eugene Shapiro and 
Howard Schonberger. 
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1.4. Cyrus McCormick and his family 
While it is not the intention of this study to write a McCormick 
family history, it is essential for an understanding of the development 
of the harvester business also to know the main actors in the play. 
Time normally glorifies deeds of great men, but contemporaries 
are usually inclined to remember things in a different light. In the 
mid-19th century Mid-West there was hardly a person who denied 
the achievements of Cyrus McCormick. With the invention of the 
reaper, he had raised himself in two decades from a blacksmith and 
a farmer to one of the most prominent businessmen of his time. 
Such a career demands special skills combined with unyielding 
character to win the battles in business. The winner normally has 
few friends. Such was Cyrus McCormick, too: widely respected, but 
loved by few.61  
Cyrus McCormick was a hardworking man, who expected the 
same from his associates. He was constantly traveling from city to 
city, managing his businesses. The everyday functions of the 
Company he left to his brothers Leander and William. Cyrus made 
decisions on Company policy, which his brothers then implemented. 
He had more important tasks in mind than the details of production. 
Cyrus understood early in his career that great wars in business were 
won in courtrooms and in the chambers of Washington. He fought 
numerous patent wars against his competitors, in order to establish 
an adequate basis for future production and new models, and 
acquired money from East Coast bankers to accomplish his plans. 
For his brothers, these operations were difficult to understand and 
accept.62 
McCormick's hard entrepreneurship was fused with deeply 
religious convictions. During his early years he had no time to waste 
on social life, but even in the smallest cities he had time for a 
sermon. On the day of defeat he silently accepted the ruling of 
Providence, but more important is that his mounting success made 
him convinced that the same Providence was on his side in the long 
run.
63 
At the age of 49 years, fame and prosperity had made McCormick 
one of the most eligible bachelors in the country, who nevertheless 
had no time to waste on the gentler sex. In 1857, however, at a 
party in Leander McCormick's home, he met Nancy Fowler, who 
61 Hutchinson 1930, passim. 
62 Casson 1909, 56-57, 179-182; Hutchinson 1930, 453-454, 456-457. 
63 Casson 1909, 158-165, 178-181. 
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sang in the choir at the Presbyterian Church. A year later, the couple 
was married. In Nancy (Nettie) Fowler, Cyrus gained not only a 
reliable companion, but also a business counselor who took an active 
part in crucial decisions.64 
Nettie broadened Cyrus' otherwise narrow range of interests. She 
opened Cyrus' eyes to recognize that he had something to say about 
things unrelated to his business. Besides his church activities and 
generous philanthropy, Cyrus took active part in politics as a stout 
Democrat. During his political career Cyrus contested the offices of 
mayor, governor, congressman, senator, vice-president, and 
ambassador, but never held an office as the result of an election. As 
Hutchinson noted, for Cyrus life without competition would merely 
be existence. This Hutchinson saw as giving a singular unity to his 
career.
65 
By the 1860s, Cyrus began to complain of rheumatism, the attacks 
of which grew stronger over the years. He was concerned about the 
state of his health, and every year spent weeks at minerals springs 
throughout the country. In the same proportion as Cyrus's energy 
weakened, the position of Nettie McCormick at the stern of the 
business strengthened. Her responsibilities grew even larger after 
1878, when a malignant carbuncle came near to killing Cyrus at the 
moment of one of his greatest victories, his promotion in Paris to 
the rank of Officer of the Legion of Honor.66 
Nettie Fowler McCormick took an active part in high society and 
also introduced her husband to its members; but even these moves 
were only to promote the glory of the great invention. Nettie learned 
to take the case of the reaper as her own. She shared Cyrus' 
conservatism, which was to mark all their actions both at home and 
in business. The family was the other pillar of Nettie's life. By 1874, 
they already had five children, two others having died in infancy; 
yet it was not until 1876, when Cyrus Jr. was already seventeen 
years old, that they began to build their first own home. During all 
those years, they had lived in a hotel or in a rented house.67 
If Nettie's position was decisive in business matters, it was 
pre-eminent at home and in the question of the children's education. 
From the very beginning the children were taught to save time. 
Nettie urged them to write down how much time they used to brush 
their teeth or put on their clothes. During the construction of their 
64 Hutchinson 1930, 458-461. 
65 Hutchinson 1935, 3-41. 
66 Ibid. 671-673, 763-768. 
67 Ibid. 3.5, 736-741. 
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house in Chicago, the eldest son Cyrus Jr. visited the site each day 
and kept his parents informed of the progress. The children had to 
learn to work and understand that the comfort and wealth that 
surrounded them could not be taken for granted, but had to be 
earned every day.68 
Especially Cyrus' McCormick's eldest child and namesake, Cyrus 
Hall McCormick Jr.,69 who was born on May 16, 1859, learned these 
facts from his birth. As the first child, he was sent to a normal city 
high school, while the other children were instructed by private 
tutors and in private schools. After long discussions with Nettie, 
however, his father let Cyrus Jr. continue his studies at Princeton. 
The ageing inventor had begun to feel the need of a reliable assistant, 
and was obviously ready to turn over some of his workload to his 
son. Cyrus Jr. had no formal business training, but instead a 
traditional classical education. Nevertheless, he was born to an 
atmosphere where life was business, and he gained his experience 
in action. After the firing of Leander McCormick and his son Hall 
from the McCormick Co. in 1880, Cyrus Jr.' responsibilities grew 
year by year, until after his father's death in 1884 he was elected as 
the new President of the Company.70 When the International 
Harvester Company was formed in 1902, Cyrus was made its 
President until 1918, when he turned the Presidency over to his 
brother Harold.71  
Although the McCormick family managed their business in a 
marvelous way, in personal life they suffered many ordeals. The 
oldest daughter of Cyrus and Nettie McCormick, Mary Virginia, was 
found to be mentally retarded at the age of nineteen. Their second 
daughter, Anita, married an attorney, Emmons Blaine who, however, 
died after three years of marriage and left her with one son. Mary 
Virginia and Anita McCormick did not take an active part in the 
business, although each had an interest in the company.72 
Harold F. McCormick, the second son of the inventor, joined the 
McCormick Company in 1895 following his graduation from 
Princeton University. In 1898 he was made Vice-President of the 
68 Ibid. 737-761. 
69 Originally younger Cyrus's second name was Rice, but it was changed to Hall 
about 1870. Hutchinson 1935, 110 note 39. 
70 Directors meeting 6.4.1880. Mss M/I, box 17; Extract from the minutes of Board 
of the Directors. 4.5.1880; Hounshell 1987, 178-180; Special meeting of the Board. 
5.22.1884. Mss lb, box 25, vol.1; Harvester World 7/1936. In memory of Cyrus H. 
McCormick 1859-1936. 
71 Hafstad 1973, 20. 
72 Ibid. 27-29. 
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Company, and later succeeded his brother at the head of the 
International Harvester Co. Although Harold McCormick left only a 
few business records, his marriage with Edith Rockefeller connected 
the McCormicks to another mighty family.73  
The youngest son, Stanley R. McCormick, was like his brothers 
educated at Princeton, and entered the McCormick Company first 
as a salesman, then as Comptroller and finally as a Director and 
Assistant Secretary of the company. Stanley McCormick represented 
the Company at the Paris World Fair in 1900, and his trips to Europe 
and reports therefrom are a valuable addition to this work. In 1906, 
however, in the prime of his manhood at the age of thirty-two, 
Stanley McCormick broke down and became mentally incompetent.74 
Another person who must be counted in the inner circles of the 
McCormick family was Eldridge M. Fowler, brother of Nettie Fowler 
McCormick, who became Vice-President of the McCormick 
Company in 1890.75  
73 President's annual report to the stockholders, 7.13.1899. Mss M/1, box 18; 
Hofstad 1973, 38-42. 
74 President's annual report to the stockholders. 7.13.1899. Mss M/1, box 18. 
75 Hafstad 1973, 10-12. 
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II 

• The Entrepreneur 
Explores the Field 
2.1. The farmer's options 
In 1831, when Cyrus Hall McCormick made his first experiments 
with the reaper, agriculture in America was still practised with 
traditional methods. Work was hard, carried out using hand tools, 
and farms were short of labor. However, the frontier moved steadily 
towards the Mississippi River valley, and by the 1830s was on the 
brink of seemingly endless prairie. It took nearly fifty years to 
substitute wheat and corn for prairie grass. Simultaneously, settlers 
pushed ahead into Kansas, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota and the 
Dakotas.' 
The further west the wagon trains slowly moved, opening new 
territories for agriculture, the more expensive and difficult became 
transportation. Farmers were neither able to sell their farm products 
in the markets, nor haul consumer goods through the muddy roads 
back to their homesteads. The opening of the Erie Canal in 1825, 
and during the next decades of the other canals that connected the 
Ohio River to Lake Erie, however, made commercial farming possible 
in the Middle West.2 In time, canals were replaced by more flexible 
and faster railroads, although no uniform route system was 
completed before the Civil War. Railroads were private enterprise, 
and cargo often had to be transhipped and reloaded several times 
before it reached its final destination, because of the differences in 
rail gauges between the different railroad companies.3 Whereas in 
1835 Ohio was the only state in the region of the Great Lakes from 
which grain was transported to the east, three years later the first 
carloads of grain took their course east from Chicago. In 1860 rails 
were extended to the western parts of Iowa and thus to the outer 
1 Bogue 1968, 8-12. 
2 Taylor 1951, 15.27, 33-35, 43-48, 54; Schlebecker 1975, 89-91; van Metre 1939, 
20.21. 
3 Schlebecker 1975, 93. 
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limits of permanent farming.' 
The story of free American land was a mere illusion up to the 
Homestead Act in 1862, and in practise even after it. The would-be 
farmer had first to acquire title to his land. The principles for the 
distribution of land were laid down in the Land Ordinance of 1785, 
which set the minimum size of the farm at 640 acres, and thus 
opened the way for speculators, since only the wealthiest 
proprietors could afford to buy such a lot at the required price of 
one dollar per acre. In the Homestead Act, the standard farmsize 
was set at 160 acres on terms of occupation and improvement only. 
This, however promising it seemed, did not help the newcomers as 
much as had been expected. Establishing a homestead was an 
expensive business, and in spite of the availability of free 
government land, many a farmer preferred to buy land from the 
railroad companies, which could provide financing and help with 
settlement; moreover, their land was often in better regions.5 
A considerable number of land seekers had to give up their 
expectations for the time being, however, and to be content with 
the life of a tenant: they could not afford either to buy a farm 
outright, or to meet the requirements of breaking up prairie land 
and equiping a farm. For many, tenancy was a good way to begin, 
and it can be seen as a ladder toward a homestead of one's own. 
According to Allan G. BOGUE, between 1860 and 1880, the number 
of tenants in Clarion township in Bureau County, Illinois, rose, while 
"would-be farmers saw the cost of land rise and the amounts of 
machinery needed for farming increase".6 
4 Railroads did not necessarily mean lower freight costs than the riverboats. 
SCHLEBECKER states that by 1850 it cost 25 cents per ton and mile to transport 
goods by train. By 1860 rates had dropped to 4 cents, in comparison with 2 cents 
by boat. Schlebecker 1975, 93. SHANNON on the other hand mentions that in 1868 
to carry a ton of wheat by rail from Chicago to New York cost 42.5 cents and by 
boat 25.3 cents. In 1882 the figures were 14.6 cents and 8.7 cents respectively. 
Shannon 1945, 177. Transportation costs were of great importance to the implement 
industry also, in which Cyrus McCormick tried to exert influence. Hutchinson 1933, 
10-12. McCormick Collection, special reports file, box 5. 
5 Schlebecker 1975, 21, 47, 61-67; Gates 1960, 89-91; Hughes 1987, 90-91, 94-95, 
274. 
The 1785 Land Ord'nance opened up the way to speculators. The parcel size and 
price were too high for a normal farmer, who throughout his lifetime on average 
earned only $50 in cash. In 1800 the size was reduced to 320 acres, but the price 
was raised to two dollars. In 1841 Congress accepted a general pre-emption law for 
squatters, and limited pre-emption to 160 acres. Pre-emption laws were required 
because thousands of land-seekers flooded into the opening lands of the west and 
could not understand the government's claims to the land. Bidwell-Falconer 1941, 
151-155; Hughes 1987, 94; Bogue 1968, 29-30. 
6 Bogue 1968, 56-66. 
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The real life of a settler began only after the land purchase. He 
had to plow tough prairie land, build a house and a barn, make 
fences and buy some machines for his homestead. Breaking the 
tough prairie land was a hard and expensive task to accomplish. 
Custom brakers charged from $2.00 to $4.00 per acre for their 
services during the 1860s and 1870s. After preparing the seedbed, 
the farmer had to surround his new fields with good fences against 
free-running hogs. Before the time of barbed-wire, this demanded 
much, both in time and dollars.' 
Most of the would-be farmers were so young that they could not 
rely on their children's help in daily work on the farm. By the age 
of fifteen, at the latest, a farm boy was generally performing a man's 
work. Before that time, and after his son's marriage, the farmer had 
to rely on hired hands. In the 1860s, farmers had to pay for day 
laborers as much as $3 per day, compared to 35 to 50 cents per 
day in the 1840s.8 
In addition to these costs, farmer had to add the burdens generated 
by the rapidly expanding mechanization of agriculture. A settler 
could not grow more than he was able to take under cultivation. 
On the other hand, it was a waste of time to plow more than one 
could cope with at harvest time. Harvest time was short, normally 
about two weeks, and free hands were especially short at that time.9 
With mechanization, the farmer could save both labor and time, and 
even expand his farming land or cultivated area. Table 1 shows how 
much more time was required for harvest than for preparing the 
seed bed.'°  
7 Ibid. 70-81. 
8 Ibid. 182.184. 
9 Gates 1960, 279; Danhof 1969, 181-182. 
10 Similar development can be found in Europe too. In France after the introduction 
of the combine harvester and mower in the 1880s the harvest time per hectare was 
reduced from 16 man-days to five or six. Kindleberger 1964, 213 note 18. 
Man Olmstead and Paul Rhode have, however, in their latest article noticed that the 
efficiency of the reaper declined unless it was followed by a proper number of 
workers; at least a driver, a raker, and four to six followers to bind and shock. 
Consequently they argue that the view that the reaper eased demand for outside 
harvest labor is incorrect. Olmstead-Rhode 1995, 41.42. 
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Table 1. Man-hours needed to grow an acre of wheat. 
Year 	 Before 	 Harvest 	 Total 
harvest 
1800 16 40 56 
1840 12 23 35 
1880 8 12 20 
1900 7 8 15 
Source: Cooper-Barton-Brodell 1947, 3. 
A pioneer farmer's equipment usually consisted of a wagon, plow, 
axe, shovel, scythe, cradle, fork and rake. In a couple of decades, 
horse tools were substituted for hand tools. Farmers began to buy 
John Deere's steel plows," spring tooth and disk harrows and seed 
drills.12 As Table 1 shows, harvesting machinery was of great impor-
tance to agriculture. Even in the 1880s, more time was spent on the 
harvest itself than on the work before it. Before the time of the 
reaper, the harvest work consisted of the cutting, binding and 
shocking of the grain. Thereafter, the harvest had to be threshed 13 
According to Bogue, the first settlers in the prairies area in the 
1830s had to pay about $300 for their machines and draught animals. 
Horses and other draught animals increased costs considerably, and 
in 1870 the Iowa Railroad Land Company estimated the cost of a 
team (horse or oxen) and outfit as between $515 and $847. Included 
in this outfit were wagon and harness, two plows, cultivator and 
harrow, and a combination of reaper and mower. In the nineteenth 
century, nevertheless, investments in machinery and implements 
never constituted more than six percent of the farm's total 
investments. I4 
The transition from handtools to horsedrawn implements was 
closely connected with developments in metallurgy and engineering. 
New machines required better raw materials and also standardization 
of production. This was evident, for example, in the development 
11 Normal wooden or even cast iron plows were inefficient in tough prairie lands 
full of intermingled roots. John Deere was certainly not the first to experiment with 
steel plows, but he was the first to make a profitable industry out of it. He made the 
first model in 1837 and in 1856 turned out 14 000 plows in a year from his factory 
in Molin, Illinois. Broehl 1984, 43-50. 
12 Rogin 1931, 59-64; Danhof 1969, 206-207; Schlebecker 1975, 107-108. 
13 Rogin 1931, 125. 
14 Bogue 1968, 148, 169-170, 286. 
40 	 • TH E ENTREPRENF.II R EXI'I.ORES TIIE I'I E1.1) 
of plows. Especially during the Civil War, when farms were short 
of labor, mechanization took rapid steps forward. When reaping 
machines became a common part of a farmer's implements, it also 
meant new requirements for draught animals. Oxen were too slow 
to keep reaping machines in proper motion and were changed for 
horses. Wayne D. RASMUSSEN has even called this change the first 
revolution in American agriculture, the impetus for it being the Civil 
War.15 Machine power had been used for plowing since the 1830s 
and 1840s. The steam engine found its proper place in the farm as 
a stationary source of power. and was used mostly for threshing 
only. Steam engines reached their heyday at the turn of the century, 
when the first combustion engines were already being tried out for 
traction purposes.' 
2.2. From reaper to harvester 
Reaping has been for centuries one of the most important stages of 
agriculture, and numerous rites and traditions have been associated 
with it. It is therefore no wonder that the question as to who was 
the inventor of the reaper" in the late nineteenth century has 
excited the minds of countless researchers and manufacturers. 
Sickle, scythe and cradle were in common use in Europe 
throughout the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, it was in England 
that the first attempts to mechanize the laborios work of harvesting 
were undertaken. Capel Lofft was probably the first to suggest the 
idea of mechanical reaping. Lofts idea, published in 1785, was put 
15 Rasmussen 1962, 578-582; Rasmussen 1965, 193-195. Thomas C. Cochran, Stanley 
Engerman and Alan Olmstead do not accept Rasmussen's arguments and state that 
the agricultural machine industry had already begun to expand before the Civil War 
and coincided with it only accidentally. Olmstead, furthermore, shows how labor 
costs did not rise faster in agriculture than in other sectors. Besides, agriculture was 
short of horses during the hostilities: after the War the number of horses had fallen 
by eight percent. Cochran 1961, 170-171; Engerman 1966, 195-198; Olmstead 1976, 
35-50. 
16 Danhof 1969, 181-182; Hounshell 1987, 3-8; Danhof 1972, 81; Spence 1959, 
107-108, 112-115; Wik 1951, 182-186; Wik 1953, 208-211. 
The first tractor that used a combustion engine was patented already in 1889, but 
not until the Hart-Parr Company began to sell its tractions in 1901 did it become a 
success. Actually Hart-Parr was the first to call this monster a "tractor". The name 
was then commonly used to mean all machines that used their own power for moving. 
McKibben-Griffin 1938, 3-8; Wik 1964, 80-84; Owings 1911, 170-174; Gray 1954, 
15, 19-21. 
17 The word reaper is normally used to mean a machine which during the first phases 
of its development only cut the grain; a raker raked the cut grain into sheaves from 
the cutting table. In the later models, a self-raking mechanism freed farmers from a 
separate raker. Ardrey 1894, 40-48; Miller 1902, 11-19. 
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into practice by William Pitt, who in 1786 or 1787 constructed the 
first model of a reaper. However, it was not until 1799 that the first 
machine was patented. Among the most important developers of the 
reaping machine were Henry Ogle and Patrick Bell. The reaper was 
seen as a machine of the future, and it inspired numerous inventors; 
by 1831 there are records of 2 French, 1 German, 33 English and 22 
American reapers. Although Cyrus McCormick and Obed Hussey are 
the most famous inventors of reaping machines, they did not live in 
a vacuum. Before their reapers, the British had invented the first 
reciprocating cutter and divider, the platform, the reel and side draft 
features.18 How much McCormick and Hussey were able to get 
information on these earlier inventions is impossible to establish, but 
it is obvious that at least news of these inventions also spread to 
America. 
In 1833, Obed Hussey patented the first practical American reaper, 
which also sold in fair numbers: about 45 machines during the 
1830s. Cyrus McCormick inherited his interest in reapers from his 
father, Robert McCormick, who had been making unsuccessful 
experiments with his reaper since 1816. In 1831 the machine fell 
into Cyrus McCormick's hands. According to his own claims, Cyrus 
made the necessary improvements, and was ready to introduce his 
first reaping machine during the same year. It was then remodeled, 
and tried in the field in 1833, but patented only in 1834. Thereafter, 
McCormick put aside his invention for nearly a decade and together 
with his father embarked on ruinous efforts with an iron-smelting 
furnace, which ended in 1837 in financial disaster. Two years later 
he devoted more of his time to the reaper, but it was not until 1840 
that he sold his first two machines.i9 McCormick's reaper raised wide 
interest and enthusiasm among farmers. In 1842 it was tried in field 
18 The model which Ogle finished in 1822 already incorporated the cutter and reel, 
with a reciprocating knife over stationary fingers and a platform behind the cutter. 
In spite of the fact that Ogle's machine thus already contained some of the main 
elements of a successful reaper, it was never very popular. Patrick Bell, on the other 
hand, constructed a reaper which found some popularity among British farmers, and 
a couple of machines were also brought to America. Miller 1902, 7-10, 12-13, 15-18; 
Ardrey 1894, 42-44; Jones 1979, 117-126; Fowler 1895, 354; Oliver 1956, 226-227. 
19 Ardrey 1894, 45-46; Miller 1902, 24-25; Rogin 1931, 73.74; Jones 1929, 127-135; 
Oliver 1956, 226; Thwaites 1909, 235.237, 242-243. 
Thwaites gives the credit to McCormick for introducing and connecting for the first 
time in one machine what he calls "four vital elements": a platform, reciprocating 
knife, horizontal and adjustable reel and a divider. Thwaites 1909, 240-241. These 
were, however, already used in the English machines, as well as in Hussey's reaper. 
The main difference between the Hussey and the McCormick was that the latter had 
a reel and a divider. The former had, nevertheless, a unique cutter. It consisted of 
"a series of slotted iron fingers through which vibrated a number of triangular knives 
fixed to a flat bar." In 1847 Hussey modified his cutter by introducing a new guide, 
that was open at the back and an upper part. Hussey's cutter mechanism was later 
used as a model for mowers. Miller 1902, 24, 26. 
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McCormick's 
original hand-rake 
reaper was called 
by his competitors 
a backbreaker, 
because of the 
laboriousness of 
the task. 
(McCormick 
Collection. State 
Historical Society 
of Wisconsin). 
tests and, according to testimonials, made a favorable impression.2°  
In spite of favorable opinions among the public, McCormick had 
difficulties in finding customers. The cost of the reaper, in 1844 
$100 in cash or $106 in four monthly payments, was a major 
investment even for the wealthiest proprietors. Besides, he was not 
alone in the field. In addition to Hussey and McCormick, there were 
numerous other inventors who were trying to get their share of the 
promising markets. It was therefore no wonder that altogether 138 
patents were granted to reaping machines in 1834-1854.21 The two 
foremost competitors, though, were Obed Hussey and Cyrus 
McCormick. Their first encounter in 1843, from which McCormick 
emerged victorious, was the first of its kind, and was a model for 
the machine trials and contests so typical later.22 
Cyrus McCormick was also able to expand his production 
geographically. Cyrus hammered together his first reapers in his 
father's blacksmith's shop in Walnut Grove, Virginia. As the demand 
for reapers began to grow, in 1844 Cyrus sold about fifty and a year 
later about 150 machines; he now also introduced his reaper in New 
York, Illinois, Wisconsin and Missouri. Cyrus understood the 
potential of the new western states, and especially the prairie, which 
at that time was opening up to farmers. Meanwhile, Cyrus 
20 Farmers Register Nov. 30, 1842 in W.J. Hanna: Collection of Historical Material. 
1885. S.L., 3-5. 
21 Petition to the Legislature of Wisconsin. 1854. 2-5. 
22 Hutchinson 1930, 187-193. 
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McCormick continued to hammer out his machines in the home 
shop; but by 1845, he had contracted with various machine shops 
in Cincinnati, Ohio, to produce his reaper. Manufacture of a reaper 
was technically demanding, and not all the licensee manufacturers 
could turn out the quality that McCormick expected. Broken 
machines were bad advertisements; eventually, to avoid more 
confusion, in 1847 McCormick establised his factory together with 
Gray, in Chicago. The following year this first reaper factory in the 
west was able to turn out 500 reapers, and 300 more were produced 
by licensees.23  
During most of the 1840s, besides McCormick and Hussey, there 
was only the Easterly Harvester worth mentioning; but the situation 
changed dramatically in 1848, when McCormick's orginal patents 
expired. In a couple of years a number of strong competitors, some 
of them Cyrus's old partners or licensees, founded their own 
factories. Especially Seymour & Morgan was active, and by 1849 had 
begun to manufacture its New York reaper. Production rose to about 
five hundred machines in 1851, with additional production by 
Warder and Brokaw at Springfield, Ohio.24 
23 Cyrus himself moved to Brockport, New York, where in 1846 he supervised the 
manufacture of two hundred machines at the works of Seymour and Morgan, his 
later competitors. From Brockport, the machines could be transported both 
westwards and eastwards through the Erie Canal. Fagan 1931, 1-3; Rogin 1931, 72-75; 
Thwaites 1909, 244-245. The invention of the reaper 1931, passim. 
24 Rogin 1931, 74-77; Fagan 1931, 3-4; Hutchinson 1930, 278-279, 292. Construction 
of the reaper developed considerably during the 1840s, when McCormick, too, 
modified, completed and patented his versions. In 1845 McCormick received a patent 
on a divider and two years later on a raker's seat. Rogin 1931, 87-89; Miller 1902, 
28. Obed Hussey took out a patent in 1847 for improvements in guards, but he could 
not compete with McCormick or any other manufacturer in volume. In 1840-1849, 
according to his own statement, he had sold altogether ca. 358 reapers, and during 
1851-1854 Hussey himself made about eleven hundred machines. To this number 
should be added reapers made under royalties or territorial licenses. Many a 
manufacturer copied Hussey's and McCormick's principles, but there were also 
imaginative inventors like Nelson Platt, who took a patent in 1849 for a self-acting 
rake. It was later assigned to Seymour and Morgan, who in the 1850s improved it, 
added to it another sweep-rake patent, and began to make their famous "New Yorker" 
self-rake reapers. John H. Manny, on the other hand, developed a mower attachment 
to the old reaper construction so that the same machine could be used both for 
reaping and mowing. This opened the way for combined machines. The first attempts 
to bind grain by machine were also made in the 1850s. Although none of these yet 
achieved great success, the Marsh brothers developed a successful model which was 
improved during the 1860s, and the later binders were based on its principles. 
Researchers usually give to C.W. and W.W. Marsh the honor of the development of 
the first practical harvester. Harvesters include self-binders and combine harvesters 
and threshers: in other words a machine that not only cuts the grain, but either binds 
it into sheaves or also simultaneously threshes it. Ardrey 1894, 53; Miller 1902, 3335. 
Obed Hussey is normally regarded as the father of the mower. Later inventors followed 
his ideas of a reciprocating knife and slotted guards. In the development of a mower, 
two names tower over the rest, namely William F. Ketchum and Cyrenus Wheeler. 
Ketchum was the first to put mowers on the market as distinct machines. His mower 
was of a rigid bar type with a single drive wheel. Wheeler's machine was fundamen- 
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The manufacture and trade of the reapers was, as noticed, subject 
to tough competition. Competition increased not only because of 
the expiry of Hussey's and McCormick's original patents, a situation 
which their former licensees naturally exploited; in addition, 
countless improvements and totally new inventions had been added 
to the machines. Furthermore, mowers and reapers began to follow 
their own paths of development. Besides, there was also a new field 
of contest: continuous warfare between the manufacturers with 
patents, which in the 1860s led to the formation of the first patent 
pools. 
Numerous new manufacturers sprang up around the beginning of 
the 1850s, McCormick's patents having expired in 1848. Inevitably, 
after this setback, he decided to fight his competitors on every 
front.25 In 1851 McCormick sued Seymour & Morgan for infringe- 
tally different, with two drive wheels and a flexible bar, thus laying the basis for the 
subsequent division between the two types. Miller 1902, 30-31, 34-37, 39-40; Deering 
Harvester Co. 1900, 13-14, 42, 48-49; Ardrey 1894, 47-49, 58-60, 78-82; Fagan 1931, 
4-6; Humphries-Gray 1949, 6-11; Fowler 1895, 355. 
25 The most notable of the other manufacturers were two already mentioned: 
Seymour & Morgan of Brockport, New York, and Warder & Brokaw at Springfield, 
Ohio, who had been making the "New Yorker" reapers under their license. Perhaps 
the toughest competitor, however, was John H. Manny of Waddams Grove, Illinois, 
THE ENTREPRENEUR EXPLORES THE FIELD n 45 
ments of his patents and eventually won the case in the Supreme 
Court. He renewed the case against Manny in 1855, but this time 
he met the resistance of the united front of the other manufacturers 
and lost his case.26 Had the decision been favorable for McCormick, 
the reaper business would thereafter have been his monopoly and 
all the others would have had to pay him license fees and royalties. 
Cyrus McCormick was certainly the most prominent manufacturer 
of reaping machines during the 1850s. Nevertheless, he was 
constantly losing his relative advantage compared with other 
entrepreneurs who were beginning to manufacture self-rake reapers 
and mowers. McCormick did not bring his first self-rakers onto the 
market until 1862, and when the McCormick reaper was found to 
be too clumsy and heavy for efficient mowing, McCormick bought 
in 1865 the manufacturing rights for Hubbard's mower.27 According 
to Alan OLMSTEAD and Paul RHODE, between 1850 and 1865 
McCormick's share of the market fell from over 50 percent to about 
5 percent.28 
By 1855 the reaper was no longer a curiosity: it had become a 
necessity for farmers, and production numbers continued to grow 
for several decades. Most of the reaper factories were short-lived, 
and so it is difficult to obtain even approximate estimates of 
production during the 1850s and 1860s. Table 2 shows the steady 
rise of McCormick's output from 1853 onwards.29  
who later moved his factory to Rockford, Illinois. He obtained a patent for his reaper 
in 1851, and began to manufacture them in fairly large quantities, In 1854 about 
eleven hundred a year. Rogin 1931, 77; Ardrey 1894, 48; Deering Harvester Co. 
1900, 51-52. 
26 Deering Harvester Co. 1900, 51-52; Hutchinson 1930, 432-443. 
27 Hutchinson 1930, 374, 379-382, 386, 390; Heikkonen 1989, 69, 71; Fagan 1931, 
7. 
28 Olmstead-Rhode 1995, 28. 
29 Incomplete list of sales of reapers and mowers manufactured by reaper and 
mower companies other than McCormick Company. Mss Special Reports File. Box 
14. The source of this information is unknown and may therefore be in some measure 
unreliable. However, the information concerning the Walter A. Wood Co. and its 
sales seems to be correct. It is, nevertheless, possible that Wood's sales have been 
collected from the company catalogs which were also used in Table 2. 
According to Rogin, in 1854 John H. Manny built at least 2500 reapers and Atkins 
1200 of his 'automatons'. When Wood's 600 machines are added to this number, the 
total known output for 1854 is about 6000 reapers. The material in the McCormick 
Collection indicates, nevertheless, an even larger volume than Rogin's calculation. 
Material found in the Special Reports File records that John S. Wright, who made 
Atkin's Automaton in Chicago, sold 1200 machines in 1855, and 5000 the next year. 
In addition, there were 10 036 machines built by Manny in 1853-1855 and 25 089 
machines in 1856-1858. Although there were also numerous other smaller 
manufacturers (Hussey for example continued to work and had sold production rights 
to several blacksmiths), it is obvious that McCormick had by this time cornered at 
46 • THE ENTREPRENEUR EXPLORES THE FIELD 
Table 2. Number of harvesting machines produced in 1850-1864 
by C.H. McCormick & Bros. and the Walter A. Wood Co. 
Year 
McCormick Co. Walter A. Wood Co.°  
Reapers Self-rakers Reapers 
1850 
1851 
1852 
1603 
1004 
1011 .. 
1853 1101 500 
1854 1558 600 
1855 2534 1300 
1856 4076 2500 
1857 4065 3800 
1858 4565 4500 
1859 5118 5500 
1860 4083 6000 
1861 5491 6500 
1862 4965 203 5500 
1863 2259 2053 6500 
1864 2027 4063 7500 
Source: "McCormick Machines Built since 1841", McCormick Estate Papers, 
M/l, Box 18; Walter A. Wood Company, catalog for 1873. Mss 4z, box 25. 
a) Walter A. Wood's figures include only sold machines and should be ap-
proached with caution in view of the origin of the information. 
These figures confirm that while in the 1850s McCormick was the 
market leader, he subsequently gradually lost his position to his 
competitors. As one reason for this, David HOUNHSHELL points 
toward conflicts between Cyrus McCormick and his two brothers 
Leander and William. Leander was the superintendent of the factory 
and responsible for production. William, on the other hand, took 
care of the management and book-keeping. Both of the younger 
least one fourth of the total market. This becomes even more evident in 1856, when 
Atkins made 2800 machines, Wood 2500, and McCormick 4076. ROGIN, however, 
has estimated that by 1858 there were in America altogether 73 000 reapers, of which 
McCormick had produced 23 200, which makes about one third of the total 
production. It must be taken into account that not all these machines were reapers; 
at least 20 000 of them were mowers. Rogin 1931, 78, 96 note 151; Olmstead 1975, 
347-348. Rogin estimates that in 1862 the total output was 33 000 reapers and a 
year later 40 000 reapers and mowers together. In 1864 production was probably 85 
000-90 000 mowers and reapers. Rogin 1931, 91, 93. Rogin's calculations are based 
on newspaper material and other secondary sources and have to be considered with 
some caution. 
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brothers hesitated to expand production to such an extent and at 
such a pace as their elder brother, the owner of the enterprise, 
demanded. HOUNSHELL has demonstrated that the question was in 
part one of two totally different kinds of business ideologies, and in 
part of inferior and inflexible production technology.3o  
What Hounshell presents is undoubtedly true, and he opens up a 
totally new approach by stressing the impact of production 
technology. Besides these admittedly important internal difficulties, 
McCormick's competitors were also pressing him harder year by 
year. John H. Manny was one of the most aggressive entrepreneurs, 
who not only manufactured himself, but also sold production rights 
to other makers. One of the latter was Walter A. Wood at Hoosick 
Falls, New York, who became involved in the business about 1852. 
This firm was incorporated as the Walter A. Wood Mowing and 
Reaping Machine Company in 1865 and began to produce in 1873 
a wire binder patented by Sylvanus D. Locke.31 The Wood Company 
was an expansive one-man concern in the same manner as 
McCormick's, and despite their rivalry, the two men seemingly 
understood each other and during the 1870s even discussed 
co-operation.32  
Cyrenus Wheeler obtained the first of his seventeen patents on 
mowing machines in 1854. He supplemented these with sixty-seven 
patents bought from other inventors and in 1859 incorporated two 
smaller mowing machine companies and one machine tool company. 
The Wheeler Association began to make the famous "Cayuga Chief' 
mowers, and tried to prevent competition with numerous patents. 
Another outstanding concern developed in Greentown, Ohio, 
around John Miller, Cornelius Aultman and Ephraim Bell, who started 
a reaper business by manufacturing Hussey's reapers under license. 
30 Hounshell 1987, 156-157, 159-172. 
31 International Harvester Co. 1913, 49; Miller 1902, 36; Ardrey 1894, 60; Farm 
Implement News 3.21.1892,vol.XIII, no.3. p.19. Although International Harvester Co. 
1913, a report from the Deparment of Commerce and Labor is regarded as reliable, 
there seem to be minor flaws in it. The report states that Wood began to make 
Locke's wirebinder in 1870; nevertheless both Miller and Ardrey mention the year 
1873. Ibid. 
32 Seymour & Morgan had developed the famous New York reaper and put it on the 
market in 1854. Their company was later bought by D.S. Morgan, and was finally 
incorporated in 1894 into Adriance, Platt & Co. In 1854 B.H. Warder from Springfield, 
Ohio, also began to make the New Yorker under Seymour & Morgan's license. The 
name of the company was changed when new partners were taken into the concern, 
and finally the firm took the name Warder, Bushnell & Glessner. The Warder group 
pooled its business in 1867 with Whiteley, Fassler & Kelly, also from Springfield: the 
outcome of this pooling of interests was the Champion Machine Co. When Whiteley, 
Fassler & Kelly failed in 1887, the partnership was changed to a corporation, the 
Warder, Bushnell & Glessner Co., which thereafter controlled the Champion lines. 
Hutchinson 1935, 542-543, 546-548; International Harvester Co. 1913, 47-50. 
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With their own patents and patent purchases, the partners 
developed in 1856 the "Buckeye" line of mowers. Adriance, Platt & 
Co of Poughkeepsie, New York, which was incorporated in the 
1850s, began to make Buckeye mowers under license and later 
became part of the Buckeye line. By 1860 Wheeler, Aultman & Miller 
and Adriance, Platt & Co. owned the central mower patents. Since 
the patents overlapped, they became convinced that if either of them 
attempted to assert rights over the other, the result would be an 
endless list of litigations. All of them were experienced reaper men 
and understood the problematic situation, but could also see its 
possibilities. After negotiations they decided to pool their patents. 
The country was divided into selling areas, the mower was 
standardized, and license fees and royalties were imposed on other 
manufacturers. This hinged-bar pool proved to be profitable. In 
royalties and license fees alone, by 1868 it had gained more than 
$530 000 from more than twenty-five producers. The position of the 
pool was further reinforced, when it reached agreement on 
production rights with Walter A. Wood and Moses Hubbard33 
Patents and lawsuits were from the very beginning an integral part 
of the reaper business. Every substantial reaper and mower company 
had both lawyers and inventors on their payrolls. "Lawsuits for 
infringements, and purchase of likely patents, either for use or to 
prevent competition, were as normal parts of a year's business as 
the appointment of agents and the shipment of machines".34 Cyrus 
McCormick, too, had brought numerous charges against his rivals. 
Now he himself had his back against the wall. The McCormick 
hand-raker was a combine machine and could be used as a mower, 
too, but it was already totally outmoded. McCormick had developed 
a new self-rake reaper, but was not able to introduce a combined 
self-raker until 1869.35 
Since every company maintained a battery of lawyers, lawsuits 
were prolonged, and finally only the most prominent manufacturers 
33 Deering Harvester Co. 1900, 49; Hutchinson 1935, 370-376; International 
Harvester Co. 1913, 47-50. 
34 Hutchinson 1933, 2. 
35 Members of the mower pool had reserved for themselves some of the patents, 
and began to sell them to outsiders. McCormick tried to use this loophole to his 
advantage by buying in 1865 production rights for Moses Hubbard's patent for five 
dollars per produced machine. The agreed selling area was too limited for McCormick, 
and he had to make a contract with the pool in the same year. He could now make 
and sell an efficient mower in the entire Mid-West, except in Ohio. As a hardboiled 
entrepreneur McCormick bluntly declined to pay the royalties. Finally Wheeler in 
1869 charged him for breach of patent. Two years later, the mower pool was 
demolished, when Wheeler sold his patents to Aultman & Miller; but the case dragged 
on, and was settled only at the end of the 1870s when McCormick agreed to pay 
Miller $25 000 in unpaid royalties. Hutchinson 1930, 374, 379-382, 386, 390. 
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survived, in a field of contantly intensifying competition. The patent 
case of the mowers was repeated with self-rake reapers and later 
with self-binders. By around 1860 Cyrus McCormick, finally 
acknowledged the necessity to develop a self-raker to replace the 
old hand-raker. He was, nevertheless, a latecomer. Other manu-
facturers had already been experimenting, developing, producing 
and patenting self-rakers for a decade. Therefore, McCormick had to 
reconnoitre and protect his moves very carefully. First, in 1861, he 
bought patents from Benjamin Fitzburgh and McClintock Young, and 
supplemented them with patents bought from Isaac and Henry 
Russel. He further acquired production rights to Seymour & Morgan's 
self-raker. Finally, in 1862, McCormick's began to make a self-raker 
of their own. As in the case of the mower, patent lawsuits and 
accusations of breach of patent followed. The self-rake reaper was 
already a fairly complicated machine, and its construction was 
covered by hundreds of patents. It was just a question of time who 
would sue whom. Moses Hubbard began in 1865 to gather various 
patent rights and finally constructed the Harvester Rake Pool. In one 
way or another, the pool involved Adriance, Aultman, Warder and 
In the 1860s, the 
combined reaping 
and mowing 
machine was a 
favorite machine 
of many farmers. 
It was also sold 
in Europe by 
James T. Griffin. 
(McCormick 
Collection. State 
Historical Society 
of Wisconsin). 
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Whitley. Two years later Samuel Johnston assured himself a domina-
ting position in the pool with his rake patent, which became a 
standard in the pool. Pool raised a litigation case against McCormick 
in 1870 but it was once again delayed, and after a lawsuit lasting 
nearly a decade, McCormick and Johnston finally agreed on terms.36 
Simultaneously with the development of the self-rake reaper the 
real harvester also took its first steps. According to C.W. MARSH, 
he and his brother W.W. Marsh of DeKalb County, Indiana, 
experimented with the Mann machine (probably J.J. and H.F. Mann, 
of Clinton, Indiana) in 1856 and 1857, and finally next year patented 
a harvester of their own.37 The introduction of the harvester was 
laborios. It had an energetic advocate in J.D. Easter, who became 
interested in it in 1864 in a trial near De Kalb, and acquired in the 
same year, with his partner E.H. Gammon, a license for the machine. 
By 1879, various companies had produced about 100 000 Marsh 
Harvesters.38 
36 Ardrey 1894, 51; Hutchinson 1930, 395-404; Deering Harvester Co. 1900, 71. 
37 The Marsh brothers' invention was one of the breakthroughs in the history of the 
reaping machine. It cut the grain and then a continuous canvas elevated the grain 
into a receiving box to the waiting hands of normally two binders. This basic idea 
was later used by all the leading self-binder manufacturers. In 1894 Ardrey noted: "it 
(Marsh harvester) has never changed materially, in principle or form, since; and if 
the same old machine as used in 1858, and painted as others now are, were seen 
standing to-day in any field in America, Europe or Australia, with binder's table off, 
one familiar with such machines would wonder, as he came forward for a closer 
inspection, whether it was McCormick's, Wood's or Deering's, Samuelson's or 
Hornsby's harvester and binder, and why the binder was not in place." Ardrey 1894, 
58-59. 
38 C.W. Marsh to J.D. Easter 12.7.1900. Mss la, box 116. Statement by Mr. J.D. 
Easter, 6.4.1900. Mss la, box 115. Interviews of J.D. Easter give a lively picture of 
the reaper business and offers many important details of the entrepreneurs and of 
their relations. Easter, who once was one of the big names, also underlines the 
importance of patents and how easy it was to infringe someone's rights. Easter and 
his pool had to pay to Aultman & Miller $36 000 for their claims and to Mann $25 
000 and still $10 000 to E.S. Morgan Brockport, New York. Unfortunately Easter does 
not mention when these events happened. Statement by J.D. Easter 6.4.1900. Mss 
la, box 115. Easter also tells of a patent case against Cyrus McCormick in the interest 
of the Marsh patents. McCormick offered to pay $25 000 on 5000 machines already 
sold and was ready to pay a $5.00 royalty on each machine he would make in the 
future. Easter would not accept the offer and lost everything when McCormick won 
the case. Reminiscences of Hon. J.D. Easter 11.16.1900. Mss lA Box 113. Of the 
Marsh brothers Easter says that they "were very poor men as manufacturers. I never 
could get them to build a good machine. They would not build it according to sample". 
Reminiscences of Hon. J.D. Easter. Mss la, box 113. His other business partners do 
not get a better evaluation. "In getting interested with Gammon & Deering and 
Emerson in the harvester business, I got in with a d---- set of sharpers. An old methodist 
preacher for the first one was as sly as a snake... Emerson was one of the sharpest 
old rascals that ever lived in this country". Reminiscences of Hon. J.D. Easter. 
11.22.1900. Mss la, box 113. Easter's outburst is understandable, for his business 
had failed in 1878 and was taken over by Gammon & Deering. Reminiscences of 
Hon. J.D. Easter 11.27.1900. la, box 113. While Easter's information is interesting, 
it should be approached with some caution because of the intimate relations of the 
parties. 
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The Marsh harvester showed the way for the future development 
of harvesters, and its idea and construction were also used in 
selfbinders. Sylvanus Locke was the first inventor to attach a binding 
mechanism to a Marsh harvester. The first samples came out in 1873, 
from Walter A. Wood's factory. Two years later the experimental 
phase was over, and Wood manufactured about 300 of them. Locke 
was not, however, the only inventor to work with binding mecha-
nisms: Charles B. Whittington, of Janesville, Wisconsin, developed 
perhaps the best and most advanced binding attachment, which was 
attached to a McCormick harvester. In 1875 and 1876, McCormick's 
made their first experimental machines, and began large-scale 
production in 1877, when 1040 of them were put on the market. 
McCormick's continued to expand production of wire-binders until 
1884, when it was finally replaced by the twine-binder.39 
The development of harvesters and wire-binders, and the 
opportunities to make a profit, attracted William Deering to enter 
the field as well. In 1869, Deering acquired an interest in the factory 
of Marsh & Steward at Plano, Illinois, and formed a partnership in 
1874 with Gammon.40 In 1879, the partnership between Deering & 
Gammon was dissolved and Deering moved his factory to Chicago. 
The concern was incorporated in 1883 as William Deering & Co., 
and renamed as the Deering Harvester Co. in 1894. Deering 
introduced the twine-binder with the Appleby knotter in 1880, and 
some 3000 machines41 were put on the market.42 
39 Miller 1902, 36-37; Ardrey 1894, 74-77; Rogin 1931, 110-112; McCormick 
Machines Built since 1841. Mss M/I Box 18. 
40 Deering & Gammon manufactured at their Plano factory, for the most part, 
wire-binders of the Gordon type, as did D.M. Osborne & Co. Deering earned his 
reputation, however, as the maker and developer of the twine-binder. 
In his bitter statement J.D. Easter somewhat strips Deering's fame. Easter describes 
Deering as a tough and quarrelsome person. Easter had met Gammon in Europe and 
Gammon had been in 1873 "about half crazy" and told how Deering was everlastingly 
going for him. On the development of the Marsh harvester Easter maintains that 
Deering had nothing to do with it, and had wrongly inherited the name and merits 
of the Marsh Company. Furthermore Easter gives new evidence on the development 
of the wire-binder, when he explains that McCormick was in the 1870s clearly the 
market leader in wirebinders. That is why Deering was compelled to make something 
else, and the answer was the twinebinder. Reminiscences of Hon. J.D. Easter, 
11.22.1900. Mss la, box 113. 
41 Competition was also growing on the Canadian side of the border, where the 
Massey Manufacturing Company claimed to make 1000 binders for the 1884 harvest. 
Similarly A. Harris, Son & Company reported 1000 for the same season. Denison 
1949, 82-83. 
42 With the exception of Walter A. Wood Co., all the prominent firms, including 
McCormick, Champion and Osborne, secured production rights to Appleby patents. 
From 1882, therefore, the leading companies were all producing practically the same 
machine, with only minor improvements, for example, in bearings and substituting 
steel for wood; the basic construction and binding mechanism remained unaltered. 
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After the 
emergence of the 
self-binder, only 
minor 
improvements 
were made in 
the harvesting 
machines. 
(McCormick 
Collection. State 
Historical Society 
of Wisconsin). 
Competition continued to intensify up to the end of the century. 
Large companies could invest in research and develop new models 
year after year, and were able to use money freely for buying 
promising new patents. As the construction of the machines became 
more complex, the threshold to enter the business grew higher. In 
addition to this, only large companies could build a nation-wide sales 
and service system. To this must be added the problems of unsold 
machine stock and part payment, which naturally strained 
companies' liquidity.43  
International Harvester Co. 1913, 47; Fagan 1931, 8-10; Rogin 1931, 110-112; Miller 
1902, 36-37; Ardrey 1894, 74-77; Kuznets 1937, 558; Forty harvest seasons. Deering 
1898, 1. 
43 International Harvester Co. 1913, 56-57. 
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Table 3. Number of manufacturers and the value of production in 
the US agricultural machine industry, 1849-1909. 
Year Manufacturers Production ($) 
1849 1333 6 842 611 
1859 2116 20 831 904 
1869 2076 52 066 875 
1879 1943 68 640 486 
1889 910 81 271 651 
1899 715 101 207 428 
1904 648 112 007 344 
1909 640 146 329 268 
Source: Cencus of the U.S., 1910. Manufacturers; Heikkonen 1989, 88. 
From Table 3 it can be seen how in the 1850s the agricultural 
machine industry expanded and attracted new entrepreneurs, but 
from the 1860s a declining trend in the number of manufacturers is 
visible. Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode have estimated the number 
of harvester firms to be approximately 200 in 1864 with a total 
output of about 90 000 machines. In 1890 there any more were only 
21 harvester and mower makers.44 
In 1883, severe competition forced the leading companies into 
negotiations on evolving some kind of common policy. For two days 
in Chicago, the binder manufacturers discussed the price question, 
and decided to continue their meeting at Niagara Falls. A special 
committee of five manufacturers, Osborne, Deering, Walter A. 
Wood, Buckeye and McCormick, was appointed to prepare a plan 
for consolidation.45 At the Niagara Falls session, the companies tried 
to find solutions to the price question, discounts and payments, 
commissions and especially the total number of binders to be built. 
The companies were, however, unable to reach a mutual understand-
ing. The most complex question turned out to be production quotas. 
The small, owner-managed companies, in particular, such as Easterly 
and Whitley, opposed any kind of interference in their business.46 
44 Olmstead-Rhode 1995, 27; Clark 1929, 8. 
45 Cyrus Jr. to Cyrus H. McCormick 8.11.1883. Mss la, box 90. 
46 Cyrus Jr. to Cyrus H. McCormick 8.31.1883. Mss la, box 90. 
The committee of the manufacturers recommendeed the retail price for 5 ft. 
harvesters and binders to be $230 and for 6 ft. machines $240, with a five percent 
discount on cash sales. Payments that would have been made before November 1st 
were considered as cash sales. The maximum commission to local agents was planned 
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Despite the initally promising prospects, therefore, this collective 
undertaking by the harvester companies did not materialize. The 
idea of some kind of combination was not buried, however, and in 
1884 D.M. Osborne held conversations with the General Manager of 
the McCormick Company, E.K. Butler, over a merger of the largest 
companies. Osborne suggested that the large companies could then 
buy out the remaining 15 manufacturers.47 
In 1890, the next time the leading companies seriously moved to 
prevent competition, they finally agreed on a merger, and the 
American Harvester Company was incorporated, with the same 
twenty-one companies still in the game.48  
2.3. Machines had to be sold 
Invention and development of an implement was only part of the 
tasks of an entrepreneur. If he wanted to make a living out of his 
invention, he had to find ways and means of selling his products. 
For most of them, this turned out to be a complicated task. Similarly, 
the reaper manufacturers found it a difficult task to convince poor 
and reluctant farmers of the benefits of their machines. 
In his works, Alfred D. Chandler has defined the outlines of this 
process. Mass distribution of products was one of the central 
elements in Chandler's concept of the emergence of big enterprise. 
In the selling of their products, manufacturers traditionally used 
territorial agents, who initially hired subagents or dealers, but in later 
phases changed to using jobbing houses.49 The modern industrial 
enterprise, the birth of which Chandler dated to the 1880s, 
integrating mass production with mass distribution, could no longer 
at 20 percent. The most difficult part was the settlement over the volume of 
production, which was suggested to be 65 000 binders for 1884. There was also 
agreement on the uniform cutter bar lengths. The Committee was also unanimous 
that "the combination should take the form of a contract between the manufacturers; 
with a commissioner appointed by the association who should have full power to 
assess damages and forfeits, investigate all charges for accusation of violation of 
contract, and whose decision upon any point should be fmal". 
Report of Cyrus Jr. shows that the total number of binders built during 1883 was 
about 77 000. All the main companies agreed that output was too high and Cyrus Jr. 
expressed his opinion that prices should be kept as high as possible. 
47 Diary of Cyrus McCormick Jr. 4.7.1884. Mss 4c, vol. 18. 
The big companies were McCormick, Wood, Osborne, Deering, Champion and 
Buckeye. Cyrus Jr. considered such an idea utopian. 
48 International Harvester Co. 1913, 57. 
49 A jobbing house or jobber is a wholesaler who sells to dealers. Leigh 1924, 54, 
80, 85-86. 
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tolerate intermediaries in the trade. Consequently, distribution too 
was transferred to the manufacturer. The reasons for this trans-
formation were, according to Chandler, the inability of the marketers 
to distribute products at the volume and speed now required. 
Besides, some items required specialized distribution and marketing 
services, which wholesalers, retailers, and other middlemen were 
unable to provide.50  
Markets for the reaper were affected by numerous factors. There 
was evidently a shortage of labor but, as Allan Bogue has shown, 
farmers tried to overcome this, as far as possible, by using their 
families' own resources. Where these were not sufficient, they hired 
hands for harvest.51 Before a farmer decided to buy a machine to 
lighten his burden, he had to be sure of the markets for his own 
products. This in turn was at best uncertain before the construction 
of transportation facilities and growth of demand for agricultural 
products. Furthermore, manufacturers had to publicize their ideas. 
For this purpose they used from the very beginning farm magazines 
such as The American Farmer, The Genesee Farmer or The New 
England Farmer. 
In the 1830s, and even in the 1840s, the marketing and 
distribution of commodities was still undeveloped. However, in the 
larger cities some implement and seed dealers had already 
established their warehouses, and also had shops, where simple 
implements were manufactured. These repositories could also buy 
patent rights to some patented articles and hammer them in their 
own shops. There is some evidence of the first jobbing business 
too.52 
In 1842 Cyrus McCormick succeeded in selling six of his reapers, 
and as his trade began to grow, he decided to benefit from the 
existing marketing channels; the next year, he sold county rights 
both to manufacture and to sell the reapers to four persons in 
Virginia and Maryland. Besides, McCormick, who himself 
manufactured reapers at Walnut Grove, closed down the shop for 
harvest time and followed his machines into the field. From the very 
beginning this was one of his principles; a man had to stand behind 
his machines. In addition, McCormick announced that he would sell 
50 Chandler 1977, 209-239, 285-288; Chandler 1987, 67-69; Chandler 1988, 41-42. 
Chandler's basic concept can be found in his famous "The Visible Hand" published 
in 1977. In his later articles Chandler adds new details to the basic idea and illustrates 
his concept of throughput. 
51 Bogue 1968, 182-184. 
52 Another possible channel for the distribution of machines was the sale of county 
or state rights. This could include either the right to manufacture and sell, or to 
manufacture only. Leigh 1924, 12-15. 
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his machines at fixed prices all over the vast country. This intention 
was made widely public; publicity was to be used in numerous 
variations in the war for farmers' souls and against other manu-
facturers.53 
During his journey in 1844 to the new western states of Ohio, 
Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, McCormick realized the future 
potentials of the prairie area. He made a contract for the following 
year with some manufacturers in Ohio, New York, Wisconsin and 
Missouri; these small local shops both manufactured and sold the 
reapers, and paid $20 royalty per machine. When demand for the 
reapers grew, since McCormick could not guarantee the quality of 
the reapers made under license,54 he decided to move his factory to 
the center of the wheat-growing territory.55 
Expansion of business also meant new requirements for sales 
operations. When McCormick's own establishment in Chicago was 
finally able to meet the demand, he tried to free himself of the 
manufacturing agents. Since 1844, McCormick had been canvassing, 
and in 1845 he appointed an agent to collect orders in the eastern 
states. Thereafter he began to construct his new market organization. 
McCormick appointed general agents to specific territories. In 1848, 
McCormick seems to have had nineteen agencies. It was, 
nevertheless, too expensive a way of doing business to have agencies 
in all the new communities; therefore the number of the general 
agents was reduced, and they selected assistants or subagents to take 
care of local sales.56 If local agents were successful, they could even 
53 Eckles 1953, 41; Leigh 1924, 16. 
54 Cyrus McCormick sent to his contractors a model of his reaper. It was not a normal 
size machine, but a miniature model. Besides he provided technical assistance if 
necessary. Hounshell 1987, 155. 
55 Leigh 1924, 39-44; Rogin 1931, 74-75. Warren Leigh, basing his information on 
McCormick's statement on his extension case in 1845, separates four different kinds 
of contracts. McCormick could give the right to sell in a certain area or manufacture 
and sell for an agreed sum. McCormick used also contracts, where the royalty was 
bound on sales. It was not a fixed sum, but whatever he could get. On these bases 
he got $15 on reapers made in Virginia, in the West it was $20, and Gray & Warner 
and D.I. Townsend paid $30. Sometimes royalties were connected to the sales price. 
Thus Seymour & Morgan paid $22.50 on machines priced at $105. The great variety 
of contracts express McCormick's business talents and ambitions. In other cases he 
got $5 commission on every machine sold while he himself collected orders. Leigh 
1924, 47-48. 
56 Subagents were normally local farmers, blacksmiths or postmasters, usually well 
known persons in their vicinity; and even if they were unable to sell machines, they 
boosted the idea, and made it known to possible future customers. Allan G. Bogue 
quotes D.R.Burt's letter to Cyrus McCormick where he tells of the hard rivalry 
between the competitive companies' agents in 1854. Burt also describes how he 
succeeded to persuade the local agricultural society's president to change his Manny's 
reaper for a McCormick. This farmer was furthermore interested in acting as a local 
agent for five dollars for each machine he helped to sell. Bogue 1968, 208. 
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hold some machines in stock. General stores, too, might stock 
machines; but in the 1850s, the field was not yet ready for a retailer. 
Neither did the jobbing houses find a steady foothold in the western 
states.57 
By the beginning of the 1860s, McCormick had brought his 
distribution system to its ultimate phase. The General Manager of 
Agencies at headquarters in Chicago controlled from ten to twelve 
general agents, who in turn had some 400 subagents of various 
kinds, covering over one thousand counties and thirty-one states. 
Other manufacturers of course tried to copy McCormick's ideas, but 
he was able to back his operations with better economic standing, 
and his organization reached practically to every farmer in the main 
grain growing area 58  
During the 1860s, retailers and dealers entered in the picture. They 
developed from general store keepers into specialized implement 
dealers, at least to some extent, from the impetus of the Civil War, 
usually selling most of their machines on consignment. By the end 
of the 1870s, machines had developed considerably, and were fairly 
complicated. Retailers were not always able to set up or instruct the 
farmers carefully enough. Besides, they normally also had other 
machine lines on sale, as well as harvesting implements, and could 
not entirely concentrate on that trade: understandably, since the 
harvester trade was limited to a short period of the year. In addition, 
service problems and the question of spare parts and freights grew 
hand in hand with the growth of the trade. 9 
McCormick resolved the widening dilemma by establishing his 
own warehouses and general agents at key junction points.60 
McCormick's first branch house was opened in either 1877 or 1878 
57 Leigh 1924, 49-56. Eckles 1953, 43. Subagents normally got from seven to ten 
percent of the collections of each reaper. Orders were normally taken in early spring 
and sent to the factory in Chicago. McCormick was not, however, satisfied with this 
order and adopted the system of sending machines to agents to keep them in stock 
ready for delivery. Machines were normally sent in lots to a certain point, wherefrom 
the purchaser paid the freight. Leigh 1924, 50-52. 
58 Leigh 1924, 77-77; International Harvester Co. 1913, 56; Eckles 1953, 43-44. 
59 The dealer obtained his stock from the manufacturer, who also set a fixed price 
for the machines sold to farmers. Dealers received a fixed percentage on each 
machine, and few of them were wealthy enough to buy machines directly from the 
manufacturer. Those who were able to do so, however, received an extra discount 
on their machines. Dealers opened their branches in new localities and began to 
supersede manufacturers' own canvassers and even the general agents. This of course 
freed the manufacturer from keeping his own sales force, but had also some 
drawbacks. Leigh 1924, 78; Eckles 1953, 43-44; International Harvester Co. 1913, 
55-56. Leigh tells about a firm in Peoria, Illinois (Lukens & Branden), who normally 
contracted the farmer's payment out of increased yield from the same acreage 
resulting from the improved methods of harvesting. Ibid, 79. 
60 J J. Glessner of Champion line had, according to his interview, already established 
the first branches in 1870 in St. Louis, St. Paul, Omaha and Denver. Leigh 1924, 89. 
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at St. Louis. Branches supplied the retailers and also monitored the 
company's credit policy. McCormick also concentrated collection 
and credit departments in branch offices, keeping only supervisory 
power at the central office in Chicago. When the branch house 
organization was set up and elaborated during the 1890s, these 
dealers were the only independent factors in the field.61  
The founding of the branch houses in the harvester business was 
no unique phenomenon: development was much the same among 
implement makers, and for example, the Moline Plow Company 
opened its first branch in 1878 in Kansas City. And on an even more 
general level, evolution of the agricultural machine industry followed 
the overall trends in American industry.62 
A reliable and well-lubricated marketing organization was, never-
theless, only one aspect of successful commerce. As has been noted 
earlier, farmers did not hold large amounts of cash; moreover, farm 
incomes came in just once a year, at harvest time. This, combined 
with farmers' conservatism, led even well-established ones at first to 
ask a neighbor or a custom reaper to cut their grain.63  
61 The Deering Company also had a similar system. General agents governed areas 
alotted to them with a sales force of about 3300 local agents. An undated and unnamed 
memorandum of the Deering Co, 1890. Mss w, box 2. 
According to the Federal Trade Commission an unnamed but, however, one of the 
larger manufacturers had the following employees in a branch house: 1 manager, 1 
assistant manager, 2 bookkeeppers, 1 cashier, 1 shipper, 5 clerks, 5 stenographers, 
16 salesmen and 5 experts. Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Causes 
of High Prices of Farm Implements 1920, 55. 
62 Thomas 1976, 40-41; Chandler 1977, 287-288. 
The branch system was certainly more efficient than jobbers or independent general 
agents, but it also represented a heavy burden to the manufacturer. Reaper 
manufacturers normally produced just harvesters, mowers and reapers. All of these 
machines were used in the fall, and therefore production was also very seasonal. 
Factories began to warm up their engines and call in labor in the fall, and the 
production peak was at midwinter. The seasonal nature of the manufacturing was 
reflected in marketing, too, and general agents gathered their sales force in spring as 
the plants began to close their doors. The canvassers' and retailers' high noon lasted 
to the end of July or beginning of August, and they had to move with the harvest 
from south to north. Most of the sales were made within four months just prior to 
the harvest. After the harvest, the general agents visited the local agents to take stock 
of unsold machines off their hands and to approve their accounts. Seasonal fluctuation 
was trying for the manufacturers, who could not keep all the work force on the 
payroll for the whole year. To overcome this problem, some manufacturers began to 
add new production lines to their assortment. Leigh 1924, 82-92, 103-110; 
International Harvester Co. 1913, 55-56; Undated and unnamed memorandum of the 
Deering Co., 1890. Mss w, box 2. 
63 According to Olmstead-Rhode the farms of reaper owners, on avarage, were larger 
than the farms of typical farmers. The number of reaper owners was, however, 
increased by machine sharing. In Illinois in 1859 about 18 to 22 percent of farmers 
owned a share of a reaper. Olmstead-Rhode 1995, 32, 34, 46-49. 
Allan Bogue's carefully collected material shows that the expansion of reapers began 
during the Civil War and continued into the 1870s, when even the most prejudiced 
farmers began to acquire machines to cut their grain, either alone or in partnership 
with a neighbor. Bogue 1968, 261-262, 271-272. 
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Cyrus McCormick knew his customers, and developed an elastic 
credit system. In the 1850s, McCormick's normal policy was to 
acquire from the purchaser $50 in cash, plus freight costs of $5, on 
delivery of the machine. The remaining sum of $100 was to be paid 
on the first of December of the same year at six percent interest.64 
A heavy burden was also laid on the shoulders of the agents, who 
were responsible for enforcing the credit terms set to farmers. They 
had to be sure of the reliability of their customers. The McCormick 
Company frequently stressed in its circulars to agents the importance 
of good sales. Renters should be avoided, except in cash sales, and 
all freights and charges must be paid in cash too.65 Other manu-
facturers had also faced the same quandary. John J. Glessner asked 
his agents to examine the interior of the home of a possible 
part-payment purchaser; if the house was neat, the farmer was a 
good risk 66 
Sales on credit were a stress not only on small manufacturers, but 
also on the larger ones, and it was no wonder that the McCormick 
Company emphasised the importance of cash collection whenever 
possible. It was not a complicated task to make a deal, but collecting 
claims was more intricate, as the Company frequently had to remind 
its agents. Intensified competition forced McCormick to extend his 
credit policy; by 1873, the purchaser had to pay half of the price 
during the fall of 1874 and the other half in fall 1875. In 1880, the 
McCormick Company allowed its agents to give farmers a discount 
of ten percent for any amount of cash down payment. It also further 
64 McCormick Reaper Order 1850 (blank). Mss 5x, box 1; McCormick Reaper Order 
7.14.1954. Mss 5x, box 1; McCormick Reaper Order 4.24.1958. Mss 5x, box 1. 
Normally the deal was made just before the harvest, but the money was collected 
only when the harvest was sold. Under the strain of growing competition, McCormick 
& Bros had to modify their credit terms. In 1862, the company promised to extend 
credit for two to five years, at twelve percent interest on the outstanding loan. Four 
years later, interest was six percent again, but with freight and other charges added. 
Credit Policy of the McCormick Co. 1839-1902. Mss. Special Reports File, box 2; 
Machine order 6.1.1866. Special Reports File, box 2. The information of the 
customers included exact co-ordinates of the farms under mortgages, their standing 
and amounts due and paid and when the payments should be made. Alan Olmstead 
also includes the interest freights and service charges and ends up with a nineteen 
percent interest rate. Olmstead 1975, 332-333. 
65 Private circular to agents. March 1867. Mss 5x, box 1. Agents are asked to sell 
the old machines first, even at reduced prices. The freights were agents' own separate 
business and had to be kept out of the Company records. Furthermore McCormick 
required agents to keep uniform prices for all customers, whereas the terms of trade 
might vary. Agents were also asked to make intensive canvassing and even to haul 
machines to a reluctant farmer's field for a trial. "It is the only way to make numerous 
sales"..."Sales can be more quickly and pleasantly closed up by note or cash while 
the farmer is using the machine than afterwards.". An interesting note is the 
McCormick Company's strong comment on the banks which should be avoided in 
the transfer of money because they are unreliable and liable to go bankrupt. 
66 Leigh 1924, 98 note 2. 
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widened the time limits for credit. The ultimate limits were reached 
for sales closed in 1880: one-third on January 1st 1881, one-third on 
December 1st 1881, and one-third on June 1st 1882. On the other 
hand, the Company required its agents to enforce the published 
prices; otherwise, the agents would bear the loss.°  
The Deering Company's conditions at the end of the 1880s were 
very similar. Its credit provided that one third should be payable in 
October 1888, one third in January 1889 and one third in October 
1889. In some territories, however, it was possible to extend credit 
up to October 1890. Interest on promissory notes given in payment 
for machines varied from six to even ten percent in those territories 
where there was no limit on the rate of interest; it was, however, 
always the highest rate that State law allowed. 
Table 4 explains McCormick's concern over bad notes and his 
repeated demands for cash payment. From the records, it can be 
seen how the amount of notes increased, both in relative and in 
absolute terms. This situation imposed a heavy burden on the 
Company's liquidity. To be able to meet production costs, 
McCormick had to finance factory operations with loans from East 
Coast bankers.G9 
67 The McCormick Co. recommended October or the weeks immediately thereafter 
as the best time for collections. To the Agents for the McCormick Machines. June 
23, 1869. John Edgar, General Agent Mss 5x, box 1; Private Instruction for Agents. 
C.H. McCormick & Bro. March 1, 1869. Mss 5x, box 1; Private Instruction to Agents. 
July 31, 1873. John Edgar, Agent. Mss 5x, box 1; For Agents Only. May 1, 1874. C.H. 
& LJ. McCormick. Mss Special Reports File, box 2; Private-For Your Information 
Only. May 3, 1880. E.C. Beardsley, General Agent. Mss 5x, box 4. 
The McCormick Company included among those whom agents should avoid those 
who lived on homesteads, those on railroad and school land and those whose property 
is exempt by law. To the Agents of the McCormick Machines. Mss 5x, box 1. 
68 An undated and unnamed memorandum of the Deering Co., 1890. Mss w, box 2. 
69 Other manufacturers were, however, in the same situation, as was reflected in 
their business practices, which were similar to McCormick's. In 1856, Atkins sold his 
reaper and mower at $200 in three payments during the same year; $10 was added 
for longer credit, and ten percent interest if the purchaser failed to pay the amount 
due on the first of May. On the other hand, Manny promised cash buyers discounts 
as high as 25 percent. The Minneapolis Harvester Works demanded eight percent 
interest on time sales. It is, nevertheless, difficult to make a reliable comparison 
between McCormick and the other firms, because of the incomplete material. All the 
manufacturers warned against bad credits, wanted more cash payments, but year by 
year made terms more attractive to farmers. Atkins Automaton 1856, 2. 4z, box 1; 
Minneapolis Harvester Works. Contract 1881. Mss 4z, box 16; Minneapolis 
Harvester Works. Order for Harvesting Machines 1882 Mss 4z, box 16; D.M. 
Osborne. To Our Agents. 1.16.1882 Mss 4z, box 17; Aultman, Miller & Co. Binder 
order 1884. Mss 4z, box 1; Minneapolis Harvester Works. Contract of Robert Newton 
12.20.1881. Mss 4Z, box 16. 
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Table 4. Total annual sales and financial standing of the 
McCormick Company, 1848-1858. 
Year Annual 
sales of 
reapers 
Total 
proceeds 
($) 
Proportion Proportion 
in cash 	 on credit 
($) 	 ($) 
Notes as 
proportion 
of total 
proceeds 
(YO 
1848 500 60 000 19 800 40 200 67 
1849 1490 178 800 54 247 124 553 70 
1850 1598 191 760 58 170 133 590 70 
1851 999 119 880 36 362 83 518 70 
1852 994 142 950 43 356 99 549 70 
1853 1079 161 850 53 410 108 440 67 
1854 1549 232 350 74 933 157 410 68 
1855 2524 390 675 118 032 272 673 70 
1856 4039 626 045 189128 436 917 70 
1857 3937 609 995 126 815 483 180 79 
1858 3917 581 560 110 496 471 064 81 
Source: Leigh 1924, 67. 
The evolution of the McCormick Company's machine prices in Table 
5 show a marked fall. When a new model was introduced, prices 
were at first high but came down in a couple of years, as was the 
case with the harvester. In most years, McCormick was not able to 
maintain the published rates; in 1883, for example, the actual rates 
were on average from five to ten dollars under the announced price 
level. The same phenomenon was repeated the following year, and 
for 1885 Cyrus McCormick Jr. ancipated still stiffer competition and 
therefore suggested to his mother they should begin with the prices 
of 1884.7° In the price rates there were clear regional differences. 
All the states were classified into various rate categories.71 The reason 
for this price 
70 1882 seems to form an exception to this general rule: probably the question is of 
a special price for one territory only, in this case San Fransisco, and the figures 
possibly also included extra charges for freight. Cyrus McCormick Jr. to Nettie Fowler 
McCormick 1.11.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. 
71 McCorcmick Harvester Machine Co. Draft for 1891. 12.5.1890. Mss W, Box 2. 
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Table 5. Unit prices of McCormick machines ($), 1860-1890. 
Year Reliable 
Advance 
Imperiala 
Mowers Harvesters Daisy 
reaper 
Dropper 
1865 2651280b 
215/230 
1872 175 120 
200 
1874 195 115 175 
180 
1880 160 75 290/300c 140 
170 
1882 210 100/115 350 
1883 160 75 230 115 140 
1884 160 75 225/235 125 
1888 50/55 150/155/160 80 
1889 50/55/65 155/160/165 80 
1890 50/55/65 150/155/160 
Source: C.H. McCormick & Bros. Circular 1865. Mss Special Reports File, 
Box 2; C.H. McCormick & Bro. Machine Order 1872. Mss Special Reports 
File, Box 2; C.H. & J.L. McCormick. For Agents Only, May 1st, 1874. Mss 
Special Reports File, Box 2; The McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. 
Private.- For your information only, May 3, 1880. Mss 5x, Box 4; N.B. Barnes 
to Geo. O. Bates & Co., Feb 20, 1882. Mss Special Reports File, Box 2; 
Records of the Director's Meetings. Secretary Records. Jan. 2nd. 1883. Mss 
1A, Box 90; E.K. Butler to Ben Craycroft, Sept. 17, 1888. E.K. Butler to N.B. 
Fulmer, February 7, 1889. Mss Special Reports File, Box 1. E.K. Butler to 
W.P. Patch, Apr. 15, 1890. Mss Special Reports File, Box 2. 
a The Reliable was a combined reaper and mower which was in production 
in the 1860s, replaced at the end of the decade by the Advance and in the 
late 1870s by the Imperial. They all were combined machines. In the figures 
for 1872 and 1874, the first row means the Reliable and second the Advance. 
For 1880, the first row means the Advance and the second the Imperial; 
thereafter, there is only the Imperial. 
The first figure means a hand-rake reaper and the second a self-rake reaper 
of various cutting widths. 
Parallel figures express various cutting widths of machines. The normal 
widths were 4, 5 and 6 feet. 
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elasticity was the stiff competition to which McCormick had to 
adjust its activities.72 
According to the information collected from contracts, catalogs 
and price lists, on average, the McCormick Company held its prices 
higher than its competitors. The figures used are companies' list 
prices; actual deals in individual cases, both with the McCormick 
Co. and with other companies, were often made at lower rates. For 
example, in 1884, the McCormick Company gave a ten percent 
discount on cash sales on binders, and discounts on other machines 
varied between ten and twenty percent.73  
The McCormick Company, like other manufacturers, still relied 
in the 1880s on jobbing houses; but once they established their own 
branch offices, most of the trade was done through retailers, who 
sold machines at commission. Commissions of course reduced 
manufacturers' profits. During the early years, McCormick allowed 
his agents a commission of between eleven and fifteen percent. 
About twenty years later, when competition was stiffer, the 
Minneapolis Harvester Works gave its agents twenty-five percent 
commission on all machines; on the other hand, the company set 
out to increase cash payments by promising dealers five percent 
commission on cash sales. At about the same time, McCormick Co. 
agreed to give eighteen percent commission for all kinds of machines 
and an extra commission of twenty percent in lieu of the said 
eighteen percent on cash sales. In addition, the Company allowed 
72 Competition increased considerably during the 1880s. Nettie McCormick remarked 
in 1883 that the Deering Co. sold twine binders at $200, which was $30 under 
McCormick's list price. Nettie received confirmation for her doubts during the next 
fall, when Deering, Osborne and the Minneapolis Co. made contracts with some 
agents for rates as low as $135 for harvesters and binders. In 1884, Cyrus Jr. wrote 
to Nettie that "there is no doubt that prices may be very much demoralized for next 
year, as the small collections will tend to make farmers very backward about ordering 
machines next year, and there is liable to be an overproduction". Competition hit 
the smaller manufacturers harder than McCormicks' or Deerings'. D.M. Osborne & 
Co. required its agents to canvass every foot of their territory and offered help for 
closing deals. Osborne wanted its agents to dispose of everything still unsold, even 
at reduced prices and with longer credit. Walter A. Wood expressed his fears in a 
letter to Adriance, Platt & Co., stating "as long as the McCormick and Deering 
Companies keep the attitude they now have and have maintained towards each other, 
nothing can be done to advance prices in this country". Furthermore, Wood states 
that none of McCormick's sales of twine-binders were over $110 and most were as 
low as $95. Nettie McCormick to Cyrus Jr., 3.21, 1883. Mss 1B, Box 25; E.K. Butler 
to Nettie McCormick, 10.13, 1883. Mss 3b, box 2; Cyrus Jr. to Nettie McCormick 
1.11.1884. Mss 3B, Box 3; D.M. Osborne & Co. To Our Agents. 5.28, 1886. Mss la, 
Box 104; D.M. Osborne. 7.8.1886. Mss 1A, B 104; Walter A, Wood to Adriance, Platt 
& Co. 12.17.1889. Mss W, Box 1. The Deering Company's prices for agents in 1890 
for the mowers was between $36 and $42.50, and for binders $105 and $130. These 
prices were well under McCormick's list prices for its agents. An undated and 
unnamed memorandum of the Deering Co., 1890. Mss w, box 2. 
73 List price refers to the prices published in the Company catalogs. Cyrus Jr. to 
Nettie McCormick 10.20.1884. Mss 2B, box 27. 
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a ten percent cash discount.74 The Deering Company required its 
agents to guarantee promissory notes given by farmers. Their agent's 
net price was fixed, and everything he brought in above this price 
was his commission, normally fifteen percent.%  
Without any doubt, the McCormick Company kept prices of its 
products on a higher level than its competitors, as David Hounshell 
has stated. This became possible because of its marketing strategy, 
which included retail dealers, service system, and an installment 
purchasing plan. Alfred Chandler had already earlier noted how by 
1917 the large companies had become the price leaders, due to the 
same factors which Hounshell defined 76 Although the McCormick 
Company was not initially in the 1880s a clear market leader, it 
possessed many such characteristics. These factors, combined with 
its good economic standing and reputation, allowed it to maintain 
its prices. The development of machine prices which has been 
shown in the present work concur with the official material 
produced by the US Department of Agriculture.77 
Parallel to credit problems, reaper manufacturers encountered the 
service question. From today's perspective the first reapers were 
simple, and could be produced by almost any blacksmith; but to a 
farmer in the middle of the nineteenth century the case was 
different. The manufacturer had a two-sided dilemma to solve: to set 
up and keep the machines going and, on the other hand to take 
care of spare parts supply. 
At first both Hussey and McCormick closed the doors of their 
shops and personally followed their machines to help to set them 
up. Often reapers needed some adjustment, which is no wonder in 
view of the crude production methods and the many producers to 
whom licenses were sold. The set-up expences significantly 
increased as distribution of the machines expanded. To get round 
these problems, McCormick began to publish special instruction 
74 Contract of A.R. Metcalf, 1862. McCormick & Bros. Mss 5X, box 1; Contract of 
L.G. Dudley 1.11.1864. McCormick & Bros. Mss 5x, box 1; Contract of Robert Newton 
12.20.1881. Minneapolis Harvester Works. Mss 4z, box 16; Agency Contract of Wright 
& Co. 12.1.1883. McCormick Harvester Machine Co. Mss 5x, box 2; Cyrus Jr. to 
Nettie McCormick 10.20.1884. Mss 2b, box 27. 
75 An undated and unnamed memorandum of the Deering Co. 1890. Mss w, box 2. 
76 Hounshell 1987, 5.6; Chandler 1977, 409. 
77 The course of prices of farm implements and machinery 1901, 13, 19. 
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Table 6 Unit prices of the competing harvesters by manufacturer 
($), 1855-1885. 
Manufacturer Year Reaper Combined Mower Binder 
J.P. Manny 1855 135/145 120 
Atkins 1856 175 200 
Buffalo 
Agric. Machine 
Works 
1858 120 100 
Warder, 
Mitchell & Co. 
1866 170 200 140/160 
Warder, 
Mitchell & Co. 
1876 160 180/190 100/120/130 
1.Minneapolis 
Harvester 
Works 
2.Adriance, 
Platt & Co. 
3.D.M.Osborne 
1881 
135 
135 
150 
160 
160 
80 
80 
70/75/80 300/310/325 
300 
Minneapolis 
Harvester 
Works 
1882 135 270 
Aultman, 
Miller & Co. 
1883 150 80/85 260 
275 
Warder, 
Mitchell & Co. 
Aultman, 
Miller & Co. 
1884 100/115/120 130/135 70/75 225 
190 
1. Warder, 
Mitchell & Co. 
2.Aultman, 
Miller & Co. 
3.D.M.Osborne 
1885 180 
160/180 
180/200 
Source: J.H. Manny. Patent adjustable reaper and mower compined and sin-
gle mower. 1855. Mss. 4Z, box 14; Atkins' Automaton. Self-Raking reaper 
and mower. 1856. Mss 4Z, box 1; Buffalo Agricultural Machine Works, 1858. 
Mss 4Z, box 2; Warder, Mitchell & Co. Price List No.1. 1866. Mss 4Z, box 
24; Warder, Mitchell & Co. Price List No.l. 1876. Mss 4Z, box 24; Min-
neapolis Harvester Works. Contract 12.20.1881. Mss 4Z, box 16; Adriance, 
Platt & Co. Net cash prices for machines. 1881. Mss 4Z, box 1; D.M. Os-
borne & Co. Price card 1881. Mss 4Z, box 17; Minneapolis Harvester Works. 
Order for harvesting machines. ? May 1882. Mss 4Z, box 16; E. K. Butler 
to Nettie McCormick 10.18.1883. Mss 3B, box 2; Aultman, Miller & Co. 
Retail prices of machines. January 1883. Mss 4Z, box 1; Champion. Revised 
net cash price list 1884. Mss 4Z, box 3; Aultman, Miller & Co. Machine 
order 1884. Mss 4Z, box 1; Morgan Bros. to W.H. Hatch 3.7.1885. Mss 3B, 
box 5. 
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leaflets on how to set up and handle a reaper.78 
The normal spare parts which a farmer was able to change himself, 
even a canvasser or a local agent could take care of. Salesmen simply 
carried with them the parts that normally first wore out, or a general 
agent had them in store. More problematic were parts that 
demanded special handling. A partial solution was found from the 
factory, which normally closed for harvest time; in this way, 
mechanics were freed for use as travelling experts. And experts were 
needed, for the McCormicks relied upon specialty contractors to 
supply their factory with some parts even up to the 189Os. During 
the early years, agents often complained about the quality of 
McCormick's machines and advised the Company to devote more 
time to improved workmanship. The use of castings and careful 
specifications for the contractors guaranteed uniformity in some 
measure in the same year's models. McCormick's also founded a 
special repair department which maintained a duplicate of every 
year's model and also the patterns. The customer needed to state 
the year, model and possibly the number of the part, and was 
responsible for the fitting of the new castings or wrought-iron parts.79 
Development of the harvesting machines made it impossible for the 
fanner to set up a machine himself. A skilled mechanic was a necessity, 
but very costly to maintain. Even in the case of jobbing houses, the 
manufacturer had financially to carry the heaviest load. The poor 
mechanic had to carry the physical burden, traveling on wagons or on 
horseback hundreds of miles from one customer to another. His task 
was to keep the machines running and farmers satisfied. In a word, he 
was the show window for the manufacturer. Companies recognized 
this side of competition as extremely important, and farmers frequently 
78 Leigh 1924, 36-38, 68; Hounshell 1987, 159; Names of parts and directions for 
putting together & operating M'Cormick's patent Va. reaper, 1850. Mss 5x, box 1. 
According to the above mentioned leaflet, machine parts were numbered and marked 
with paint. Besides, in the brochure there was also a picture of the reaper and 
directions were so detailed that they enabled the purchaser to set up his machine. 
The other manufacturers also adopted McCormick's methods. John H. Manny 
published in 1856 directions for using his reaper, where he had point by point minute 
instructions. Directions for using Manny's patent adjustable reaper and mower! 
Mss 4z, box 14. 
79 Hounshell 1987, 157-160. The McCormicks relied on the old system but modified 
it in 1875 when they began to cast or stamp the numbers on the parts. Nonetheless, 
they had problems with frequent model changes. Agents should know that " a 
machine may be made in one year and sold in some future year, and in this way lead 
to mistakes. We may also add, that the year when patented gives no information 
when made". Price list and catalogue of C.H. & L.J. McCormick, 1875. Mss 5x, box 
1. McCormick's system was obviously common among the other manufacturers, too. 
Cayuga Chief Manufacturing Company asked its customers in ordering extras to give 
the number of the part, of the machine and the name of the manufacturer. Cayuga 
Chief Mower and Reaper. Cayuga Chief Manufacturing Company, 1867. Mss 4z, 
box 3. 
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received their repairs totally free of charge. The importance even in 
this question can be seen, for example, in the McCormick Compa-
ny's circulars to agents, where it is stressed they should "spare no 
time to look after them (machines) in the field" and furthermore 
agents should be masters in handling the machines.80 
Closely connected to the service question was the warranty that 
a manufacturer gave to his machines. In the first years McCormick 
guaranteed his reaper to cut a certain amount of acres in a day and 
also to save grain normally scattered by cradling. He also gave a 
warranty for the workmanship of his machines. The other manu-
facturers followed suit, and both their acreage and quality guarantees 
were very similar.81  
The same warranty policy was continued in the 1860s but in 
McCormick's agent's contracts there was no mention of a warranty of 
any kind. In the 1880s manufacturers set out exact acreage figures and 
simply guaranteed that the machine is well made of good material, and 
if in a fair test, it did not satisfy the customer, he could have a new 
machine or have his money refunded. Aultman, Miller & Co., on the 
other hand, included in their contracts a clause guaranting their 
machine to do as good work as any of its size in America. Only in the 
event that it failed to do so, would the machine be changed.8  
80 Private circular to agents. McCormick Bros. 1867. Mss. Special reports file, box 
2; Private instruction to agents. 7.31.1873. Mss 5x, box 1. 
The importance of the service and repair question becomes evident in the comments 
of John J. Glessner and L.J. Martin. Both mention service as one of the main reasons 
for the establishment of the company branch house system. Another key question 
was the credit problem. When service became part of the branch house, it was 
separated to form a separate department which could take care of almost any work 
that emerged. In this way, organizational power was transferred downwards and 
nearer the customer. Leigh 1924, 98-100. 
John J. Glessner was formerly president of Warder, Bushnell & Glessner and after the 
great merger in 1902, director of the International Harvester Company. W. Martin 
was a General Manager of Experimental Department at International Harvester 
Company. Leigh has obtained this information by interviews with both of the persons 
mentioned. Ibid. 149. 
81 McCormic's Patent Virginia Reaper. 1848 (?). Mss 5x, box 2; McCormick's Patent 
Virginia Reaper. 1850. Mss 5x, box 1; In 1848 McCormick promised his reaper could 
cut one and a half acres in an hour and in 1850 two acres in an hour and to save 
"at least three-fourths of all the wheat scattered by ordinary cradling." 
J.H. Manny guaranteed his machine would "Mow as well as can be done with the 
Scythe, and Reap as well as can be done with the Cradle." Furthermore he warranted 
that his reaper would cut from ten to fifteen acres a. day. J.H. Manny's Patent 
Adjustable Reaper and Mower Compined and Single Mower. 1855. Mss 4z, Box 14. 
Atkin's tried to convince purchasers by calculating the amount of money that a 
self-raker saved compared to a hand-raker. Atkin's Automaton, 1855. Mss 4z, box 1. 
82 Agency contract.C.H. McCormick & Bros. 1862. Mss 5x, box 1; Agency contract. 
C.H. McCormick & Bros. 1864; Sales contract. C.H. McCormick & Bros. 1866. Mss 
Special Reports File, box 2; Cayuga Chief Manufacturing Company. Catalog 1867. 
Mss 4z, box 3; Privat circular to agents. C.H. McCormick & Bros. 1867. Mss Special 
Reports File, box 12; Minneapolis Harvester Works. Order for Harvesting Machines, 
5.?.1882. Mss 4z, box 16; Aultman, Miller & Co. Sales contract. 4.26 (?).1884. Mss 
4z, box 1. 
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Both of the inventors of the reaper realized the value of publicity 
for the future of their business. Obed Hussey introduced his reaper 
to farmers for the first time in 1834, and continued his appearances 
during the following years. Cyrus McCormick made his first serious 
public appearance in 1839.83 
 This manner was a preface for future 
field tests. Farmers wanted to see the reaper at work, and perhaps 
to drive it themselves, before they were convinced of its benefits. 
Some manufacturers, like McCormick, began even to lend machines 
for free trials. The agricultural societies also became important 
factors in the trade. They arranged tests and appointed committees 
to investigate competing machines, and eventually also published 
reports of these investigations. When new firms came into the field, 
competition became stiffer and mere cutting tests were no longer 
enough. To stand out from the others, one had to find something 
more attractive, until reapers and mowers were driven at full gallop 
against poles or horses drew them in opposite directions so that 
they broke apart84 
Cyrus McCormick opened a totally new field in trials in 1851, 
when he shipped his reaper to the first World Fair in Crystal Palace 
in London, where he won the Great Council Medal, beating his 
arch-rival Obed Hussey. After the London Fair, McCormick presented 
his reaper in all the major fairs all around Europe and reaped medals 
and honor with his machine. From the very beginning, this fame 
was extensively used on the homefront; but he could not keep this 
privilege for many years. Other producers followed the lead, went 
over to Europe and exploited their success in the Old World to 
boost their standing in America.85 
Newspapers and magazines were another integral part of 
marketing efforts. Manufacturers could publish descriptions of new 
models, publish reports of trials and of course actual advertisements. 
An essential part of newspaper advertising, and later on of sales 
catalogs, consisted of written testimonials from those who already 
83 Greeno 1912, 39; Leigh 1924, 10-11. 
84 Heikkonen 1989, 81; Warder, Glessner, Bushnell & Co. 1900. Mss 4z, box 24; 
Leigh 1924, 26, 94. Importance of the trials and fairs becomes evident for example 
in D.M. Osborne's circular to agents, where the company tried to push its agents, 
by emphasising how in Mount Morris Fair twenty-nine binders were sold and for 
good prices. D.M. Osborne & Co. Circular to agents 5.28.1886. Mss la, box 104. 
85 Reaper contract of Henry Werner 4.24.1858. C.H. McCormick. Mss 5x, box 1; 
Walter A. Wood. Catalog 1873, 1874. Mss 4z,box 25; The Johnston Harvester Co. 
Catalog 1876, Mss 4z, box 14; Wm. Anson Wood. Catalog 1878. Mss 4z, box 5; Walter 
A. Wood Company published in 1900 a sales catalog, which listed all the company's 
main achievements in field tests. Of the 35 pages of descriptions of the results fifteen 
were reserved for foreign awards. Walter A. Wood Company, 1900. Mss 4z, box 25. 
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had bought a machine. 
Sales catalogs were a direct channel to affect farmers' opinions. 
Together with handbills, flyers and showcards, they provided 
effective means to hit competitors. A common feature of marketing 
was the use of various ways to make competitors look ridiculous in 
the eyes of purchasers. In 1890, the Deering Company published a 
showcard where the Company's salesman introduced their latest 
reaper to its competitors, who were represented as rednecks with 
mucus running from their red noses: "Deering Binder carefully 
studied and imitated by all binder manufacturers". In another card, 
McCormick's harvester was displayed as a skunk which a fanner was 
carrying away holding his nose: "We hold our nose as we treat the 
subject (McCormick)".87 
Catalogs are also a part of cultural history. They reflect the state 
and opinions of the latter part of the 19th century. During the first 
years catalogs were simple and usually illustrated only with black 
and white drawings. The same catalog contained information on the 
latest models, testimonials, sites of depots and offices, victories in 
trials and other achievements, a history of the factory, and 
instructions on how to order machines and extras. And of course, 
how supreme this reaper was compared with the others.88  Scenes 
and pictures were simple, stoic and showed only the machine at 
work. In the 1860s, the number of pages began to grow and pictures 
were also added on inside pages, but the main line was still 
informative. Manufacturers wanted to send a message to purchasers 
and emphasized qualities of their products, changes in the factory, 
production numbers etc. A slow change became visible in the 1870s. 
On the covers some (pale) colors were used. Themes became 
romantic scenes with maidens holding scythes, and grain wreaths, 
encircling the main theme, the reaping or mowing machine. No 
drastic changes occurred in the contents, however, except that the 
86 See for example Atkin's Automaton 1856. Mss 4z, box 1; C.H. McCormick & 
Bros.;flyer 1860. Mss 5x, box 1; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. Sales catalog 
1882. Mss 5x, box 1; D.M. Osborne & Co. Circular to Agents 8.24.1886. Mss 1A, 
box 104; Heikkonen 1989, 82.83. 
87 In 1855 John A. Manny warned McCormick not to infringe his mower patent, and 
makers of Atkin's automaton called McCormick's hand-raker a back-breaker. Attacks 
continued with complaints of humbuggery and with a challenge to a contest during 
the next season. J.H. Manny's Patent Adjustable Reaper and Mower Compined and 
Single Mower 1855. Mss 4z, box 14; Atkin's Automaton 1856. Mss 4z, box 1; Deering 
Harvester Co. Showcard 1890, 1894. Mss 4z, box 4; 
88 See for example Atkin's Automaton 1856. Mss 4z, box 1 ;John P. Manny. Catalog 
1869. Mss 4z, box 14; Walter A. Wood. Catalog 1873. Mss 4z, box 25; McCormick 
Harvester Machine Co. Catalog 1884. Mss 5x, box 1; William Deering and Co. 
Catalog 1887. Mss 4z, box 4. 
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Advertising was 
aggressive, and 
tried to show 
competitors in 
as unfavorable 
a light as 
possible. 
(McCormick 
Collection. State 
Historical Society 
of Wisconsin). 
pictures, which were still hand-drawn, became more detailedA9 
The general romantic atmosphere was preserved during the 1880s 
and the 1890s, with colorful and decorative covers, which might 
represent exotic themes like the first gallic header or oriental 
transportation methods. Orientalism was several times repeated, 
probably in order to show the universality of the products. Equally 
common were romantic harvest scenes, where happy children were 
playing in their Sunday clothes while their parents watched. The 
idea was to project an image of peace and comfort, which only the 
harvester made possible. There were also patriotic themes from the 
War of Independence, Congress and of course the American farmer; 
harvesters cutting wheat on the prairie while a remnant from the 
past, the buffalo bull, looks quietly from the mountains at his lost 
empire.90 
89 C.H. McCormick & Bros. Catalog 1863. Mss 5x, box 1; John P. Manny. Catalog 
1869. Mss 4z, box 14; Walter A. Wood. Catalog 1873, 1878, 1879. Mss 4z, box 25; 
D.M. Osborne & Co. Catalog 1876, 1879; The Johnston Harvester Co. Catalog 1876. 
Mss 4z, box 14; Wm. Anson Wood. Catalog 1878. Mss 4z, box 5. 
90 McCormick Harvester Machine Co. Catalogs 1881, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1887, 1889, 
1894. Mss 5x, box 1 and 2; Wm. Deering Harvester Co. Catalog 1887, 1895, 1897. 
Mss 4z, box 4; Plano Manufacturing Co. Catalog 1891. Mss 4z, box 20; Adriance, 
Platt & Co. Catalog 1896. Mss 4z, box 1; Aultman, Miller & Co. Catalog 1884. Mss. 
4z, box 1; 
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What were the crucial factors behind the success of the 
McCormicks? Cyrus McCormick was one of the inventors of the 
reaper. It was a big advantage in the fight over the market, and 
Cyrus also understood its marketing value. As the inventor he was 
able to patent some critical parts of the machine and in that way 
either to collect royalties or prevent competitors reaching the 
market. This policy lead to continuous lawsuits with his rivals. In 
these he showed himself to be a hardboiled and impudent 
businessman. A great deal of McCormick's success was due to the 
marketing strategy Cyrus designed. It included warranty and service 
of the machines, well lubricated delivery systems and long credits 
to customers. That was made possible partly because of the 
accumulated wealth during the first decades of the business. 
McCormick was far from being a market leader in the 1860s, neither 
were his machines more intelligent than those of other makers. 
Therefore it is tempting to consider that due to his fame, combined 
with the rapidly growing market, he was able to stay in the game, 
in spite of his problems with patent pools, and with his aging 
machines. Nevertheless, McCormick's held their machine prices at 
a higher level than their competitors and had strict contract terms 
with its dealers. 
The evolution of the firm of Cyrus McCormick followed 
surprisingly closely the outlines of the development of modern 
enterprise as defined by Alfred D. Chandler. By the beginning of the 
1880s, it had replaced wholesalers, and built instead a network of 
its own branch houses. Distribution of high technology binders 
required investments in specialized, product-specific facilities and 
personnel, which independent agents were not able to offer. Thus, 
the harvesting machine industry was part of the modernization of 
American industry. 
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III 
~ 
i 
I Changing Patterns of 
European Agriculture 
3.1. Old fashions and new winds 
The American harvesting machine companies that enlarged their 
operations to Europe soon noticed the great differences between 
one country and another. The underlying reasons for these are 
countless. Some researchers have pointed towards the varied ways 
in which different countries had shaken off the remnants of their 
feudal past. General economic progress had not been even, either, 
and its influence in the development of agriculture consequently 
differed from country to country. 
In England, enclosure and consolidation of farms had led to large 
holdings. The old landed aristocracy were able to hold their position 
as landlords by letting out their land to tenant farmers; wealthy 
landowners therefore had both the means and an interest to invest 
in their farms. In France, on the other hand, the state of agriculture 
by the middle of the nineteenth century was the opposite of the 
dynamism and receptivity to new ideas found in Britain. After the 
Revolution, farms had been split into small units, and almost 40 
percent of the farming land was in farms of less than 20 hectares. 
This problem was further aggravated by the division of land between 
the heirs on the death of the owner. In the western parts of 
Germany, farms were similarly small and fragmented. Peasant 
agriculture also had a long history in parts of southern Germany, 
Switzerland and the Tyrol. On the contrary, the old landed 
aristocracy (the Junkers) dominated the eastern parts of 'the new 
German Empire, and development was much the same also in Russia 
and Austria-Hungary.' 
In most European countries, farms in the 1870s were still 
1 Tracy 1964, 19-21; Tracy 1966; 98-99; For example, in Thuringia, where the land 
was subdivided into smallholdings, the owner of a farm of 12 hectares could barely 
support himself and his family. Those possessing less than 12 hectares had to work 
part time in the nearby industries for their living. Reports of the consuls of the United 
States No.2, 1880, 97-98; In Russia the United States consuls underlined the primitive 
character of agricultural pursuits in general. Russia with its 80 000 000 inhabitants 
used annually only about $3 000 000 on agricultural implements. The dearth of money 
was so great that an association had to be formed to enable a peasant to purchase a 
$30 plow. Reports from the consuls of the United States No.20, 1882, 233.234. 
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self-sufficient, producing only for the use of their own household, 
although there were big regional differences. Britain, as a result of 
its expanding industrial population, had become a large importer of 
food. France also imported some grains, while it exported others. 
Germany imported grain in its western regions, while exporting 
grain from the great estates in the east. The largest exporter of grain 
in the world was Russia. Nevertheless, agricultural trade was still 
largely an intra-European affair.2 
The opening up of the lands of the American Mid-West, together 
with the rapid improvements in methods of transportation, produced 
a flood of cheap American wheat, which was imported in increasing 
measures at the end of the 1870s. Simultaneously, Russian grain 
began to flow in ever larger quantities to central Europe through 
the railroads, which now extended to the Baltic. The impact of these 
imports was multiplied by exceptionally good harvests in America 
at the end of the 1870s, while Europe was suffering from bad 
weather. Normally, bad harvests were accompanied by higher prices; 
but now, cheap exports from America forced prices even further 
down until 1896.3  
Table 7. Area under wheat in the main grain growing countries, 
1860-1900 (millions of hectares). 
Year U.S.A. Russia Canada Argentina Australia 
1860 - - 0.6 - 0.2 
1870 8.4 - 0.6 0.1 0.5 
1880 15.3 11.6 0.9 - 1.2 
1890 14.7 13.7 1.1 1.0 1.3 
1900 19.8 20.2 1.6 3.2 2.1 
Source: Grigg 1974, 262. 
Although Table 7 shows a continuous increase of the area under 
wheat cultivation, this was not directly reflected in world trade. 
Expansion of grain growing took place in very similar environments. 
The new lands were grasslands with progressively more arid climates 
as settlement moved out from the core areas. Farmers in the new 
agricultural lands were confronted in establishing farms by many 
2 Tracy 1964, 21. 
3 Tracy 1964, 22-24; Tracy 1966, 101-102; Klein 1973, 122-123; Haushofer 1972, 
238-239; Grigg 1974, 174. 
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problems similar to those faced by the prairie farmers in America. 
Besides, there were questions over the systems of land disposal. The 
transportation of the harvest also had to be taken into account. In 
Canada, Argentina and Australia it was not thought possible for 
wheat production to be carried on profitably more than 25 
kilometers from a railroad 4 
The cheap grain pouring into Europe from overseas and from 
Russia caused problems for European farmers. Although the effects 
of grain imports did not hit all farmers as severely, the phenomenon 
was soon labeled an agricultural crisis. In its early stages, it mostly 
affected grain growers;5 livestock producers actually benefited from 
the fall in grain prices, since they used grain for feeding their 
animals. There were also major geographical variations in the effects 
of the depression. In England the arable farms were mostly in East 
Anglia and the south of England. The plains of the Paris basin and 
Northern France were the central grain growing regions in France, 
while in Germany grain production was concentrated on the large 
Prussian estates. 6 
Responses to the agricultural crisis varied from one country to 
another. Throughout the Continent there had been a growing 
demand among industrialists to raise barriers against growing imports 
and to protect own production. This attitude gained new thrust from 
the nationalistic feelings aroused after the Franco-Prussian War of 
1870. It was therefore no wonder that the farmers and industrialists 
in central Europe found a common ground to raise a protectionist 
wall against imports. In 1881, France raised its tariffs and its duties 
on livestock products considerably, followed by new tariffs in 1885 
and 1887 whereby the duties on all agricultural products were raised. 
Germany imposed moderate duties in 1879 on agricultural products. 
Duties on grain were, however, raised in 1885 and 1887. After the 
dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, for a time Germany followed liberal 
tariffs as the country tried to obtain markets for its industrial 
products.' 
4 Grigg 1974, 259-263. 
5 As a consequence, prices of arable products fell and the wheat acreage in England 
contracted from 3.3 million acres in 1871 to 1.8 million acres in 1904. Over the same 
period the area of pasture rose from 11.2 million acres to 16.2 million acres. Jewell 
1976, 126. 
6 Tracy 1964, 25-26; Klein 1973, 125-126; Kindleberger 1964, 216.217. Kindleberger 
remarks that in France farms in the densely populated areas became smaller but were 
more efficient in the northern part of the country, the east-center area and around 
Paris. Ibid. 216. 
7 Tracy 1964, 27-28, 65-70, 87-89; Klein 1973, 124; Skalweit 1937, 584-585; 
Haushofer 1972, 247-248; Grigg 1974, 174. 
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Britain took a totally opposite attitude towards cheap foreign grain. 
The government did not offer the slightest protection to domestic 
agriculture. Industrialists preferred cheap food and raw materials, 
and since the farmers were unable to form a united front to push 
their case, foreign competition hit British farms with its full strength. 
Good harvests during the 1880s brought some relief to the situation, 
but hopes of a better future were destroyed in the early 1890s by 
drought and cold summers in conjunction with further increased 
American competition. The decline of the agricultural population, 
which had continued from the middle of the 19th century, continued 
at an accelerating rate. Whereas in 1861 agriculture still occupied 
18 percent of the total workforce, by 1901 the proportion of the 
active population in agriculture was reduced to a mere 8 percent of 
the totaL8 
In the small European countries, Denmark and Netherland held 
firmly to free trade. Both countries were so dependent on foreign 
trade that they could not even consider protectionism. Here the 
reaction was a fundamental transformation of agriculture from grain 
growing to dairy production. A distinctive feature in Danish farming 
was the development of co-operatives, which played a vital role in 
its transformation. Co-operatives offered a good solution for 
independent smallholders, who could not afford themselves to 
arrange processing and marketing of their livestock products. As a 
result, exports of Danish livestock products grew many times over 
in three decades.9  
The development described above also had its impacts on sales of 
agricultural machinery. The expansion of agricultural land in 
America, together with increased export of agricultural products, 
undoubtedly promoted production and sales of machines. In Europe, 
where farmers now faced a totally new situation, corresponding 
changes in the demand for agricultural machines and implements 
might be predicted. 
There were, however, many other factors affecting the use of 
machinery in agriculture, as Folke DOVRING has shown. All 
machines save labor, but where labor is abundant and capital scarce, 
there is no incentive for mechanization. Nevertheless, there are other 
factors promoting labor-saving machinery. New technology can 
produce higher output, improve the quality of the harvest or, as in 
8 Tracy 1964, 30, 46-50. 
9 Tracy 1964, 106-113. Exports of butter increased from 9 thousand tons in 1870-74 
to 70 in 1901-05, of pork from 8 thousand tons in 1881-85 to 76 in 1901-05. Tracy 
1964, table 33, page 112; Skalwett 1937, 584-585; Larsen 1895, 145-148, 161-166; 
Fussel 1966, 219-220. 
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the case of the harvesting machinery, rescue crops from spoiling. 1° 
The labor question was, nevertheless, one of the key components 
affecting mechanization of agriculture in Europe. On the Continent, 
the main increase in population occurred in the countryside, and 
the change from a mainly agricultural to an urban population did 
not take place until the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 
Britain, however, the non-agricultural population exceeded the 
agricultural population well before 1800, and in Belgium, too, before 
the middle of the 19th century, when half of the population in 
France was still occupied in agriculture. The agricultural population 
remained very stable in actual size until World War I. In Germany, 
the agricultural population was 18.7 million in 1871 and 18.5 million 
in 1895, when it still made up 34.9 percent of the total population. 
In eastern Europe, on the other hand, the population increased 
considerably during the 19th century. In view of the lack of industry, 
most of this increase had to be absorbed by agriculture." 
In most west European countries, the field systems underwent a 
thorough change, and agricultural land was re-allocated in a more 
economic way. This movement was reinforced by the introduction 
of new agricultural techniques, especially new crops and improved 
crop rotation systems. Root crops, clover and other leguminous 
fodder crops were introduced into the rotation, intensifying tillage 
of the soil and making control of weeds more efficient. New plants 
and consequent rotations also intensified the use of the workforce. 
As can be seen in Table 1, harvesting was one of the bottlenecks in 
U.S. agriculture, and the same can be presumed to have been the 
case in Europe too. Besides, during the 19th century, corn, root and 
leguminous crops competed with each other for labor. E.J.T. 
COLLINS even states that grain production grew faster than the 
supply of harvest labor. Consequently, he argues that there existed 
growing disparities between harvest work demand and harvest labor 
supply. The farm labor market became increasingly ruled by the 
trade cycle. Supplies of labor were unpredictable and could fluctuate 
from season to season. In Britain, Collins has found that cyclical 
peaks coincide with shortage of farm labor and increased farm 
mechanization. Accordingly, there was a close correlation between 
the state of the labor market and the diffusion of labor-saving 
machinery. Agricultural machinery did not directly raise the level of 
output and saved more labor than land. A key problem in the 
10 Dovring 1966, 645-646. 
11 Dovring 1966, 604-608; Klein 1973, 121; Krzymowski 1939, 272-273. According 
to Krzymowski, the agricultural population was 42.5 percent of Germany's total 
population in 1882, and 28.6 percent in 1907; Berend-Ranki 1982, 16-21. 
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mechanization of British agriculture was the question of the poor. 
Farmers preferred to give work rather than charity and consequently 
opinion was against the use of machines as long as there were 
available hands in the parish. Even when the machines had been 
acquired they were not necessarily used to full advantage. The 
reaping machine could be used only for wheat, leaving other grains 
to be harvested by hand. The harvesting machine was welcome as 
long as earnings and employment were unaffected 12 
According to Collins, the drying up of the flow of migrant workers 
in Britain and France accelerated the shift to reaping machines. On 
the other hand, the small average size of farms in France and 
Germany prevented mechanization of agriculture. In fact, in many 
areas of western Europe, technological change took the form of a 
switch from lower to higher capacity hand tools. Resistance to these 
new more efficient tools was strongest where labor was abundant. 
Those who supported the use of the sickle against the scythe argued 
that the latter was wasteful of grain. In Scotland, there were still 
doubts expressed in the 1860s whether the scythe could ever be 
transformed into a successful grain harvesting tool. Up to the 
mid-1860s in Britain and throughout Continental Europe the scythe 
gained ground faster than the reaping machine between 1850 and 
1880. In many areas farmers were reluctant to introduce technology 
that could cause unemployment among resident workers. Besides, 
only the largest farms could provide a sufficiently large seasonal 
work-load to justify the adoption of harvesting machines. JEWELL 
estimates that less than half the British cereals acreage was harvested 
by machine in 1870.13 
 
J.R. WALTON's findings confirm Collins' observations. He found 
that in Oxfordshire in Britain, innovations that did not involve 
12 Doering 1966, 626-630, 636-640; Collins 1969, 61-65, 71, Collins 1989, 204-206, 
208, 211-215. 
13 Collins 1969, 71-72, 78-79, 83-86, 93-94; Long 1963, 22; Kindleberger 1964, 213; 
Jewell 1976, 127; Long 1963, 22; Grantham 1899, 17. 
On the Thuringian smallholdings reapers were still rare in 1880. Most of the harvest 
was cut with scythe and sickle, which were preferred, as doing less damage to the 
grain. Reports from the consuls of the United States No.2, 1880, 99. 
In Finland even the landed aristocracy resisted the introduction of hay in crop 
rotation. In the third general meeting of Finnish agriculturists in 1852, J.G. von 
Bonsdorff, announced that he would oppose growing of fodder on the fields until 
people learnt to eat grass. Liakka 1920, 129-130. A similar typical fate met Professor 
Lerche, who was obliged to leave his new swing plow and iron harrow untouched 
to rust. Soininen 1975, 103. This phenomenon was not unknown either in America, 
where the machine-breakers' movement expanded in 1878 from Ohio to the main 
Mid-West grain-growing states. It was aimed against farmers who had bought or 
intended to buy a binder and thereby diminish demand for labor. Arger-
singerArgersinger 1984, 397-409. As late as the 1880s in some parts of Hertfordshire 
in Britain it was no uncommon practice for the laborers to burn reapers and binders. 
Collins 1989, 207. 
80 n CHANGING PATTERNS OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE 
substantial reductions in labor were adopted at rates consistent with 
known improvements in the quality and reductions in the price of 
machinery from 1830. On the other hand, innovations that reduced 
labor were ignored, even though available at an early phase. 
Therefore, in 1850 there was in Oxfordshire no evidence of any use 
of mowing and reaping machines, whereas by 1880 both appeared 
in over 30 percent of the advertisements. In the five-year running 
means that Walton calculated, adoption of mowing and reaping 
machines increased rapidly after the 1860s. By 1880 the majority of 
barn operations and a large part of the hay and corn harvests had 
been mechanized 14 Jewell adds an interesting point that competition 
between American harvester manufacturers accelerated the adoption 
of the harvesting machines in England 15 
In an article published in 1966, Paul A. DAVID presented a new 
approach to the mechanization of agriculture in America. He 
calculated the threshold size for a farm where it would be profitable 
to buy a reaper. Factors affecting this threshold were the prices of 
labor and the cost of reaping machines. David set the threshold size 
at 46.5 acres in the beginning of the 1850s, but a couple of years 
later it was lowered to 35.1 acres, as wages rose faster than machine 
prices. As a result, reapers began to spread among the farmers. t6 
In his later study David has applied his method in Britain. He 
attacks the interpretations of Folke Dovring and other researchers, 
who had explained the slow mechanization of agriculture by labor 
abundance. Instead, David offered as an explanation the state of the 
farming landscape and the attendant expenses involved in rendering 
it suitable for mechanical farming. The greatest impediments to the 
reaper were the nature of the field surfaces across which the 
machines would have to be drawn, and the size of the farms. Often, 
the breadth of the swath cut by the generally available makes of 
reaping machines often turned out to be insufficient for the width 
of the cultivated tracks, causing loss of straw and leaving behind 
sheaves of varying lengths. Besides, fields were in need of drainage. 
Consequently, David argues that these factors made the use of 
14 Walton 1973, 8-10; Collins 1989, 205. 
15 Jewell 1976, 128. 
16 David 1966, 13-16, 21-22; David's ideas have not met with unanimous acceptance. 
Alan L. OLMSTEAD showed David omitted from his calculations joint-ownership of 
machines and professional reaper men who circulated from farm to farm after the 
harvest. Besides, farmers began to increase their holdings only after the introduction 
of the reaper. In addition, the reaper went through a radical modification and 
evolution process which reduced the average draft alone over 40 percent. Olmstead 
1975, 330-344. The latest turns in the discussion can be read in Olmstead-Ankli 1995, 
27-57. 
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reapers more costly than the use of hand labor on all but very large 
farms. Grain growing in Britain was for the most part in the hands 
of tenant farmers, which further diminished the incentive for 
improvements or financial abilities thereto. On the other hand, rising 
labor costs in relation to the price of grain and price of machinery 
made it attractive to invest in machinery. David, however, argues 
that unfortunately wage costs for the improvement of land also rose 
which then began to hinder mechanization." 
S. TVEITE's observations in Norway follow the main ideas of 
David's original threshold model. In his study, Tveite found labor 
supply and wages to be the key factors affecting the mechanization 
of agriculture. Following David's example, he has calculated 
threshold acreages for Norway too, but has expanded his approach 
also to include the horses, which were initially too small to draw 
the first mowers, and had to be changed for larger ones. The 
question of labor costs also turn out to have been more complicated 
than had been estimated. Wages differed from work to work. 
Mowing was done normally with scythes by men, while grain was 
harvested with sickles. Since women were also used for this work, 
wages tended to be lower than in mowing. Besides, the calculations 
also have to include efficiency of both the hand labor and the 
machine. In this way, Tveite estimates that the decisive factors 
favoring purchase of the first reapers and mowers was a combination 
of higher wages in hand mowing with the development of better 
machines. He claims that in 1875 there were about 4000 farms that 
had adequate economic resources or for which it was economically 
reasonable to buy a harvesting machine. The acreage even on many 
of these farms was curtailed by natural hindrances like steep hills, 
which in many cases considerably cut savings obtained by the 
purchase of a reaper or mover.18 
The size of the farm is not, however, the only factor determining 
investment in machinery, as B.H. SLICHER van BATH has noted; the 
kind of cultivation practised on the farm also has to be taken into 
account. Large machines could not be used in small-scale diversified 
farming. Instead, light, small and simple tools were used. Slicher van 
Bath especially underlines the influence on farmers of market prices 
in the purchase of machinery. More tools and machines are invented 
and applied in periods of high prices for farm produce than in 
periods of low prices. If dairy production is more profitable than 
17 David 1971, 145-146, 148-151, 156, 158, 160-161, 173-175. 
18 Tveite 1980, 1-18, 20, 24. Tveite estimates there must have been in 1890 about 
12 000 harvesting and mowing machines in Norway and in 1907 49 190 machines 
on 225 795 farms. Ibid., 28-29. 
82 IN c: HANGING PATTERNS OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE 
grain, inventive activity moves towards machines for milking, 
churning, hay mowing, etc.19 
In summary, it can be noted that Europe emerged very unevenly 
to the state where it was profitable to mechanize harvesting. In 
Britain, that point was reached early in the 1860s, when reapers and 
mowers began to expand in increasing numbers. On the Continent, 
the situation was more complex. In western Europe farms were 
smaller and land ownership scattered. However, there were regional 
differences, such as the Paris basin. As a whole, distribution of 
harvesting machines was restricted by the supply of cheap hand 
labor. On the other hand, the fluctuation of the agricultural product 
prices should also be taken into account. The price of the machines 
themselves was also an important factor, especially relative to the 
price of labor but also relative to the efficiency of the machine. 
In relation to the labor question, it should be noted that although, 
for example, Germany lost through emigration in 1881-1890 some 
1 342 400 people, and 529 000 more in 1891-1900, at the same time 
new people were arriving in the country. In 1880 there were about 
300 000 foreigners in Germany, and twenty years later 1 260 000. 
Thousands of them were wandering farm workers, especially from 
Poland 2° 
In this light, the question of the effects of emigration on farm 
mechanization appears to be much more complicated than, for 
example, Jan Kuuse has explained21. Besides, more effective hand 
tools, such as the scythe, were still spreading at the same time as 
reapers and mowers emerged on the market. So when the American 
harvester companies began to compete in Europe, there were in 
Britain in 1874 about 80 000 reapers, in 1880 in Belgium about 1500, 
and in France in 1882 about 35 000. In Germany in 1882 there were 
19 600 reapers and mowers.22 In this sense, the American har- 
19 Slicher van Bath 1960, 4-5, 12.14. Slicher van Bath also adds costs of labor, capital 
investment, size of the farms and the initiative of the farmer in his list of the 
determining factors conditioning the development of the agricultural tools. Ibid. 8. 
20 Klein, 1973, 21. 
21 Kuuse 1977, 274, 278-279. 
22 Collins 1969, 75; Haushofer 1972, 226; The number of machines at a certain 
moment does not tell the whole story. It has to be compared with the number of 
farms before the real state of mechanization becomes evident. From France this kind 
of account is available. According to G.E. FUSSEL there were in France 52 000 mowers 
and 51 000 reapers in 1892 which means that in a country of 5 672 000 holdings 
less than one percent of farms had some kind of harvesting machine. On the other 
hand, 4 034 000 of the farms were smaller than five hectares. Fussel 1966, 199. There 
were 29 000 farms classed as big holdings possessing over 250 acres of which only 
23 000 had reaping machines; that makes less than one reaper on each holding. 
Clapham 1951, 171. 
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vester-makers faced very demanding but also potentially very 
lucrative markets. On the other hand, expansion into European 
markets coincided with the agricultural crisis and consequently 
implement makers had to fight on two fronts: against competitors 
and against economic strains. One of the tasks of the present work 
is to figure out the factors that helped the American harvester 
companies to conquer the European market. 
3.2. Competition from the European agricultural 
machine industry 
When Cyrus McCormick and Obed Hussey brought their reapers for 
the first time to Europe in 1851, harvesting machines already had a 
long history behind them in Europe. However, none of the European 
machines had become popular among the farming community before 
the introduction of the American machines.23 The reason for this 
was apparently that the early models were insufficiently well 
constructed, and the time was not yet ripe for their expansion. 
After Crystal Palace both Hussey and McCormick made extensive 
agreements with European machine companies for the production 
of their reapers.24 The effects of the success of the American reapers 
were also reflected in patents. From 1849 to 1854 thirty-two patents 
were issued on reapers in England. Impacts were felt also on the 
Continent. French inventors had made some experiments with 
reapers prior to 1851, and even presented a French reaper at Crystal 
Palace. Only after the International Exposition in Paris in 1855 did 
the reaper gain success in France, when McCormick contracted with 
Fleischmann for fifty machines.25  
Although the American harvesting machines were able to conquer 
the European market, this does not mean that there was no high-level 
competitive agricultural machine industry in Europe. On the 
23 Hutchinson 1930, 380. Hutchinson tells, how an English visitor in America, Hon. 
Thos. Tollemache, introduced the Hussey machine to a friend, who later let the firm 
of Garret & Sons of Leiston make drawings of it. By 1851 the firm had constructed 
two reapers and exhibited one at Crystal Palace. Ibid. 384. 
24 Hutchinson 1930, 392-393, 399. In 1851 Hussey made an agreement with Dray 
& Co. to manufacture for the British market. Garret & Son and William Crosskill also 
manufactured Hussey's machines for the next harvest. Crosskill also made Bell's 
reapers. McCormick, on the other hand, arranged with Burgess & Key of London to 
represent his reapers. Burgess & Key, in turn, engaged Samuelson of Banbury to 
manufacture the McCormick reaper. By 1855 also Garret & Son of Saxmundham and 
Ransome & Sims of Ipswich were manufacturing for Burgess & Key; Saul 1968, 211. 
Saul states that still in 1860 Hussey had three or four factories in Britain making his 
machines. 
25 Hutchinson 1930, 399 note 67, 404-405. 
84 • CHANGING PATTERNS OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE 
contrary. English inventors had by 1848 completed a successful 
threshing machine where a winnowing machine was attached to the 
thresher. A step further was taken at about the same time when 
steam power was used to drive the machine.26 British steam-powered 
threshing machines won a high reputation all over Europe, and 
dominated markets to the end of the century.27 Collins even states 
that if there had existed demand in the 1850s for reapers, British 
manufacturers, who had been able to produce such a complicated 
device as a thresher, could have made just as good reapers too.28 
According to S.B. SAUL, the history of the reaper in England has 
been oversimplified. There were intelligent reaper manufacturers 
who could compete succesfully with the American firms, even at 
Crystal Palace, where five British makers were given Medals of 
Honour. In fact, in reapers made largely of metal the British firms 
led their American counterparts by some twenty years. It was only 
in the 1870s that Americans began to drive out the British products 
in Europe.29 The findings of the present study confirm Saul's results. 
Although the American companies had sold their machines for years 
in Europe, the big wave hit in the 1870s, when for example the 
Walter A. Wood Company began to export thousands of reapers and 
mowers to Europe. Saul's other statement is true too, in the light of 
the current study: American companies did not substitute iron frames 
for wooden ones until the 1880s. 
By 1900, the British makers had clearly lost the game. By 1914 
the English manufacturers numbered only four reaper, binder and 
mower makers, catering almost entirely for the home market.30 Their 
total output was less than ten percent of that of McCormick alone 
in America. To clarify his point Saul cites an article in The Times 
26 Beaumont-Higgs 1958, 10; Fussel 1952, 221. 
27 The predominance of the English threshing machines becomes perhaps best 
evident by their distribution also to the peripherical agricultural areas in northern 
Europe. Probably the first English threshing machines reached Finland in 1850 when 
the owner of the Orisberg estate, Captain Björkenheim, ordered one directly from 
England. It was followed by the Dregsby estate a year later. The first steam thresher 
had come to Finland by 1862, when it was acquired from Clayton & Shuttleworth 
for the Finnish agricultural college at Mustiala. Liakka 1920, 130; Suomen 
Huoneenhallitusseuran Sanomia 1851, number 21, 346; Nya Pressens Landt-
bruksafdelining 1890, number 14, 54-55. 
In the seventh general meeting of Finnish agriculturalists in 1876, four English 
threshing machine companies were represented: Clayton & Shuttleworth, Davey & 
Parman, Richard Hornsby and Robey & Co. Kertomus seitsemännestä yleisestä 
Suomen Maanvilfelyskokouksesta 1877, 105. 
28 Collins 1969, 93. 
29 Saul 1968, 211; Aldcroft 1968, 30. 
30 Jewett 1976, 128. 
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describing the Maidstone Agricultural Exhibition in 1899: it "gave 
the impression that some of our leading firms were becoming 
implement agents rather than implement makers". Saul points out 
that not only British but also German and French companies were 
not quick enough to adapt their machines to local requirements. In 
Britain, falls in grain prices and in arable acreage, coupled with low 
labor costs and mixed farming, also made the home market 
particularly weak. British firms were not able to follow the 
Americans into mass production methods.31  
Ever since James Small started to manufacture his swing plows, 
English plow makers had been active on the European market. As a 
relatively simple device, the English plow was soon copied all over 
the world. In Scandinavia, Swedish companies like Överum, 
Norrahammar and Näveqvarn found significant markets for their 
implements.32 English plows were sold also in Germany, where they 
were copied and adapted to local conditions. In the same manner 
as in Sweden, local manufacturers soon began to hammer their own 
plows according to the orginal models, and some of them were 
lucky enough to expand their production on a prominent scale. 
Heinrich Eckert began his career by copying American plows 
initially, but by the 1850s he already had twenty different models 
in production and expanded his activities to mower production in 
the 1860s. Rudolf Sack had a very similar history, as had Heinrich 
Lanz, both of whom began manufacturing in the 1850s, a crucial 
decade for the German agricultural machine industry, and soon they 
expanded their operations abroad, especially to Russia. During the 
last part of the nineteenth century German firms grew into 
large-scale enterprises. By 1883, Rudolf Sack had made 100 000 
plows, and twenty years later one million.33 
As has been shown above, only the English factories were able to 
compete with the American manufacturers. German agricultural 
machine makers were still developing their plants. In other countries 
on the Continent in the 1870s and early 1880s, such as Sweden, 
manufacturers were small and most of them were able to make only 
simple implements like plows and harrows. Of course there were 
exceptions, such as Th. Munktells of Eskilstuna, who made threshers 
31 Saul 1968, 211. 
32 Eskeröd 1973, 87; Kuuse 1974, 55-57, 60, 64-70; Lantmannen 1878 number 24, 
372. 
33 Blaich 1984, 70; Haushofer 1972, 112-114, 142-143, 225. The first order, for 120 
plows for Russia, Rudolf Sack was forced to give to the English makers due to lack 
of adequate capacity. English plow making knowhow was also needed in the erection 
of his first plow factory. Haushofer 1972, 142. 
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and portable steam engines, or J. Thermaenius of Torshälla, who 
manufactured threshers and horse-powers too.34  
This situation left the doors open to the English and American 
factories, as becomes evident in contemporary descriptions of the 
distribution of the harvesting machines. The first reapers were 
acquired both in Denmark and Sweden in the same year, 1852. The 
Danish machine was a McCormick, and the Swedish one a Hussey 
manufactured by Garret in England. Burgess & Key's McCormick 
reaper found its way to Sweden in 1857.35 The American harvester 
companies soon found their way to Europe too, although many of 
them licensed English manufacturers to make their machines. Many 
of these manufacturers began later on to make harvesting machines 
in their own names: Burgess & Key, Samuelson and Hornbys to 
mention the most popular of them. Although the American machines 
outnumbered their English competitors, there was, however, a 
feeling that in demanding conditions the English machines were 
better, due to their stronger construction. From the beginning of 
the 1870s, however, an expansion of the American harvesters can 
be seen from one agricultural show to another; new makers and 
models were exhibited, while the European makers, with a few 
exceptions, remained the same.36 
34 Juhlin Dannfelt 11913, 304; According to the consular reports of the U.S. consuls, 
still in 1881 "plows, spades, rakes, hoes, pitchforks, shovels, and hand tools generally, 
are wretchedly made in France." Reports from the consuls of the United States No.3, 
1881, 100. 
35 Juhlin Dannfelt 11913, 303; Illustrerad Landtbrukstidnings Årsbok för år 1876, 
64. 
36 Illustrerad Landtbrukstidnings Årsbok för år 1876, 64.81; Reports from the 
consuls of the United States No.20, 1882, 234. The managing director of a Russian 
iron foundry also preferred British products. "As to portable engines and 
thrashing-machines, I prefer the English make - Clayton and Shuttleworth. They are 
far dearer than the American ones, but also stronger and more solid"; The U.S. 
vice-consul Geo. W. Sillcox confirms this comment by stating that for "machines 
constructed of iron, such as engines and thrashing machines, chaff-cutters, plows, 
cultivators, harrows, etc., preference seems to be given to the English and continental 
makers." Reports from the consuls of the United States No. 48., 1884, 482. 
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IV 

n Cyrus Hall McCormick 
Turns Abroad, 1851 
4.1. First laurels at Crystal Palace 
The fame of the new American harvesting machines began to spread 
around Europe and from 1849 onward, there are records of 
McCormick's reaper in Austria; but his greatest victory and lifelong 
reputation McCormick achieved in 1851 in the Exhibition of the 
Works of Industry of All Nations, the first World Exhibition, held at 
Crystal Palace in London. His ridiculed machine struck the audience 
by surprise with its performance. It reaped laurels, and The Times 
declared that it was worth the whole cost of the exhibition. Besides 
the Grand Prize of the World Fair, McCormick gained publicity 
which lasted for decades not only among the farming community 
but even among scholars.' 
But what were the forces that drove Cyrus McCormick to begin 
foreign business? Alfred D. Chandler has explained that enterprises 
had the prerequisites to turn abroad when they had taken over the 
distribution of their products, obtained units for producing raw and 
semifinished materials and had begun investing in development. In 
the first phase, companies invested abroad in marketing. Foreign 
commercial agents were soon replaced by companies' own sales 
force.2 Chandler, however, fails to describe the reason for foreign 
expansion. 
Neither has Mira Wilkins found any general reasons for the 
ante-bellum foreign business of American companies: she merely 
notices that "motives were diverse, and often highly personal". On 
another occasion, she explains the post-bellum foreign activities in 
terms of meeting foreign demand, disposing of surplus output, and 
obtaining economies of scale, but also of reaching markets or 
obtaining sources of supply. However, she has carefully described 
the evolution of the foreign enterprise stage by stage, from 
independent agents to salaried export managers in the next stage, 
a branch house or a distribution subsidiary in the third stage, and 
1 Hutchinson 1930, 392, 399-401, 406-407. 
2 Chandler 1988, 31, 34, 44. 
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finally a finishing, assembly or manufacturing plant in the final stage.3  
McCormick knew from previous experience the importance of 
tests, trials, and exhibitions in the marketing of products. He had 
noticed that people were most receptive to new ideas when they 
had tried or seen a machine themselves. This knowledge he 
immediately put to good use in England, where he sold production 
rights to several firms, of which Burgess & Key became his 
permanent business partner.4 
In the New World, McCormick had abandoned or was abandoning 
the old organization, based on manufacturing rights. In Europe, 
however, he found local manufacturers the best way to promote his 
reapers. Numerous researchers such as Fred CARSTENSEN have 
explained his decision by the conservatism of European farmers and 
their preference for homemade products.5 David A. HOUNSHELL has 
probably found a more likely reason for the selling of production 
rights to European manufacturers: as has been previously noted, 
production technology was in its infancy and factories were mere 
blacksmith shops. As a consequence, agents made frequent 
complaints about the workmanship in McCormick's reapers. 
Furthermore, the McCormick brothers were not unanimous on the 
company's strategy.6 
McCormick's were simply not able to produce enough machines, 
even to meet American demand. It was, therefore, understandable 
that if Cyrus wanted to expand his trade outside America, he had 
to find manufacturers near the new markets. This explanation 
becomes even more plausible in the light of William McCormick's 
complaint to Cyrus in 1863 of the stress that the changes of models 
for European conditions put on the factory. He suggested that Cyrus 
had better find a European manufacturer for his European business. 
The reasons for William's criticism lie in the production technology, 
which was not flexible enough to meet new requirements.' 
3 Wilkins 1970, 19, 29, 36, 45-46; Wilkins 1988, 22. 
4 Hutchinson 1930, 415, 424; Carstensen 1984, 109; Wilkins 1976, 29. Burgess and 
Key made subcontracts with D.L. Laurent and Francois Bella in France, and with a 
couple of firms in Germany and in Poland. 
5 Carstensen 1984, 109. 
6 From the early days of the business, Cyrus McCormick's younger brother William 
kept his brother's accounts, and later was in charge of management, whereas his 
other brother Leander was the Superintendent of the factory. Both of the brothers 
preferred a very conservative and cautious business strategy. Cyrus, on the other 
hand, wanted to enlarge production to its limits. Hounshell 1987, 155, 157, 159-160. 
7 Leander McCormick to Cyrus H. McCormick 15.1.1864 Mss la, box 53; William 
McCormick to Cyrus H. McCormick 24.1., 7.2., 21.2., 21.12.1864. Mss la, box 53; 
Hounshell 1987, 167; Heikkonen 1989, 158. 
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Another possible explanation for the selected strategy could be 
customs duties. However, among the original material in the 
McCormick Collection there is no mention of customs at all at this 
phase. 
The selling of production rights freed McCormick from setting up 
a sales organization of his own for the European trade. His only 
responsibility was to arrange the collection of royalties. However, 
McCormick's relations with his English licensee, Burgess & Key, 
began to cool in the beginning of the 1860s, and he decided to 
appoint a European agent to look after his business interests. James 
T. Griffin began actively to canvass continental Europe to find new 
energetic agents. He also tried to find new manufacturers for the 
McCormick machines.8  
Burgess & Key was McCormick's main agent and manufacturer of 
his machines for England. Relations between the parties were, 
however, strained, and Griffin tried to find a new partner, but in 
vain: for example, the respected house of Richard Garret & Son 
declined to make McCormick reapers under license if they had to 
compete with other makers. If McCormick wanted to continue his 
European business, he was forced, under the pressure of his 
brothers, to continue to rely on Burgess & Key.9 
The main marketing area for McCormick's reapers was England, 
but they had found their way also to continental Europe. In the 
mid-1850s, reapers were being sold in German states and in Warsaw. 
Russia was from the very beginning a lucrative possibility, with its 
huge acreage. Some machines were sold there, too and the Russian 
Consul General, J. de Nottbeck, made a request for two models for 
8 Burgess & Key almost stopped making McCormick's reapers in the beginning of 
the 1860s, and consequently machines had to be shipped from America. McCormick's 
decision in 1862 to form a manufacturing contract with the French house of Albaret 
et Cie. reflects the tensions between the parties. McCormick still continued to 
transport his machines in 1862, when he intended to send 50 machines to London 
and 50 to Hamburg. The machines normally arrived in England through Liverpool, 
and the recipient had to pay all the charges all the way from Chicago. James T. 
Griffin to C.H. McCormick 28.5.1863. Mss la, box 52; Carstensen 1984, 110; 
Heikkonen 1989, 145; T.B. Bunting & Co. to C.H. McCormick 29.5.1862. Mss 2a, 
box 23. 
9 Burgess & Key tried to benefit from McCormick's name and reputation, but to 
evade the license fees, by attaching additions of their own to machines; they also 
developed their own mower, and began to promote its sales by using McCormick's 
name, while producing only a few reapers. This of course led to a lengthy quarrel. 
J.T. Griffin to C.H. McCormick 3.12.1864. Mss la, box 54; Hutchinson 1930, 439; 
Burgess & Key's mower was a good and reliable machine and constructed for 
European conditions. That is why Griffin asked for permission from McCormick to 
sell it on continental Europe to compete with Walter A. Wood. The Company's reaper, 
on the contrary, was not recognized as equivalent to the original McCormick reaper. 
JT. Griffin to C.H. McCormick 21.1.1865. Mss la, box 54; J.T. Griffin to C.H. 
McCormick 9.9.1865 and Moritz & Joseph Friedlander (Breslau) to J.T. Griffin 
21.1.1867. Mss la, box 55. 
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the new Imperial Agricultural Museum at St Petersburg. ° 
Grain production in England, which was at first the main 
marketing area for the harvesting machines, began to diminish after 
the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. On the other hand, the U.S. 
Civil War, which interrupted American exports of grain, and 
simultaneous good harvests in the 1860s in Europe, gave a stimulus 
for grain growers, and the area under cultivation expanded until the 
general depression of the 1870s. The situation deteriorated as a result 
of a series of wet summers at the end of the decade. Consequently, 
the situation opened good opportunities for the harvester machine 
companies, especially in England, where farm labor was for the first 
time becoming scarce. Besides, the clientele was now expanding 
from the ranks of the estate owners to include tenant farmers. 
Furthermore, machine prices had fallen and their workmanship 
improved." 
When McCormick's European agent, James T. Griffin, arrived in 
Europe, he began energetically to appoint new agents and even had 
discussions in Prussia about the manufacture of machines. Prospects 
for larger sales in German states were not promising, however. 
Griffin had great difficulties in finding willing and competent agents. 
Dealers and jobbers had tried reapers without any success and spent 
too much money in vain. In that area the biggest obstacle to the 
spread of the reaping machines was cheap and abundant labor. In 
spite of the difficulties, Griffin continued his canvassing from Berlin 
to Vienna and Budapest, from there to Turin in Italy, and planned 
a trip to St Petersburg and Moscow. Finally he had appointed agents 
in German states, Russia, England, France, Austria and Romania. 
Central Europe and England were, however, the main marketing 
areas. Griffin had high expectations from Spain, but claimed that 
Italy was a hopeless country for reapers. In Hungary he saw good 
prospects for sales in the future.12 
10 Hutchinson 1930, 406-407; Gebrüder Butenose to Cyrus H. McCormick 20.7.1858. 
Mss. la, box 49; J. de Nottbeck to Cyrus H. McCormick 11.12.1860. Mss 2a, box 20; 
C.H. McCormick Esqr. Burgess & Key to C.H. McCormick. Royalty Account for 1863. 
Mss 2a, box 23. Burgess & Key's royalty account of 1862 confirms sales of 52 reapers, 
two of which were sold in Hamburg, and one each in Budapest, Wiesbaden and 
Florence. McCormick got four pounds on each machine as a royalty. In 1863 that 
made 208 pounds together. 
11 Tracy 1964, 43-46. 
12 After long discussions, agreement was finally reached, and in 1864 Mr. Pintus 
began to make machines for the Prussian markets. James T Griffin to Cyrus H. 
McCormick 28.2.1863. Mss la, box 53; Griffm assured that in time large sales would 
be achieved in Prussia. He expressed the importance of wellknown exhibitions such 
as that at Hamburg and furthermore of mailing circulars directly to would-be 
customers. Ibid. 
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Griffin's experiences correlate well with the information on the 
state of agriculture in various parts of Europe. England and parts of 
central Europe excluded, the market was not yet ripe in Europe for 
a large scale reaper trade. Only the wealthy estate owners were in 
a position to mechanize agriculture on their holdings. In Germany 
as late as in 1882, the use of the harvesting machines was limited 
to holdings larger than 180 hectares13. For the most part cheap labor 
connected to the high price of the machine and its inadequate 
workmanship, however, made the efforts of harvester agents useless. 
As a contemporary living amid the events, James T. Griffin either 
was not able to interpret the market correctly or then he really 
foresaw a niche for reapers. Anyway, Cyrus McCormick decided to 
strengthen his presence in the German-speaking area in 1864 by 
change to the jobbing-house system which was in use in America 
too. The appointed jobber, James R. McDonald & Co. of Hamburg, 
spent considerable sums on advertisements and posters, and was 
hopeful about future prospects.14 
Griffin's optimism soon changed to disappointment. In Central 
Europe there were a bunch of agent candidates but sales had not 
realized: Burgess & Key had sold only 42 machines on the Continent. 
Besides, Burgess & Key were concentrating more and more on the 
promotion of their own products in England. For the Continent they 
James T. Griffin to Cyrus H. McCormick 28.5. 1863. Mss la, box 53. Griffin estimates 
production costs in Prussia and calculates that timber was cheaper in Chicago but 
labor and iron about a third cheaper in Prussia and coal even half the price that it 
was in Chicago. Ibid. James T. Griffin to Cyrus H. McCormick 14.7.1864. Mss la, 
box 54. Griffin had in 1866 36 agents in Europe, of whom ten were in Germany. In 
Russia he had agents in Moscow, in St. Petersburg and in Odessa. Statement of 
Reaping Machines sold by Mr. Griffin of London. la, box 55. 
Hungary was so promising that Griffin even suggested after a dispute with Burgess 
& Key that production could have been moved to Budapest. James T. Griffin to C.H. 
McCormick 17.3.1866 and 19.1.1867. Mss la, box 55. 
13 Blaich 1984, 72. 
14 Griffin had a very ambitious marketing program too. In 1863 he published sales 
catalogs in his own name both in English and in French. The cover showed the 
Company's latest reaper, with an automatic sheaf delivery attachment, and the inner 
pages proclaimed its best abilities in work. The catalog also reveals all the trials where 
McCormick's reaper was exhibited during 1862, and carefully described all the 
changes in construction and their benefits. McCormick's reaping and mowing 
machine. Catalog 1863. Mss 5x, box 1. Besides, McCormick's reaper was exhibited 
at Turin and Cuneo in Italy, Budapest and Vienna, Grignon in France, Gembloux in 
Belgium, Moscow and St. Petersburg in Russia, Stanford-le-Hope, Hemel Hempsted, 
and Preston in England and Phantassie, Sterling, Berwickshire and Dunkeld in 
Scotland. Ibid. 
McDonald & Co. suggested that they could only be importers and that selling efforts 
had to be left to the agents. This way, the Company would take charge of the machine 
stock and then supply all the agents. James R. McDonald & Co. to James T. Griffin. 
26.10.1864. Mss 2a, box 25. 
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did not develop any organized system.15 
But there were still other problems to come. For years, agents had 
praised the quality of McCormick's reaper, but it was actually too 
heavy: a severe drawback in competition with Wood's and 
Samuelsson's lighter machines. McCormick's success in the agri-
cultural shows began to slow down, too. At the Plymouth 
Agricultural Fair, Walter A. Wood, Samuelson and Hornsby totally 
beat McCormick. 1865 also proved how closely interrelated were 
good weather and large sales of reapers. Griffin reported in August 
that the harvest in Germany had failed and his agents had suffered 
great losses; and in September he had to announce the total failure 
of the European harvest 16 
McCormick's confrontations with Burgess & Key were continual. 
Burgess & Key had developed their own mower and reaper models, 
and would have preferred their own production. Nevertheless, they 
were bound by agreement to make only McCormick's reapers. All 
these plans collapsed the next year. In spite of all their promises, 
Burgess & Key failed to push their business and sales effectively 
enough, and finally the company went into bankruptcy. The 
receivers for the bankrupt estate agreed on the continuation of 
business, but were reluctant to continue production of McCormick's 
reapers. Burgess & Key's mower was selling well in England, while 
demand for the McCormick reaper had sunk to 40 machines!' The 
company's bankruptcy was a minor catastrophe for McCormick. 
James T. Griffin made a contract for the unsold machines of Burgess 
& Key without McCormick's concession. Griffin and McCormick had 
also discussed Griffin's salary, which was tied to the volume of sales; 
15 On these machines Burgess & Key earned four pounds royalty per machine. The 
machines had no mowing attachment. Griffin also suggested changes in his own 
terms: he proposed that his salary be raised to 300 pounds a year, plus one pound 
for each machine sold. The licensee would have paid his travelling expenses if he 
was not working directly for McCormick. James T. Griffin to C.H. McCormick. Mss 
la, box 55. In 1865 Griffin appointed new agents in Leipzig, Oschusleben, 
Braunschweig and Hannover; in France, on the other hand, he had made no active 
efforts, and Russia offered also a severe setback. Twenty-eight machines in Moscow 
had to be returned unsold to London. McCormick's reapers were too expensive and 
heavy. Besides, there were no resources for such investments in Russia. Griffin's 
situation darkened further, when during 1865 two of his reliable Central European 
agents died. Griffin estimated his sales to reach at most 200 machines. Ibid. 
16JT. Griffin to C.H. McCormick 21.1.1865; 11.3.1865; 30.5.1865; 29.6.1865; 
8.7.1865; 21.7.1865; 9.8.1865; 9.9.1865. Mss la, box 55. 
17 In 1865, Griffin made a proposal for a new license, in which McCormick would 
have withdrawn from the trade and Burgess & Key would have exported all machines 
to the continent excluding France. The Receivers for Burgess & Key's bankruptcy 
demanded that McCormick pay in cash for all the machines that the company had 
made for the next year. Griffin asked McCormick to send 1000 pounds for the 
payment of about fifty machines. J.T. Griffin to C.H. McCormick 6.4.1867. Mss la, 
box 55. 
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as a result McCormick fired Griffin, but finally the parties agreed 
that before his final departure Griffin would put McCormick's 
business in order in Europe.i8  
News of Burgess & Key's bankruptcy and of Griffin's firing aroused 
serious concern among McCormick's agents. They wanted to know 
if McCormick intended to continue business, and expressed their 
preference to buy original American McCormicks rather than Burgess 
& Key's copies. Consequently, McCormick's sales faded out in 
Central Europe. In England there was still demand, but because of 
the ongoing dispute with Burgess & Key's bankrupt estate, the 
company was not able to supply enough machines.19 
Disputes with Burgess & Key were not McCormick's only 
problems. In spite of his reputation Cyrus had to work hard for 
every single contract. He was not the only reaper manufacturer in 
Europe, not even the only American reaper manufacturer. Obed 
Hussey had also made an appearance, though unhappily, at the 
Crystal Palace World Fair. Although he had little success at the Fair, 
Hussey managed to make contracts with Garret, William Dray and 
William Crosskill, and by 1852 claimed to have sold 1500 machines. 
William Crosskill also made Patrick Bell's reapers, however, and 
competition grew in 1853 when Manny and Atkins from the U.S. 
brought their machines to Europe as well. In 1858 Walter A. Wood, 
who at about that time began production in America, sent his agent 
to Europe with fifty reapers; the next year the volume increased to 
two hundred and fifty, and from then on Wood sold yearly over one 
thousand machines. It is, however, difficult to obtain exact sales 
figures for any other manufacturers. Moreover, the English 
companies of Samuelson and Hornsby were powerful competitors 
not only in their home fields. 
It has been difficult to draw an overall picture of the competition 
in Europe during the first two decades. From 1873, however, we 
know that at least Warder, Mitchell & Co., Johnston, the Austrian 
Hoffer's, the American Kirby's, Burdick, Buckeye, The Little 
Champion of Wisconsin and The Little Champion of Germany and 
Bradley's were being sold in Europe in addition to those mentioned 
above.20 Hutchison estimates that by 1859 Burgess & Key had sold 
up to about 2000 reapers and states that in 1861 it was still the 
18 J. T. Griffin to C.H. McCormick 24.10.1866, 29.10.1866, 19.1.1867, ?.2.1868. Mss 
la, box 55; Hutchinson 1935, 436-438. 
19 Moritz & Joseph Friedlander to C.H. McCormick 21.1.1867. Mss la, box 55; J.T. 
Griffin to C.H. McCormick 5.8.1867 and 20.8.1867. Mss la, box 55. 
20 Warder, Mitchell & Co. Catalog 1873. Mss 4z, box 24; Bradley Mfg. Co. Catalog 
1873. Mss 4z, box 2; Adriance, Platt & Co. Catalog 1875. Mss 4z, box 1. 
CYRUS HALL McCORMICK TURNS ABROAD, 1851 n 97 
most popular machine in Europe.21 If Hutchinson's information is 
reliable, it is very unlikely that Hussey or even Wood had been really 
as successful as they had claimed. 
American reaper manufacturers continued their rivalry on every 
possible level in Europe, with all the significant companies taking 
part. The patent war was also moved to Europe. American 
companies had to protect their machines both against their American 
competitors and against illegal European copying. In 1855, J.H. 
Manny had already taken out patents in Europe. The patent office 
of Robertson, Brooman & Co. took care of Cyrus McCormick's patent 
claims in most European countries. In 1868 McCormick held patents 
at least in England, in France, in Italy, in Austria, in Belgium and in 
some German states, such as Hamburg.22 The real value of the 
patents proved, nevertheless, insignificant. Cyrus McCormick's wife, 
Nettie Fowler McCormick, noted nearly twenty years later that over 
more than twenty-five years the Company had spent considerable 
sums on patents, but these had not protected it from patent 
infringements. Besides, the Company's European competitors were 
so irrelevant that she recommended abandoning the remaining 
patents.23  
4.2. The European trade fades away 
Burgess & Key's bankruptcy and the firing of his salaried European 
agent James T. Griffin in 1867 were severe setbacks for McCormick's 
business in Europe. In the aftermath of the Burgess & Key fiasco, 
Griffin tried to arrange the production of reapers with its successor, 
Burgess & Co., and with some German manufacturers and one in 
Hungary.24 The old models, nevertheless, he was obliged to sell at 
21 Hutchinson 1930, 392, 399-401, 412-413; Heikkonen 1989, 144-145; McCormick 
1931, 55-57; The Eight Census. Manufacturers of the U.S 1860, 1865, ccxii; The 
Farm Implement News 21.3.1892, vol. XIII no.3, 19. 
22 Patent laws varied from country to country. The German states were especially 
problematic for foreign companies; for example in 1868 the Patent Office of Prussia 
stated that they were unable to continue McCormick's patents because the patented 
device was already in common use. In France annual patent costs were ten pounds 
and in England renewal of a patent cost 100 pounds. Robertson, Brooman & Co. to 
J.T. Griffin 18.1.1868, 29.9.1868, 2.11.1868, 12.11.1868. Mss la, box 56; Berlin 
Patent Agent to J.T. Griffin 17.1.1868. Mss la, box 56. 
23 Nettie McCormick to C.H. McCormick Jr. 13.10.1883. Mss lb, box 20. 
24 Burgess Co. offered machines at a price not to exceed 16 pounds but Griffin had 
serious doubts whether they would make McCormicks even without the royalty and 
certainly not with the royalty. He was likewise skeptical about the next summer's 
prospects. Griffin estimated that the trade should be at least 500 pounds plus expenses 
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extremely low prices. McCormick's reapers, which normally sold for 
ca. 30 to 40 pounds sterling, were disposed of for little over five 
pounds.25 
Cyrus McCormick did not want to give up, despite all the 
difficulties that had filed up before him in Europe. He personally 
took part in the 1867 World Fair in Paris and once again achieved 
the highest honors. Together with Walter A. Wood, he won the gold 
medal of the Fair and was appointed a Chevalier in the Legion of 
Honor. McCormick crowned his triumph with a contract for two 
reapers with the Emperor of France, Napoleon III. News from the 
Paris World Fair spread rapidly in Europe. Information was spread 
at least in France by advertisements in newspapers and agricultural 
magazines. Newspapers were, however, not always sources of 
neutral and impartial knowledge. A. Albaret, who was McCormick's 
manufacturer for the French market, promised to arrange articles by 
two journalists "in their papers in praise of your (McCormick's) 
machine".26 
MI these marvelous achievements, nevertheless, failed to save 
McCormick's situation in Europe. He continued to manufacture most 
of the machines sold in Europe at Burgess & Co., and Albaret & Cie. 
manufactured reapers for the French trade. In Germany he appointed 
James R. McDonald as his main agent in 1868.27 
but the continental sales would not be enough alone. James 7: Griffin to C.H. 
McCormick 16.1.1868. Mss la, box 56. By April, Griffin, fired by McCormick, was 
back in America again and with some bitterness wrote to the superintendent of the 
McCormick Co., Mr. Spring, who probably was his old friend, expressing his wish 
to see Leander McCormick. Furthermore he predicted that after his departure "all 
that he (Cyrus McCormick) has abroad will go to the dogs". J.T. Griffin to Mr. Spring 
6.4.1868. Mss la, box 56. Griffin mentioned in his letter that he had a good offer to 
return to England; this warning was realized when Griffin moved to Walter A. Wood's 
camp and became Wood's main agent in Europe. J.R. McDonald to C.H. McCormick 
5.4.1872. Mss la, box 56. 
25 J.7: Griffin to C.H. McCormick 1.2.1868. Mss la, box 56; Sales account of J.T. 
Griffin, 1864. la, box 55. 
26 Bericht über die WeltAustellung zur Paris im Jahre 1867. Herausegaben durch 
das K.K. Österreichische Central-Comite. Mss 6x, box 1; Le Moniteur universel. 6 
Janvier 1868. Mss 6x, box 1; A.Albaret to C.H. McCormick 20.4.1868. Mss la, box 
56; Heikkonen 1989, 158. 
27 McDonald had already been McCormick's agent since 1864 and knew the systems, 
and was one of McCormick's most reliable representatives who could announce to 
Chicago the sale of 63 reapers. This was, however, an insignificant amount overall 
and besides, could hardly guarantee any profits. He had to buy machines in cash 
from Burgess & Co. and pay a three pound royalty for each machine to McCormick. 
This left McDonald only two pounds commission, from which he also had to cover 
advertising expenses. James R. McDonald to C.H. McCormick 21.8.1868. Mss la, box 
56; McDonald paid 20 pounds for each reaper to Burgess & Co. In addition he had 
to pay three pounds royalty plus two pounds for freights, making 25 pounds for each 
machine. McDonald considered it too risky a business; especially if the trade expanded, 
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Burgess & Key continued to press McCormick. They demanded 
that McDonald should buy at least 500 reapers for cash, declined to 
finance advertising or show expenses, and declared themselves free 
from liability for possible breakages in their machines. Cyrus 
McCormick had apparently begun to have second thoughts about 
the European business, but McDonald encouraged him to continue 
in spite of the modest benefits. Reapers had now been introduced 
to European farmers, and had become a regognized necessity on the 
Continent.28 
McDonald's anticipation of a large trade was not realized. In 1871 
he complained about poor sales. In 1869 he had bought 200 reapers, 
40 of which had remained unsold. Next year McDonald took only 
112 machines, and still the number of unsold reapers increased. He 
noted the possible effects of the Franco-Prussian War, but the biggest 
obstacle was the machine itself. The McCormick reaper was too 
heavy, and for this reason unsuitable for German conditions; besides, 
it was too expensive. These factors gave McCormick's competitors 
an advantage, and McDonald had great difficulties to find new 
agents. 29 
It is difficult to obtain accurate figures for McCormick's foreign 
trade from the first years of business, since this was totally Cyrus 
it would bind up too much cash money. J.R. McDonald to C.H. McCormick 2.10.1868. 
Mss la, box 56. 
According to Hutchinson James R. McDonald was the U.S. consul in Hamburg. 
Hutchinson 1935, 423. 
28 J.R. McDonald to C.H. McCormick 29.1.1869. Mss la, box 56. 
29 J.R. McDonald to C.H. McCormick 1.4.1871. Mss la, box 56. McDonald & Co. 
worked hard to increase sales, but had to admit weaknesses in the construction of 
the McCormick reaper. Besides, Burgess & Key could not produce a machine suitable 
for Germany, and were more interested in their English trade, where they had their 
own machine on sale. McDonald & Co. was McCormick's main agent for Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, but was also selling Walter A. Wood's machines. Sales of Wood's 
machines increased every year. Wood shipped reapers and mowers directly from 
America and, most importantly, introduced machines that were in demand. It was 
therefore no wonder that finally, after many warnings, McDonald declined to do 
further business with machines made by Burgess & Key. Burgess & Key to James R. 
McDonald & Co. 25.4.1872. Mss la, box 56; James R. McDonald & Co. to C.H. 
McCormick 5.4.1872, 2.12.1873, 3.2.1874, 22.4.1874, •Mss la, box 56; James R. 
McDonald to C.H. McCormick 27.7.1875. Mss la, box 58; McCormick's 
Getraide-Mähmaschine. Catalog of James R. McDonald & Co. 1870. Mss 5x, box 2. 
To increase the fame of his machines Cyrus McCormick decided to take part in the 
Vienna International Exposition of 1873, and despite many difficulties his "Advance" 
reaper obtained a gold medal of merit. McCormick also received a bunch of 
applications from new agents for the representation of his machines. Vienna Awards. 
C.H. & L.J. McCormick. Mss la, box 56; Fourteen Highest Prize Medals Awarded 
the Champion in Europe for 1873. Warder, Michell & Co. Mss 4z, bobx 24; Bradley 
Mfg. Co. Catalog 1873. Mss 4z, box 2; G.E. Illingsworth to C.H. McCormick 18.6.1870 
Mss la, box 56; Gülich & Koeppel to C.H. McCormick 9.11.1872. Ibid; Henri Lion 
to C.H. McCormick 3.6.1876. 
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McCormick's own private affair, separate from the company 
business. Furthermore, a large proportion of the machines were 
made in Europe, but simultaneously reapers were also shipped from 
America. Although James T. Griffin was McCormick's general agent, 
it is not sure that all the machines were in his balances. Normally 
very reliable, William T. Hutchinson estimated that up to 1859 about 
2000 reapers had been sold in Europe and that in 1861 McCormick 
was still the market leader.3°  
Nevertheless, McCormick lost his market position rapidly during 
the 1860s. In 1866, 267 reapers were sent for sale and 209 of them 
were sold. The total value of reaper sales was about 8115 pounds, 
from which we have to subtract agent charges and commissions.31  
James R. McDonald claimed in 1866 to have sold only 40 reapers, 
and in 1868 his balance shows sales of 63 reapers of which he 
remitted three pounds royalty per reaper to McCormick. It is of 
course possible that some machines were imported directly from 
America, especially when sales the next year increased to 160 
reapers. According to Hutchinson, McDonald sold in 1870-1875 
altogether 238 reapers. Because information is very fragmentary and 
partly difficult to interpret, the researcher has to be satisfied with 
an approximation for total sales in 1868-1875, which seems to be 
about 600 reapers.32 The Statistical Abstract of the U.S. reports the 
total export of mowers and reapers in 1870 as only 537 machines, 
and for the next year 3342.33 McCormick's sales in Europe at the 
end of the 1860s were so minimal that they offered hardly anything 
else than some mariginal fame for the inventor. 
An additional reason for this dramatic drop can be found in the 
competitive companies. Cyrus McCormick and Obed Hussey were 
among the first to open doors for American manufacturers in 
Europe.34 During the 1870s, the reaper had made a breakthrough 
30 Hutchinson 1935, 412-413; Heikkonen 1989, 151. 
31 Statement of Reaping Machines sold by Mr. Griffin of London 1866. Mss la, box 
55. Agents' commission was approximately ten percent, which made 525 pounds for 
209 reapers. Agents' charges were 2020 pounds. Griffin's statement also reveals the 
number and distribution of agents. McCormick had 37 agents, of whom ten were in 
Germany. The number of agents in Russia is astonishing: eight altogether, in St. 
Petersburg, Odessa, Moscow and Riga. 
32James R. McDonald to C.H. McCormick 31.12.1868 and 31.12.1869. Mss la, box 
56; Hutchinson 1935, 440-441; Heikkonen 1989, 153. 
33 Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1878. p. 91. 
34 Other American harvesting machine companies followed their example, and Walter 
A. Wood succeeded in conquering the leading position. The 1860 Census maintains 
that in 1858 Wood sent fifty reapers to Europe, and the next year already one 
thousand. The latter, however, is evidently a huge overestimate. Nevertheless, 
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among wealthy farmers in Europe. It had an established and growing, 
although still relatively small, demand.35 Increasing demand attracted 
new manufacturers in the field. At least Johnston's reaper had been 
exhibited in 1871 in Hungary and, in 1873, at the Vienna 
International Exposition all the leading American and European 
reapers fought for the victory36. The contest spread rapidly to almost 
every corner in Europe where grain was grown. Adriance, Platt & 
Co. competed during 1873 at least in Prussia, Holland, Hungary, 
Norway, Sweden, Posen and Hannover against Samuelson, Hornsby, 
Wood, Brigham, Bramlette, Burdick, Kirby, Bickerton, Champion, 
Howard, Hubbard and Excelsior.37 Three years later, in 1876, in the 
seventh general meeting of the Finnish farmers, nine machines were 
exhipited. What was interesting in this show was the two Swedish 
companies who exhipited their mowers. Westerås had its Buckeye 
and Palmcranz its one horse mower. Palmcranz had possibly 
manufactured its own model but Westerås made its mower very 
likely under license to the Buckeye line.38 
although this information has to be approached with caution, the fact is that Wood 
expanded his sales, won important trials and gained reputation and reliability. In 1864 
Wood seems to have sold at least 300 machines in Moscow and the following year 
he sold 250 machines in England to Chuttleworth & Co. Since information on Wood's 
sales comes from Griffin's letters and from other secondary sources, it is obvious that 
his trade may have been much larger. By 1868 at the latest, Wood had two branch 
offices in Europe, in London and Madrid, and two years later a third one, in Paris. 
Although there were also other American manufacturers competing for the slowly 
growing European trade, the real contest was between Wood, the English firms 
Samuelson and Hornsby, and in the 1860s during Griffin's period, also McCormick. 
James T Griffin to C.H. McCormick 10.12.1864 and 9.9.1865. Mss la, box 55. Wood 
too had problems with his business and a bad harvest put obstacles in every 
manufacturer's way. Because of the failed harvest, according to Griffin, Shuttleworth 
was able to sell only 6 reapers. Ibid. Walter A. Wood. Circular for the Year 1868 
and 1870. Mss 4z, box 24. See for instance J. T. Griffin to C.H. McCormick 8.7.1865 
and 21.7.1865. Mss la, box 55. Once again Griffin complains of the weight of the 
McCormick reapers and claims that Samuelson had sold over 300 reapers during the 
season. 
35 In Germany Gülich & Koeppels alone announced having arranged sales of 1500 
machines. Gülich & Koeppel to Messiers McCormick Brothers 9.11.1872. Mss la, box 
56. 
36 Bradley Mfg. Co. Catalogue 1873. Mss 4z, box 2. Among the companies were 
Aultman, Miller & Co., Adriance, Platt & Co., Johnston Harvester Co., Osborne & 
Co., Sprague Mowing Machine Co., Warder, Mitchell & Co., Walter A. Wood and 
McCormick from America, Hornsby and Samuelsson from England, and some smaller 
Austrian and German manufacturers. Fourteen Highest Prize Medals awarded to the 
Champion in Europe for 1873. Warder, Mitchell & Co. 1873. Mss 4z, box 24; Vienna 
awards 1873. C.H. & L.J. McCormick. Mss la, box 56. 
37 The Premium Harvester of the World. The Buckeye Mower & Reaper. No date. 
Mss 4z, box 1. 
38 Kertomus seitsemännestä yleisestä Suomen Maanvilfelys•kokouksesta...1876, 
103-105. The companies were Adriance, Platt & Co, Champion, Hornsby, Palmcranz, 
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The history of McCormick's European business begins with an 
energetic push into the markets. Why did he not, in spite of all the 
warnings and advice from Europe, change the construction of his 
machines, start shipping machines from Chicago and get rid of the 
annoying partnership with Burgess & Key? In a word, why did he 
not fight for and defend his position in Europe with the same vigor 
as in America? 
Fred Carstensen stresses that prestige and boosting of domestic 
trade were the main reasons for McCormick's foreign enterprise.39 
This explanation seems to be accurate. McCormick very aggressively 
used his success in European Fairs on the domestic American 
markets.40 McCormick took part in almost every major international 
fair after his triumph in London41. Triumphs on foreign fields were 
utilized on the home markets, but so were his competitors' 
triumphs.42 Victories in trials and fairs were used to expand foreign 
Walter A. Wood, Westerås, Aultman, Miller & Co., William Anson Wood and Johnston. 
Ibid. Heikkonen 1983, 84. 
In Germany especially Johnston had managed to make large sales and also Champion 
was gaining new ground. James R. McDonald & Co. to C.H. McCormick 5.4. 1872. 
Mss la, box 56. 
But, in spite of the increasing competition, Walter A. Wood was able to hold its 
position as the leading reaper manufacturer in Europe. It had employed James T. 
Griffin as its main agent and used hard and agressive sales methods. When, in 1872, 
other manufacturers raised their prices by ten percent, Wood held his old prices to 
outdo his competitors. The next year Griffin had his son and two travellers in Europe 
and intended to sell 1000 machines in Germany and Austria alone. For 1874 he had 
plans for the shipment of 3000-4000 machines to Hamburg, 800 to Bremen and 800 
to Rotterdam. James R. McDonald anticipated a great rush of American companies in 
Europe and was ready to introduce McCormick's new reaper but not the one made 
by Burgess & Key. Besides, the machine should be light. James R. McDonald to C.H. 
McCormick 4.6.1873 and 2.12.1873. Mss la, box 56. In April 1874 McDonald 
confirmed this information by reporting that Walter A. Wood had agents who were 
contracting for up to 1000 machines. Furthermore, he himself had a customer in a 
small province, who had already ordered 124 implements and expected to go up to 
200. Ibid. 3.2.1874 and 22.4.1874. Mss la, box 56. 
39 Carstensen 1984, 109. 
40 Atkins, for example, attacked McCormick in his 1856 catalog, and declared 
McCormick's success in the 1855 Paris exhibition was inflated. Furthermore, Atkins 
claimed that McCormick had to go abroad to get premiums and continued that "your 
success... was owing less to the work in the field... than to the ability of your agents 
in humbugging the committee." Atkins' Automaton 1856. Mss 4z, box 1. 
41 Besides the large international exhibitions machines were also exhibited in 
numerous agricultural societies' trials and shows. These local fairs were in many cases 
more important for concrete sales than those for the large audience. Cyrus McCormick 
won for example the 1853 and 1862 silver medals of the Royal North Lancashire 
Agricultural Society and the 1863 gold medal awarded by the French Minister of 
Agriculture at the agricultural fair in Lille. McCormick Company. Catalog 1882. Mss 
5x, box 1. 
42 John H. Manny advertised in 1855 that his machine had also been patented in 
Europe, and in 1857-1858 Talcott, Emerson & Co. announced that Manny's reaper 
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trade, too. For example, the news of McCormick's victory at the 
Paris World Fair in 1855, where he won the Grand Medal of Honor, 
was imediately publicized to a larger audience through the press. 
European farmers were as conservative and as reluctant customers 
as their American counterparts; they wanted to see the machines in 
practise, and the machines which worked most effectively reaped 
the sales.43  
When Cyrus McCormick had disputes with his English lisencee 
Burgess & Key, he had to send his machines from Chicago. This put 
a heavy burden on the factory that still relied on crude and simple 
production methods. It could not adjust its patterns according to 
the requirements of the European conditions. The European models 
were seen as a hindrance to the domestic business. During 
1851-1876 McCormick sold about 4 000 machines in Europe while 
they sold more than 4 000 machines in the state of Iowa, alone, in 
1875.44 
McDonald's complaints about the reaper were illustrative of 
McCormick's reaper business during the early years in Europe, where 
he tried to sell the same basic American reaper to European 
customers without taking local conditions into account. A partial 
explanation for this stubborn attitude can be found from the 
expanding domestic markets. Coverage was larger and easier to 
obtain there than in Europe. Especially if McCormick's share of the 
U.S. trade was only 5 percent as Olmstead and Rhode have 
calculated45, there were good incentives to push on at the home 
front. 
During the civil war, American reaper manufacturers enjoyed 
prosperous times. In spite of the numerous patent cases nearly all 
the companies could increase their business. Also McCormick & 
Brothers increased their output. Cyrus himself found it wiser to 
move abroad where he stayed until 1864. This way he was able to 
stay neutral in the war and also to push his European trade. When 
he returned to the U.S. in 1864, he met the combined resistance of 
his brothers for his ideas of an even larger turnout than before. 
Although the company was not able to satisfy the demand, Leander 
had won the silver medal at the Paris World Fair in 1855 and the gold medal, also 
at Paris, the next year. J.H. Manny. Catalog 1855. Mss 4z, box 14; Talcott, Emerson 
& Co. Catalog 1857-1858. Mss 4z, box 22. 
43 McCormick 1931, 56; James T. Griffin to C.H. McCormick 3.6.1863, 4.8.1864, 
21.7.1865. Mss la, box 55. 
44 Kuuse 1974, 272. 
45 Olmstead-Rhode 1995, 28. 
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opposed expansion. Leander's and Cyrus' business ideologies were 
contradictory and their personal relations deteriorated year after year 
when Cyrus began to take an active part in the business. After 
William's death in 1865, Charles Spring followed him as General 
Manager. Spring began to make the company's sales organization 
more effective and also advocated a more agressive marketing 
strategy. Not until the great fire of Chicago destroyed McCormick 
factory were there any possibilities for changes. As Hounshell has 
shown, the company, and especially Leander as the Superintendent, 
were not able to utilize the possibilities that the situation offered, 
when the new and larger factory was built. Production technology 
and machinery stayed practically the same as before and did not 
change until the firing of Leander.46 
When this background is taken into account, also the decline in 
the European business and Cyrus's obvious reluctance to spend more 
energy becomes more understandable. He could not provide all the 
machines even to meet the American demand and had to rely in 
Europe on Burgess & Key. The McCormick Company was not able 
or willing to produce reapers for Europe and so they did not listen 
to McDonalds' requests for modifications in the models and as a 
consequence lost the battle in Europe. 
Why did Cyrus not then simply retreat from Europe? He could still 
use his achievements in Europe to promote his sales on the domestic 
field. Besides, European business did not stress Cyrus economically 
too heavily. McDonald bought his machines in cash f.o.b. in New 
York or from Burgess & Key and he earned a royalty for each 
machine sold. Thus, business was in a way self-sufficient, did not 
strain too much economically and McCormick's name did not vanish 
totally from Europe. 
Alfred Chandler's remark that although the first great businessmen 
were brilliant strategists, "their moves were personal responses to 
new needs and opportunities. They did not plan systematically for 
the continuing growth of the enterprise".47 This explanation may 
resolve some of the questions around the early stages of 
McCormick's foreign enterprise. 
46 Hounshell 1987, 167-175. Fred Carstensen maintains that after his return in 1865 
(should be 1864) Cyrus moved to New York and gave little attention to the reaper 
business "domestic or foreign". Carstensen 1984, 111. However, he had at that time 
major patent cases pending and fought for the business in that sector. Besides, as 
emerges from Hounshell's research, the brothers had continuous disputes over 
production. 
47 Chandler 1977, 414. 
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• The New Start in Europe, 
1878-1894 
5.1. Slow recovery with the self-binder 
In spite of their strained personal relations, Cyrus and Leander 
McCormick expanded their business and added new models to their 
production lines. One of the most important and crucial inventions 
was the wire-binder. McCormick's made their first experimental 
machines in 1875 and in 1876, and began large-scale production in 
1877.1 The wire-binder also made it possible for Cyrus McCormick 
to return to the European field. 
In 1875, at the time when his European busines was dying off, 
Cyrus McCormick appointed a Dane, A.A. Westengaard, as his agent 
in Denmark. Westengaard came to Denmark with high expectations 
and began energetically to recruit agents and advertise McCormick's 
"Advance" reaper and mower. In spite of his efforts, Westengaard in 
1877 finally had to admit that establishing a market in bad harvest 
years and against acute competion was too laborious.2 A.A. Westen- 
1 Miller 1902, 36-37; Ardrey 1894, 74-77; Rogin 1931, 110-112. 
2 A.A. Westengaard to C.H. McCormick 1.2.1876, 18.2.1876, 1.9.1876. Mss la, box 
66. 17.2.1877. Mss la, box 70. 6.4.1877 Mss 2x, box 180; Agreement of James T. 
Mason and Cyrus H, McCormick 16.11.1876. Mss 2a, box 56. In the agreement Rush 
T. Mason agreed to sell on commission the unsold machines of A.A. Westengaard. 
Westengaard landed in a highly competitive market in Denmark. In the machine test 
arranged in 1875 in Tastumsö, there were 9 reapers and 8 combined reapers and 
mowers tested. Unfortunately the manufacturers or brandnames are not mentioned 
in the report of the test. Jörgensen 1902, 12-21. 
Although the Danish enterprise did not find enough wind under its wings, it gives a 
vivid picture of the complex conditions of the grass-root business. Westengaard had 
to arrange the shipment of the machines, to assemble and try them out, and of course 
take care of advertising. Westengaard started in Denmark an American style marketing 
program. He published advertisements in the newspapers and agricultural magazines, 
spread posters in hotels and tried to recruit agents. Furthermore, machines were 
exhibited in numerous field tests and expositions, in Sweden as well. For the most 
part, the potential customers came from the ranks of the estate owners, and possibly 
the larger peasant farmers who bought their machines in partnership. Already at that 
time it was considered essential for further sales to make customers satisfied. A 
satisfied buyer was the best advertisement. By experience, Westengaard learned to 
know how fundamental an element weather was in the harvester business. Equally 
important was to have the machines shipped as early in the spring as possible in 
order to assemble them and distribute them to the agents, because most sales were 
made just before harvest time. A.A. Westengaard to C.H. McCormick 1.2.1876, 
18.2.1876, 1.3.1876, 1.8.1876, 1.9.1876, 1.11.1876. Mss la, box 66; 17.2.1877. Mss 
la, box 70. 
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gaard was a victim of bad luck and probably of bad management. 
On the other hand, time also worked against him. He arrived in 
Denmark during great changes in the agricultural production 
structure. Grain growing was giving way to dairy production, and 
as a result demand for reapers diminished while demand for mowers 
increased. 
Simultanously with the Danish enterprise, Cyrus McCormick 
intended to nominate a new main European agent to promote his 
business. In 1876 he made an agreement with an Englishman, Rush 
T. Mason, to represent his machines; he had also received offers 
from numerous applicants for agencies in Europe.3 These 
propositions reveal the fact that in spite of his now reduced stance, 
customers had not forgotten McCormick's name and reputation, and 
were eagerly waiting for his new harvester. 
In his agreement with McCormick, Rush T. Mason undertook to 
exhibit the new McCormick "automatic binder" and to take for sale 
at least ten binders, one hundred and fifty "Advance" reapers and 
four hundred mowing machines. The terms were those customary 
in McCormick's foreign trade: machines were to be delivered free 
on board a steamer at an Atlantic port at sixty days' notice. The 
contract was made for one year only and during its duration Mason 
had exclusive sales rights in Europe. Furthermore, Mason agreed to 
procure patents for the new binder in Britain, Germany and possibly 
in Hungary, too.4 
Cyrus McCormick had been in the business for so many years that 
he knew the meaning of publicity for trade, and sent his new binder 
to the Liverpool Agricultural Show. His son, Cyrus Jr., and an expert 
mechanic, F.C. Newell, followed the machines to England. On the 
fair ground, McCormick's foremost competitors were Walter A. 
Wood and D.M. Osborne. Preparations for the trial showed that the 
binder needed to be adjusted for the heavy European grains; 
furthermore, European farmers, like their American counterparts, 
3 Agreement between Rush T. Mason and Cyrus H. McCormick 16.11.1876. Mss 
2a, box 56; J.W. Snedeker to C.H. and L.J. McCormick 14, 1876 and Julius Damus 
to C.H. McCormick October 1876. Mss 2x, box 196. 
4 Agreement between Rush T. Mason and Cyrus H. McCormick 16.11.1876. Mss 
2a, box 56. The agent's price for the binder was thirty-six pounds, twenty-one for 
the "Advance" and thirteen for the mower. 
When Cyrus McCormick had made the decision to return to the foreign field, he 
commenced with great vigor. He sent two of his binders at short notice to his old 
agent in Hamburg, James R. McDonald, who very cordially declined to do any more 
business with the McCormicks. He had still sixty-one unsold old reapers in his 
possession and had decided to sell them by public auction. Walter A. Wood had 
nominated McDonald as his main agent in Germany, and besides, McDonald 
anticipated major problems in organizing a totally new network of agencies all over 
Europe. James R. McDonald to C.H. McCormick 6.2.1877 and 7.7.1877. Mss la, box 
69. 
110 n THE NEW START IN EUROPE, 1878-1894 
also had objections to wire as a binding material. A sale could also 
depend on minor details, like the nippers to cut the wire before 
threshing. Moreover, the Liverpool show confirmed how unreliable 
the results of these tests were. One of the judges was inclined to 
McCormick's side, the second to Osborne, and the third's opinions 
were not known before the trial. It was likewise important to make 
a good expression on the public. For this reason, F.C. Newell had 
acquired a pair of iron-grey horses, on which the animals' 
perspiration would be less visible.5 
The promising start in Britain was followed by a severe setback 
when Rush T. Mason suddenly died, just before the Liverpool Show. 
Cyrus decided to continue preparations for the trial and began to 
seek a new agent. At the same time his machines made an invasion 
in New Zealand, when Newell sold fifty machines to Morrow, Basset 
& Co. and made an equal contract with another dealer from the 
same country.6 
Newell, however, met obstacles that he could not overcome. 
Walter A. Wood was too strong and influential a competitor. He had 
established his name over many years, and knew the tricks to handle 
the jurors. Moreover, McCormick's binder needed adjustments for 
the local conditions. Consequently, the Liverpool Show was a defeat. 
McCormick had made an agreement with Rush T. Mason, but he 
also had another contract, with the house of Brown, Shiply & Co. 
Newell complained that these two firms treated each other jealously, 
were only interested in the commissions, and would sell only for 
cash. This had sabotaged the sales and neither firm had made any 
efforts to promote and make the binder known.?  
Newell also proposed a scenario of the manner in which future 
business should be conducted. McCormick should avoid commission 
agents and sell directly to responsible dealers. Dealers would need 
exact terms of trade, since they had no time to consult with the 
Chicago factory. Newell also underlined the importance of personal 
influence, which was lost with the prevailing system. Without a 
complete system of agencies like Walter A. Wood and Osborne had, 
business in Europe would only gather expenses.8 
5 C.H. McCormick to Messrs. Brown, Shipley & Co. 22.6.1877. Mss la, box 68; P.C. 
Newell to C.H. McCormick 11.7.1877. Mss la, box 69; F.C. Newell to C.H. McCormick 
11.7.1877. Mss 2a, box 56; Cyrus McCormick Jr, to C.H McCormick 13.7.1877. Mss 
2b, box 15; F.C. Newell to C.H. McCormick 15.7.1877. Mss la, box 69. 
6 F.C. Newell to C.H. McCormick 15.7. and 5.8.1877. Mss la, box 69. 
7 F.C. Newell to C.H. McCormick 20.7.1877. Mss lx, box 181; 20.7.1877, 5.8.1877, 
6.8.1877, 27.8.1877 and 12.9.1877. Mss 2a, box 56. 
8 F.C. Newell to C.H. McCormick 18.7.1877 and 6.8.1877. Mss 2a, box 56. 
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Cyrus McCormick probably adopted or at least listened to F.C. 
Newell's advice, for in the fall he appointed O.S. Gage from Chicago 
as his agent for Britain, Germany and Austria. Gage agreed to exhibit 
the binder and other machines at the important Smithfield Cattle 
Show in December 1877, and to establish agencies in the countries 
mentioned. In return, McCormick guaranteed the services of an 
expert to assist him at trials and in setting up the machines. O.S. 
Gage introduced Waite, Burnell & Co. to Cyrus and recommended 
making an agreement with them for business in Britain for the 
harvest of 1878.9 
In spite of these new agents, the McCormick factory was not in 
a state to provide Europe with adequate machines. The 
Superintendent of the factory, F. H. Mathews, informed Cyrus that 
they were able to make only minor changes in the structure of the 
machines for Europe; otherwise they would be forced to make totally 
new models, which would have been too expensive at that stage. 
Another problem was Leander McCormick, who declined to have 
One of McCormick's machines was sold at 59 pounds and the other at 60 pounds. 
McCormick asked James R. McDonald to sell machines in Germany too at 60 pounds. 
McDonald sold Wood's machines at the same price and received a discount of 27.5 
to 30 percent on each machine. Newell knew that Wood had closed a deal at 45 
pounds on a lot of fifty machines for Australia and that Osborne was selling at 40 
pounds in lots from fifteen to fifty also to Australia. P.C. Newell to C.H. McCormick 
18.7.1877, 6.8.1877 and 12.9.1877. Mss 2a, box 56; James R. McDonald to C.H. 
McCormick 27.7.1877. Mss la, box 69. 
9 In the agreement McCormick undertook to furnish machines to the ports of entry 
in Europe, from which points transportation expenses and commission were to be 
added to the port of entry price and thus collected from the purchasers. Gage's 
commission was confirmed at ten percent. In addition, McCormick agreed to pay in 
advance $3000 as commission and a loan of $2000 for Gage to begin the business. 
Agreement between Cyrus H. McCormick and O.S. Gage 1.12.1877. Mss la, box 68. 
McCormick had already sent an expert to set up machines in summer 1877 and now 
in his agreement with Gage promised at his own expense to provide such advice. 
This was the first step towards completion of the Company's foreign organization, 
although as Fred Carstensen has noted this happened only just before the founding 
of the International Harvester Co. in 1902. Carstensen 1984, 117. O.S. Gage to C.H. 
McCormick 2.2.1878. Mss la, box 71; Waite, Burnell & Co. to Richard McCormick 
11.8.1877. Mss la, box 70. Waite, Burnell & Co. had previously sold Walter A. Wood's 
machine and Buckeyes'. The Company asked in its application for sales rights for 
France, Italy and Algeria. Ibid. Points for a contract between Cyrus H. McCormick 
and Waite, Burnell & Co. No date. In the draft agreement Waite, Burnell & Co. 
agreed to buy two hundred binders at a price not exceeding 65 pounds for the 
customers. Ibid. James R. McDonald, to whom McCormick had sent two of his 
binders, also expressed his willingness to sell again in larger amounts. This was 
probably because of the outcome of the previous year's business with the Woods. 
McDonald also recommended the exhibition the next summer in Hamburg, where 
people would gather from all over Germany and Scandinavia. James R. McDonald to 
C.H. McCormick 16.1.1878. Mss la, box 72. McDonald fmally had to withdraw his 
offer when Walter A. Wood refused permission. J.R. McDonald to C.H. McCormick 
4.4.1878. Mss la, box 72. 
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anything to do with the European business.10  
Nevertheless, Cyrus Sr. decided once again to send, at his own 
expense, an expert to help Gage. Louis Frank was in Britain by May. 
He informed Cyrus of the severe competition in the United Kingdom 
and also of the inadequate packing of the machines." Cyrus Jr. 
followed him in June and was instructed by his father to look after 
Gage and his undertakings. Cyrus Sr. was not yet quite sure of the 
European business and its possibilities, for he asked his son to "take 
into account the low wages of agricultural laborers, the value of the 
grain saved by the use of the machine, the expense of introduction, 
and all points in connection with the subject". This comment shows 
how aware Cyrus was of European market conditions and of the 
factors affecting them.'Z 
When Cyrus Sr. gave instructions to his son, he simultaneously 
had to fight Leander, who had communicated with other 
manufacturers proposing to them the use of some of the Company's 
patents. Leander had also raised the question of the originality of 
Cyrus's patent and opened a decades-long debate over the origin 
and invention of the reaper. Leander stated that their father was the 
real inventor of the reaper.13 The brothers' antagonism had been 
obvious for decades and had merely worsened over the years; its 
impact was also felt in the daily functions of the factory, as well as 
in the foreign trade, which Leader staunchly opposed. 
1878 was crucial for McCormick's future foreign business. Cyrus 
Jr's travel to and preparations for the Royal Agricultural Society's 
show in Bristol reveal the state of McCormick's establishment in 
Europe. The nippers which had caused difficulties the previous year 
were still missing, nobody had sent invoices to the new agent Waite, 
Burnell, Huggins & Co., nor to McDonald, there were no price lists 
for spare parts and no price for binding wire. Furthermore, many 
10 F.H. Mathews to C.H. McCormick 1.12.1877. Mss 3a, box 5. 
The role of Nettie McCormick begins to become more and more visible in foreign 
business during 1878. In her letter to Cyrus Jr., who at the time was in college at 
Princeton, she expressed her good opinion of Gage. Nettie regretted that they (Nettie 
and Cyrus Sr.) had been able to send only 15 machines adapted for European 
conditions, since "the others" (Leander and his son Hall) had already stopped making 
them. Nettie McCormick to Cyrus Jr. 23.5.1878. Mss lb, box 25 vol. 1. 
11 Louis Frank to C.H. McCormick 1.6.1878. Mss 2a, box 56. 
12 Cyrus H. McCormick Sr. to Cyrus H. McCormick Jr. 17.6.1878. Mss la, box 72. 
Cyrus Sr. was eager to know what Gage had done so far to promote business in 
England and what exactly were the terms of the contract between Gage and Waite, 
Burnell & Co. There were already questions over the use of the money that 
McCormick had sent (the aforementioned $3000) and the remaining $2000 that had 
been promised Gage to cover his travelling expenses. 
13 Cyrus H. McCormick to Leander J. McCormick 17.6.1878. la, box 72. 
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parts of the machines were missing. This shows lack of adequate 
control in the factory. It was thus no wonder that Cyrus Jr. recom-
mended his father to appoint a secretary for his foreign trade, and 
at the end of his letter finally suggested that "there can be no doubt 
but that this English & foreign trade must be made a regular 
department, and attended to as regards points mentioned, like any 
other part of the business. "t4 This was the first time that the impor-
tance of foreign business was openly expressed. It had cost consid-
erable sums when Cyrus Sr. had not been able to take care of all 
the nessessary correspondence. 
Cyrus Jr.'s letter shows the central position that his mother had 
acquired in the Company business.15 Nettie McCormick's firm hand 
and opinion were decisive when Cyrus McCormick got an offer for 
the manufacture of his binder from the English company of 
Samuelson. McCormick's binder had won the gold medal and the 
Grand Prize at the Bristol Show, and also at the Paris International 
World Fair. In Paris, Cyrus McCormick was also decorated with the 
Cross of an Officer of the Legion of Honor.16 This provoked great 
interest both among farmers and manufacturers. Nettie McCormick, 
however, very strongly advised her husband to stay away from all 
British companies, reminding Cyrus of all the problems that Burgess 
& Key had caused. Nettie's letter also explains some reasons why the 
American machines had defeated their European and especially 
English rivals. According to Nettie, the English companies would 
merely copy the patterns, change them, make experiments, wait a 
season or two and lose important time at the moment when the fame 
of the victories in trials should have been utilized in sales. The English 
makers were simply too cautious and not ready to take risks.17 
14 Cyrus Jr. to Cyrus McCormick 7.8.1878. Mss la, box 72. 
15 Cyrus H. McCormick Jr. to C.H. McCormick Sr. 8.7.1878. Mss la, box 72. 
16 Cyrus H. McCormick Jr. to Nettie F. McCormick 8.8.1878. Mss 2b, box 16. 
According to Cyrus Jr. McCormick, the binder was the only machine to give a good 
performance or to cut all the test areas. In The Times there was a large article on 
the competition for "the gold medal of the Royal Agricultural Society, a distinguished 
honour seldom awarded". The Times 9.8.1878. Mss 2c, box 128. Although judges 
awarded the gold medal to McCormick, they suggested all manufacturers should 
replace wire by some other binding material: wire could cause harm to animals and 
to workers in the threshing and stacking of the sheaves. Haddingtonshire courier 
6.9.1878. Mss 2c, box 128. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs to C.H. McCormick 
21.10.1878. Mss la, box 72. 
17 Nettie F. McCormick to Cyrus H. McCormick 14.8.1878, 17.8.1878 and 27.8.1878. 
Mss la, box 72. 
In his estimates on the English implement manufacturers, Jewell comes to the same 
conclusions as Nettie McCormick. They were too slow to react to changes and for 
example plowmakers produced too many models to make the production profitable 
and efficient. Jewell 1976, 130-131, 135. 
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The volume of the foreign trade had increased and grown beyond 
the limits of Cyrus and Nettie McCormick. Nettie therefore also 
suggested, just as Cyrus Jr. had a month before, to turn over the 
foreign business to the McCormick company and to give Leander 
his share of it. Nettie's comments make it clear that McCormick's 
foreign trade had thus far been Cyrus's own private business, which 
he and Nettie had shared with the assistance of some company 
officers such as F.A. Matthews. This was the case especially from 
1876 to 1878. Nevertheless, it had caused problems, and required 
too much of their time. Nettie was sure that the Company would 
be capable of making the machines for Europe and also of taking 
care of the administrative side too; otherwise she would be greatly 
disappointed, especially since they already had patterns made for 
the European binders. Leander insisted on a definite order either 
from Cyrus or Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co., and at the same price 
as charged in New Zealand. In this way, he added pressure for the 
salvation of the foreign trade problem. Although Nettie was 
confident of the factory's ability to manage the European business 
also, Matthews was stressed over the new machines and demanded 
exact production numbers well in advance. However, for the first 
time Company officals began to express their belief in the European 
trade and its possibilities.'8 
1878 began in Europe very favorably for Cyrus McCormick. He 
had reaped great victories and fame, and his name was once again 
in the minds of customers. His sales organization was, nonetheless, 
undeveloped, and he needed the support of a prominent jobbing 
house both in Britain and on the Continent. Such agents were rare 
indeed and he had to be satisfied with a contract with O.S. Gage 
and Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co.19 After the agreement, though 
18 Nettie F. McCormick to C.H. McCormick 27.8.1878. la, box 72; F. H. Matthews 
to C.H. McCormick 26.8.1878 and 21.12.1878. Mss la, box 72. 
19 Cyrus made a contract with O.S. Gage for selling his machines in Europe; Gage 
for his part had made his own agreement in the name of McCormick with Waite, 
Burnell, Huggins & Co. This agreement McCormick would not accept, and had long 
discussions with Gage, who had exceeded his authority by settling the cash price of 
the binders at forty-five pounds instead of fifty. Finally Cyrus Sr. and Waite, Burnell, 
Huggins & Co. made an agreement in which the latter agreed to buy both for 1879 
and 1880 three hundred binders, with a provision for at least two hundred more. 
The price of the machines was settled at forty-five pounds in Liverpool, and Waite, 
Burnell, Huggins & Co. had the right to set the price for customers as high as they 
saw fit. Their firm had exclusive selling rights for Britain, Ireland, France, Spain, Italy 
and Algeria for two years. Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. had to pay for the machines 
within four months from the arrival of the ship in harbor. Furthermore Cyrus had to 
promise that the new agreement would not interfere in any way with the agreement 
made between Gage and Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. C.H. McCormick to Waite, 
Burnell, Huggins & Co. 21.9.1878. Mss. 1 a, box 72; Notes for an agreement between 
C.H. McCormick and Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. No date. Mss la, box 72; F. A. 
McCormick to Mr. Samuelson. No date. Mss la, box 72; C.H. McCormick to Waite, 
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sick and tired, Cyrus McCormick was satisfied with the state of affairs 
in Europe. Future business looked bright, he already had a contract 
for a large number of machines, and prospects for even larger sales 
were good. Although everything was developing promisingly, the 
greatest obstacle was at home. Nettie was still afraid that Leander 
would not allow the machines to be sent to Europe.20 
In spite of all the good prospects and work done in Europe, once 
again everything was fading away. Gage and Waite, Burnell, Huggins 
& Co. could not settle their dispute over Gage's commission. Besides, 
Matthews had sent 110 machines to England and 70 to France on 
terms of four months' payment, but in July Waite & Co. announced 
their inability to fuffil their responsibilities. Furthermore they wanted 
to revise articles of the contract to carry on the business in Europe.21  
Burnell, Huggins & Co. 4.10.1878 and 15.10.1878. Mss la, box 72; Agreement 
between C.H. McCormick and Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. 30.11.1878. Mss la, 
box 56. 
Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. had printed for 1878 a flyer announcing them to be 
McCormick's agents for Great Britain, Ireland and the Colonies. The price of the 
machine was set at sixty-five pounds and the firm promised expert help from the 
manufacturer free of cost to put up and start machines. Waite, Burnell, Huggins & 
Co. 1878. Mss 4z, box 22. 
20 Nettie F. McCormick to Cyrus Jr. 1.10.1878. Mss lb, box 25. 
21 Nettie F. McCormick to Cyrus Jr. Jan. 1879. Mss lb, box 25, vol.1; F. H. Matthews 
to C.H. McCormick 30.5.1879. Mss la, box 74; Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. to 
CH. McCormick 22.7.1879 and 2.10.1879. Mss 2a, box 57. 
Shipments of machines were made either with the Anchor Line or Inman Line, both 
of which also had agents in Chicago for foreign freights. There was some variation 
in freight costs. Through Inman Line the ten first machines went to Liverpool at 17 
shillings and 6 pence per ton or 40 cubic feet. London shipments cost 22 shillings 
and 6 pence per ton and then the freight to Liverpool rose to 20 shillings per ton. 
Matthews calculated that on average freight per machine was about $12 from New 
York to England, five percent primage being added to all freights mentioned above. 
Freights from Chicago to New York were $5 per machine or $50 for a car load. F.H. 
Matthews to C.H. McCormick 30.5.1879. Mss la, box 74. 
As a reason for their unsatisfactory achievement Waite & Co. pointed to the general 
economic depression both in Britain and in France and the rainy season that had 
spoiled harvests. Their information is probably not quite sincere, however, for private 
information reveals some misappropriations on the side of Waite & Co. The firm had 
for instance charged ten dollars for packing cases which McCormick had sent free, 
for the shears they charged one dollar, and five pounds for the extra parts that 
accompanied every machine. In addition, Davies complained of the incompetency of 
the firm's travellers. Furthermore Waite & Co. had used McCormick's old stock in 
Europe as a source for extra parts. All this had raised bad feelings among farmers, 
many of whom had canceled their orders after having heard of the state of affairs 
and of the business manners of Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. James Davies to C.H. 
McCormick 11.10.1879. Mss 2a, box 57. 
When it became evident that Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. could not fulfil their 
liabilities, Cyrus McCormick at first limited Waite & Co.'s trading area to cover only 
Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Spain and Algeria; the next year, after the firm had 
gone into liquidation, he had to find new agents and resolve the problem of 
presentation in Europe. C.H. McCormick to Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. 
12.11.1879. Mss 2a, box 57. Before the bankruptcy McCormick and Waite, Burnell, 
Huggins & Co. made an agreement on the Gage case by admitting to Gage 30 percent 
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McCormick's sales methods through an independent jobbing house 
were not effective enough. His competitors had their own 
representatives and offices in Europe in direct and close touch with 
customers and their wishes. McCormick's, on the contrary, continued 
its cautious policy. It was not ready to expand in Europe, which was 
at the moment only a minor market compared with America. 
The growing importance of overseas business, on the other hand, 
is shown by problems caused to the Company in that field. F.A. 
Matthews wrote a warning letter to Cyrus McCormick in which he 
informed the inventor that the Company had needed to borrow 
much more money than he had anticipated because of the falling-off 
of foreign trade.22 
In 1877, Cyrus tried to persuade Leander to take a positive attitude 
toward the foreign business, by offering him a share of the profits. 
Furthermore, a separate office was established to administer foreign 
trade. Before anything permanent could be settled, Cyrus had to 
resolve his controversy with Leander. Leander McCormick had been 
connected with the manufacturing of machines since 1835 and been 
in charge of the manufacturing operations since 1859. His 
experience was, however, from the time of blacksmith shops where 
simple machines were hammered together. Cyrus and Leander had 
had continued disputes over the volume of turnout, which Leander 
did not want to increase. Leander McCormick was a blacksmith who 
was interested in the machines, and did not want to take any risks. 
He could not understand his brother's more managerial approach 
and demands for ever-increasing production. In the great fire of 
Chicago, which also destroyed the McCormick works, Leander lost 
the chance to build a technically and organizationally modern 
factory.23  
Cyrus wanted to stabilize the situation, and suggested the 
formation of a joint-stock company. Finally, after long discussions, 
Cyrus, Leander and his son Hall agreed to close down the old firm 
of the sales price exceeding forty-five pounds. Furthermore McCormick agreed to 
supply his machines to Waite & Co. up to July 1st 1880. Draft for an agreement 
between C.H. McCormick and Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. 1879. Mss la, box 74. 
22 In the older research this side of the role of the foreign trade has been omitted. 
See for example Kuuse 1974, footnote 170, page 272 and table 60, page 273 and 
Carstensen 1984, page 114. The Company had borrowed so far $30 000 but older 
loans from Connecticut Mutual were falling due for $100 000, $150 000 and $100 
000. F.A. Matthews to C.H. McCormick 30.5.1879. Mss la, box 74. 
23 Charles Colahan, a patent expert whom Cyrus had hired in 1877, reported several 
defects in the factory organization and in the quality of the products. Officials of the 
McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. Mss Special Reports File, box 14; 
Hounshell 1987, 172-176. 
THE NEW START IN EUROPE, 1878-1894 n 117 
of C.H. & L.J. McCormick on August 1st 1879, and on August 11th 
1879 agreed on forming a joint-stock company, which was ratified 
next month at a meeting of the Board of Directors. The new 
company was called the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company.24 
The formation of the new Company did not resolve any of the 
old problems. Cyrus and Leander could not agree on the terms of 
the foreign trade. Leander now wanted to have his share of the 
business, but Cyrus on the other hand resisted this, as he saw it to 
be totally his own private business. At the height of the controversy 
Leander dictated in the company records a clause in which he 
objected to the establishing of foreign agencies and the selling of 
machines abroad. He stated that such activities were beyond the 
activities of the Company.25 Leander did not have any interest in the 
company either and hardly spent any time at the factory. Company 
officials began in increasing measure to show their discontent with 
the state of affairs, and even demanded the dismissal of Leander and 
Hall. Finally, in February 1880, Cyrus left a statement to the Board 
of Directors about the poor management of the factory, a statement 
which led to the resignation of both Leander and Hall.26 
Organizationally and technically one of the most important 
events in the history of the McCormick Company was the hiring of 
Lewis Wilkinson as the new Superintendent. He was an experienced 
24 Three-fourths of the property was to be owned by Cyrus and one fourth was in 
the hands of Leander and Hall. Its capital stock was two million five hundred thousand 
dollars. The Board of Directors consisted of six persons, of whom Leander and Hall 
could apppoint two. Leander McCormick was appointed as Superintendent of the 
manufacturing department, and as Vice President of the Company. His son Hall was 
appointed as an assistant superintendent in the same department as his father. 
Although Hall was nominally appointed in a key position in the Company, Cyrus Jr. 
had also long been involved in the business, and company officials regarded him as 
the successor of Cyrus Sr.. This idea can also be found in the correspondence of 
Nettie and Cyrus McCormick. Agreement between Cyrus H. McCormick, Leander J. 
McCormick and R. Hall McCormick 1.8.1789. Mss Mil, box 2; By-laws of the 
McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. Mss la, box 74; Meeting of board of 
the directors 9.9.1879. Mss M/I box 3. In this meeting the purchase of property from 
C.H. & L.J. McCormick by the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company was 
approved. Nettie McCormick to C.H. McCormick 22.8.1878. Mss la, box 72; WJ. 
Hanna to Cyrus Jr. 8.4.1879. Mss la, box 1879. 
25 Minutes of the board of directors 13.2.1880. Mss Mil box 3. 
26 As an example of the state of affairs between Leander and Hall McCormick on the 
one hand, and factory officials on the other, can be mentioned a quarrel with Charles 
Colahan over his journey to New York on patent affairs. Matthews, who was in charge 
of correspondence and was left by Cyrus in charge of the business, complained that 
Hall is "the most outrageous fool" and wanted him to be displaced from the business 
"to which he is only a drag & a hindrance". Leander and Hall had threatened to 
establish a factory of their own. Furthermore, Matthews had to write to Cyrus in the 
evening from home because Leander and Hall wanted to know everything about the 
correspondence between Cyrus and the factory. F.H. Matthews to Cyrus H. 
McCormick 14.3.1879. Mss la, box 74. Directors meeting 6.4.1880. Mss WI, box 
17; Hounshell 1987, 178. 
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engineer who had worked at the Colt Armory, at the Connecticut 
Firearms Company and at the Wilson Sewing Machine Company. He 
brought with him the new system of manufacturing developed and 
used in the New England factories. His arrival meant also an end to 
the old blacksmith system. Production was for the first time 
organized in a practical fashion, new special-purpose machines were 
bought and the factory began to use nightshifts.27 
5.2. From private to corporate enterprise 
Cyrus McCormick had to admit once again how difficult it was to 
win a place in the sun. On the home field he had fought a continuous 
battle against Leander to increase the Company's production. The 
McCormick Company had established a working sales organization 
of its own throughout America, but in Europe it was using jobbing 
houses. For some reason Cyrus had kept foreign trade as his own 
private business, to which he unfortunately could not devote enough 
time. 
During the crisis of Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co., two of its older 
employees, George Glough and Percy Lankester, suggested 
important changes to the way the business should be performed. 
They noticed that although the new harvester had now been 
introduced to farmers, there were still crucial drawbacks. Firstly, 
there was no control and acquaintance of the business, and secondly, 
there was no contact between the manufacturer and the consumer. 
Too many hands between factory and farmer increased the price of 
the machine. As a consequence, Glough recommended that 
McCormick open in London his own business house, which could 
also serve as a central depot. The manager should have a fixed salary. 
Furthermore, although the wire-binder had attracted wide publicity, 
few farmers could afford to buy one; they needed a light, strong 
mower or a combined machine.28 
Waite, Burnell, Huggin & Co. signed a contract with an agent for 
the representation of McCormick's machines in Russia. He, however, 
soon found it impossible to make profitable trade when he had to 
pay in cash sixty-five pounds for a binder, plus freight and packing. 
27 Extract from the minutes of Board of Directors. 4.5.1880. Wilkinson's salary was 
set at $3000 p.a.; Hounshell 1987, 178-180. Wilkinson's salary has to be regarded as 
very low when his position and importance to the company are kept in mind. It can 
be compared with the $4000 per year at which sum the Moline Plow Company made 
a contract with its first branch manager in 1878. Thomas 1976, 41. 
28 George Glough to C.H.McCormick 9.1.1880 and Percy Lankester to C.H. 
McCormick 9.1.1880. Mss la, box 76. 
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These charges raised the retail price up to eighty pounds, which 
was unthinkable in Russia, even for estate holders. Perrin could not 
meet the clauses of his agreement and began negotiations for a direct 
agency with McCormick29  
The appointment of Perrin as a salaried agent also meant a clear 
shift from McCormick's earlier conduct of business. Now, instead of 
a jobber who thought only of his own benefit, he had an agent of 
his own who should take care only of the Company's interests. A 
salaried agent was actually a form of direct investment in the sense 
defined by Mira Wilkins, and could be seen as a first step on the 
way to representation abroad. 
Russia was a large area to cover for an inexperienced man, and 
so the Company decided to send George A. Freudenreich, a practised 
agent from the Red River Valley, to take charge of the Russian 
business. Perrin was to work in the future under his control. 
Freudenreich's territory was also extended to include Rumania, 
where W. Staadecker had already represented McCormick for a year. 
The McCormick Co. assured Staadecker that Freudenreich had full 
power of attorney and negotiations concluded with him would have 
the same effect as if made directly with the Company. Behind 
Freudenreich's nomination, Cyrus Jr. was clearly taking more and 
more charge of affairs in the Company.30 
29 Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co. to A.V. Perrin 10.6.1879. Mss 2a, box 57; A.Y. 
Perrin to C.H. McCormick ? 1879. Mss 2a, box 57. Perrin's contract with Waite & 
Co. reveals that Waite & Co. took twenty pounds profit per machine and furthermore 
charged agents for freights and even for packing the machines although McCormick 
normally took care of packing in Chicago. Machines and extras had to be paid in 
advance in London. Perrin also informed McCormick of the big profits that the other 
harvester companies were reaping in Russia: at least Johnston, Wood, Shuttleworth, 
Samuelson and Osborne were represented there by their own men. 
30 McCormick Co. to Emil Liphart & Co. 7.1.1880, McCormick Co. to W. Staadecker 
8.1.1880 and 17.1.1880. Mss 1x, LPCB 455. 
Before McCormick Co. approved Staadecker as its agent it examined his background 
very carefully. Company officals sent letters to the American consul in Bucarest, Simon 
J. Sina and M. Hofher in Vienna and to R. Hornsby & Sons in England. 7.11.1879. 
Mss lx, LPCB 455. This practise was also continued on numerous other occasions 
and displays the Company's stricter control over affairs. Foreign trade was no longer 
private business, but part of regulated corporate management. A.V. Perrin to Cyrus 
Jr. Mss la, box 77. 
The McCormick Company simultaneously continued negotiations over representation 
in Britain with Waite, Burnell, Huggins & Co., who were seriously indebted to the 
Company. After a long correspondence, the McCormick Company finally decided to 
terminate the contract. The junior partner in Waite & Co., George Glough, had visited 
Cyrus McCormick in New York and later offered his own services to the old harvester 
king; when McCormick's contract with Waite & Co. expired, Waite's old employee 
Percy Lankester took their place.Percy Lankester probably to C.H. McCormick 
9.1.1880 and George Glough probably to C.H. McCormick 9.1.1880. Mss la, box 76; 
C.H. McCormick by Cyrus Jr. to Clarkes, Rawlins & Clarke 1.2.1880. Mss lx, LPCB 
455 and 10.2.1880 Mss la, box 76; C.H. McCormick by Cyrus Jr. to Albaret & Cie 
29.6.1880. Mss lx, LPCB 455. From all of these letters there can be seen the constantly 
increasing touch of Cyrus Jr.'s fingers in the business. Cyrus Sr.'s sickness began to 
120 n THE NEW START IN EUROPE, 1878.1894 
At this point, the McCormick Company planned a total change in 
its European marketing structure. The concept was to concentrate 
the European business in the hands of George Freudenreich, in 
Odessa in Russia. Although McCormick now had two salaried men 
in Russia, the base structure of the business remained unchanged. 
Machines were delivered only to reliable dealers f.o.b in New York; 
the Company did not want to bind its hands with "unsatisfactory 
credits in a country so far away".31  
The McCormick Company's business in Europe at the end of 1880 
once again looked brighter after new arrangements were made both 
at home and in Europe. The Company did not want to enlarge its 
activities too fast. It had to reject suggestions for representation of 
its machines from numerous candidates.32 Behind the Company's 
somewhat conservative policy can be detected Nettie McCormick's 
influence. On the other, she understood the vast possibilities which 
Europe offered and complained about the miserable state of 
business.33 
worsen and although he keenly followed business matters, the daily conduct of it 
was transferred to company officials and to his son Cyrus Jr. In his letter to Albaret, 
Cyrus McCormick offered his reaper for tests and implicitly also for sale by Albaret, 
who had previously also made McCormick reapers; George Glough and Percy 
Lankester probably to C.H. McCormick 22.7A880. Mss la, box 76. The McCormick 
wire-binder had met resistance from other makers and also from customers, who 
wanted to have the more comfortable twine-binder. In summer 1880 there were 
already about half a dozen twine-binders competing for the European trade. Ibid; 
Percy Lankester & Co. to C.H. McCormick 16.12.1880. Mss la, box 76. 
31 Two salaried agents in the same country did not work well. Although Freudenreich 
was the manager of the business, Perrin, as a native Russian, presented himself to 
the subagents as the main agent. Freudenreich complained over Perrin's extravagancy, 
but nevertheless suggested renewal of his contract. Freudenreich was not too 
confident over the future of the trade in Russia. The country was so undeveloped 
that he could not expect any large trade with binders in the near future and so the 
McCormick company had to rely on trade with its other machines. McCormick Co. 
to Geo. A. Freudenreich 31.5.1880 and 1.7.1880. Mss lx, LPCB 455; Geo. A. 
Freudenreich to McCormick Co. 1.8.1880 and 22.9.1880. Mss la, box 76. 
Freudenreich wrote the Company to send for the next year 525 machines of which 
four hundred were mowers and only seventy-five were various kinds of binders. Geo. 
A. Freudenreich to McCormick Co. 22.9.1880. Mss la, box 76. Perrin saw the situation 
in a totally different light. He anticipated large sales of binders, but sales needed hard 
work and it would take a couple of years before large trade would materialize. A.V. 
Perrin to C.H. McCormick 8.10.1880. Mss la, box 77. Perrin was appointed as George 
Freudenreich's general traveling agent for two years at the same salary as before. His 
powers to make contracts and handle money were, howerever, limited. C.H. 
McCormick to A.V. Perrin 24.12.1880. Mss lx, LPCB 455; A concept for agreement 
between Geo. A. Freudenreich and A.V. Perrin. Mss la, box 77. 
32 See for example Cyrus fr. to H. Pixxolli in Italy. 14.5.1880. Mss lx, LPCB 455. 
All what Cyrus Jr. was ready to offer was cash trade f.o.b. in New York. 
33 She could not approve of the plan to give the general agency for Europe to George 
Freudenreich; she considered that it was too large an area for one man and certainly 
too large for Freudenreich. Nettie had serious doubts about his talents, commenting 
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A harvester with a wire-binding mechanism was a big step 
forward, and generated new sales in America and opened a new 
start in Europe for McCormick. Wire as binding material had, 
however, defects which did not make it so popular as had been 
expected. Farmers were afraid that their animals might get pieces 
of wire in their stomachs and millers expressed their dislike as well. 
Already in 1879 some experimental twine-binder models had been 
exhibited at agricultural shows in Europe. In America the next year 
was a period of intensive experimentation and development of 
various binding mechanisms: the continuation of business was 
dependent on it. The McCormick Company, too, spent much time 
and energy to develop the best possible knotter. Cyrus Jr. was 
actively engaged in the process and regularly sent reports to his 
father.34  
The McCormick Co. had solved the mechanical problems of the 
twine-binder, and its markets were promising in America. In Europe, 
the Company's situation at the beginning of 1881 was still unsettled. 
After the bankruptcy of its agent, Percy Lankester had marketed the 
machines in Britain; nevertheless, Lankester was not McCormick's 
agent: the Company denied any connection with him and tried to 
find a new agent for Britain. In the same manner, the McCormick 
Company tried to find agents for France, too.35 In Russia a natural 
solution to the problems in Russia was found when the Russian 
that "F. is not a great man" Nettie F. McCormick to Cyrus Jr. Monday 1880 (no other 
date available). Mss lb, box 25, vol. 1. Nettie's letter was confidential and she asked 
her son to destroy it. The letter also reflects both how closely Nettie followed business 
and also her close relations to her son. 
34 In its circulars to agents McCormick Co. in spring 1880 affirmed that the 
twine-binder was only something which firms that had not succeeded with 
wire-binders had began to propagate. After these excuses it gradually had to admit 
that it was experimenting with twine, too and then asked every agent to keep his 
eyes open and carefully examine every twine-binder they could fmd and report to 
the factory how they were constructed. In June, Cyrus Jr. examined the work of 
Wood and Marsh harvesters and in August was anxiously experimenting with three 
different binding mechanisms. In August 1880, Cyrus Jr. was already ready to exhibit 
their first twine-binder in public but was not yet ready to send it to the agents, who 
for 1881 should still push the sales of wire-binders "to the fullest extent" and 
twine-binders only in critical cases. The explanation for this procedure was simple: 
the machine was not yet ready for the market but the pressure of the competitors 
forced McCormick to put it on sale. Circular to agents 20.3., 22.3, 31.5., 18.12.1880. 
Mss 1x, box 472; Cyrus Jr. to C.H. McCormick 16.6., 9.8, 12.8., 16.8.,18.8., 23.8.1880 
Mss la, box 77 
35 Cyrus Jr. to Louis Franck 8.1. and 21A.1881. Mss lx, LPCB 455. Franck was told 
to travel to France to see Albaret & Cie. to test their willingness and conditions for 
an agency and to find out what kinds of mowers and other implements they produced. 
Franck should also try to find out if Albaret used McCormick's machines only to 
promote sales of his own mowers. Franck was also asked to contact Burnell & Co. 
and examine its status and the likelihood of it becoming agents for France. 
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governement tried to arrest Perrin, who was a Russian naturalized 
in America. Perrin had to flee the country, and at this moment Cyrus 
Jr. dissolved the contract with him. For a while, it was left open 
whether it was nessessary at all to keep a permanent salaried agent 
in Russia;36 but Russia was such an important and growing area that 
the McCormick Co. decided to push on.37 
The McCormick Co. had hammered together a working model of 
a twine-binder and decided to exhibit it also in England. The natural 
venue to do so was once again the Royal Agricultural Society's show, 
this time arranged at Derby.38 McCormick's victory in Derby was a 
severe blow to other companies, but especially to Walter A. Wood, 
who had invested money and energy in the European trade.39 Cyrus 
Jr. understood straight away the full meaning and advertizing value 
of the achievement. He ordered leading officers of the company to 
visit editors of the Chicago newspapers, to discuss proper 
publication of the news. Furthermore, news of the victory was also 
cabled to the New York papers, and special attention was paid to 
36 Cyrus Jr. to Geo. A. Freudenreich 3.8.1881. Mss la, box 80; Cyrus Jr. to Cyrus 
H. McCormick 4.8.1881. Mss 2a, box 57. Cyrus Jr. was not satisfied with Perrin after 
having heard complaints of his behavior among dealers and how he was constantly 
exceeding his powers. Ibid; A.V. Perrin to Cyrus H. McCormick 6.8., 13.8., 17.8., 
20.8. and 26.10.1881. Mss 2a, box 57. Perrin blamed the situation on "jealous 
individuals" who wanted to destroy his efforts to sell McCormick's machines. Walter 
A. Wood's agent shared the same fate with him. Both Freudenreich and Company 
officials handled Perrin very carefully, wanting to avoid open conflict with him, but 
at the same time made it clear to other parties that Perrin had no longer anything to 
do with the McCormick Company, even if he might have letters of recommendation 
from the Company. Geo. A. Freudenreich to A.Y. Perrin 23.8.1881. Mss la, box 79; 
Cyrus Jr. to Percy Lankester 13.12.1881. lx, LPCB 456. 
37 At the end of 1881 McCormick Company had eight agents in Russia: in Moscow 
and Charkoff (same agent), Simperopol ?, Taganrok, Ekatermoslaff, Rostoff, Poltava, 
Elizabethgrad and Odessa, plus one agent in Bucarest in Rumania. McCormick Co. to 
Cyrus H. McCormick 15.12.1881. Mss 2a, box 57. 
38 The Company decided to send Britain three representatives, including their leading 
expert, Louis Frank, who had already won a handful of gold medals in Europe. 
Unfortunately the steamer which was carrying the reapers was shipwrecked, and the 
machines intended for the show sank along with the ship. When the ship was raised, 
the binders were rusty and ugly-looking. This situation, nevertheless, McCormick's 
turned to benefit. The machines were left unpainted and rusty, except that all the 
bearings were polished and fitted to run as smoothly as possible. Furthermore, Cyrus 
Jr. ordered Louis Franck to acquire small horses, to make the contrast with other 
machines as large as possible. As a consequence, the McCormick binder reaped the 
gold medal. Cyrus Jr. to W.H. Town 6.7.1881. Mss lx, LPCB 455; C.H. McCormick 
to R.0 Ransom 12.7.1881. Mss la, box 80; An Incident Pertaining to the McCormick 
Reaper by Dr. Gray. Mss la, box 115. 
39 Louis Franck to C.H. McCormick 11.10.1881. Mss la, box 79. For instance, in 
Russia, the other companies already in 1880 accused of the McCormick Co. of coming 
to a ready-set table. They had advertised and made the reaper known in Russia and 
now McCormick intended to take the whole steak. A.V. Perrin 26.5.1880. Mss la, 
box 77. 
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it in the fair circulars.40 
The triumph in Derby was not simply a victory for the McCormick 
Company. It was also a great day for Cyrus H. McCormick, whose 
private business the European trade still remained. For this reason, 
his name was listed in the advertisements before the Company 
name.41 Cyrus McCormick, on his wife's and son's recommendation, 
had turned the correspondence and practical matters of the foreign 
business over to the Company; however, the business itself had 
remained under his control. This probably also explains in some 
measure the lack of continuity, which appears for instance in the 
uncertainty of the future of business in Europe. Even in August 1881, 
Cyrus Jr. still stated that "our desire is not to push the European 
business any further than Russia and Roumania at present..."42 The 
triumph at the Derby Show apparently changed McCormick's mind, 
for two months later Cyrus made an agreement with Percy Lankester 
on the exclusive agency for Britain and Ireland;43 he gave also a 
positive answer to Waite, Burnell & Co.'s inquiry for an agency in 
France in the event that the firm could provide proper guarantees.44 
The fact that the European business was Cyrus's own private affair 
caused one large and final confrontation between Leander and Cyrus. 
Leander McCormick began to ask for compensation for the machines 
sold in Europe in 1878 and 1879. Futhermore, he demanded that 
the price should be the same as to any outside wholesaler. After 
month-long discussions, Cyrus agreed to pay for 200 machines which 
had already been manufactured, but declined to pay for 300 which 
had only been ordered. Eventually, the dispute was settled at 200 
machines, for which Cyrus paid to the Company; Leander's share of 
the sum was $14,800. 5 
40 Cyrus Jr. to McCormick Co. 11.8.1881 and to B.K Butler 12.8.1881. Mss 8c, box 
11. 
41 Cyrus Jr. to McCormick Co. 11.8.1881. Mss 8C, box 11. 
42 Cyrus Jr. to Geo.A. Freudenreich 3.8.1881. Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
43 Cyrus H. McCormick to Lankester & Co. 12.10.1881. Mss lx, LPCB 456. The 
contract was made for one season only; it comprised 12 iron mowers, 28 harvesters 
and binders and 26 twinebinder attachments. The machines were to be paid free on 
board in New York and prices varied for binders from $315 for a five-foot machine 
to $330 for a six-foot binder. The price of an iron mower was $85. From these prices 
Cyrus promised a discount of 35 % and from repairs and extras a discount of 33 % 
44 C.H. McCormick by Cyrus Jr. to Waite, Burnell & Co. 12.12.1881. Mss lx, LPCB 
456. Conditions and prices were the same as for Lankester & Co. 
45 Diary of Cyrus H. McCormick Jr. 26.1., 10.2., 22.3., 26.4. and 23.11.1882. Mss 
4c, box 2; Conversation between CH. McCormick, W.J. Hanna and C.H.McCormick 
Jr. 14.3.1882. Mss la, box 85; A Statement by C.H. McCormick 20.3.1882 and A 
Statement of C.H. McCormick. No date. Mss. la, box 85. According to these State- 
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In spite of the conflict, the European business was continued. 
Waite, Burnell & Co. took care of the French sales, but 
notwithstanding all the guarantees, the French part of the firm failed 
and the McCormick Company had to turn to Albaret & Cie. and 
Roche Papillon to take its machines for sale. Percy Lankester, who 
had been the agent for Britain only, was at first asked to take care 
of the negotiations in the French question and in 1883 the 
supervisory power in France was turned over to him. Thereafter all 
the French transactions went through Lankester, who also had the 
power to decide which orders should be filled.46 
The first years in Europe were a long learning process for the 
McCormick Company. It wasted energy in trying to find agents and 
in finding the proper ways to manage the trade. In France, for 
instance, Albaret & Cie., who had previously manufactured 
ments Cyrus had bought the machines at manufacturing cost and paid all expenses 
from his own pocket. Expenses came from patent fees for Britain, Germany, New 
Zealand and Australia. Also advertising, trials, exhibitions and freights had caused 
considerable costs. 
Leander's attack was his last effort against the foreign trade, and was aimed more to 
gain money and to cause harm to Cyrus than to stop the sales. Although the affair 
itself was not very serious, the statements and memoranda made reveal important 
information about the true value and meaning of the European business to the 
Company. In the use of this documentary material it has to be remembered that it 
is not unbiased, because of its origin and purpose. According to Cyrus McCormick, 
the entire European business had achieved economically nothing but expenses, which 
had been greater than the value of all the machines sold in Europe since 1864. The 
real reason for such an unprofitable business was the publicity and advertising value 
which was won through the great victories in Europe. These spread all over the 
world through the press, and the name of McCormick was made familiar to everybody 
in the agricultural community. The benefits for the home trade had been enormous. 
Conversation between...14.3.1882, A Statement by C.H.McCormick 20.3.1882 and A 
Statement by C.H. McCormick (no date). Mss la, box 85. Cyrus was extremely 
disappointed with Leander, since both Leander and William McCormick had declined 
to take any part in Cyrus's European sales. When Cyrus had succeeded in the shows, 
however, Leander wanted to have the victories in the name of the Company without 
doing anything for it. 
Albeit Cyrus certainly was right in his outburst, it was only one side of the story. 
Leander had undeniably as good reasons for his behavior. He had managed the 
production plant for decades, made his own inventions and improvements without 
any compensation, and had been stressed by the new demands of the foreign trade. 
The two brothers simply had a totally different kind of approach to the business. 
Leander was satisfied with the existing state of affairs, while Cyrus saw no limits for 
his business. 
46 Lankester was, nevertheless, informed of the proper ways of trade. Machines 
should be ordered as early in the season as possible and preferably in car loads. This 
amount varied by machines but was normally about ten. C.H. McCormick by Cyrus 
Jr. to Waite, Burnell & Co. 7.1.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456; C.H. McCormick by Cyrus 
Jr. to Albaret & Co. 13.1.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456; C.H. McCormick by Cyrus Jr. to 
Lankester & Co. 14.1.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456; McCormick Co. to Drexel, Harfes & 
Co. 8.8.1882. lx, LPCB 456 and 11.8.1882. Mss M/I, box 3; McCormick Co. to J.W. 
Sully 1.10.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456; Cyrus Jr. to Albaret Co. 27.11.1882. Mss lx, 
LPCB 456; C.H. McCormick by Cyrus Jr. to Lankester & Co. 5.1. and 26.2.1883. Mss 
lx, LPCB 456; Cyrus Jr. to Lankester & Co. 2.8.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
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McCormick's machines under license, was known to be a copier of 
others' implements. That did not prevent the McCormick Co. from 
entering into a contract with the firm; but from the very beginning, 
it turned out to be a complicated partnership. Albaret exhibited 
McCormick's binder as his own machine and had even replaced 
McCormick's name with his own.47 
Victories in the famous shows stimulated sales, not only in America 
but also in Europe. After the Derby triumph there was a surge of 
potential agents, none of whom the McCormick Company rejected 
outright. The conditions were the same as they had been for years; 
the Company did not want to take any risks, and agents had to buy 
their machines free on board in New York. For their services, agents 
received a commission which during the first years was normally 
around thirty-five percent.48  
Both for the McCormick Co., and for other companies, too, the 
trade in Europe caused totally new kinds of problems than they had 
met in America. Machines had to be fitted for European conditions; 
but that was not all. The names of the machine parts had to be 
translated into various European languages, which was difficult when 
both the machines and parts were new and there were no existing 
words for them.49 
When the McCormick Company appointed Percy Lankester as its 
47 Cyrus H. McCormick by Cyrus Jr. to Lankester & Co. 26.12.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 
456. 21.7. and 17.8.1883. Mss 1x, LPCB 457. 
48 See for example McCormick Co. to H. Hendrickx & Sons in Belgium 26.1.1882. 
Mss lx, LPCB 456; McCormick Co. to Richard Weibull in Sweden 20.11.1882. Mss 
lx, LPCB 456; McCormick Co, to Antonio de Sarmento in Portugal 31.1.1883. Mss 
1x, LPCB 456; McCormick Co. to J. Börsum in Norway 29.6.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 
457; McCormick Co. to Mateo Funon de Lara in Spain 19.9.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 
457. During 1883 McCormick Co. made a contract with A. Cosimini & Sons in Italy 
and the firm was awarded the sole agency for the whole country. Cyrus Jr. to 
Cosimini & Sons 21.12.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 457. Another contract was made with 
a Canadian firm, "The North American Agricultural Implement and General 
Manufacturing Company of London, Canada". Draft for an agreement 9.11.1883. Mss 
la, box 90. An interesting feature in the answers to the applications is the variation 
in prices. For Hendirickx in Belgium in 1882, the price for a 5-ft twinebinder was 
$315, for a 6-ft machine $330 and for an iron mower $85. The next year the price 
for Antonio de Sarmento for the same machines was $198, $208 respectively. For 
Börsum in Norway the machines cost: 6-ft twinebinder $210, iron mower only $55. 
In Sweden prices were $250 for a 5-ft binder and, what was amazing, prices for the 
same machines in Canada were $230 for a 6-ft twinebinder and $65 for mowers. Ibid. 
Prices for Percy Lankester in Britain were extremely low and he was asked to keep 
this strictly confidential. For a 6-ft binder he paid $175 and for a mower $47.50. E.K. 
Butler to Lankester & Co. 10.11.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
These variations cannot be explained by differences in distance and freights. If the 
price of a harvester in Canada was higher than in Europe, the question might be of 
competition. If these prices are compared to prices in America, harvesters in Canada 
seem to be the same as McCormick charged in the U.S., but the price of mowers in 
1883 was $75. Other manufacturers charged in the U.S. from $80 to 85 for mowers 
and for binders from $260 to $275. See Table 6. These are nevertheless the list prices, 
and do not tell about the actual situation. 
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agent in Britain and then expanded his responsibilities to include 
France and most of Western Europe, for the first time since the 
1860s its management of the business on the Continent became 
somewhat concentrated and organized. In 1883 Lankester made a 
journey to the countries under his supervision, and reported on 
developments.5o 
In Russia, the McCormick Co. had its own salaried agent and 
expected good progress.51 In 1882 the McCormick Co. began to send 
machines directly to Odessa in large shipments, the first of them 
comprising 700 machines. The greatest obstacles for trade arose from 
Freudenreich's apparently too lavish management. The Company 
pressed him to make only written contracts, and to confirm the 
existing ones in writing. The McCormick Co. had to pay dearly for 
its experiences. It wanted to get rid of the old stock of machines 
in Russia and in Rumania at any price Freudenreich was able to 
obtain in cash. For future business, the Company took much more 
careful steps, reducing shipments of the new reaper model to very 
moderate numbers to avert further growth in the stock of unsold 
machines.52  
49 McCormick Co. to Freudenreich 13.12.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
50 In France, Lankester had made an agreement with a new agent, Paul Francey; in 
Italy he had acquired a new agent, and the Company expressed its satisfaction, since 
it stopped other manufacturers from getting good agents. Spain proved to be an 
unprofitable area, but in Portugal Lankester appointed an agent. Sales were also 
extended to Algiers, which was, however, under Freudenreich's supervision. Cyrus 
Jr. to Lankester & Co. 27.7.1883 and E.K. Butler to Lankester & Co. 10.11.1883. Mss 
lx, LPCB 457. 
51 Nettie McCormick's assessment of Freudenreich began to be verfied, however. He 
could not stand the competition and began even himself to believe that Johnston's 
machines were better than those he represented (which could be true but was not 
allowed for an agent to acknowledge). The weather also caused problems for the 
harvest and for sales. Nevertheles, the Company decided to continue his contract. 
Directors Minutes 7.4.1882. Mss M/I box 24, vol.35; E.K. Butler to Freudenreich 
6.10.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456. Freudenreich did not get along well in Russia and 
wanted to visit America which was, however, refused in the current market situation. 
Ibid. 
52 Freudenreich asked the Company to loan one of his major agents for a year the 
balance due, of $4000; this the Company could not understand, especially since it 
had already sent machines to Mr. Mazewski on consignment so that he paid that fall 
only for the machines that had been sold and the company carried over the unsold 
machines. McCormick Co. to Emil Liphardt 16.2.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456; E.K. Butler 
to Freudenreich 21.2.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456; Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 21.10.1882. 
Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
The McCormick Company's dissatisfaction with Freudenreich accumulated during the 
next winter. In Rumania, where Wm. Staadecker had an agency under Freudenreich's 
supervision, well over thirty machines were left on hand from the season of 1882. 
Still more anger arose from the shipping of the machines that were left in 
McCormick's charge. "Your report of our business at Bucharest, Roumania, under 
date of Dec. 9th. makes us sick of shipping machines all over Russia and Roumania 
on our own account." E.K. Butler to Geo. Freudenreich 1.3.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
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Nettie McCormick's stern hand had been visible at the rudder of 
the McCormick Company for several years. When the old inventor's 
health began to deteriorate at the end of the 1870s, her position 
became central in decision making. Company officers reported 
directly to her on daily activities. These reports could be very 
detailed, concerning new production methods, improvements in the 
machines' construction, or the financial state of the Company." 
Cyrus Jr., who had taken charge of the business after the firing of 
Leander and Hall McCormick, was also almost daily in contact or in 
correspondence with his mother.54 In 1883 it was already clear that 
no key decisions were made without Nettie McCormick's consent. 
She approved the new agressive management philosophy of the 
newly appointed General Manager, E.K. Butler. Decisions had to be 
made fast. "Delay is loss - strike while the iron is hot." On the other 
hand she stood for centralized management. "Where five or six have 
the management - like the Rockford parties no one can decide and 
so nothing is done."55 
Nettie McCormick also had the final word in the European affairs. 
In spite of the good progress in Europe, she was unwilling to renew 
the European patents. She stated that sales in Europe were so small 
that it would not pay back the heavy costs of the patents. 
Furthermore, in Europe there were only a few manufacturers, and 
European patents would not give protection against the American 
competitors.56 Nettie's approach in the business seemed to be more 
practical than her husband's. There was no room for emotions. If 
some operations did not bring profit, they were cut out. 
Although Nettie McCormick was a key figure in the Company, 
Cyrus Jr. had taken the leading role in daily activities in the business. 
He had been engaged with the business since his college days at the 
end of the 1870s and had gained practical experience under Lewis 
Wilkinson. All this was training for the final transition of power after 
Cyrus Sr., who finally died on May 13th, 1884. Cyrus Jr. was elected 
as the new President of the Company, and E.K. Butler was nominated 
also as a Director of the Company. In this way, some of the powers 
The Feelings of E.K. Butler become clear from the following note where he urged 
Freudenreich for immediate actions. "For gracious sake. If he is good, sell them to 
him: we will name as a price $150 for harvester and binder. We want them closed 
out." Ibid. 
53 See for example E.K. Butler to Nettie McCormick 10.13.1183. Mss 3b, box 2. 
54 See for example Cyrus Jr. to Nettie McCormick 11.1.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. 
55 Nettie McCormick to Cyrus Jr. 4.21.1883. Mss lb, box 25 vol. 1. 
56 Nettie McCormick to Cyrus Jr. 13.10.1883. Mss lb, box 25, vol.l. 
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of the old inventor and owner of the McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Company were handed over to a professional manager.57 
Figure 2. Organization of the McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Company, 1886. 
Organization of tile McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, 1886 
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Source: E.V. Crouse, list of the known members of the McCormick Reaper 
Works organization year 1886. Mss Special Reports File, box 14. 
a In charge of the office was the superintendent assisted by the assistant 
superintendent. In addition, there was an office manager and officals for 
painting, packing and shipping, timekeeper, shipping clerk and a clerk. 
The head designer directed the experimental department with the help of 
a draftsman, a utility man and a pattern foreman. 
In the factory worked a bunch of various foremen: a master mechanic, 
tool foreman, drafsman, grey iron foundry foreman, foundry timekeeper, 
forge shop foreman, press room foreman, binder room foreman, mower 
room foreman, packing department, wood shop, assembly department, 
machine & roller department, receiving office, lumber inspector & yard, 
yard & stable, grey iron shipping, millwright, cupola, car loading, repairs 
and fire & watch. 
57 Special meeting of the Board. Thursday May 22nd, 1884. Directors' Minutes. Page 
70-72. Mss M/I Box 24, vol.35. 
Butler's position had already been central before his official nomination as General 
Manager. For example, in 1883 Nettie McCormick stated her wish that Butler take 
over the patent pool negotiations: "Mr. Butler I tell you that you are required in this 
matter, and I am right in my position, and I want you to take hold of it." Nettie 
McCormick to E.K. Butler. 4.11.1883. Mss lb, box 24. 
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The McCormick Co. had re-established itself in the European 
market through new innovations in harvesting machinery. Cyrus Sr. 
had great difficulties to find reliable, prominent agents in Europe, 
and his efforts ended in failures. He succeeded, nevertheless, to 
organize the foreign trade as part of company business and 
appointed in Russia the Company's first salaried representative. The 
American homemarket clearly surpassed the overseas market in 
importance. Although foreign trade affected to both Cyrus and 
Nettie, it had to give way for domestic requirements. Foreign sales 
were not allowed to cause uncalculated expenses; machines were 
delivered f.o.b. in New York which left the risk on the agent. The 
same very calculated approach was visible in Europe as it was in 
the U.S. In Europe only Britain has reached a considerable level in 
the mechanization of agriculture at the end of the 187Os, while the 
rest of the Europe was just taking its first steps towards 
mechanization. The demand for harvesting machines was therefore 
limited and it was further curtailed by imports of cheap American 
grain. Europe was not yet ready for large-scale operations but under 
the pressure of competition McCormick's were forced to show the 
flag there too. 
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n New Fields to Conquer 
6.1. Opening up in Australia and New Zealand 
Information about the new inventions spread rapidly through the 
farming community. The McCormick Company had hardly 
experimented with its wire-binder in 1876 when news of it had 
spread all the way to New Zealand. The machine had been presented 
at the Continental Exhibition in Philadelphia, and the Government 
of the colony of New Zealand decided to purchase one as a sample.' 
The introduction of the new machine, and the great future 
prospects in the opening lands of the Pacific colonies, tempted Cyrus 
McCormick to enter that scene. He had patented his binder in several 
European countries, and followed the same strategy in the Pacific. 
Patents were used to restrict competitors' operations and to reserve 
time for McCormick's own actions.2 
The Company had sent one of its most able experts, J.C. Newell, 
to the Liverpool show. The show was a disappointment, but opened 
the door to the Colonies. Newell arranged a contract for fifty binders 
with Morrow, Basset & Co. from New Zealand, and a similar deal 
with another party from the same colony.3 Besides New Zealand, 
Australia was also growing in importance. Cyrus planned to send to 
the new territory machines that had been left unsold in America. 
Australian commission agents, for their part, felt it necessary to have 
new machines and were ready even to pay half of the costs of an 
expert to help them to set up and start them. These plans were 
realized and a master mechanic, E.C. Beardsley, was sent already 
during the fall of 1877 to supervise activities in both countries.4 
1 A.M. Greenfeld to C. & L. McCormick 11.11.1876. Mss 2x. box 196. 
2 C.H. McCormick to F.H. Matthews 7.11.1877. Mss la, box 68. According to 
McCormick, 450 binders had been sold in colonies during 1877. Haseltine Lake & 
Co. to Morgan & Co. 1.11.1878. Mss la, box 71. 
Reino Kero in his study on foreign enterprise at the turn of the century in Finland 
has found that even in such a small and remote market area the big companies 
secured there interest by patents, either to hinder other companies to reach the 
market or to restrict the domestic production. Kero 1987, 160, 165, 174-175. 
3 F.C. Newell to C.H. McCormick 7.15 and 8.5.1877. Mss 2a, box 56. 
4 C.H. McCormick to F.H. Matthews 7.21.1877. Mss la, box 68. F.H. Matthews to 
Cyrus H. McCormick 10.8.1877. Mss la, box 68. 
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E.C. Beardsley's reports from New Zealand give a vivid insight into 
the many difficulties which awaited in a new environment. Machines 
had to be modified to local conditions, which turned out to be 
difficult. On many occasions information did not reach the factory 
or the agent in time, or was worthless due to unintelligible 
telegrams.5 Beardsley had to be ready to travel through vast areas at 
all times of the day. Competitiors had also discovered the colonies and 
the fierce fight was transferred from America and Europe to the Pacific. 
The familar maneuvers were repeated on the new fields. Tests and 
shows were the most important occasions to display the benefits of 
one's own implements and to blacken competitors' devices .6  
Beardsley started the business energetically, but was replaced by 
the more experienced F.C. Newell,' which says much about the 
growing interest of the McCormick Company. After his arrival in 
Australia, Newell estimated he could sell as many as 1500 binders 
in Australia alone.8 The realized orders, only 500 harvesters and 
binders for 1879, were far less than he had anticipated. Factory 
officials expected, however, to get further orders for at least 500 
more. Since on the other hand, European orders were only for 300 
machines, the colonies had already superseded Europe as the main 
foreign selling area during the two first years of trade.9 
The Pacific trade casts new light on the question of the role of 
McCormick's foreign enterprise. Even in the present study, during 
the first years, the advertising value of overseas business has been 
found to be of most interest for McCormicks. F.H. Matthews, 
superintendent of the McCormick factory who, during the absence 
of Cyrus McCormick, was in charge of the Company operations, 
maintains in his report to Cyrus in March 1879 that the Company 
had in the bank about $150 000.00, and by the time that amount is 
5 The McCormick Co. began to use special codewords to shorten its telegrams to 
make them cheaper. For example, "McCormick, Chicago: Danger, Ryland" meant "ship 
us three five foot wide Harvesters with String Binder attachment: the Harvester to 
have Iron wheels". A.H. Town to McCormick Co. 8.9.1880. Mss la, box 78. 
Codes were used throughout the trade: in 1886 the words "Hamilton charming carrot" 
meant: "our price for the 100 machines ordered is $155 each net in New York". 
McCormick Co. to McLean Bros. & Rigg 4.27.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
6 E.C. Beardsley to C.H. & L.J. McCormick 1.31.1878. Mss 2a, box 56. Beardsley 
had to cast some parts himself because the original ones were of inferior quality. The 
victory of the Osborne in the New Zealand trial was a severe setback to McCormick. 
It diminished, according to Beardsley, the next year's orders by as much as one 
hundred machines. 
7 C.A. Spring to C.H. McCormick 9.26.1879. Mss 2a, box 52. 
8 F.H. Matthews to C.H. McCormick 12.21.1878. Mss la, box 72. 
9 F.H. Matthews to C.H. McCormick 4.14.1879. Mss la, box 74. 
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gone "we will be getting money out of the New Zealand & Australian 
sales & perhaps some from Waite & Burnell H & Co." The 
McCormick Co. charged $205.00 cash in New York for ordinary 
harvesters. If the Company was able to sell nearly 1100 machines, 
as it calculated, this would mean over $225 000 in revenue. During 
1879 the McCormick factory produced about 13 600 harvesters and 
binders which means that Oceanian trade was 8 percent of the total 
sales. In this light, foreign sales were not a mere mariginal affair for 
the Company, and had an important role in the Company balances.10 
A similar event can be found in the European trade too (see page 
117). 
This information also makes Leander McCormick's demands for a 
share in the foreign business more understandable. It could therefore 
be suspected that for Cyrus it would have been lucrative to understate 
the foreign field, and keep it separate from Company business. 
The Company's serious approach becomes clear from its persistent 
attitude in Australia. It had to lower somewhat the prices of binders 
and binding wire, under the pressure of competition. Furthermore, 
the factory decided to send a permanent representative to the area 
and made preparations in good time beforehand for the coming trials 
in Melbourne. Sales were increasing in the Pacific. Osborne had 
cleaned out all the machines they had shipped over and could have 
sold more. McCormick's agents, on the contrary, had to carry over 
90 machines. Wood had met even greater problems and had to sell 
its harvesters by auction." 
As had been stated before, machines intended for American 
markets did not necessarily fit foreign conditions. Even small 
alterations meant extra costs, and no company would have made 
them without hope of compensation.12 The factory responded to 
agents' demands with frequent changes in models, made specially 
fitted machines and machine parts, but was not ready to produce a 
totally new machine for the Pacific trade.i3  
10 F.H. Matthews to C.H. McCormick 4.14.1879. Mss la, box 74; McCormick 
Machines Built since 1841. Mss Mil box 18. 
11 E.K. Butler to McCormick Co. 9.30.1879. Mss 2a, box 52; McCormick Co. to 
McLean Bros. & Rigg 10.17.1879. Mss lx, LPCB 455. 
12 The average production cost per harvester and binder at the McCormick works 
in 1883 was $42.58. This consisted of material costs of $27.55, labor costs of $12.97 
and running expenses of $2.06. According to the company officials, changing the 
patterns alone raised production costs by about $8 a piece compared with the 
previous year's model. C.A. Spring to Nettie McCormick 9.20.1883. Mss 3b, box 2; 
the Company returned to this question again in 1884, when it reminded McLean 
Bros. & Rigg that "changes or improvements of any character are not done without 
a money-cost".McCormick Co. to McLean Bros. & Rigg 1.13.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
13 See for example McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 4.1.1883. Mss Ix, LPCB 
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Foreign fields were also important in one more respect. When the 
factory developed a new machine, as in 1879, it was possible to 
send a sample for preliminary tests to Australia, to gain practical 
experience, and then to make the necessary alterations in 
construction for the coming season at home.14 
In the McCormick Company's Pacific trade the same trends were 
reflected as in its domestic and its European business. Farmers 
demanded twine-binders and agents pressed the factory to supply 
these or they would take Deering's instead. Company officers 
repeatedly had to give assurances that the factory was experimenting 
with one and simply wanted to have the utmost confidence in the 
machine before taking any action.15 
By 1880, when McCormick's were assuring their agents of the 
coming success, there were already at least five companies16 in full 
swing selling twine-binders. Some of McCormick's agents had to give 
up under pressure from farmers. Rival companies pushed hard to 
gain a foothold and at least Wood, Deering and Osborne had each 
sent two men to the colonies to promote their business. McCormick 
had only one man there, who had great doubts if he alone could 
even earn enough to cover all the expenses he had caused. The 
456; McCormick Co. to McLean Bros. & Rigg 4.27.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458 and 
4.5.1887 Mss 2c, box 112. 
In the correspondence between the McCormick Company and its representatives and 
its agents the question of adapting machines to local conditions rose to the surface 
time after time. One of the frequent complaints was that grain and hay were too 
heavy for the machines or straw was too long. Farmers therefore wanted, for example, 
binders with a deeper platform. Edward Ackerman, the Company's representative in 
the area, had numerous suggestions for future changes and was an important part of 
the business also on that front. He could, for example, write how "The divider is 
worse on this year's machines than last; the grain wheel leaves a large track every 
swath... This point as well as lowness of cut are the two important points for Australia, 
and unless the Steel machines have these improvements, it will not become a favorite 
among the Australian farmers." Edward Ackerman to McCormick Co. 11.30.1884. 
Mss 3b, box 3. 
For the statement on a special machine for the Colonies see McCormick Co. to 
Edward Ackerman 1.3.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
14 C.A. Spring to C.H. McCormick 9.26.1879. Mss 2a, box 52; the same habit 
continued over the years and for example in 1886 the Company put its new knotting 
device to the test first in Australia. McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 10.13.1886. 
Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
15 McCormick Co. to McLean, Brothers & Rigg 4.2. and 6.25.1880. Mss lx, LPCB 
455. 
16 The first five were Wood, Deering, Osborne, Johnston and one unknown colonial 
company. A.H. Town to McCormick Co. 10.4.1880. Mss la, box 78. Agents were in 
such desperate need of the new machines that some of them asked if the Company 
could send them at least the necessary parts to change wire-binders to twine 
machines. Morrow, Basset & Co. 10.9.1880. Mss la, box 77. 
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same comment was repeated six years later by E.K. Butler.'7 These 
notes once again raise suspicions of the statements concerning the 
value and reasons for the Pacific trade. On the other hand, in spite 
of Butler's pessimistic opinion, the McCormick Co. tried to find a 
better competitive position by expanding its trade in auxiliary 
articles.18 
The contest continued in the Pacific harder than ever. Field tests 
and agricultural shows followed each other, and the results were 
reported to the home office for use in America and Europe. Positive 
news from the other continents was also printed in the colonial 
papers, even though local farmers preferred what they saw with 
their own eyes and did not trust foreign trials. For all the leading 
harvester companies, by the beginning of the 1880s the whole globe 
had become one single market place. Consequently, competition 
expanded in full force to every part of that market. Smaller factories, 
as in the colonies, tried to hold on by copying the larger ones' 
machines. In the field tests all the companies bribed the jurors, and 
made special machines for these trials. Besides, there were numerous 
special ways to cause harm to the other competitors.19 
17 A.H. Town to McCormick Co. 8.9. and 10.4.1880. Mss. la, box 78; E.K. Butler to 
McLean Bros. & Rigg 4.27.1886. Mss 1 x, LPCB 458. 
18 McCormick Co. made an inquiry about the possibility to add the Aultman & Taylor 
Co's threshing machines to its line for sale in the Pacific. McCormick Co.to Aultman 
& Taylor Co. 4.22.1888. Mss 3a, box 5. 
19 McCormick to Edward Ackerman 10.10.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
The English firm Hornsby's local agents had acquired some of the first models of 
McCormick's harvesters and then masked them as new machines. Furthermore, they 
had removed some of the key original parts and replaced them with Hornsby's and 
other makers' components. The mixtures were then put on sale as original 
McCormicks. It caused a lot of damage and extra work for McCormick's local 
representatives to explain to the angry farmers why the machine did not function 
properly. Edward Ackerman to McCormick Co. 9.6.1885. Mss 3b, box 4. 
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Table 8. Volume of foreign sales of the McCormick Company, by 
machines and importing countries, 1884-1898. 
Country Harvesters Mowers Reapers Total 
(A) 
Percentage 
of A 
Africa 775 423 1 059 2 257 2.6 
Australia 4 619 645 131 5 395 6.1 
Denmark 93 2 244 2 704 5 041 5.7 
Egypt 2 - 5 7 0.0 
England 4 408 6 488 540 11 436 13.1 
Finland - 900 - 900 1.0 
France 3 302 8 848 2 558 14 708 16.1 
Germany 623 4 834 2 713 8 170 9.3 
Mexico 43 21 225 289 0.3 
New 3 741 305 90 4 136 4.7 
Zealand 
Norway 37 1 692 311 2 040 2.3 
Russia 3 565 4 591 8 986 17 122 19.4 
South 8 916 2 689 699 12 204 13.8 
America 
Sweden 100 3 476 916 4 492 5.1 
Sum 30 224 37 036 20 937 88 197 100 
Source: McCormick Estate Papers. Mss M/I box 18. 
From the above it has become evident how the harvester business 
expanded rapidly to the colonies. It is also apparent that foreign 
trade began to have a distinct value for all the competing companies. 
Its material value, as in the case of the McCormick Co., was not 
merely nominal if compared with the domestic. The total number 
of reapers, mowers and harvesters sold on foreign markets in 
1884-1898 was 8.1 percent of total sales. At the same time the Pacific 
trade was 10.8 percent of total foreign sales as can be seen in Table 
8. That amount certainly meant a considerable sum of money even 
to such a prominent factory as the McCormick Co. 
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Table 9. Unit prices of machines sold by the McCormick 
Company in the Colonies, 1882-1886 (U.S. dollars). 
Year Harvester and 
binder 
Reaper Mower 
1882 305-340 170 85 
1883 305-340 170 85 
1884 305-315 170 85 
1886 145-155 
Source: McCormick Co. to McLean Bros. & Rigg and Morrow, Basset & Co. 
12.8.1881. Mss lx, LPCB 456; McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 
4.1.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 456; E.K. Butler to McLean Bros. & Rigg 4.27.1886. 
Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
Although the sales figures already confirm the growing value of the 
export for the McCormick Co., further evidence can be found by 
comparing machine prices in America and in the Pacific. The 
intention of the comparison is to find out if there were any 
differences in the Company's coverage. Prices also reveal information 
about the terms of trade of the various ftrms.20 
In America, Cyrus McCormick was among the first to introduce 
the hire purchase system. It was not transfered to the Company's 
Pacific trade, but machines were, with minor exceptions, sold f.o.b. 
in New York or in some other port as was the case in the European 
trade. The other companies followed the same lines, at least in the 
Pacific.2' This meant that the factory had to bear the transportation 
costs from Chicago to the port, but from there on agents had to pay 
20 In 1880 Champion dealers sold combine reapers and mowers at $100, single 
reapers at $85 and mowers at $52. N.H. Town to McCormick Co. 8.9.1880. Mss la, 
box 78. 
A notice survives from 1884 that Buckeye and Hornsby were selling their machines 
at $45, and Howard and Deering at $50 and $55 respectively. Morrow, Basset & Co. 
to McCormick Co. 12.6.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. Altough it is unknown which machines 
these prices refer to, it is probable that the quotations were for mowers. These prices 
were about $30 cheaper than what McCormick could offer. 
21 McCormick Co. to Morrow, Basset & Co. and to McLean, Bros. & Rigg. 12.8.1881. 
Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
For 1882 McCormick offered its agents in Oceania a discount of 35 percent from the 
prices in Table 8. On spare parts, the discount was 33 percent. Two years later the 
terms were more liberal: the discount on machines remained the same but for parts 
it was raised to 37.5 percent. Cash sales were also changed in 1883 to a more liberal 
'time sale' in which payments were to be made in three months from the date of 
Bill of Lading. McCormick Co. to McLean Bros. & Rigg. Mss lx, LPCB 457; 
Competition forced the English firm Hornsby, at least, to send its goods on 
consignment to their agents and even to pay all expenses for advertising and 
exhibiting the machines. Edward Ackerman to McCormick Co. 9.6.1885. Mss 3b, 
box 4. 
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for freight and insurance.22 Domestic and export prices are therefore 
comparable, but the comparison itself, due to the lack of information, 
is not totally reliable. However, it appears that at first prices were 
higher than in America but then, for some years, were considerably 
lower. If this interpretation is correct, it leaves for the manufacturer 
a larger marginal in export trade than in domestic business. 
Although factories set fixed prices for their agents, it depended 
on the agent what price he charged his customers. The McCormick 
Co. had to warn one of its agents not to raise the prices of the spare 
parts to such a high level as he had done. The Company's own 
business ideology had been the contrary. The cost of the extras had 
to be on such a level that customers were satisfied.23 When the 
competition became more acute, the McCormick Co. had plans to 
fight back with prices, but did not put the cuts into effect in the 
fear that agents would not pass them on to customers.24 Equally 
surprising was the Company's comment on how its representative 
22 Although the agents had to pay for freights, normally the factory made the 
arrangements and also negotiated the rates. Freights were calculated in tons or cubic 
feet. In 1880 the rates were $7.60 + 5 percent primage per ton or 40 cubic feet. 
McCormick Co. to McLean Bross. & Rigg 4.2.1880. Mss lx, LPCB. Three years later 
the rates were $7.00 per ton or 40 cubic feet. McCormick Co. to McLean Bross & 
Rigg 2.12.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 456. Freights were an important part of overall business 
competitiveness. If one company could get lower rates than its rivals, this was a 
significant advantage which in turn lowered pressure on agents and expanded their 
profits. The importance of freights becomes clear when in 1888 the McCormick Co. 
threatened to charter a vessel to deliver its machines, in order to break the 
shipbrokers' common prices. This advantage was not intended for those agents who 
wanted to take care of their own freights. McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 
5.26.1888. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
At first the machines were sent to the Pacific through Boston or New York and from 
there via London or Liverpool, but by 1883 some machines went through San 
Francisco. McCormick Co. to McLean Bross. & Rigg 4.2.1880. Mss lx, LPCB; 
McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 1.3.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 456; McCormick Co. 
to McLean Bross & Rigg 2.12.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
The question of insurance is more complicated. McLean Bross. & Rigg did not, 
however, at first want to insure the machines it had ordered. Another agent, Morrow, 
Basset & Co., on the other hand complained that the McCormick Co. had not insured 
its machines as requested, at 10 % on invoice value, and if there had been an accident, 
it would have meant considerable loss for them. Morrow, Basset & Co. to McCormick 
Co. 10.9.1880. Mss la, box 77. Morrow, Basset & Co. continued to insure its 
shipments. McCormick Co. to New Zealand Insurance Co. 4.27.1888. Mss lx, LPCB 
459. 
23 Furthermore, the company actually ordered its agent to lower the prices to a 
similar level as the factory itself had done. This action was justified by the large 
discounts which the factory had passed on to its agents, the idea being that they 
could trasmit part of that reduction to their own prices. McCormick Co. to McLean 
Bross, & Rigg. 1.12.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
24 Edward Ackerman to McCormick Co. 10.30.1884. Mss 3B, box 3; McCormick Co. 
to Edward Ackerman 2.7.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
E.K. Butler expressed the Company's beliefs by stating that "we would not, of course, 
expect to give them a reduction and have them put it in their pockets, and not 
increase the sale of the machines by making use of the reduction". E.K. Butler to 
Edward Ackerman 9.17.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
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had been laboring with old machines long enough against 
competitors' newer models. Local agents seemed to be, for some 
reason, very conservative, for E.K. Butler hoped "that our Melbourne 
friends will at last consent to allow us to ship them our latest, with 
which you need have no fears of any of our competitors".25  
Cyrus McCormick had patented his machines in the colonies, but 
patents did not prevent copying. Even the large companies kept a keen 
eye on each other's improvements and made similar modifications in 
their own models. In this sense it is no surprise how calm Edward 
Ackermann was about local copies of the McCormick machines in the 
colonies: a more dangerous threat came from the pirate part makers, 
who sold their castings as original McCormick spare parts.26 
In contrast to what it did in Europe, the McCormick Co. in the 
colonies appointed several agencies but gave none of them sole rights. 
In Australia, Lassater & Co. had New South Wales and Queensland, 
while McLean, Bros & Rigg managed Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania.27 
To strengthen agents' morale and efforts, officers told them 
confidentially how the factory was running at full capacity and could 
not fill all the orders even in America. In the next sentence agents 
were asked to put in their orders as early as possible so that they 
could be filled. 8 Although the McCormick Company's orderbooks 
25 E.K. Butler to Edward Ackerman 10.13.1896. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
26 Edward Ackerman to McCormick Co. 9.6.1885. Mss 3B, box 4. The Company 
accused of copying was Reid & Gray of Dunedin. 
The situation in Oceania was a special case, since the countries in that region were 
British colonies and the Company held patents in England. The English factories could 
not copy McCormick's machines in England and ship them over to the colonies, and 
manufacturers in the colonies were too insignificant to take seriously. E.K. Butler to 
Edward Ackerman 10.13.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
27 The two agents could not resist the temptation and began to sell in each other's 
areas. Competition went on with price reductions, but at this stage headquarters in 
Chicago took a firm stand in the matter. The Company declared strictly that it wanted 
its agents to keep prices as high as possible, as has been the case in America. The 
McCormick Company justified its argument with the good quality of its products. 
McCormicks could be sold even at higher prices. This argument perhaps explains 
why the McCormick Company, like the others, took tests and trials so seriously. To 
keep its word the Company had to defeat its competitors over and over again. 
McCormick Co. to Lassater & Co. Limited 12.13.1879 and 1.12.1880. Mss 1x, LPCB 
455. When Lassater & Co. repeated its trick some years later, its rights to the 
McCormick agency were withdrawn. McCormick Co. to Lassater & Co. 9.11.1882 
and McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 4.1.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
To get rid of its unsold stock of outdated wire-binders, McCormick's former European 
representative, Waite, Burnell & Co., sent them to New Zealand at prices which 
"materially interfere with their (other agents') trade". The McCormick Co. took a strict 
stand on the question. It sent stern letters to Waite, Burnell & Co. and also to its 
new European agent, Percy Lankester, in which it prohibited such actions in the 
future. McCormick Co. to Waite, Burnell & Co and to Percy Lankester & Co. Mss 
lx, LPCB 456. 
28 McCormick Co. to Lassater & Co. Limited. Mss lx, LPCB 455. 
NEW FIELDS TO CONQUER n 141 
were full, and there was a growing demand for harvesting machines, 
there remains a doubt as to its real intentions: was this only a trick 
to encourage agents to make further orders? 
Irrespective of all the efforts of the agents and the factory, the 
realized sales depended to a considerable extent on the weather and 
the farmers' prospects from the harvest.29 Any competing harvester 
company could win the tests and shows and agents could expect 
large sales, but if the weather was too wet or too dry, farmers were 
unwilling to invest in expensive machinery. This was one of the key 
factors to consider when agents made decisions about the next year's 
orders.30 In one respect, McCormick's agents were in a disadvanta-
geous position, since they claimed that competitors charged their 
representatives only after machines were sold; if the year turned out 
bad, it was the factory that carried the risk. The f.o.b. system that 
McCormick used forced its agents to avoid unnecessary risks, which 
in some conditions also decreased sales. Agents simply could not 
trust even the "brightest prospects".31  
6.2. The Pacific falls into oblivion 
The big expectations which the McCormick Company had of the 
Pacific trade were not realized. It had to fight the same companies 
as on the home front and in Europe. The McCormick records leave 
an impression that in the Pacific it was a market leader and other 
companies tried to usurp its place. Not all years were, however, 
equally good, and a marked fluctuation in sales is visible, especially 
during the 1880s. 
After a brisk start in 1878, McCormick's sales began to drop. 
Machines remained unsold on agents' hands. At the beginning of 
29 Bad weather could also have a positive influence on sales, as happened in America: 
in 1878 the weather had been very rainy throughout the whole Northwest and 
consequently farmers had hurried up their harvests by ten days. For the McCormick 
Co. it meant an increased demand for binding wire which the company had to collect 
in a hurry from all possible sources to prevent farmers from returning their newly 
bought wire-binders. F.C. Matthews to C.H. McCormick 8.3.1878. Mss la, box 72. 
30 See for example Edward Ackerman to McCormick Co. 11.30.1884. Mss 3b, box 
3 and 9.6.1885 Mss 3b, box 4. Since after the long drought, crops were very light, 
farmers bought 'strippers' instead of heavier harvesters, since these were the only 
machines by which such crops could be reaped. Strippers were domestic Australian 
machines that began to compete with the exported reapers. 
See further: Thompson, Alan: The Origins of a Harvester Revolution: The Development 
of the Combine Harvester in Australia, Canada and U.S.A. (Tools and Tillage. Ed. by 
Axel Steensberg, Alexander Fenton and Grith Lerche. Vol. III:2 1977). Copenhagen 
1977. 
31 McLean Bros. & Rigg to McCormick Co. 1.22.1897. Mss 2x, box 298. 
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1883 hopes for large trade were still bright, and headquarters 
requested Edward Ackerman to stay in the area.32 Ackerman was 
able to defeat his competitors at most of the shows, but during 1884, 
in spite of his efforts, about half of the machines remained unsold 
and had to be carried over to the next year. The English Hornsby 
had outdone its archrival, with its machine carefully built for these 
markets. For the moment McCormick and Wood had to fight for the 
second prize.33 The McCormick Company acknowledged the 
situation but a letter to Edward Ackerman probably gives an answer 
to why it continued its foreign trade: "We do not propose to abandon 
the trade, nor the ground; neither are we disposed to take a back 
seat in the future and allow the opposition to occupy the field that 
up to this time has been so succesfully held by our Australian and 
New Zealand agents."34  
Business had spread to every part of the globe and it had become 
impossible to give it up even in the most remote places. No company 
could anymore afford to allow rumors of a retreat from some markets 
in a situation where the news of the results of field tests in Europe 
was used for advertising in Australia and vice versa. Mira Wilkins 
has noticed that American and German multinationals often invested 
abroad to sell and to make goods, based on new technology. They 
expanded over borders either to reach the market or to obtain 
sources of supply. In the case of the American firms Wilkins stresses 
these two factors even over the financial returns.35  
In spite of the doubtful outlooks for the future, within a year 
McCormick had regained its position and its agents could once again 
report victories at shows.36 With its new machine, the Company 
32 McCormick Co to Edward Ackerman 1.3. and 4.1.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
Exact numbers of sales to Oceania by year are not available before 1891. In 1883 
McLean Bros. & Rigg from Melbourne ordered 250 harvesters. Ibid. 
33 McCormick Co.to McLean Bros. & Rigg 1.12.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457; Edward 
Ackerman to McCormick Co. 10.30.1884. Mss 3B, box 3. 
During the season of 1884-1885 McCormick was awarded seventeen first prizes in 
the Colonies. The competitors were Hornsby, Wood, Buckeye, Deering, Johnston, 
Samuelson, Esterly, Champion and Howard. McCormick Co. to Lankester & Co. 
5.5.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
To its European representative McCormick boasted to be "further at the front to-day 
than we have ever been heretofore both in New Zealand and in Australia"; the English 
companies could not compete with American manufactures. E.K. Butler to Lankester 
& Co. 1.8.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
34 McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 2.7.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
35 Wilkins 1988, 22-24. 
36 McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 4.7.1885. Mss 1x, LPCB 457; Edward 
Ackerman to McCormick Co. 9.6.1885. Mss 3B, Box 4. 
Ackerman hurried to post local newspapers which had published results of the tests 
and shows to headquarters. 
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declared the next year that "what we have produced is something 
they will have to work a long while at before they can equal".37 
These proud words were fulfilled, and in 1886 the only relevant 
competitor was the English Hornsby. Next year the McCormick 
Company anticipated severe rivalry, but expected to knock out its 
competitors with its new steelbinder, as it had done on the home 
front.38 The positive trend continued to the end of the decade and 
the Company rejoices over its large orders. Among its competitors 
the same trends were visible as in other countries. The Deering 
Company had increased its share of business, but the Canadian 
Massey Company had become the strongest competitor. Massey 
proved to be an aggressive rival, that threatened McCormick several 
times for infringements of its patents.39 
By 1890, Edward Ackerman, who had been in Oceania since 1881, 
began to devote some of his time to European problems, arranging 
exhibitions and trials in France and in Belgium.40 Ackerman was still 
in the Colonies in 1892, but thereafter his services were needed in 
37 C.H. McCormick Jr. to Edward Ackerman 7.24.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. The 
McCormick Company's serious approach to the Oceanian business becomes evident 
from Cyrus Jr.'s personal interest in its problems. 
38 McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 10.8.1886 and 7.21, 1887. Mss lx, LPCB 
458 and 459. 
The McCormick Co. trumpeted that they had sold over 21 000 steel-binders on home 
markets in 1887 and estimated to have lost the sale of at least 5000 more due to 
their inability to meet the demand. For their competitors, this success had been a 
serious blow and between the lines can be read how McCormick's expected new 
efforts from its rivals. 
The New Steel Binder won 16 first prizes in the Colonies during the season of 1886, 
the English Hornsby being the only significant rival. E.K. Butler to Lankester & Co. 
12.8.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
39 E.K. Butler to Edward Ackerman 4.29 and 9.17.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
In 1883 the Massey Company sent its first twenty-five machines to Australia on 
consignment. Consigment business was soon found to be a total failure and three 
years later the company sent over its own traveler to oversee sales and set up the 
machines. Denison 1949, 95-96, 98, 100-101. 
The McCormick Co. was eager to get all possible details of its competitors' machines. 
When Deering introduced a new Chain Drive Harvester, McCormick reminded 
Ackermann not to fail to post all the information available on the working of the 
machine. E.K. Butler to Edward Ackerman 4.29.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
Even in 1888 E.K. Butler did not foresee Canadian companies as a serious threat to 
Lankester in the Colonies, since their machines "are not calculated for that work". 
E.K. Butler to Edward Ackerman 11.7.1888. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
By 1892 the situation had changed totally. The new Massey-Harris Co. and Wood did 
their utmost to capture the Australian trade and other firms, Deering, Hornsby and 
Buckeye were on the decline. E.K. Butler to Edward Ackerman 7.18.1892. Mss lx, 
LPCB 461. 
On patent infringements see E.K. Butler to Edward Ackerman 7.18. and 10.29.1892. 
Mss lx, LPCB 461; D.M. Osborne & Co. to McLean Bros. & Rigg 2.3.1896. Mss 2x, 
box 282; McLean Bros. & Rigg to McCormick Co. 10.27.1897. Mss 2x, box 298. 
40 McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 10.9.1881. Mss lx, LPCB 456; Edward 
Ackerman to Stanley McCormick 8.2.1890. Mss la, box 109. 
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Europe and in South America.41 The reasons for this changed focus 
of activity have to be sought in the volume of trade. Relative to the 
European business, the Oceanian trade had lost significance, and it 
was understandable that the Company directed one of its most able 
men to more lucrative markets.42  
Table 10. Sales of harvesting machines and mowers by the 
McCormick Company in the newly colonizing areas, 1878-1901. 
Year South 
America') 
Australia Cape 
Colony 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 - 
596 
255 
101 
270 
1882 52 2 
1883 106 1 011 
1884 157 1 096 17 
1885 281 75 17 
1886 56 198 36 
1888 171 
1889 87 
1890 832 1 159 98 
1891+) 100 170 110 
1895+) 646 274 420 
1896+) 594 1 181 237 
1898)  1 950 965 317 
1899 2 617 898 242 
1900 2 140 839 238 
190f 1 310 554 169 
1902+) 
 
2 168 1 043 461 
1) South America includes here Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay. 
Source: Statement showing machines sold to foreign countries, 1874-1901. 
Mss la, box 72; Machines sold to foreign countries counted by agents. Mss 
3x, box 26. Marked with +); Statement showing machines sold to foreign 
countries and prIts on foreign machine business, 1898-1900. Mss M/I, box 
18. Marked with 
41 E.K. Butler to Edward Ackerman 7.18 and 11.29.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
42 Machines sold to foreign countries counted by agents. Mss 3x, box 26. 
According to the Machine Ledgers, which state the number of machines sold by the 
agents, in 1891 there were only 170 machines sold in the Colonies and 274 in 1895. 
This information must be approached with caution, since there is no record at all of 
McLean Bros. & Rigg's orders for 1891, but from other sources it is clear that this 
firm had three houses in Australia and had made orders and sales both in 1891 and 
1892. McCormick Co. to Edward Ackerman 1.3.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460 and E.K. 
Butler to Edward Ackerman 11.29.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
In spite of these comments the overall trend is visible. Europe had become the main 
foreign sales area. 
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The sales figures in Table 10 do not totally coincide with the 
information that has been collected from the McCormick Company's 
correspondence. At the end of the 1880s Ackermann announced the 
victories in trials and agricultural shows and the large orders from 
the Company's agents; but in the Company records these orders 
seem to be considerably smaller. Only in 1884 and in 1890 did the 
sales exceed 1000 machines, and in most years sales were totally 
missing or were minimal. It is, however, obvious that the reports of 
Edward Ackerman are in this case more reliable than the Company 
records.43  
Simultaneously with its Pacific trade the McCormick Company also 
sent out its tentacles to South America and South Africa. A first 
shipment of twelve wire-binders was sent in 1879 c/o Dumeresq, 
LeBas & Company of Montevideo in the Oriental Republic (today 
Uruguay). This firm obtained the rights to the sole agency in South 
America for one year, extended until 1882. At that time McCormick 
sent its travelling agent, Lee Borrel, to oversee the business. On his 
recommendations, the agency was transferred to Buenos Aires, 
where a permanent agency was established in 1883.44  The earliest 
information on the African trade is available from 1882, when the 
McCormick Company sent its first shipment to Smuts & Koch in 
Malmesbury, Cape of Good Hope.45  
In Buenos Aires the McCormick Company was a latecomer that 
43 Statements showing the volume of the McCormick Company's production, sales 
and profits are very fragmentary. Ledgers are available only for 1891, 1895, 1896, 
1901 and 1902. The various extant statements were produced by company officials 
for various purposes over a long duration of time. For this reason, not all the available 
material is totally consistent, and has to be approached with caution. Nevertheless, 
it was produced for internal Company use and when the purpose of the material is 
kept in mind, it gives at least outlines of the development of business. 
It is, however, obvious that not all sales and transactions are visible in the statements, 
as becomes clear by comparing sales figures in Table 10 and information collected 
from the Company's correspondence. 
Scholars' use of the material has varied. Jan Kuuse includes machine parts in the 
Company's production figures. Kuuse 1974, 273. In this study this has been avoided, 
since such a practise can lead to misinterpretations. In some years an agent might 
order a large amount of extras and only a few machines, but if in the statistics these 
are calculated together, the result can be misleading. 
44 The Buenos Aires agent was J. Mohr, Bell & Company and it continued to act as 
McCormick's agent until 1887, when the agency was transfered to Agar, Cross & 
Company. Memorandum February 1931. Mss Special Reports File, box 14. This note 
was probably written for the use of Cyrus McCormick III, grandson of the inventor, 
who at that time was completing his book "The Century of the Reaper". 
This information is partly confirmed by a letter to Linus R. North care J. Mohr, Bell 
& Co. 11.30.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
45 McCormick Co. to Smuts & Koch 8.5.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456. 
The first shipment met with considerable obstacles. The goods were delayed owing 
to a strike of railroad employees in New York and had to be sent to South Africa via 
London. There is no record of the machines that were sent, but the number was 
apparently only one or two judging from the general invoice of $316.30. 
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had to fight for its place. In spite of its position McCormick's stuck 
to its principles in foreign business: machines were sold only on 
f.o.b. terms in New York.46 On the other hand, prices were 
considerably lower for South America than they were in Oceania47 
and even on the home fields, as can be seen from Table 5, whereas 
McCormick's competitors sold their goods at the same prices as in 
the U.S. 
The McCormick Company regarded South America as an important 
and promising market. It sent its travelling experts as soon as 
possible from Europe to assist South American agents. Sales were 
increasing and by the end of 1884 Linus B. North reported that 
demand had been larger than the Company was able to fill.48  
In the beginning of the 1880s, there is a visible expansion in the 
McCormick Company's foreign business. It had established itself in 
Europe and tried aggressively to find new markets. By the beginning 
of the 1880s, it had become a world wide concern, but it was not 
alone in the field: its competitors had also extended their networks 
into the same areas, and the contest for farmers' dollars continued 
in every part of the world. 
Jan Kuuse explains the rapid expansion of the harvester companies 
to the newly colonized areas by emigration. The new lands were 
smooth and suitable for large-scale farming; moreover, these areas 
were short of labor and there was therefore a heavy demand for 
machines. Kuuse states furthermore that these new immigration 
areas succeeded Europe as the principal customer for agricultural 
technology, and only after the mass emmigration had sucked up the 
surplus population from Europe did it once again, at the end of the 
1890s, became the largest selling area for American agricultural 
machines.49  
Kuuse's interpretation seems at first sight very realistic. There 
were new fertile lands waiting for European emigrants, who were 
in need of tools and machines. On the other hand, as Europe 
discarded its extra hands and mouths, it needed to invest on 
46 McCormick warned its representative, Linus R. North, to make only cash sales. 
"You will understand that whatever orders you may be able to get shall come through 
James E. Ward & Co. or some other equally as responsible house in New York, who 
will pay for the goods they may want when delivered in New York." McCormick Co. 
to Linus R. North 11.30.1883. Mss 1x, LPCB 457. 
47 The price for a regular twine-binder was $190.00, for a combined reaper and 
mower $110.00 and for an iron mower $52.00. McCormick Co.to Linus R. North 
11.30.1883. Mss 1x, LPCB 457. 
48 Linus B. North to McCormick Co. 11.21.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. North also reported 
that Argentina was too large an area for a single agent to cover it properly. 
49 Kuuse 1974, 274, 278-279. 
NEW FIELDS TO CONQUER n 147 
machines. Nevertheless, in the case of Australia the emigration 
statistics and figures for the growth of population do not confirm 
Kuuse's theories. According to Olavi KOIVUKANGAS, the mean 
annual growth rate of population through net migration was 1.60 
percent in 1881-1890 and only 0.08 percent in 1891-1900. 
Furthermore, Koivukangas maintains that fertility was the major 
factor in population growth during the latter part of the 19th 
century; and the two leading sectors that brought settlers into 
Australia were mining and railway construction. Koivukangas 
confirms, however, the impact of climate on the economic 
situation.50 On the other hand, consular reports seem to confirm that 
Australasia as a whole suffered from a shortage of labor, which 
pressed farmers to invest in labor-saving machinery.51  
In discussing emigration, we have to remember age and gender 
distribution. Not all of the emigrants were young men at their best 
working age. Besides, as has been noticed in the case of American 
agriculture, farm-making was not a simple task: it required money 
and years of backbreaking work before the fields were in a shape 
to allow the use of a harvester. 
The situation was similar in South America and South Africa. 
Argentina was the main grain-growing state in South America, but 
not even there was immigration a major factor. The migration peak 
in the 1880s did not reach 150 000 migrants, and immigration passed 
this figure only after the turn of the century. Argentina tried to 
induce immigrants during the 1880s by free tickets, but without 
visible success. Besides, the large estate holders prevented the 
enactment of a homestead act according to the American model. 
This of course limited the number of possible farmers but on the 
other hand wealthy holders were freer to invest in machines.52 
Immigration to South Africa did not rise to the same levels as in the 
other newly colonizing areas.53 
This information does not deny the fact that there was a large 
reclamation process going on in the Colonies, but it explains the 
difficulties and setbacks which McCormick encountered in Oceania. 
Sales did not reach amounts that would justify Kuuse's arguments. 
The McCormick Company's expansion to the Pacific, and later in 
50 Koivukangas 1986, 49-50. According to Koivukangas "drought and depression 
combined in 1892-93 and 1898-1900 to occasion higher out-migration than new 
immigrants arriving". Ibid, 50. 
51 Agricultural machinery in their several districts... 1885, 751-752. 
52 Lähteenmäki 1989, 65-66, 275 appendix 1. 
53 Kuparinen 1991, 368-370 appendix 1 and 2. 
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South America and South Africa casts new light on the role of foreign 
trade. Although its financial returns from overseas business were 
only around 8 percent of the total sales in the 1880s, which in fact 
was not a minor income, its importance was growing in another 
way. Foreign sales had in the beginning of the 1880's become an 
integral part of normal harvesting machine trade and companies 
could not afford to leave some markets without consideration. The 
whole World had become one market for the harvester firms. In this 
light the McCormick Company's interest also in the European trade 
becomes more understandable. It was not very eager to expand it 
activities but it had to follow its competitors. Common to all its 
foreign actions was its aspirations to minimize its risks. It made a 
direct investment by sending its representative to the Pacific as it 
did to Russia. But otherwise trade continued on the f.o.b. basis. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that all the competing companies 
rushed to these newly colonizing areas with future hopes. 
Immigration and population in the Pacific, South Africa and South 
America in the 1880s and 1890s were still too small to allow 
large-scale trade, but factories had to secure their positions there in 
hopes of a brighter future. 
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VII 
~, 
n Founding of the Foreign 
Market 
7.1. New winds begin to blow 
7.1.1. A jump into the new era 
At this phase of the study, it is time to turn again to Mira Wilkins' 
and Alfred Chandler's theories on the evolution of foreign enterprise. 
Was there in America in the 1880s already overproduction looking 
for new markets? Was the McCormick Company in the 1880s a 
modern enterprise and did it seek economies of scale and broadening 
of market through foreign business?' 
In the beginning of the 1880s, the harvester machine industry had 
to adjust to a new generation of harvesting machines. After the 
invention of the twine-binder, all the main principles of the modern 
harvester were combined. Subsequent inventions were more or less 
merely improvements on the basic design and materials: wood was 
substituted for iron and steel and the knotting apparatus was 
simplified. This does not diminish the importance and value of these 
changes, and it would be an underestimation to call them only 
marketing tricks.' 
Competition between the harvester companies intensified at the 
same time, and the remaining twenty-one companies tried to fight 
each other through prices, trials, shows and other marketing 
manoeuvers. Prices of reapers sank from $200 in 1872 to $160 in 
1883, and whereas the twine-binder cost $350 in 1882, by 1888 
only from $160 to $150 was charged (Table 5). Although all the 
competitors understood how injurious the situation was for all of 
them, they were unable to reach an agreement over production 
quotas. During the 1890s, competition expanded to every continent 
and was transformed to what was called a reaper war. 
The McCormick Harvester Machine Company was prepared to 
meet the competition. It had rationalized its production systems after 
1 Chandler 1988, 31, 34, 44; Wilkins 1970, 19, 29, 36, 45-46. 
2 Hounshell 1987, 185. 
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the firing of Leander and Hall McCormick, and had changed to a 
new branch house system. It had also obtained rights for the Appleby 
binding mechanism for its new twine-binder 
Table 11. Main indicators describing the McCormick Company's 
economic activity, 1880-1902. 
Year Net sales'  Net 
profits 
Dividends Notes Notes on 
hand 
Capital 	 Net profits 	 Net profits 	 Number of 
	
invested on repairs") 	 on twines  machines sold°  
1880 2 429 278 1 192 733 .. 1 537 913 70 111 26 786 
1881 3 010 942 1 254 961 .. 1 601 956 94 330 32 353 
1882 4 269 653 1 761 226 .. 2 044 526 174 664 .. .. 44 848 
1883 4 425 467 1 486 632 .. 2 457 992 236 824 4 213 180 50 376 
1884 4 469 271 1 776 506 500 000 2 735 755 275 546 5 856 163 151 602 154 346 54 922 
1885 3 691 110 841 007 400 000 2 472 949 254 438 6 790 542 66 339 116 091 51 439 
1886 2 851 926 679 924 250 000 1 740 785 176 928 7 502 121 76 090 121 447 44 103 
1887 3 855 643 1 007 767 400 000 2 415258 261 646 8 061 750 73 141 301 944 71 363 
1888 4 616 057 1 473 986 200 000 2 853542 385 954 9 655 270 120 170 324 456 91 881 
1889 4 687 093 1 803 319 2 860 771 615 020 11 291 084 112670 508 828 104 114 
1890 5 051 291 1 543 037 625 000 3 087 249 	 1 394 362 12 324 170 115 727 369 620 127 654 
1891 6 180 153 1 867 058 625 000 3 406 038 	 2 785 388 13 634 961 131 536 151 773 170 666 
1892 7 356 123 2 550 322 1 000 000 .. 15 507 670 128 354 340 119 202 350 
1893 6 485 193 2 056 481 625 000 .. 17 209 492 131 935 361 442 179 643 
1894 5 183 167 1 502 581 .. 15 815493 230 546 143 143 
1895 7 449 770 2 397 862 2 500 000 .. 16 197 297 337 680 195 461 206 488 
1896 7 244 627 2 284 814 2 500 000 .. 16 603 891 292 803 263 042 129 100 
1897 8 016 089 3 321 666 2 000 000 19 083 550 274 930 206 138 151 885 
1898 11 094 464 4 695 010 1 000 000 .. .. 21 844 689 365 925 378 135 208 346 
1899 12 358 905 4 677 733 1 000000 266 849 
1900 14 203 873 3 292 997 .. 312 128 
1901 17 085972 402 362 
1902 17 275 106 100 000 ., 432 100 
x 
Source : For net sales; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. Net sales of machines, repairs, twine and wire for 
seasons 1880 to 1902 inclusive. Mss M/l box 18. For net profits; Statement showing net profits for the years 
1880-1891. Mss 2C, box 29. Ozanne 1962, 366 for the years 1892.1897. Comparative statistics of McCormick and 
Deering companies for 18984900. Mss M/I, box 1. For dividends; List of Stockholders of Record on date of each 
Dividend. Mbs M/I,box 21. For reaper notes and notes on hand; Statement. Reaper Notes to May 1st 1892. Mss 
2c, box 29 and are from Net Profits on Repairs sold, 1884.1898. inc. and Net Profits on Twine sold, 1884-1892. 
inc. Mss M/1, box 18. is from Statement showing number and kind of machines sold during the years 1880 to 
1902 inclusive. In this figure are included also attachements and other supplementary implements. 
In this case figures include also repairs or extra parts because these were displayed in net values and as such 
lemonstrate more accurately the real situation. 
Figures are only instructive. McCormick Company's officials have produced a substantial amount of accounts 
on machines produced and sold which, however, differ from each other. For example statements Machines 
manufactured 1884-1898 inc. and Machines sold 1884-1898 have omitted totally binders. Mss Mil, box 18. On 
the other hand its information on net profits on twine are in line with other sources (Kuuse 1974, 285) and the 
same can be expected also on repairs. See also To the President and Board of Directors of the McCormick 
Harvester Machine Co. 4.1.1887. Mm 2c, box 29 which confirms the informations of column number of machines 
sold. Some new light in the question comes from the letter of G. Freudenreich where he explains how, "you 
(McCormick Co.) figure machines, counting each H.& B. as two machines." Geo. A. Freudenreich to McCormick 
Harvester Machine Co. 12. 6-18. 1884. Mm 3b, box 3. This explanation makes more understandable remarkable 
low figures in some tables. 
It has to be taken into account also that every year some of the machines were left unsold on hand. 
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and besides had developed new mower and reaper models.3 As a 
result of these exertions, the Company reaped unparalleled net pro-
fits and could declare relatively high dividends to its shareholders 
in the beginning of the 1880s. A noteworthy feature in Table 11 is 
that over the period about half of the sales were made on credit. 
Collection of these revenues was burdensome, and as can be seen 
from the two final years, 1891 and 1892, in the first year only a 
marginal share of the notes were paid. It was therefore understand-
able that all the companies preferred cash sales and warned their 
agents against bad notes. Notes bound a significant allotment of a 
company's investments for a long time in the future. Another item 
to be noted in the McCormick Company's revenues concerns its 
income from twine and repairs. Early in its infant years, the Company 
had understood the significance of repair services, and after the in-
vention of wire- and twine-binders, took care of the distribution of 
the essential binding materials too. 
McCormick's profits dropped dramatically more than 50 percent 
from 1884 to 1885 and dropped 19 percent more during 1886 hand 
in hand with its sales. The same trend is visible also in its dividends. 
In spite of these setbacks, the Company remained profitable and 
continued its investments. 
A similar process is also visible in its arch-rival's development. The 
Deering Company's net profit in 1884 was $1 508 649, in 1885 $834 
405, in 1886 $627 575, in 1887 $940 180 and in 1888 $1 227 582. 
These figures show how alike the companies were. Their profits 
followed the same general trend, but it is interesting that in 1885 
the Deering Company blamed the drop in profits on the bad harvest.4 
The explanation for the rapid decline after the profit peak of 1884 
was the business recession, which also hit the McCormick Company. 
In concert with other employers, the McCormick Co. decided to hit 
back by cutting all day workers' wages by 10 percent and all piece 
workers' and machinists' wages by 15 percent. Cyrus McCormick 
had not anticipated his employees' reactions: after fruitless 
negotiations the molders went out on strike in March 1885 and in 
April the entire plant followed them. McCormick's main competitor, 
the Deering Company, responded to the workers' demands and 
restored the wages. The McCormick Company tried to keep the 
factory open with non-union molders but as tensions began to grow 
and the Company was not able to get police protection, it had to 
surrender, restore the wages and dismiss the scab molders.5 
3 McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. catalog 1880, 1882, 1884. Mss 5x, box 1. 
Catalog 1887, Mss 5x, box 2. 
4 An undated and unnamed memorandum of the Deering Co., 1890. Mss w, box 2. 
5 Ozanne 1962, 362-363; Schonberger 1964, 20-22. 
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Cyrus McCormick Jr. had no intention of giving up, and he waited 
for a second round in the game. Remodeling of the factory systems 
in the McCormick Company had been under way for some years 
and keeping this in mind it was understandable that Cyrus and E.K. 
Butler decided to replace molders by pneumatic molding machines. 
As a result, not a single one of the 91 striking molders was on the 
payroll for 1886. The Company was able to manage new strikes, but 
the situation deteriorated and finally developed into the infamous 
Haymarket incident on May 3. 1886.' 
Robert OZANNE, who made a pathbreaking study on McCormick's 
labor policy, tried to show that trade unionism played a major role 
in the Company's wage policy. According to Ozanne, it was the 
molders' union that pressed the McCormick Company to increase 
wages, and consequently owners wanted to replace harmful labor 
by machines.8 
David Hounshell opened a new approach to the subject by 
pointing out the implications of the new production systems. As has 
been already noted, Leander McCormick had had to give way to 
Lewis Wilkinson in 1880. During his short time in the Company, 
Wilkinson brought with him a new management and production 
ideology which has been called the American Manufacturing System. 
The factory was turned over to two work shifts and various jigs, 
fixtures and gadgets were introduced into production. The Company 
also began to use in increasing measure special-purpose machines, 
which in many cases it had to develop itself. Moreover, the new 
manufacturing system offered means for control over labor.9 
6 New Molding machines did not work accurately enough and castings did not fit 
together. Nettie McCormick expressed her concern over the matter but gave her 
backing to Butler's handling of the matter. Nettie McCormick to E.K. Butler 
11.11.1885. Mss lb, box 24. 
7 Schonberger 1964, 22.24. 
8 Ozanne 1962, 362-364, 373-375. 
The son of Cyrus McCormick Jr. passes over the whole event with a couple of words 
in his book and blames the harsh Superintendent, who was dismissed shortly after 
the incident. McCormick 1931, 90. According to the Directors Minutes, the General 
Superintendent of the McCormick Harvester Machine Company, C.A. Spring Jr., 
tendered his resignation on June 1st 1889. Directors Minutes. June 1st, 1889. Mss 
M/I, box 24. vol. 35. C.A. Spring might be the person whom McCormick means. In 
spite of this fact, in the light of new evidence, McCormick's explanation of the strike 
is oversimplified and partisan, and fails to take into account changes in the factory. 
There are some small errors in Ozanne's calculations. He has not found labor costs 
for 1883-1885. For 1884 costs were $11.66 per machine, in 1885 $11.89 and in 1886, 
according to Company statements, $12.91 instead of $16.16, which Ozanne used as 
evidence for the aims of the molders' union. Cost to Manufacture and Sell 1886 
Machines. Mss M/I, box 4. For 1885 C.A. Spring to Nettie McCormick 9.24. 1885. 
Mss 2b, box 31. 
9 Hounshell 1987, 178-182; Kobayashi 1974, 205. 
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In 1883 the 
McCormick 
works mostly 
used handfitting 
but soon 
acquired 
special-purpose 
machines and 
thereby tried to 
obtain economies 
of scale. 
(McCormick 
Collection. State 
Historical Society 
of Wisconsin). 
In a careful study, Hal HANSEN has taken Hounshell's reasoning 
a step further by showing the introduction of cost accounting in 
1881 at the McCormick works. Furthermore, he stresses the 
expansion of piecerates and growing managerial supervision. Hansen 
also points strongly to the enhanced significance and development 
Although Hounshell underlines the importance of the two-shift system, Nettie 
McCormick stressed her preference for one shift. She wanted to avoid night work, 
which raised the cost to manufacture; she would rather see "the need of improving 
the time in the first part of the season, instead of pushing for dear life in the last 
part." (spacing Nettie McCormick). Nettie McCormick to E. K. Butler 10.15. 1885. 
Mss lb, box 24. 
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of the machine shop, which finally became an independent unit 1° 
Table 12 shows how the cost of manufacturing machines fell 
during the first part of the 1880s. The change is still more visible if 
it is compared to the $62.11 in 1876. The clear jump in expenditures 
from 1880 to 1881 may be due to increases in material prices, or, 
stated."equally possibly, to rising labor costs, as Ozanne ha  s ated.The 
McCormick Company included under manufacturing costs all 
material, labor and running expenses. To the overall costs, there 
must also be added sales expenses, which included the categories 
agents, special and office. In 1886, sales expenses raised the 
expenses by $42.25,12 which means $77 overall costs per machine. 
Because the McCormick Co. summed all the various kinds of 
machines in the average cost, it is impossible to count net profit 
per machine. 
Table 12. Average unit cost per machine in the McCormick 
Company, 1880-1886. 
Year Cost of 
manufacture 
($) 
1880 41.21 
1881 44.28 
1882 41.78 
1883 42.15 
1884 38.72 
1885 40.41 
1886 34.75 
Source: C.A. Spring Jr. to Nettie McCormick 9.24.1885. Mss 3b, box 5. For 
1886, Cost to Manufacture and Sell 1886 Machines. Mss M/1, box 4. 
10 Hansen 19890), 6-7, 15, 18-23. 
Hansen's ideas are supported from C.A. Spring's letter to Nettie McCormick, where 
he calculated the average cost of a machine to be $1.69 higher in 1885 than in 1884. 
The reason for the increase was not labor costs, but more expensive raw materials: 
it simply cost more to make the new steel machines. C.A. Spring Jr. to Nettie 
McCormick 9.24.1885. Mss 3b, box 5. 
11 Ozanne 1962, 369 table 6. 
12 Statement of Cost to Sell 1886 Machines. Mss 2c, box 29. 
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It is clear that by 1884 the McCormick Company had entered a new 
phase in its history. It was on its way to become a modern corpo-
ration with a professional management. It had invested major 
amounts in new labor-saving machinery, and reorganized its produc-
tion. Although it is evident that at the McCormick plant the supply 
side of the business was in better shape than it had ever been before, 
there remains the demand side and various factors affecting it. 
Some of the key elements in the agricultural machine trade were 
the prospects for coming crops and for grain prices. In the late 
1870s, rising prices of wheat encouraged farmers to invest in land. 
Even investors smelled money in the air, and organized the famous 
Red River Valley bonanza farms. After 1883, however, prices of 
agricultural products began a downward trend to 1896. Export 
prices of wheat also followed the overall trend. During the 1880s, 
acreage sown in wheat stayed approximately constant, but wheat 
output sank considerably, largely due to bad weather conditions.13 
The business recession that began in 1884 had severe side-effects 
on the McCormick Company. Its management tried to cope with 
the depression by wage cuts, but was hit by strikes that cut into 
productivity and profits. Since American agriculture was simulta-
neously facing falling grain prices, there seemed to be good reasons 
for the expansion of trade abroad. On the other hand, American 
companies had to encounter the European agricultural depression, 
caused by the cheap American grain. How did they manage the 
situation? Did it affect their operation? Or was the agricultural crisis 
visible at all in the McCormick Company's activities? 
7.1.2. Sales through jobbing houses 
In 1884, when the first effects of the depression were apparent in 
America and the McCormick Company decided to resort to wage 
cuts in its production plant, its foreign trade also began to faulter. 
In the Colonies it was losing ground to its competitors, especially 
to the English firm Hornsby. In Europe the situation was not much 
better. McCormick's representative in Russia, George Freudenreich, 
with his continuous demands and complaints, pleased neither Cyrus 
Jr. nor E.K. Butler. In 1884, Freudenreich visited the Chicago head-
quarters, probably for new ideas and to gather encouragement for 
his future undertakings.14  
In England, low prices of wheat had collapsed the demand for 
harvesters, and was forcing English manufacturers to seek customers 
13 Shannon 1945, 156-160, 292-295, 417; Hughes 1987, 277, 280-282. 
14 McCormick Company to J. Maszewski 2.28.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
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on almost any terms. Percy Lankester reported considerable 
reductions in prices and accused his English competitors of 
provoking prejudices against American machines. Accordingly he 
asked for more liberal terms of trade and lowering of prices.15 
In the midst of its domestic problems, the McCormick Company 
decided to fight back. It had developed new machines, the "Daisy" 
light one-horse reaper. To boost the efficiency of its organization, 
the McCormick Co. transferred Algiers from Freudenreich's to 
Lankester's control. The Russian trade was given a new injection by 
sending a couple of able mechanics to help Freudenreich for as long 
as they could be of service. Freudenreich, for his part, intensified 
his efforts by cutting the trading areas of his agents and tightening 
the stipulations. ° Furthermore, Percy Lankester was shown the 
green light for the appointment of an agent in Hungary." 
In the beginning of 1885 the McCormick Co. had twelve agents, 
who had appointed a network of their own subagents in various 
parts of the world.18 Yet the Company had not decided on its future 
strategy in Europe. George Freudenreich had made frequent 
complaints over bad management in the Old World. In its replies, 
the McCormick Co. had to admit that it had not done enough on 
canvassing and appointing agents, as the other companies had. The 
extension of trade to Romania, Hungary and Syria were due to 
15 Percy Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.15.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. 
The list price of the McCormick harvester for Lankester was 60 pounds. Walter A. 
Wood and Howards fixed their price at 52.10.0. , for Samuelson 50 and Hornsby 55 
pounds. Lankester received 20 % off 55 pounds or 15 % off 52, with 2.5 % for cash 
in October. Now he complained that he could only get 43 pounds for his binders 
instead of 50, because the binder cost him 40 pounds in New York with shipping 
charges. Three pounds profit marginal on $15 was not enough for Lankester even to 
cover his working expenses. 
In Paris the English makers delivered their mowers at $50 while Lankester had to 
pay the same in New York. Consequently Lankester asked for his price to be dropped 
to $47.50 at least. Ibid. 
16 E.K. Butler to Messrs. Lankester & Co. 4.15.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457; McCormick 
Co. to Geo. A. Freudenreich 5.6.1884 and 6.5.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457; De 
Franquefort to the Directors of McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. 7.11.1884. Mss 
3b, box 3; Cyrus Jr. to Geo. A. Freudenreich 1.31.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
17 E.K. Butler to Cyrus Jr. 1.3.1885. Mss 3b, box 4; McCormick Co. to Messrs. 
Lankester & Co. 1.8.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
18 List of foreign agents 1885. Mss 2b, box 31. 
The agents were Bell, J. Mohr & Co. in Buenos Ayres, Geo. A. Freudenreich in Odessa, 
Lankester & Co. in London, Le Bas, Dumaresq & Co. in Montevideo, Emil Liphardt 
& Co. in Moscow and Charkow, McLean Bros. & Co. in Melbourne and in Adelaide, 
Morrow, Basset & Co. in Christchurch, J. Maszewski in Odessa, Wm. Staadecker in 
Bucharest and Jules Thiollier & Co. in Algiers. Ibid. To the list of agents there should 
also be added Cosimini & Sons in Italy. 
With some of the agents McCormick Co. had direct contacts, but in the other cases, 
like Emil Liphardt and J. Maszewski, information went through the local 
representative. 
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Freudenreich's own activity. Cyrus Jr. also agreed that it would be 
"profitable and wise to do something more in the way of extending 
our business in Western Europe". From Cyrus Jr.'s letters to 
Freudenreich, it becomes evident that the McCormick Co. had 
managed European affairs in an ad hoc way: it had no overall plans 
for the future, but on the other hand, Cyrus Jr. denied any prejudice 
against the European business. i9 Freudenreich, who was seemingly 
getting tired with the slow movements in Chicago as well as with 
long journeys in Russia, was ready to move his headquarters from 
Odessa either to Berlin or Vienna. This Cyrus Jr. was not ready to 
accept, in spite of low sales figures in Russia.20 On the contrary, 
general manager E.K. Butler repeatedly assured Freudenreich of the 
future possibilities in Russia, albeit the breakthrough might be slow.21  
As a friendly gesture, the McCormick Company sent its machines 
and one of its mechanics, Lee Borrell, to the Budapest trial in 
Hungary where he was able to defeat his rivals. Success in the Show 
opened doors for sales and attracted several agent applicants in 
Hungary, including the famous English machine and implement 
factory of Clayton & Shuttleworth, who, however, represented 
Walter A. Wood in other countries.22 
19 Cyrus Jr. to Geo. A. Freudenreich 5.29.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. Cyrus Jr. was 
confident over the future possibilities and continuation of business in Russia. On the 
other hand he was not ready at that point to transfer the American sales area system 
with a main agent and the Company's own houses to Europe. Ibid. 
Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 7.24.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. Cyrus assures Freudenreich 
that "we are as anxious to push forward in bringing our machines before notice of 
European agriculturists, as is possible". 
20 Cyrus Jr. to Geo. A. Freudenreich 5.29.1885, 7.24.1885 and 8.6.1885. Mss lx, 
LPCB 458. 
Freudenreich blaimed cheap labor as his main obstacle to large sales in Russia. 
According to Cyrus Jr. he had even suggested that the only way "to improve the 
trade is to kill off a couple of thousand stout and healthy young fellows." Cyrus Jr. 
to Freudenreich 8.6.1885. Mss Ix, LPCB 458. 
21 Butler to Freudenreich 9.15.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. Butler's opinion was that 
"there is more money in the business to us in Russia, even though it may seem slow 
for the present, than any other countries upon the continent or in England." Butler 
restated his argument some time later in about the same words. Butler to 
Freudenreich 11.10.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
22 Cyrus Jr. to Nettie McCormick 7.9.1885. Mss 2b, box 31; Cyrus Jr. to Lee Borrel 
7.9.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458; Cyrus Jr. to Messrs. Lankester & Co. and to Geo. 
Freudenreich 9.3.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
George Freudenreich objected to such a move, referring to the basic sales strategy 
of the McCormick Co. "As it has not been your habit to make arrangements with 
firms which handle other reaping machines, especially if the Woods". Consequently 
he closed an agreement with Emil Müller. Geo. A. Freudenreich to McCormick Co. 
10.4.1885. Mss 3b, box 4. Freudenreich was able to get rid of commission trade in 
the negotiations with Emil Müller, but otherwise had to give the same terms as in 
the Russian trade. That meant payments in three years, so that by the third year every 
machine had to be paid for, whether sold or not. 
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The strikes that hit the McCormick Company are not visible in 
the foreign correspondence. Mostly they were felt only in machine 
shipments, which were delayed, or the Company was not able to 
supply goods at all.23 It would, nevertheless, be attractive to 
contemplate whether the recession that began in 1884 had any 
influence on the foreign trade. A dramatic drop in the production 
and sales figures is apparent. Was it due to the strikes or due to the 
slump? If the recession is to blame, the logical outcome for the 
McCormick Company should be the expansion of its foreign 
business. On the other hand, it should be remembered that there 
was a recession in Europe too. 
Nevertheless, during the summer of 1886, E.K. Butler, General 
Manager of the Company, made the first of his subsequently annual 
tours to Europe.24 He wanted to meet Percy Lankester, and settle the 
question over a Hungarian agency. Butler extended his trip to the 
main grain-growing areas, to obtain an idea of local conditions. After 
his journey he was convinced of the future possibilities in Russia, 
which he considered more promising than any other part of Europe, 
though he did not expect there any rapid expansion. In Hungary he 
was not ready to enlarge business beyond the small agency.25  
Still, Butler did not want to close doors against possible customers 
from other countries.26 The next year Cyrus Jr. himself made a trip 
to Europe, where he attended trials in England and in France.27 
23 E.K. Butler to Messrs. Lankester & Co. 4.5.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. Butler declared 
that the Company had "lost a full month" in the strikes, but at the time of the writing 
of the letter the works were in operation with between 700 and 800 men at work. 
The situation was, nevertheless, serious for the Company for Butler noted: "This labor 
question is becoming a very serious matter, and at present places our business entirely 
out of our control". 
24 BK, Butler to Cyrus Jr. 8.11.1886. Mss 3b, box 6. 
25 E.K. Butler to Cyrus Jr. 8.24.1886. Mss 3b, box 6; E.K. Butler to Geo. Freudenreich 
9.15.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
Freudenreich had build an extensive agency network that covered the central 
grain-growing regions in Eastern Europe. Freudenreich had fourteen agents under 
him. In Russia they were: F. Trepke in Poltava, Stoll & Co. in Voronesh, A.G. Riedel 
in Rostov-on-Don, Rahm & Co. in Kazan, John Maszewski in Odessa, Emil Liphardt 
in Moscow, Hamm & Schmidt in Armavir, Alfred Grodsky in Warsaw, F.K. Ewert in 
Saratow, P. Van D's Nachfolger in Riga, R.K. Ehrt in Saratov and Koenitzer & Co. in 
Samara. In addition, Emil Müller in Budapest, Wm. Staadecker in Bucharest and Joseph 
Friedlander in Vienna worked under Freudenreich. McCormick Co. to Geo. 
Freudenreich 8.9.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
26 E.K. Butler to Salicaths Efterfolgere, Esq. 4.9.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. Salicaths 
Efterfolgere was a Danish agent candidate to whom Butler announced the Company's 
normal terms: f.o.b. in New York in cash. Butler remainded the applicant that the 
Company did not have encouraging memories from Denmark, but for the time being 
had no agent in that country. 
27 Cyrus Jr. to E.K. Butler 8.13.1887. Mss 3b, box 7. 
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If the McCormick Company really expected new growth for its 
trade from Europe, it needed to acknowledge many setbacks and 
defects both in its business contracts and in its organization.28 
Simultaneously with its Hungarian operations, the McCormick 
Company bargained with Percy Lankester over his future role in the 
European trade. So far, Lankester had sold machines in various 
European countries as a jobber.29 Cyrus Jr., while visiting Europe 
again in 1888, proposed in a long letter to E.K. Butler a change in 
Lankester's status. Lankester should take care both of his own 
business and of McCormick's interests in Europe. In their 
correspondence Butler and Cyrus Jr. defined the future strategy of 
the McCormick Company in Europe. Lankester's own jobbing house 
should take care of the British Isles, Italy and Spain, but the rest of 
Europe would thereafter be directly under the Company's own 
control, with Lankester as its salaried manager.3°  
28 Butler had to remind Freudenreich in 1887 of Müller's poor collections in Hungary 
and of his late payments. E.K. Butler to Geo. Freudenreich 6.22.1887. Mss lx, LPCB 
459. 
Concern about Hungary began to accumulate. The next summer McCormick's 
travelling expert, H. Poppe, sent a worried message from Budapest: only a few sales 
had been made, and Poppe judged that the business was not being run properly and 
asked either Cyrus Jr. or Butler to come and investigate the matter. H. Poppe to 
McCormick Co. 6.9.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
The affair was transferred to Lankester, who after long negotiations was finally able 
to settle it. Freudenreich was released from the Hungarian business and Lankester 
made a contract with the Prager Maschinenbau Actien Gesellschaft of Prague for a 
new agency in Budapest. Emil Müller continued his career in Prager's service, as its 
manager in Budapest, but simultaneously sold McCormick's machines on commission. 
This arrangement offered the McCormick Co. opportunities to get rid of the unsold 
stock of machines and at the same time continue business in Hungary. 
Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 8.3. and 8.14.1888. Mss 2c, box 112; Geo. A. Freudenreich to 
Cyrus Jr. 8.26.1888. Mss 2c, box 112; E.K. Butler to Cyrus Jr. 9.8.1888. Mss 3b, box 
9; Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 10.19.1888. Mss 2c, box 112; Lankester to McCormick Co. 
11.3.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
The poor outcome of the Hungarian business arose partly from the insufficent 
economic standing of Emil Müller, but also from the growing disagreement between 
him and George Freudenreich.Ibid. 
Calculations by Percy Lankester, who was sent to make an investigation, showed that 
it would be totally unprofitable for the McCormick Co. to continue business in 
Hungary under their own management. Even if Freudenreich had been able to sell 
all the estimated 40 harvesters, 30 Daisy reapers and 10 mowers for 1889 with a 
profit of $9320, the total expenses of $13 000 would have have meant about $3680 
deficit. The total loss caused by Müller to the McCormick Company Lankester was 
estimated to be $16 000. Lankester to McCormick Co. 11.3.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
29 A jobber bought his machines at a specified price either for cash or on credit. He 
ordered from the factory only the number of machines he judged it possible to sell. 
The Company's responsibilities ended when it had delivered the machines aboard a 
steamer in one of the Atlantic ports. The jobber of course thought mostly of his own 
advantage, and did not want to increase his stock which might be left unsold. Jobbers 
favored long contracts, because as trade began to grow, companies tended to cut 
their sales areas and to contract with new jobbers. Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 10.5.1888. 
Mss 2c, box 112; Schonberger 1964, 25-26; Heikkonen 1989, 162-163. 
30 Cyrus Jr. to E.K. Butler 8.24.1888. Mss 2c, box 112; Butler to Cyrus Jr. 8.28. and 
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The new management ideology that the McCormick Company had 
introduced since the time of Lewis Wilkinson now also became 
visible in its foreign trade. Organization and decision making were 
concentrated in the hands of professional managers. When E.K. 
Butler was appointed as the General Manager of the Company, a 
clear division of responsibilities must have been made between him 
and Cyrus Jr., although no formal agreement has been found. In the 
correspondence of Cyrus and Butler during Cyrus's trip to Europe, 
it becomes evident how dependent Cyrus was on Butler's opinions. 
On almost all the key decisions, he asked Butler's views. Finally 
Butler took foreign trade totally under his own control, which was 
a logical extention of his travels in Europe.31 This left Cyrus Jr. more 
time to concentrate fully on the overall business as the President of 
McCormick Company, while the everyday functions were left to 
professional managers. 
Hand in hand with the new management structure, the McCormick 
Company's attitudes towards the European trade also began to 
change.32 While Lankester was still discussing the terms of his own 
contract with the McCormick Company, he was also negotiating 
with the French house of Mot & Co. on the future business in France. 
He did not know that his contract was bound to the results of his 
9.8.1888. Mss 3b, box 9; Cyrus to Butler 9.12.1888. Mss 2x, box 201; Lankester to 
Cyrus Jr. 10.21.1888. Mss 2c, box 112; Cyrus Jr. to Lankester 1.26.1889. Mss lx, 
LPCB 459. 
Lankester and Cyrus Jr. found a common base for the contract in the fall when 
Lankester finally agreed to manage the European countries for $2000. This amount 
would compensate for the loss of his own trade in France and in Germany. Cyrus 
Jr. to Butler 9.12.1888. Mss 2x, box 201; Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 10.21.1888. Mss 2c, 
box 112; Cyrus to Lankester 1.26.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
In his letters Cyrus Jr. also made estimations on the outlook for business in some 
countries. In Germany and Austria-Hungary he regarded prospects for large sales in 
the near future as minimal, though these countries had potential and should therefore 
be under the Company's own management. See for example Cyrus Jr. to Butler 
8.24.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
31 For example on 8.24.1888 Cyrus sent an eight-page letter to Butler where he 
explained in detail the European situation and his own ideas, and asked Butler to 
send a telegram in code. Cyrus to Butler 8.24.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
On decision making, cf. the following examples. "There is no real necessity your 
going to Budapest; I have no doubt Lankester can do as well..." Take the whole 
Budapest business off Fr (Freudenreich) + put in chg L. (Lankester) and let Fr. return 
Odessa..." Butler to Cyrus Jr. 8.28.1888. Mss 3b, box 9. 
32 The Company had for some time felt dissatisfaction with George Freudenreich. 
Now, when the McCormick Co. was ready to move, Cyrus was inclined without 
hesitating a second to throw over Freudenreich, who was regarded as incompetent 
to deal with sharp businessmen. Cyrus Jr. to Butler 8.24.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
Cyrus did not feel himself responsible to offer Freudenreich a new place in case he 
was fired, although Cyrus noted that Freudenreich "will be entirely in the cold if we 
don't offer him some place". 
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bargaining in France.33 
An agency contract was signed, in spite of the fact that Mot & 
Co. also represented a competing harvester company, the Johnstons 
Harvester Company. The McCormick Company also broke another 
of its basic rules: its contract with Mot was for three years, whereas 
it normally made only one-year agreements. McCormick's action was 
defensive: it wanted to prevent other companies from possible 
agreements with Mot;;4 but this policy was soon found to have been 
a mistake. The Company had bound its hands for three years in 
France, and when Mot & Co. did not promote its machines as 
anticipated, could only protest.35 This episode showed the 
McCormick Company the defects of jobbing houses and forced it to 
re-evaluate its marketing strategy. 
The McCormick Company's activity also spread to other European 
countries, but it responded to initiatives rather than actively searched 
for new markets. Between 1888 and 1890 the Company made agency 
contracts in Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The 
expansion of its operations also revealed the Company's new 
organization structure. Headquarters in Chicago forwarded incoming 
applications to the care of Percy Lankester, and informed all parties 
of his role as the European Manager of the McCormick Company. 
The daily conduct of business, and bargaining with agents, were left 
to Lankester, who reported on his undertakings to Chicago. The 
Company's subagents acted in their respective countries as sole 
general agents.36 Now the McCormick Company had constructed a 
33 Cyrus Jr. to Butler 9.12..1888. Mss 2x, box 201; H.T. Mot & Co. to Cyrus Jr. 
9.16.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
34 Before a formal agreement was made, the McCormick Co. checked the background 
of Mot & Co. Since the results of these investigations were positive and Mot & Co. 
offered greater sales than Paul Francey, E.K. Butler showed the green light for 
continuation of the discussions with Mot. E.K. Butler to Cyrus Jr. 10.17.1888. Mss 
3b, box 9; Copy of a proposition for an agreement with Mot & Co. 9.27.1888. Mss 
2c, box 112; Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 10.5.1888, 10.7.1888, 10.10.1888, Mss 2c, box 
112; Draft for an agreement between A.Mot and McCormick Harvester Machine 
Co. No date. Mss 2c, box 112. 
McCormick's new approach to the business in Europe was also clear in the French 
case. Paul Francey, the former agent, had not sold enough machines and had to give 
way to a more energetic and larger firm. Cyrus Jr. to Lankester 1.26.1889. Mss lx, 
LPCB 459. 
35 E.K. Butler to Percy Lankester 1.17.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. Hardly had the ink 
on the contract dried before Mot & Co. bought machines from Osborne "at a ruinously 
low price, for less than we can manufacture", as Butler stated. Later on Mot also 
bought mowers from the Buckeye concern. E.K. Butler to Lankester 6.24.1889. Mss 
lx, LPCB 459. At the end of 1889 the contract with Mot & Co. was a total 
disappointment. The firm had to carry over unsold machines and could not make 
large orders. E.K. Butler to Lankester 12.6.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
36 Butler to Lankester 7.31.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
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working organization and could effectively control its achieve-
ments.37 
As Manager, Lankester wrestled with one constant problem. 
Agents bought their machines in cash f.o.b. in New York. As a result, 
the marketing structure was inflexible. When there was either a 
surplus or shortage of machines in some areas, it was difficult to 
move machines from one agent to another. The reason for this 
situation was that the McCormick Company did not keep a free stock 
of extra machines or machine parts in Europe.38  
Since the main lines of the McCormick Company's European trade 
after the recession of 1884 have now been examined, it is time to 
return to the effects of the depression on foreign trade. In the newly 
colonizing areas of the Pacific and of South America there was no 
visible growth in sales, as can be seen from Table 10, nor did the 
Company devote any more energy to these regions than before. In 
Europe we can observe a change in the marketing strategy of the 
McCormick Company. Although sales were still made through 
independent jobbing houses, a special European Manager had been 
37 From Germany an agency application came from P.H. Mayfarth & Co., whose 
application was directed to Lankester. E.K. Butler to Cyrus Jr. 9.26.1888. Mss 3b, 
box 9 and to P.H. Mayfarth & Co. 9.26.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. Here too Lankester 
asked for information on the applicant's financial standing, this time from Clayton & 
Shuttleworth. Lankester to Clayton & Shuttleworth 10.12.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
Finally Lankester did not contract with Mayfarth, who demanded machines on 
consignment. Butler to Lankester 7.26.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Nevertheless, at least 
F. Vogeler in Prussia acted as McCormick's agent in Germany. McCormick Co. to F. 
Vogeler. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
Appelberg & Co. from Gothenberg in Sweden also expressed its interest in 
McCormick's machines. Butler to Lankester 6.11.1888. Mss lx, LPCB 459. Koefold 
& Haugberg from Copenhagen in Denmark applied for the whole of Scandinavia but 
had to be content with Denmark. Butler to Lankester 8.12.1889 and 9.11.1889. And 
McCormick Co. to Koefold & Haugbergs Maskinudsalg. Both Mss lx, LPCB 460. In 
1890 Koefold & Haugberg got a competitor, Geo. S. Bendix also from Copenhagen. 
Butler to Lankester 8.6.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460 and Butler to Geo. S. Bendix 
8.26.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
Conrad Knudson from Arendal represented McCormick's machines in Norway and 
Sweden was finally allotted to Andersson & Mattson of Malmö. Butler to Lankester 
7.26.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 460; McCormick Co. to Lankester 1.28.1890. lx, LPCB 460. 
38 See for example for complaints about the situation Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 
7.22.1889. Mss 10c, box 10. 
McCormick Co. recognized the problem and promised to arrange some extra 
machines. Butler to Lankester 8.12.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
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Table 13. Number of machines sold in the main European 
agricultural countries by the McCormick Company, 1877-1902. 
Year England France Russia Germany 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
4 
20 
100 
19 
- 
- 
- 
200 
126 
120 
- 
- 
- 
70 
- 
- 
- 
8 
- 
13 
26 
- 
- 
58 
504 
- 
- 
6478  
233h 
621 
- 
2 
- 
- 
- 
1888 - - - 1 
1889 - - 150' - 
1890 325 110 561 77 
1891 (407) (75) - (150) 
1892 - - - - 
1893 - - 1008d - 
1894 - 1025f  1131e 
1895 (1126) (1141) (2093) (866) 
1896 1443 1587 2171 1211 
(1443) (1587) (3672) (1309) 
1897 - - 2310` - 
1898 - - - 4500a 
1899 - 9100b 195 10 
- - - 5600a 
1900 - - - - 
1901 3287 10428 15865 13125 
(3134) (11434) (12191) (14806) 
1902 (3780) (11562) (10156) (12386) 
Source: Figures in the paranthesis are from Machines sold in foreign count-
ries counted by agents. Mss 3x, box 26. Other figures are from Statement 
showing machines sold to foreign countries, 1874-1801. Mss la, box 72. 
For the realiability of the information see chapter 5.2. note lb2. a is from 
William Couchman to Cyrus Jr. 2.23.1899. Mss 2x, box 306. is from R. 
Wallut to McCormick Co. 10.14.1898. Mss 2x, box 394.  is an estimate. 
Tracy to McCormick Co. 4.17.1897. Mss 2x, box 294. is George Freuden-
reich to McCormick Co. 7.18.1893. Mss 2x, Nix 235. e George Freudenreich 
to McCormick Co. ? 1894. Mss 2x, box 235. Lankester to McCormick Co. 
Received 12.16.1894. Mss 2x, box 235. "Freudenreich to McCormick Co. 
12.6-18.1884. Mss 3b, box 3; Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 1.31.1885. Mss lx, 
LPCB 457. figures are only for Emil Liphardt of Moscov and for Maszewski 
of Odessa. Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreic 1.31.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. Figures 
are only for Maszewski in Odessa. Freudenreich to Cyrus Jr. 9.21.1888. 
Mss 2c, box 112. Maszewski's order for 1889. 
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appointed to oversee the business. In this way, one could state that 
by intensifying its operations, the McCormick Company was 
attempting to recoup compensation from abroad for its setbacks in 
the States. This explanation follows in general the outlines of Mira 
Wilkins' concepts on the behavior of American enterprises.39 It also 
displays several of the characteristics of a modern enterprise as 
defined by Alfred Chandler:40 a managerial hierarchy, a new factory 
system, and transformed production technology; yet it retained many 
of the older structures, foremost of these, control by the owning 
family. Besides, there was no surplus to sell abroad. 
It has been impossible to cover systematically the McCormick 
Company's foreign, especially European business, in the 1880s. 
Figures constructed from the primary material are only indicative 
and give at best only a suggestion of possible developments. 
However, it does appear that there was no rapid, visible growth in 
foreign sales during the recession years of the 1880s. Organization 
of the European trade did not lead to any drastic changes in the 
volume of trade. Consecjuently, earlier explanations have to be 
modified in this respect. I Europe had economic problems of its 
own, and in spite of falling grain prices, the American farmer still 
had land to conquer, and could compensate for low prices with 
increased acreage. As long as there was demand on the domestic 
market, it was far more important than foreign fields. 
Although there was no significant growth in the volume of 
McCormick's exports, its sales organization was founded on a stable 
footing, notwithstanding Fred Carstensen's statements.42 Foreign 
trade had been made part of Company business directly under the 
General Manager, who supervised it through two salaried agents in 
Europe. McCormick's also sent its traveling experts abroad from the 
very beginning, and the question of a central depot for machines 
39 Wilkins 1970, 45. 
40 Chandler 1987, 57-61. 
41 See for example Schonberger 1964, 24. In one case Schonberger states that "the 
great attraction of Europe was a World's Fair, an exhibition, or a trial." p. 15. On the 
other hand, he writes on the effects of the depression and drop in McCormick's sales 
that "one discernable effect was an increased interest in and expansion of the 
Company's foreign business." p. 24. 
Schonberger's statements are contradictory and my own research does not confum 
either of them. Fred Carstensen also came to the same conclusion. Carstensen 1984, 
252, note 13. On the other hand Carstensen supports Schonberger's views on the 
significance for foreign trade of the depression of the 1880s, Ibid, 112-113, and in 
fact has adopted them from the latter. 
42 Carstensen 1984, 113-114. Here Carstensen either relies on secondary sources or 
"survey of correspondence, SHSW/McC. ser. 2x" and "this summary is based on 
extensive research in McCormick records". Ibid, 252 notes 14-16. 
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and repairs had been taken under consideration. In this way, the 
foreign trade was transformed during the 1880s as an integral part 
of McCormick's business and organization, although it did not have 
all the same resources as McCormick's domestic organization. 
7.2. The fight continues in Europe 
7.2.1. Old enemies, new circumstances 
In the 1880s, the McCormick Company had made fundamental 
changes in its organization structure. Professional managers replaced 
family members in the daily operations of the factory, and its 
business ideology was becoming even more aggressive, if possible, 
than before. Were these changes also reflected in its relations 
towards competing firms, and how successful were they? As has 
been shown, the McCormick Company relied on jobbers in its 
foreign trade, and, except in Russia, did not extend long credit to 
farmers. Was the McCormick Company in this relation a typical 
representative of American harvester companies abroad, or did it 
follow its own marketing policy? 
Among the American harvester manufacturers, perhaps Walter A. 
Wood had best established itself in Europe. Even by the 1870s, it 
already dominated the field: in 1874 Wood had exhibited or taken 
part in trials and shows in ten countries.43 By 1882, the Company 
had either branch offices or eneral agencies in London, Paris, 
Buenos Ayres and Valparaiso.4 In 1876, the Johnston Harvester 
Company also proclaimed victories in several countries and in 1882 
it had founded its branch office in London.45 In 1876, D.M. Osborne 
& Co. listed branch offices and depots in Bremen, Liverpool and 
Paris, and three years later it had expanded to Christ Church, Sydney, 
43 Wood's Mowing and Reaping Machines, 1874. Mss 4z, box 25. The countries 
were Great Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Russia, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and Switzerland. 
In 1878 Wood boasted to have beaten, between 1873 and 1877, in Europe alone, 
Samuelson & Co. at 146 trials, Hornsby & Sons at 104, Osborne & Co. at 133, Johnston 
at 71 and Buckeye at 58 trials. Wood's Mowing and Reaping Machines, 1878. Mss 
4z, box 25. 
Wood's catalog does not mention the McCormick Co. at all, which reflects the state 
of the business in Europe. 
44 Fair circular, 1882. Walter A. Wood's Harvesting Machines. Mss 2z, box 25. 
Because of the fragmentary material on competing companies, no definite date can 
be stated. Although catalogs do not mention foreign agencies before 1882, it is 
obvious that Wood had established them in Europe before that year. 
45 The Johnston Harvester Company, 1876 and 1882. Mss 4z, box 14. 
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Melbourne, Adelaide and Montevideo.46 Similarly, in 1878 William 
Anson Wood listed in its catalog a branch office in London.47 In 
addition, at least Champion and Buckeye had foreign branches.48  
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that European manufacturers 
were also struggling for the same markets. In addition to the English 
firms, Hornsby and Samuelson, there were numerous smaller 
manufacturers in almost every country that were making copies of 
the American harvesters.49  
During the early years of the foreign trade, all the American 
manufacturers were very similar in their functions. They all 
established themselves in Europe through jobbing houses that 
oversaw the entire business in the Old World. Another typical feature 
in these early foreign undertakings was the central role played by 
the Oceanian and South American markets. In this respect the 
McCormick Company was no different from its competitors; but 
some of the other companies had already extended their business 
beyond this phase, by sending their own salaried agents to Europe 
or by establishing their own branch houses or depots. The real role 
and functions of these branches remain unclear, due to the lack of 
information. Although details in the Company catalogs have to be 
approached with caution, they are nonetheless indicative. Percy 
Lankester confirms, for example, in 1884, that Champion and 
Osborne had opened agencies in London.50 In this respect the 
McCormick Co. maintained its careful strategy. It was not ready to 
take risks in foreign business and in spite of extension abroad, 
priority was given to the home market. 
46 D.M. Osborne & Co. 1876 and 1879. Mss 4z, box 17. 
47 William Anson Wood's Sweep Rake Reapers and Improved Eagle Mowers, 1878. 
Mss 4z, box 5. 
48 The Champion Harvesting Machines, 1883. Mss 4z, box 24. Champion's branches 
were in Bremen and in Valparaiso. 
Buckeye Harvesting Machines. C. Aultman & Co. 1884. Mss 4z, box 1. Buckeye 
registered among its branch offices and principal depots Paris, Matanzas in Cuba, 
Buenos Ayres and Sydney. 
Adriance, Platt & Co. of the Buckeye combination had in 1881 also a general agent 
of its own in Liverpool. Adriance, Platt & Co. 1881. Mss 4z, box 1. 
49 Samuelson & Co. Mowing and Reaping Machines 1878. Mss 4z, box 21. 
Unfortunately only one copy of Samuelson's catalogs has been preserved in the 
McCormick Collection. Up to 1878 Samuelson & Co. had exhibited its machines 
mostly in France but also in such remote places as Sweden, Norway and even South 
Africa. 
On the imitations of American agricultural machines see for example United States 
Consular Reports No. 38, 1884, p. 555-556. 
50 Butler to Lankester 1.8.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
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As a latecomer on the European field, the McCormick Company 
had a major task to accomplish if it wanted to turn the situation to 
its benefit. As can be seen in Table 15, the McCormick Company 
was one of the leading harvester companies in America during the 
1880s, but not the leader. In its 1884 catalog, the Walter A. Wood 
Co. published still larger sales figures than the McCormick Co. did. 
Although it is impossible to inspect the reliability of figures of 
Wood's sales, they certainly are indicative. In addition, the Deering 
Company was also rapidly increasing its share of the markets. 
Table 14 Total number of harvesting machines and mowers 
produced in the U.S., 1870-1904. 
Year 	 Total production 
1870 	 163 085 
1875 
	
159 410 
1880 	 188 974 
1890 	 324 779 
1900 	 674 199 
Source: Census of the U.S. Manufacturers 1880, 1900, 1920. 
FOUNDING OFTHE FOREIGN MARKET n 171 
Table 15. Sales of the harvesting and mowing machines of the 
leading harvester manufacturers, 1870-1888. 
Year 	 McCormick Co. Walter A. Wood Co. Deering Co. 
Number $m Number Number $m 
1870 9 033a 15 000 
1875 11 476a 23 507 
1880 26 786 27 903 
1881 32 353 7 197 
1882 44 848 12 197 
1883 50 376 17 130 
1884 54 922 4.5 48 315 22 709 4.3 
1885 51 439 3.7 25 480 3.0 
1886 44 103 2.9 26 564 3.6 
1887 71 363 3.9 31 715 4.2 
1888 91 881 4.6 41 095 5.1 
1889 104 114 4.7 4.9 
Source: For the McCormick Company: McCormick Machines Built since 
1841, Statement showing number and kind of machines sold during the 
years 1880 to 1902 inclusive. Mss Mil, box 18. For Walter A. Wood: Har-
vesting Machines. Thirty-second Annual Circular, 1885. Mss 4z, box 25. For 
the Deering Co.: An unlabeled and undated memorial of the Deering Co, 
1890. Mss w, box 2; Deering Co. Financial State. Schedule "A" showing the 
net sales for each year. Mss w, box 2. 
a 
machines manufactured. The McCormick Company's figures also include 
attachments, carriers, grinders and similar machines. In this respect the fig-
~re is not entirely comparable with the others. 
In reading the Deering figures, it has to be taken into account that the 
Company has not necessarily counted the harvester and binder as two dis-
tinct machines as the McCormick Co. did. 
In 1884 Deering's net sales were $4 251 506,5' as compared with 
McCormick's sales of $4 469 271.52 In summary, we can with 
certainty state that McCormick, Walter A Wood and Deering 
controled at least half of the American harvester market during the 
1880s. Although it is not possible to make far-reaching interpreta-
tions, due to the nature of the material, it seems that during the 
strike years the McCormick Co. lost its leading position to the 
Deering Co., but was able to regain it at the turn of the century. 
51 Deering Co. Financial state. Schedule "A" showing the net sales for each year. 
Mss w, box 2. 
52 McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. Net sales of Machines... Mss M/I, box 
18. 
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Did the European trade also follow the same main lines as in 
America? How did the smaller companies react to the situation? Did 
they compensate for their losses on the home field with expansion 
abroad? 
When McCormick appointed Percy Lankester first as its agent and 
then later on as its salaried European Manager, its position in Europe 
also began to grow to the same scale as in America. In one of his 
first letters to Chicago, Lankester noted that Wood did not sell half 
the binders he did. On the other hand, France was Johnston's 
territory." In Russia, the competitors were the same; at least Wood, 
Deering, Osborne, Champion, Johnston and the English makers.54 
The worst rivals for the McCormick Company were the English firm 
of Hornsby and Wood,55 but Osborne was losing ground, at least in 
France, where it had to close its large office and warehouse and 
withdraw its representative.56 By 1888, the Canadian Massey 
Company had arrived in Europe, and seemed to be following the 
same policies as the U.S. companies. 57 
In Russia, by the end of the 1880s, the foreign harvester companies 
began to meet local competition. George Freudenreich complained 
of cheap Russian reapers, that "have taken away a large proportion 
of his (Maszewski's) customers".58 Local makers, with agressive price 
policies, were also becoming an obstacle in France to all American 
firms: by 1888 there were at least three French binder makers. 
Besides, copying of machines and machine parts appears to have 
been common.59 
53 Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.15.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. 
54 Freudenreich to McCormick Co. 12.6-18.1884. Mss 3b, box 3; McCormick Co. to 
Freudenreich 1.31.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457; McCormick Co. to Freudenreich 
8.6.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
55 See for example Cyrus Jr. to McCormick Co. 8.13.1887. Mss 3b, box 7; Butler to 
Edward Ackerman 8.18.1887. Mss lx, LPCB 459; Hornsby's to Lankester. Mss 2c, 
box 112. 
56 Cyrus Jr, to Freudenreich 5.29.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
57 Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 8.28.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
In 1865 at the Paris International Exposition Massey had exhibited its machine for 
the first time in Europe. This event did not lead to foreign sales. Consequently, in 
1886, according to Denison, the company made its second entree at the Indian and 
Colonial Exhibition in London, again without raising great interest in the audience. 
The Massey Company was still in 1887 a relatively small enterprise with an output 
of only 8851 machines. In spite of this modest beginning, the company sent its own 
representative in 1887 to London and next year was able to report sales in England, 
Scotland, Ireland, France, Germany, Belgium and France, consisting of 127 reapers, 
30 binders, 58 mowers and 44 rakes. Denison 1949, 51-52, 100, 104-105. 
58 Freudenreich to Cyrus Jr. 9.21.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
59 Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 10.5. and 10.10.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
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The only major change during the 1880s, compared to the 1870s, 
was that the McCormick Co. had recouped in competition and that 
the Canadian Massey Company was increasing its impact on the 
trade. The same companies fought each other everywhere: in Russia, 
France, Germany, or even in small countries such as Sweden or 
Finland.6o 
Although European manufacturers copied American machines, 
they were not, except for the English makers, a real threat to the 
latter.61 The U.S. consul for Belgium, Geo. C. Tanner, counted 
twenty-three imitations of American agricultural machines at an 
exhibition in Liege. In some cases, names of American companies 
were erased or painted over.62 The situation was similar in France, 
where twelve of the sixteen competing machines were American 
and the remaining four more or less copies of them.63 This situation 
remained very stable for years. In 1890 the consul for France 
reported a heavy demand for mowers, reapers and binders; the field 
was still totally in the hands of the Americans. At the field test of 
the French Department of Agriculture in Perigueux, only two of the 
competing machines were not American.64 Even the English firms 
had to admit the superiority of their American competitors.65 
60 See for example Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 7.22.1889. Mss 10c, box 10; Butler to 
Lankester 11.4.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460; Rönnbäck 1883, 214. Present at the eighth 
general meeting of Finnish agriculturists in 1881 were at least Hornsby & Son, Walter 
A. Wood and William Anson Wood; Hällström 1889, 283-286. In the corrsponding 
meeting at Viipuri in 1887 the Swedish Aktiebolaget Palmcranz & Co. and Vesterås 
mekaniska verkstad were awarded the first prize silver medal for their mowers, as 
was the Finnish Abo Jernmanufakturbolag. The Swedish firm Överum's mowers also 
reaped the second prize bronze medal. The same honor was given to William Anson 
Wood's mower, which was the only American manufacturer to receive any offical 
attention. On the other hand, the question might be one of domestic jurors and 
powerful agents like Wictor Forselius or Francke & Hackman, who represented 
William Anson Wood for the Swedish companies. 
61 R.B. Swift from the McCormick headquarters made bitter and very instructive 
comments on the English companies in his letter. According to him "his (Hornsby's) 
machine should be a good one. There are enough of our ideas upon it to make it a 
good one." R.B. Swift to Lankester 5.20.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
62 Reports of the consuls of the United States. No. 38. 1884. p. 555-556. Belgian 
firms took castings and made exact molds of them or took the machines to pieces, 
made drawings of them, and built as near a copy as possible. But when finished "it 
bears very near the same resemblance to the machine they are trying to steal as that 
a locomotive of fifty years ago bears to one of to-day". Ibid. 
63 Reports from the consuls of the United States. No. 72. 1886. p. 558. 
64 Reports from the consuls of the United States. No.123. 1890. p. 649. These two 
European machines were from France and from England but "were made after the 
fashion of patents that have expired in the United States" and "it is certain that no 
English or French mower or reaper could compete at present with the American 
models in beauty, workmanship, and, we believe, in price." 
65 Consular reports on commerce, manufactures, etc. No. 154. 1893. p. 314-315. 
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In the long run, it was the German manufacturers who offered 
the most keen resistance to the American firms. In Russia, German 
makers outnumbered their American rivals in the sales of plows and 
harrows, but could not compete with the harvester companies. 
The growing interest of the European manufacturers in harvesting 
machines reflects the increasing demand. They clearly anticipated 
profits in that business and wanted to have their share of it. 
The growing productivity of American industry and adoption of 
new and more efficient production methods began to arouse fears 
in Europe, even in small and remote areas such as Finland. The 
United States was regarded as a giant which would in the long run 
destroy Europe's industry.67 Consequently, tariff walls began to rise 
against American exports. In Russia, foreign companies were able 
to sell their products free of import charges until 1884, when a duty 
of fifty kopecks per pood,68 effective in 1885, was placed upon 
imported agricultural machinery and implements made of iron and 
steel. In 1887 this duty was raised to seventy kopecks 6per pood, 
but was reduced in 1896 to fifty-two kopecks per pood. 9 
Foreign machinery or implements made principally of wood or 
cast iron imported into Germany were placed under a duty of 3 
marks per 100 kilograms, and the same goods made of wrought iron 
5 marks per 100 kilograms.70 
Russian tariffs were raised to protect the country's own growing 
reaper industry. The "lobogreika" (forehead sweat) was a domestic 
Russian copy of the Walter A. Wood Company's handrake reaper 
that was produced in the 1860s. It was crude, simple and easy to 
66 Consular reports. Commerce, manufactures, etc. Vol. LV. 1897. p. 270-277; 
Consular reports. Commerce, manufactures, etc. Vol. LXIII. Nos. 236, 237, 238, and 
239. 1900. p. 73-74; 
67 See for example Tallqvist 1906, 24-25, 30-35. 
68 1 pood is equivalent to 16.4 kilograms or 36.4 pounds. Facta 2001 1984,vol. 11, 
397. 
69 Queen 1942, 144; United States Consular Report No. 48, 1884. p. 490, 493; 
Consular reports. Commerce, manufactures, etc. No. 205. 1897. p. 271. 
70 United States Consular Reports. No. 48, 1884. p. 498, 518. 
German tariff laws had many peculiar details. Although in principle tariff was based 
on the material of which the machine was principally composed, nevertheless, 
polish, painting and finish or outward decoration also had an effect upon the final 
duty. In practise it was difficult even for a professional importer to say what the duty 
for a new product would be until a sample machine had been imported. If a machine 
was composed of several materials, it was set in the class to which the greatest 
weight of its materials belonged to. However, the final rate of duty was dependent 
on the outward finish of the article. So plows which were rough and unpainted paid 
a duty of six marks, but if they were painted or polished the duty was ten marks. 
The German tariffs remained at the same level until 1899. Consular reports. 
Commerce, manufactures, etc. Vol. LXI. Nos. 228, 229, 230 and 231. 1899. p.124-125. 
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manufacture and repair, and what was most important, it was cheap. 
It was a real threat" to all foreign harvester companies in a country 
where only 8.9 percent of the peasantry could produce surplus grain 
to sell, and where a peasant's expenses could amount to fifty-five 
roubles, while his income was only thirty-three roubles. It was 
therefore no wonder that imports of American machines dropped 
in value from 417 000 roubles in 1884 to 28 000 roubles in 1886.72 
In 1896, there were 196 factories producing agricultural machinery, 
to the value of 9.6 million roubles. The high duties did not protect 
and develop domestic Russian manufacture of agricultural machines; 
instead they raised the prices of harvesters by 18 to 20 percent.73  
To avoid paying the Russian duties, American firms began to 
repack their products in Germany to meet the demands of the 
Russian tariff administration. This led to another problem. When the 
German companies began to stamp their own names on American 
machines, the Russian agents could no longer distinguish American 
products from German ones.74 This was not the case with the 
McCormick Company, however, which shipped its machines directly 
from the United States to South Russian ports, normally to Odessa.75  
Sometimes the English customs caused delays in shipments. 
Importers were in such cases almost totally powerless, and all they 
could do was wait for customs decisions.76 
In addition to tariffs, all the American harvester companies were 
71 The McCormick Company considered the situation but found it profitable to 
recommence production of its old handraking models. Modification of the reaper 
would swallow too much time and energy and finally the profit marginal for such a 
cheap machine was too narrow and further narrowed by Russian competition. Cyrus 
Jr. to Freudenreich 8.6.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
72 Queen 1942, 141-142, 144-145, 147-150; Freudenreich to Cyrus Jr. 9.21.1888. Mss 
2c, box 112. 
73 Consular reports. Commerce, manufactures, etc. Vol. LV. No. 205. 1897. p. 
270-271; Freudenreich to Cyrus Jr. 9.21.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
74 Queen 1942, 144-145. The case was similar with shipments through other 
countries, for example through Britain to France. Reports from the consuls of the 
United States. No. 3. 1881. p. 100. 
75 Emil Liphardt & Co. McCormick Co. 2.15-17.1884. Mss Ix, LPCB 457; McCormick 
Co. to J. Maszewski 2.28.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
Moscow shipments were sent from London to Reval in the Baltic, which was the 
normal port for Moscow. McCormick Co. to Emil Liphardt & Co. 4.30.1884. lx, LPCB 
457. 
76 Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 8.9.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. McCormick's machines to 
Budapest were stopped without any reason and Lankester expected at least 10 to 15 
days' delay in transportation. That of course was a severe setback for the local agent, 
who was unable to supply the machines to his customers. Besides, there was always 
a threat that farmers might refuse to take the machines any more if they came too 
late for the harvest. 
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influenced in about the same way by changes in weather. This was 
equally evident in America and in Oceania. Crop failures at frequent 
intervals had especially dramatic influences in Russia. In four of the 
eight years between 1885-1892 Russia suffered serious shortfalls in 
crops. Consequently, the price for labor sank to a level where 
laborers could be hired for their board, which meant only black 
bread, cucumbers and an occasional drink of poor vodka." The 
famines and poverty arising therefrom were reflected in harvester 
sales. In general, if the promise of a good harvest continued 
throughout the spring, agents' orders rose, in anticipation of large 
sales. Conversely, if any country was hit by a drought or heavy rains, 
machines were left unsold on agents' hands.78 
7.2.2. Trials, services and pamphlets 
By the 1880s, Europe had become an extension of the American 
harvester market, with the same factories struggling for the markets 
on both sides of the Atlantic. As has been noted before, the American 
harvester companies did not transfer their sales organization to Eu-
rope; only a few firms maintained what they called branches in Eu-
rope. Nor did they extend the system of hire purchase directly to 
farmers, but, as in McCormick's case, sold solely to agents f.o.b. in 
cash. In such circumstances, how could they sell their products to 
European farmers in competition with native producers during ag-
ricultural crises? 
In 1884, the McCormick Company had to admit that, for the time 
being, it had lost its leading position in the Colonies to its English 
competitors. Defeats in England, on the other hand, were blamed 
on unfair domestic competition, aimed at keeping American firms 
out of Britain. Leaders of the Company tried to convince its agents 
of the good qualities of its machines: the machines were good, but 
competitors unfair and losses accidental.79 
77 Queen 1942, 143-144, 149-150. 
78 McCormick Co. to Freudenreich 6.5.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457; E.K. Butler to 
Freudenreich 6.22.1887. Mss lx, LPCB 459; E.K. Butler to Freudenreich lx, LPCB 
460; Queen 1942, 143-144. 
For example, in France after heavy rains in the fall, fanners even returned binders 
that had already been delivered. Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 8.2.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
79 E.K. Butler to Lankester & Co. 1.8.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. Butler tried to reassure 
Lankester by stating that "we stand further at the front today than we have ever 
heretofore, both in New Zealand and in Australia..." 
Cyrus Jr. to Lankester & Co. 8.27.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. The English companies 
that were victorious in the Shrewsbury show were Hornsby and Howard. Although 
Cyrus Jr. was not pleased with the results of the show, he was satisfied with 
Lankester's efforts and did not anticipate a dramatic impact on trade due to the late 
date of the trial. 
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Cyrus Jr. was not concerned without cause. All the companies 
were trying to obtain as much publicity for their victories as possible. 
Cyrus himself wrote immediately to his mother of their triumph in 
Hungary,80 and urged the local expert in Budapest to write 
immediately, in full, about the jurors and how much it would be 
possible to increase sales thanks to that victory.81 News of the event 
was also sent to Russia, and presumably also to other agents, to 
make use of.82 Furthermore, Butler sent news of the victories in the 
Colonies to Lankaster and asked him to send immediately all positive 
accounts from England and from the Continent to South America 
and Australasia.83  
The importance of these trials for trade becomes more evident 
during later years. After the successful test in France, Nettie 
McCormick decided to take an active part in the daily operations of 
the McCormick Company. Apparently General Manager E.K. Butler 
had not taken these victories seriously enough, for Nettie urged him 
to publish the results in the press with no more delay. Butler also 
received a lecture on the significance of these shows.84 
This confirms the earlier statement, of how important it was not 
only to stay on the market and keep the market share, but also how 
the whole world was one market where news of the results of the 
tests spread rapidly from country to country. 
Cyrus McCormick's report on the French trials also offers an 
opportunity to look behind the scenes of these tests. Cyrus Jr., 
together with Lankester and an expert mechanic, had made careful 
preparations and brought the newest specially finished machines to 
France for the Show. However, he soon noticed that "it was not to 
be a trial between machines but acquaintanceship, influence and 
smooth-talking". Walter A. Wood had been lucky enough to contract 
a prominent agent for his machines. Consequently, the result of the 
trial was already decided, according to Cyrus Jr., before the event 
itself. Cyrus was especially bitter about the results, since the 
Company's older wooden frame machine beat the new iron-frame 
binder. For him the Great National Government trial was "as 
complete a humbug as far as fair trial was concerned as I ever saw, 
80 Cyrus Jr. to Nettle McCormick 7.9.1885. Mss 2b, box 31. Cyrus was especially 
happy that Hornsby was "at the bottom of the list." 
81 Cyrus Jr. to Lee Borrell 7.9.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
82 Cyrus Jr. Freudenreich 8.6.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
83 Butler to Lankester & Co. 12.8.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
84 Nettie McCormick to E.K. Butler 8.9.1887. Mss lb, box 24. 
178 n FOUNDING OF THE FOREIGN MARKET 
more fuss and talking and less action and work".85 Cyrus's comments 
disclose how the outcome of the test depended on the jurors and 
the ability to affect them. On the other hand, it is surprising that he 
was not alredy aware of this, since he had been attending trials in 
Europe for ten years. 
As became clear in McCormick's case, results of the trials were 
published as soon as possible, whereas the losers, on the other hand, 
tried to foil the winner's efforts. Percy Lankester had printed a 
circular immediately after a show in France, on the basis of 
information he had received from his French agent; the Hornsbys 
instantly attacked and claimed that the medal which the McCormick 
Co. had won in Goderville was for the agent's collection and not 
for the machine or machines. Lankester did not withdraw his 
circular, and the result was a lengthy debate that was put in the 
hands of attorneys, but finally was allowed to drop.86 
Foreign exhibitions, such the Paris Exposition in 1889, were cases 
of special interest. Cyrus Jr. himself decided to attend this, and 
preparations for it were under way at least half a year before the event 87 
Trials and agricultural shows also offered an opportunity to 
conquer new markets. The McCormick Company had appointed 
agents in Germany, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and to help get 
them started gave either direct financial support, as in Sweden, or 
sent its experts to assist in trials, as in Germany.88 
85 Cyrus Jr. to McCormick Co. 8.13.1887. Mss 3b, box 7. 
86 Hornbys to Lankester 7.24.1888. Mss 2c, box 112; Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 7.25., 
7.30., 8.2., 8.9.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
87 Cyrus once again anticipated jury tactics. This time all possible points were taken 
under consideration. By January, special exhibition machines were under 
construction; Lankester was asked to reserve two fine teams of horses, and to make 
arrangements so that Cyrus would be able to meet all the necessary people to bring 
influence to bear upon the result. Besides, Lankester had to reserve suitable 
accommodation where Cyrus could entertain, "as that is a pretty good way to reach 
a Frenchman's heart". McCormick's French agent, H.T. Mot & Co., was asked to look 
after the members of the jury. None of the men should be appointed who had 
supported the Wood Company in Mitry in 1887. Cyrus Jr. to Lankester 1.26. and 
5.22.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459; Cyrus Jr. to H.T. Mot & Co. 6.10.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 
459. 
The McCormick Company's efforts were fruitful: it won the Grand Prize and was 
selected as the most desirable machine. McCormick's delight was overshadowed by 
Walter A. Wood, who was also awarded the Grand Prize. Butler to Freudenreich 
10.12.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Awards to an American Genius. The Development 
of the Walter A. Wood Harvesting Machinery. 1900. Mss 4z, box 25. 
88 Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 7.22.1889. Mss 10c, box 10. Other competitors at the 
Hildesheim trial in addition to McCormick were Hornsby, the German firm Hennef 
and Zimmerman, Osborne, Wood, Howard, Massey, Samuelson and Johnston. Walter 
A. Wood won the race, followed by McCormick. Butler to Lankester 7.31.1889. Mss 
lx, LPCB 460. 
On the Gothenburg International Exhibition in 1891 see Butler to Lankester 
11.4.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
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While trials were a place to advertise and gain publicity for one's 
products, one of the key factors affecting actual sales was pricing 
policy. On the domestic field, the McCormick Company was reluctant 
to become involved in price wars, preferring to follow the general 
market trend but on average hold its prices at a higher level than its 
competitors. In Europe the same tendencies are visible as in America. 
Machines became cheaper under the pressure of competition.S9  
The figures show variation in the agents' net prices, which seem 
to have been elastic in response to local competition. Percy 
Lankester, for example, asked for a reduction of mower prices from 
$50 to at least $47.50 to fight the English makers, who sold at $50 
f.o.b. in Paris when Lankester's price was f.o.b. in New York.90 In 
Russia the Deering Company offered its machines at $175 f.o.b. New 
York, and Osborne's agent sold reapers at $82.50, but there were 
rumors of an English company that intended to retail reapers at $110. 
McCormick's Daisy reaper cost the agent from $95 to $90.25, and 
it was impossible to sell it with any profit under $140.91  
During the 1880s, prices of harvesting machines on all the major 
markets were very unstable. The downward trend became possible 
not only as a result of competition, by also of falling production 
costs. While the prices referred to above in the mid-1880s were 
agents' prices in Europe, by the end of the decade some companies 
were selling their binders in America even to farmers at $100.92  
89 In 1884 McCormick's agent cash price for a harvester and binder for the Algerian 
trade was $210, and for a mower $55. Butler to Lankester & Co. 4.15.1884. Mss lx, 
LPCB 457. From the previous season there was a drop of $5 in binder prices. In 
Russia, J. Maszewski had to pay $215 and $55 for the same machines but his prices 
were dropped to $200 and $52.50 respectively to meet the competition. Butler to 
Freudenreich 11.17.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. If the sales were made in two 
installments, the McCormick company added ten percent "to be settled for a good 
approved note". Besides, the buyer had to pay the lawful interest in Russia. Emil 
Liphardt & Co. of Moscow paid for a one-foot-wide binder $220 and for a mower 
$55. Freudenreich to McCormick Company 12.6-18.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. Liphardt's 
commission was five percent of the net price. 
90 Lankester & Co. to McCormick Company 12.15.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. 
91 Freudenreich to McCormick Co. 12.6.18.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. According to 
Freudenreich the dealer must have a "profit of $25 at least or else he cannot subsist". 
This price war started rumors of extremely low prices in America. McCormick had 
to assure Lankester that not even the poorest factory had sold reapers to farmers at 
$165, as had been reported. On the other hand, by 1885 McCormick's sold its binders 
to Lankester to be forwarded to Cosimini & Sons in Italy at $155, and in Russia, 
Freudenreich had tried to sell binders to his agents at $175, but without any success. 
Butler to Lankester 1.8.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 8.6.1885. 
Mss lx, LPCB 458. Cyrus Jr. kept Freudenreich's price very low even in America. 
Other manufacturers also had difficulties in Russia during 1885. According to Cyrus 
Jr., Johnston, Hornsby and Deering would have a large number of machines left over 
in the Volga region. 
92 Butler to Lankester 7.11.1888. Mss Ix, LPCB 459. 
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Severe competition forced companies to considerable price cuts in 
Europe too. In England, Wood and Hornsby were happy to get rid 
of their stock at almost any price, and Wood offered its machines 
to farmers at 25 percent discount from list prices.93  
The price war was an aftermath of the knockout game between 
the harvester companies in America. In the early 1880s, they had 
tried to reach agreement on prices and production quotas, but 
discussions had failed. Although competition forced some companies 
to sell even under their production costs,94 by the end of the decade 
prices began to stabilize. Net prices to Percy Lankester were dropped 
to $110 for binders and $32-35 for mowers; he was also given a 
discount of sevenpercent 95  Normal agents had to pay around $125 
for their binders. When the drastic drop in the machine prices is 
taken into account, it is plausible to suppose that the severe 
competion among the American firms drove the new European 
manufacturers from the field. And it was even difficult for the 
existing ones to survive. 
The McCormick Company's basic idea in its price policy was to 
make as big a profit per sold unit as possible, and the success of 
this approach can be seen from its distribution of dividends in Table 
11. E.K. Butler's message to the Company's foreign agents in 1888, 
when he took charge of the foreign affairs, was clear: business must 
be profitable.97 The other key idea was quality. From time to time 
Butler assured that McCormick machines "compete for merit, not 
for price'';98 he was "holding to the theory of merit and hard work 
rather than to that of low price and ease". Furthermore, "we never 
have, and never shall allow competitors to fix prices at which we 
must sell our goods".99 Butler's strong comments give a picture of a 
hard-boiled manager but also of a company that regarded itself as a 
market leader that has the best machines available for sale. 
David A. Hounshell has raised the question of whether the 
93 Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 8.2.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
94 Butler to Lankester 9.23.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
95 Butler to Lankester 12.27.1888. Mss lx, LPCB 459; Butler to Lankester 9.23.1890. 
Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
96 Butler to Lankester 11.26.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. The price referred to was for 
Mot & Co. in France. 
97 Butler stated that though competitors had sold machines at very low prices "we 
have sold no machines to net us less than those we have shipped to you, and will 
average much better." Butler to Lankester & Co. 7.11.1888. Mss Ix, LPCB 459. 
98 Butler to Freudenreich 5.11.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
99 Butler to Lankester 9.23.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
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widely-held notion that American-made products succeeded in the 
market because they were cheaply made and low priced is correct. 
According to his findings, firms like Singer, McCormick, the Pope 
Manufacturing Company, and the Western Wheel Works, all leaders 
in their industries, also stand at the top of the prices list and were 
known for their quality.10° Hounshell's statement coincides with the 
findings of the present work. 
It has become evident that the McCormick Company was able to 
acquire a good share of the European harvesting machine market. 
If we consider its success at trials, Butler's words are based on solid 
ground. Every year McCormick's machines brought home a bunch 
of medals and other prizes. It is, nevertheless, another question how 
reliable and indicative of the competitive situation the tests and trials 
really were. In that respect there seem to be some discordant notes 
in the otherwise unanimous picture that is constructed from the 
McCormick Collection. 
The McCormick Company's Russian agent, George Freudenreich, 
had struggled energetically to acquire the same conditions for his 
trade as obtained in America, with some success. Russia was the 
only place where McCormick sold machines on consignment;'°' 
neither did Freudenreich hesitate to express critical comments on 
defects in the construction of machines. During the peak year of 
1884, he did not take the negative voices of his Russian customers 
too seriously; Freudenreich reported that they had simply expected 
too much of the binders, something that the machines could not 
perform.102 Soon, however, Freudenreich began to demand 
modifications in the standard harvesters, which if carried out would 
mean extra work and expenses for the factory.103 From the 
correspondence it can be read that McCormick machines, so 
victorious in the trials, had problems in practice.104 Lankester 
100 Hounshell 1987, 5-6, 9. 
101 Butler to Freudenreich 11.17.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
102 Freudenreich to McCormick Company 12.6-18.1884. Mss 3b, box 3. 
103 Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 1.31.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. In spite of all the costs 
it caused, McCormick Co. began to construct a new model of the "Daisy" reaper 
adapted to Russian conditions. Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 5.29.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 
458. 
104 The first notice of the complaints from Russia dates from 1883, when Butler 
wrote to Freudenreich that "your several favors of late have carried the impression 
that our machines were not altogether adapted for the Russian business". Butler to 
Freudenreich 1.3.1883. Mss lx, LPCB 456; Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 8.6.1885. Mss 
lx, LPCB 458. The negative news is normally in the form of short dispatches here 
and there; "we are glad to find that the "Daisy" of this year seems to meet with 
approval..." 
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reported machine breakages, and Mot & Co. in France were 
replacing McCormick mowers with Buckeyes.105 McCormick's 
previous French agent, Paul Francey, had also persistently declined 
to handle any of the Company's "Daisy" reapers, but sold similar 
competing machines. 1°6 Besides, Freudenreich reported a growing 
dissatisfaction with the McCormick mowers.107 
The explanation for the differences between the success in 
America and at trials and, on the other hand, complaints from the 
field may arise from the fact that the machines were not properly 
adapted to foreign conditions. Freudenreich, like other agents, 
frequently expressed his desire for modifications or for totally new 
machines to meet local conditions. Agents' interest in such changes 
was awakened because remodeling of the basic harvesting machines 
and the establishment of service and repair systems were key 
components in marketing. 
Cyrus Hall McCormick's experiences during his first years of 
foreign trade had already shown the importance of modifying 
American machines for Europe. One of the basic technical problems 
was caused by differences in farming ideologies. In America, farmers 
normally did not collect straw for bedding, and consequently 
harvesting machines were constructed to cut the grain near the ears. 
An especially problematic task for the first harvesters was the long 
European rye: the platform of the American harvesting machines was 
too short, and McCormick was forced to adapt the deeper English 
model.108 In this way, innovations also moved from Europe to 
America, and not only vice versa. 
Minor changes in the construction of the basic models did not 
cause serious difficulties for the production line, and these 
modifications were normal practise in the factory.109 If the restyling 
demanded new patterns, jigs and fittings, the factory began to make 
calculations about profitability. If the foreign trade's requirements 
collided with domestic business, normally the foreign had to give 
way. When Lankester asked for some modifications in McCormick's 
French mowers, Butler answered that "our pattern department has 
105 Butler to Lankester 6.24.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. The change of machines Butler 
could not understand because the McCormick mower, according to him, was superior 
in America. He supposed that the reason had to be in the users. 
106 Cyrus Jr. to Lankester 1.26.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
107 Butler to Freudenreich 1.15.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
108 Butler to Freudenreich 1.31.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. 
109 Butler to Lankester 12.6.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Butler's answer to Lankester's 
requests is illustrative on this subject. Butler goes through all the principal machines 
item by item and lists the possible changes. 
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been driven to its utmost to take care of our regular work, which 
is of far more importance to us than this model". On the other hand, 
the factory was at the same time completing a special one-horse 
mower and a folding-bar reaper to meet demands in France; this was 
possible because they did not require demanding technical 
changes.10 
The change from wire-binders to twine-binders was a big technical 
challenge for the harvester companies, and a question of survival. 
An equally trying test was the introduction of a new model on the 
market. Almost every year, harvester companies made modifications 
in their machines; farmers learned to expect this, and to demand 
the newest models or discounts on older ones."' After the invention 
of the twine-binder, perhaps the greatest change in the binders was 
when wood was replaced by iron. The McCormick Company made 
its first experiments with iron-frame machines in 1885, and already 
the next year produced 20 000 steel-frame machines and only 2500 
wood-frames. "Z 
A major change like this demanded significant investments, which 
created difficulties for smaller factories. Cyrus Jr. anticipated 
problems also for Hornsby. In America, according to his information, 
three or four smaller factories that already held patents for 
steel-frame machines were still building wood-frame harvesters 
because of the great risks involved in the changeover.' 13 Since most 
of the minor yearly changes in models were merely marketing tricks 
to attract new customers, companies had to consider the situation 
carefully so as to avoid undermining sales of the previous year's 
models.'" 
Although it is clear that there were numerous faults in the 
machines, some of the problems were also caused by unpractised 
110 Butler to Lankester 1.17.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. In this case Butler, however, 
was ready to order a model machine from some model maker. 
Making an entirely new pattern machine would have required an entirely new set of 
forms, jigs and patterns. The expense of the change was estimated at about $7000. 
Butler to Lankester 12.6.1889. lx, LPCB 460. 
111 See for example Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 5.29.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458; 
McCormick Co. to Lankester 5.20. 1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459; 
112 Butler to Cyrus Jr. 10.22.1885. 3b, box 4. 
The change from wood to iron meant a complete change in the machinery of the 
factory. All the lathes, forms and presses were replaced. It caused delays in production 
and "thousands of dollars in new machinery." McCormick Co. to Lankester 5.20.1889. 
Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
113 McCormick Co. to Lankester 5.20.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
114 Cyrus Jr. to Lankester 1.16.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459; Butler to Lankester 
12.6.1889. Mss 1x, LPCB 460. 
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Images in the 
advertisements 
were often openly 
racist. Not even 
the Zulus were 
able to stop the 
harvester. 
(McCormick 
Collection. State 
Historical Society 
of Wisconsin). 
users.
115 This fact forced factories to send travelling experts abroad 
to set up and repair machines. A working machine was the best 
advertisement and inducement for further sales. In Russia, the need 
for experienced mechanics was so great that agents were prepared 
to bear the cost themselves. Normally the McCormick Company tried 
115 McCormick Co. to F. Vogeler (McCormick's agent in Prussia, Germany) 
10.24.1888. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
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to share an expert's salary and expenses.116 
 McCormick's travelling 
mechanics were men experienced on the fields, men who helped 
in sales work but were simultaneously also the Company's eyes and 
ears."' 
 One of the many requirements for an expert in Europe was 
that he had to speak several languages. Travelling over a huge area 
extending from Russia to South America made work exhausting, and 
not all of them could stand the strain.118 
In America, a central element of sales campaigns was advertising. 
As was stated earlier, factories published not only yearly catalogs 
but also numerous other articles: posters, showcards and flyers, and 
this approach was transferred to Europe too. 
It is not clear when the McCormick Company began to send its 
own printed material to its European agents. This must have been 
before 1885, for in that year Cyrus Jr. informs his Russian agent that 
the Company is not able to furnish him with special pamphlets; he 
would have to manage with the repair catalogs and instructions 
which the Company had sent to him. The Champion Co., however, 
had sent its American catalog to Russia and added into it two other 
languages.19 For the 1886 pamphlet, the McCormick Company asked 
about special features for the English trade, and for the first time 
thought about publishing a French edition.120 The next year the 
Company's selection had expanded to folders, showcards and to its 
own magazine, Farmers Advance. German pamphlets were also 
published for the first time.121 McCormick's business connections 
116 Emil Liphardt & Co. to McCormick Co. 2.15-27.1884. Mss lx, LPCB 457; 
McCormick Co. to Freudenreich 5.6.1884. Mss lx, LPCB. The experts that McCormick 
normally sent abroad were Poppe and Borell. Ibid 
117 Poppe to McCormick Co. 6.9.1888. Mss 2c, box 112. 
118 Butler to Lankester 4.6.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. Poppe left the McCormick 
Company after a dispute over his salary. Half a year later, however, Poppe was back 
in service and on his way from South America to Russia. Butler to Freudenreich 
12.18.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
Borell's problem was his heavy drinking. Butler asked Lankester "to look after him a 
little in this regard". Borell's salary was $100 a month and the Company covered his 
travelling expenses. Butler to Lankester 6.4.1889. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
119 Cyrus Jr. to Freudenreich 1.31.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 457. Cyrus Jr., while not 
able to send company's catalogs to Freudenreich, boasted that they were better than 
their competitors'. 
120 McCormick Co. to Lankester & Co. 8.29.1885. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
The McCormick Company fulfilled its aims and printed a French pamphlet for 1886 
and a poster. McCormick Co. to Lankester & Co. 4.11.1886. Mss lx, LPCB 458. 
121 McCormick Co. to Freudenreich 1.13.1887. Mss lx, LPCB 458; Butler to Emil 
Mailer 7.6.1887. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
It was, however, curious that the McCormick Co. published printed instructions and 
directions for setting up and operating machines only in English. McCormick Co. to 
Lankester & Co. 4.14.1887. Mss lx, LPCB 458; McCormick Co. to F. Vogeler 
10.24.1888. Mss lx, LPCB 459. 
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had expanded over such a large area that it caused the Company's 
officials great problems to adapt advertising material for different 
countries.122 A major step forward in advertising was to send catalogs 
directly to the members of the agricultural societies, as in England.123  
In addition to direct advertisements, reporters were also used to 
promote sales. In 1889, Percy Lankester met a contributor to the 
German agricultural press, who offered his services to the 
McCormick Company. For 20 shillings per article he was ready to 
write columns in the seven leading German agricultural magazines, 
dealing not only with McCormick's factory and its success in the 
trials but also McCormick's ideas. Although it is not a hundred 
percent sure if this proposal was carried out, it casts serious doubt 
over the reliability of the articles published in the agricultural 
newspapers and periodicals.124  
122 McCormick Co. to Freudenreich 1.13.1887. Mss lx, LPCB 458. Different 
conditions had forced the factory to make changes in the basic construction, which 
had to be taken into account when pamphlets and other material were published. 
At this phase the McCormick Company used the same pamphlets or catalogs both in 
America and in Europe: only the language was changed and the name of the agent 
was printed on the cover. McCormick Co. to Lankester 1.28. and 4.14.1890. Mss lx, 
LPCB 460. 
123 McCormick Co. to Lankester 4.14.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Lankester decided 
to send pamphlets to the members of the Royal Agricultural Society of England. He 
asked McCormick Co. to send 15 000 catalogs for that purpose. 
124 Lankester to Cyrus Jr.7.16.1889. Mss 10c, box 10. Lankester asked authorization 
for his move but was ready to pay for all seven articles only five pounds, since he 
assumed that the German journalist was "somewhat in needy circumstances". 
Lankester saw a need for these articles, since the McCormick Company was in 
Germany more or less on the defensive and needed new wind for its sales. 
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VIII 
~ 
• The Foreign Trade Grows 
in Importance, 1890-1898 
8.1. The new division of the home markets 
8.1.1. The first merger attempt 
In the hands of Cyrus McCormick Jr., the McCormick Harvesting 
Machine Company was transformed from a family enterprise into a 
managerially run large-scale corporation. In spite of its changing 
nature, the McCormick Company remained in many respects a family 
firm. Its energetic General Manager, E.K. Butler, was in charge of 
daily operations, but under the close eye of the President of the 
Company, Cyrus Jr., and especially of his mother, Nettie McCormick. 
Besides, the Company's shares were in the hands of family members. 
At the formation of the Company in 1879, one fourth of its stock 
was left to Leander McCormick, altogether 6250 shares. In 1880, 
when Leander and his son Hall were forced to withdraw from the 
active conduct of the business, they retained their stock; besides, 
Leander remained Vice-President of the Company and Hall a director.' 
Although Leander and Hall were outside daily operations, their 
positions enabled them to follow the Company's decision making 
on the highest level. They were able to force distribution of the 
profits and made development and expansion of the business almost 
impossible. Of course it has to be taken into account that the 
material in the McCormick Collection is hostile to Leander's ideas 
and approach to the business. Not only had there been prolonged 
dispute and accumulated hatred between the two brothers, but also 
two totally different business ideologies; Cyrus demanding constant 
expansion of production, and Leander more cautiously attempting 
to restrict his brother's vigor.2 
Continued friction between the two families finally led Cyrus Jr. 
to offer to buy Leander's share in the Company. After discussions 
between Cyrus Jr. and Hall McCormick, the two parties finally agreed 
1 	 Records of the Directors Meetings. 2.4.1890. Mss M/I, box 4; Opinion of John P. 
Wilson in connection with the purchase of L.J. McCormick stock. 7.25.1918. Mss 6c, 
box 30. p. 1. 
2 	 Opinion of John P. Wilson. 7.25.1918. Mss 6c, box 30. page 3.4. 
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on the terms of the purchase on December 28th, 1889. For Leander's 
shares Cyrus and Nettie McCormick paid $3 200 000, of which $600 
000 was paid in cash at the time of the signing of the agreement. 
The remainder was paid over the five following years and was 
secured by collateral to the amount of $1 000 000. Leander and Hall, 
for their part, promised to entirely to give up the reaper business, 
including the goodwill. They were also forced to surrender their 
positions in the Company management.3 
Nettie McCormick's already strong (actually crucial) position in 
the business was reinforced when her brother, Eldridge M. Fowler, 
was elected as the new Vice-President of the Company. They were 
to be the conservative voice on the Board of Directors. The division 
of the shares4 and the duties and officers of the Company5 were 
3 	 Cyrus Jr. to Leander McCormick 12.16.1889. Mss la, box 108; Opinion of John 
P. Wilson 7.25.1918. Mss 6c, box 30. p. 1-5; Copy of the Records of the Director's 
Meeting. 2.4.1890. Mss la, box 109; Meeting of the Board of Director's. 2.4.1890. 
Mss M/I, box 4. 
4 The estate of Cyrus H. McCormick was by his will to be divided on May 13th 
1889 but was not in fact executed until Jan. 13th 1890. The shares of those under 
the age of 25 were to be held in trust for them until they reached the required age. 
At the time of the purchase of the stock 500 shares were set apart for Mrs. Blaine 
(Anita McCormick), Harold and Stanley McCormick respectively. Decades later the 
division of the shares led to an investigation of the matter which produced the report 
of John P. Wilson. Ibid. Mss 6c, box 30. p.1-2. 
5 The division of the shares was: 
Nettie McCormick 	 5752 	 shares 
Cyrus H. McCormick 	 5317 
Trustees of Harold F. McCormick 	 3500 
" 	 Stanley R. McCormick 	 3500 
" 	 M. Virginia McCormick 	 300 
Anita McCormick Blaine 	 3499 
Emmons Blaine 
	 1 
E.M. Fowler 	 20 
N.F. McCormick, Trustee 
	 200 
E.K. Butler 	 30 
W.R. Selleck 	 1 
total 	 2500 	 shares 
Stockholders' Records. Annual meeting of the stockholders of the McCormick 
Harvesting Machine Comopany. 12.30.1890. p. 34. Mss M/I, box 24. Vol. 36. 
The value of the entire estate of Cyrus H. McCormick Sr. other than the stock in the 
Company was in 1889 valued at about $6 million. At the date of the purchase not 
less than three-fifths of the entire estate consisted of stock in the McCormick 
Company. Opinion of John P. Wilson 7.25.1918. Mss 6c, box 30. 
The rate of the shares was $520 per share in 1889, at least to Nettie McCormick, 
who purchased 200 shares in that year. Stockholders' Records. Annual meeting of 
the stockholders of the McCormick Harvesting Machine Comopany. 12.30.1890. p. 
41. Mss M/I, box 24. Vol. 36. 
The Board of Directors was to consist of five persons, each of whom also had to be 
a stockholder. The Company would have a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, 
a Treasurer and a General Manager. The General Manager was to have "such powers 
and shall discharge such duties as may be delegated to him from time to time by the 
Board of Directors or the President." 
Stockholders' Records. Annual meeting of the stockholders of the McCormick 
Harvesting Machine Comopany. 12.30.1890. p. 34-39. Mss MA, box 24. Vol. 36. 
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confirmed. Even after the redistribution of shares, Nettie remained 
the largest shareholder in the Company. 
The purchase of Leander's stock also explains why the McCormick 
Company paid no dividends in 1889, and the slow, and in some 
cases even reluctant, moves and decisions in foreign business. 
Leander had opposed foreign actions from the very beginning and 
had hardly changed his mind during the 1880s. 
Cyrus Jr. also apparently had other questions on his mind when 
he began to bargain with Leander. Competition in the harvester 
business had increased both at home and abroad. Negotiations on 
the reduction of rivalry and fixed prices between the companies had 
ended in the early 1880s without any settlement. At the end of the 
decade, however, Colonel A.L. Conger, President of the Whitman & 
Barnes Manufacturing Company in Akron, Ohio started discreet new 
consultations with various parties to organize a harvester trust. The 
reasons were apparent. The fierce rivalry had forced companies to 
extend their agencies even to the smallest country towns. A patent 
war had continued since the very beginning of the industry and still 
in the 1880s companies held overlapping patents and had suits 
pending against each other.' Besides, as has already been stated, 
competition led to constant price cutting, which was of course 
beneficial to farmers but ruinous to manufacturers.8 
On November 19th, 1890, meetings of the leading harvester men 
during the fall of 1890 led to the formation of the American 
Harvester Company. Its capital stock was fixed at $35 000 000. It 
was the first large-scale merger in the American agricultural machine 
and implement industry. The companies to enter into the agreement 
were the McCormick Company of Chicago; the Walter A. Wood 
Company of Hoosic Falls, New York; the Warder, Bushnell and 
Glessner Company of Chicago; the Aultman & Miller Company of 
Akron; the William A. Deering & Company of Chicago; and the 
6 Conger had obtained options on the plants of nearly 20 different harvester 
manufacturers, including the McCormick, Deering and Walter A. Wood. Whitman & 
Barnes was itself a combination of 13 mower and reaper knifemaking facturies that 
sold their products to larger companies. The International Harvester Co 1913, 57-58. 
7 The McCormick Company paid $100 000 in 1884 for the patents of Marquis L. 
Gorham, which anticipated the Appleby twine-binding apparatus. These patents were 
added to a pool of patents and thereafter manufacturing rights sold to competing 
firms. McCormick 1931, 92. 
In 1886 the McCormick Company had a suit pending against D.M. Osborne on 
infringement of Gorham patents. McCormick demanded from Osborne $25 000 for 
the machines already built and sold and $5 000 as a regular royalty per machine for 
future production. Cyrus Jr. to DM Osborne 1.6 and 1.7.1886. Mss la, box 103. 
Three months later the McCormick Company bought half of the rights for Sylvanus 
D. Locke's patents and production for $75 000. Contract between Sylvanus D. Locke 
and the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company 4.6.1886. Mss la, box 103. 
8 Benson 1936, 5-6. Colonel Conger could remember more than eighty harvester 
companies that had gone bankrupt. Ibid, 3. 
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Whitman & Barnes Manufacturing Company of Akron.9 The 
McCormick Company subscribed for $11 000 000 and the Deering 
Company for $8 000 000 of the total amount of the capital stock, 
which gave them a majority of the entire capital stock. These two 
companies were clearly the leading firms in the business.10 
The formation of the American Harvester Company had raised 
opposition among farmers and implement dealers, who were afraid 
for their future. Amalgamation also met with resistance from within 
the Company, for the old hostility between the companies did not 
die overnight. Suspicions persisted, and were aggravated by 
thoughtless acts by Company officers; not all of the parties engaged 
in the enterprise were convinced of its benefits." Besides, the 
9 Benson 1936, 3-7; The International Harvester Co. 1913, 57-58. 
Besides these "Big Six" the following smaller firms also merged Into the American 
Harvester Co.: Plano Manufacturing Company, Plano, Illinois; Milwaukee Harvester 
Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Easterly Harvesting Machine Company, Whitewater, 
Wisconsin; Minneapolis Harvester Works, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Emerson, Talcott 
& Company, Rockford, Illinois; J.F. Seiberling Company, Akron, Ohio; Seiberling, 
Miller & Company, Boylestown, Ohio; Amos Whiteley & Company, Springfield, Ohio; 
Hoover & Gamble, Miamisburg, Ohio; D.M. Osborne, Auburn, New York; Richardson 
Manufacturing Company, Worcester, Massachusetts; Adriance, Platt & Company, 
Poughkeepsie, New York; D.S. Morgan & Company, Brockport, New York; the 
Johnston Harvester Company, Batavia, New York. Ibid. Altogether 19 of the 21 
manufacturers of reapers and mowers took part in the consolidation. Clark 1929, 
361. 
10 Benson 1936, 8. The new giant elected Cyrus McCormick as its President, William 
Deering as Chairman of the Board of Directors, Walter A. Wood as Vice-President, 
E.K. Butler as General Manager and A.L. Conger as Secretary and Associate General 
Manager. Others elected to the Board of Directors were Asa S. Bushnell, Lewis Miller 
and William Goudy. The Board of Directors delegated its powers of management and 
control to the Executive Committee. The general business of the Company was to 
be divided into three principal departments: financial, manufacturing and sales. 
Officers of the new concern decided to divide the markets of the United States into 
three parts. E.K. Butler would manage the western division, A.L. Conger the middle 
and Walter A. Wood the eastern division. Because one of the ideas behind the merger 
was to eliminate overlapping functions between the companies, the American 
Harvester Company gave notice of dismissal to some of its employees and began 
moves to establish fixed retail prices for the agents. Memorandum of agreement 
between William Deering, Walter A. Wood, A.S. Bushnell, A.L. Conger and Cyrus 
McCormick as subscribers for and owners of stock in the American Harvester 
Company. Mss 3b, box 11; Cyrus to Harold McCormick 12.8.1890. Mss la, box 109; 
Benson 1936, 8; Plan of organization for the American Harvester Company. Mss 
w, box 2; The International Harvester Co. 1913, 58. 
11 Already about a month after the formation of the American Harvester Company, 
someone (probably the Treasurer of the Deering Company) informed his superiors 
of malpractices in the company. E.K. Butler of the McCormick Co., as the new General 
Manager, had decided to put in charge of the general agencies old McCormick men, 
except in Harrisburg where a Deering agent was appointed. Now the Deering clerk 
wanted to warn his company of the possibility that Deering's name might vanish 
from the market. What was more dangerous, if the McCormick men were in charge 
of the agencies, the availability of extra parts could deteriorate and accordingly also 
the value of uncollected notes, at the time being $4 875 000. Besides, there was a 
threat that in the eyes of the public, the McCormick Company would control the 
situation. H.S. Shield (?) to William Deering & Co. 12.23.1890. Mss W, box 1. 
For the concerns of farmers and implement dealers see Benson 1936, 11. 
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American Harvester Company was unable to finance its operations 
with the expected sale of bonds to the value of $15 000 000, since 
the United States Trust Company of New York declined to provide 
the necessary financing for the operation; and finally the American 
Harvester Company was dissolved on January 11th, 1891.12 One 
reason for the dissolution was the opinion of Mrs. McCormick, who 
was afraid that her husband's name would disappear from the 
harvesting machine industry.13 
The American Harvester Company was the first serious attempt to 
fuse the mutual interests of the largest harvesting manufacturers. It 
was also for the prevailing time a typical attempt to merge mutual 
interests. The merger was an expression of the strategy of horizontal 
combination and was aimed at maintaining profits by controlling the 
price and output of the operating units. The first steps in that 
direction were taken already in the 1870s by setting up nationwide 
associations to control price and production. By the 1880s these 
federations were a normal way of doing business, although they were 
found difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, only a few manufacturers 
moved from cartels to legal consolidation during the 1880s. The first 
real merger wave occurred between 1890 and 1893 as a result of 
the legal attack on combinations, the passage of the Sherman Act, 
and the revisions of the New Jersey law. It lasted until the depression 
of the 1890s.14 
Although the benefits of the amalgamation were evident, the time 
was not yet ripe for its realization: the bonds that tied the reaper 
men to their own companies were still too tight. Most of them were 
inventors, and founders of their businesses. Mutual suspicions 
12 Benson 1936, 9.11; McCormick 1931, 108-109. McCormick has also a version of 
his own of the end of the American Harvester Company. According to him, Cyrus 
Jr. and William Deering had travelled to see the New York bankers in January 1891 
and having found the city bankers cold to their ideas were spending their night in 
the same hotel parlor. Late at night Deering had come to see McCormick and a 
conversation followed: 
"McCormick, he said at last, "are these other fellows trying to make the two of us 
carry water for them?" 
"It looks that way to me!" 
"All right, let's go home and call it off." 
"I agree," said the younger man"... Ibid, 108-109. 
13 Benson 1936, 12. Benson bases his statement on newspaper material, in this case 
the New York Herald. The Chicago Times also took part in the debate, quoting Cyrus 
McCormick's statements. Cyrus firmly denied the role of his mother in the case, was 
sorry for the outcome of the event and blamed the Sherman Antitrust Law for the 
dissolution. The Chicago Times found the real reason for the downfall to be the 
activities of the Deering Company. Deering wanted to benefit from the discontent 
among the farmers against the merger, and sent to its agents circulars, where it 
explained it would maintain its own prices and published its intention to withdraw 
from the combine. Chicago Times 1.10.1891. Mss 6x, box 1. 
14 Chandler 1977, 315-318, 320, 331-332. 
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prevented, as in so many similar combinations before, the founding 
of an agreement on production quotas and prices. As long there was 
some profit available on the market, there was always somebody 
who was ready to benefit from it. 
For research this episode is, nevertheless, very fruitful. Before the 
formation of the American Harvester Company a thorough 
investigation was made in all the major participants' production 
plants, which gives a detailed picture of the state of the various 
companies, their competitiveness and their position on the market. 
The report reveals the reasons for the positions of the competing 
manufacturers. The largest and most aggressive firms had invested 
in technology and organization, while the smaller ones had trusted 
to outdated practises and processes. The Buckeye line machine shop 
of Aultman, Miller & Company had hardly any special-purpose 
machines, and used outmoded methods with inadequate inspection. 
The same situation prevailed at the Peerless Reaper Company, at the 
Amos Whiteley Harvester & Reaper Factory and at D.M. Osborne & 
Company. On the other hand, larger manufacturers had adopted 
specialized machinery, and had installed the latest technology in 
every department from foundry to machine shop. The companies in 
best shape were Warder, Bushnell & Glessner (producers of the 
Champion line), Walter A. Wood and Deering. The benchmark for 
comparison in the report was the McCormick Company. Both of the 
inspectors were McCormick employees and certainly not neutral; 
their report was, on the other hand, meant only for their superiors 
and can be rearded at least as suggestive.15 
New machinery alone does not make production profitable, if the 
workforce is not properly organized. The largest companies had 
15 Tour of Inspection of the Different Factories of the American Harvester 
Company. Report of B.A. Kennedy and H.B. Uttley. Submitted either at the end of 
1890 or in the beginning of 1891. Mss 3b, box 11; H.B. Uttley to the American 
Harvester Company 12.17.1890. Mss w, box 1. 
David Hounshell showed in his research how companies such as Singer and 
McCormick in the beginning of the 1880s still heavily relied on general-purpose 
machinery and handfitting, and had not adopted the New English manufacturing 
systems, the 'American Manufacturing System'. Hounshell 1987, 99, 105-109, 173-175, 
182-186. 
The hiring of Lewis Wilkinson and firing of Leander McCormick were the outset of 
a new era in the McCormick Company. That also becomes indirectly evident in 
Uttley's and Kennedy's report, when they compare the other manufacturing plants 
to the McCormick factory. In a decade the larger manufacturers had began to furnish 
their plants with special-purpose machines. The smaller factories still used in 1890 
old-fashioned hand tools and "many of the tools in machine shops were out of date 
and not suitable for the economical production of Harvesting Machinery", as was the 
case at Aultman, Miller & Company. The same company had not changed from 
wooden-frame machines to steel harvesters either, which also indicates the shape of 
its business. At D.M. Osborne, the conclusion was the same, "nothing modern in the 
way of machinery, all work being done on ordinary tools such as were in use years 
ago". Tour of Inspection...Mss 3b, box 11. 
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arranged the machinery in their workshops and foundries to allow 
the best possible output. They had also adopted piece rates in 
general use, and controlled both the flow of raw materials and the 
entire process with timekeepers. Even the machines ran faster at 
their plants. The organization of the production process alone gave 
to these plants great advantages over the smaller manufacturers and 
increased their competitive ability. If we can trust the report, the 
McCormick Company was in this respect too a forerunner.'6 
The new technology, organization of work and close control of 
costs were reflected in production costs per machine. At Aultman, 
Miller & Co. the building of a harvester cost not less than $75 and 
a mower not less than $28. Production costs were at the same level 
at the Amos Whitley Harvester & Reaper Factory, namely not less 
than $75 to $80 for a harvester and not less than $34 to $36 for a 
mower."  These figures can only be taken as indicative, since there 
is no information about how they were calculated. From 
McCormick's we know that the estimated cost per harvester in 1891 
was $54.75 and per mower $18.25 to $22.18 In the American 
Harvester Company the average cost to make a harvester was set at 
16 Tour of Inspection...Mss 3b, box 11. 
Aultman, Miller & Co. used piece rates in their foundry, where average rates were 
$2.15 per ten hours work or 37 cents per hour, for laborers 14 cents per hour and 
for mechanics from 20 to 27.5 cents per hour. Seiberling & Company's general average 
in the foundry was about 27.5 cents per hour and the day labor rate was 13.5 cents. 
Rates were also about the same at the Amos Whiteley Malleable Iron foundry but 
considerably higher at Warder, Bushnell & Glessner; for an average work 17 cents 
per hour and 28 cents in the foundry. Inspectors noted that at the McCormick works 
piece rates were about half of these rates, labor costs being $2.14 for each mower 
compared with Warder's $5.12. Robert Ozanne has calculated the average labor cost 
per machine at the McCormick plant in 1890 to have been $6.73. Ozanne 1962, 369. 
According to the report the average salary at the Whitman & Barnes Manufacturing 
Company was about $1.90 per ten hours, which was the same as at McCormicks. 
There was also great variation in the organization of the work. Aultman, Miller & Co. 
had no regular timekeepers at all; at Warder, Bushnell & Glessner all the work, except 
in the foundry, was done by the day or hour and consequently "their system of day 
labor more thoroughly than ever demonstrated to me, from what I saw there, and 
my past experience, not to be the right way to economize and get the largest amount 
of work for the least money." At Aultman, Miller & Co. the lack of special devices, 
such as jigs and forms, meant that the work was done in a slow and expensive 
manner. Aultman also allowed their piece workers to leave their work at any time. 
At the McCormick works that habit had been terminated more than ten years earlier. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Cost to Manufacture 1891 Machines. Mss 2c, box 29. 
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$60 and for a mower at $22.19 
The impact of the formation of the American Harvester Co. were 
not felt in Europe, but its dissolution was. Butler informed Percy 
Lankester in good time of the coming merger; he anticipated changes 
in the contracts and organization of the foreign trade, but instructed 
Lankester to wait and stay calm. For the time being McCormick's 
was willing to continue old contracts but declined to make new 
ones.20 When the amalgamation was dissolved, Butler urged 
Lankester to move immediately to take over the business of Osborne, 
Johnston and Seymour & Morgan in Europe; he expected these firms 
to discontinue their foreign activities after the American Harvester 
episode. Lankester should react before Walter A. Wood realized the 
situation too. McCormick was even ready to invest extra money in 
the effort and hire a man from Hornsbys.21 On the other hand, 
Osborne, Bradley, Morgan and Johnston faced difficulties, forcing 
them to lower their prices in order to get rid of the stock carried 
over from 1890 at any price. Butler even accused them of dumping 
their machines in France. McCormick had now decided to take up 
the markets in France, and Lankester was advised to reduce his 
prices at once by up to $10.22 Butler was not worried about Wood 
without cause: in 1890 the value of its foreign business was about 
a million dollars, making it the McCormick Company's leading 
opponent. Deering's business at the end of the 1880s was still almost 
entirely domestic, foreign trade playing only a minor role.23  
19 Estimated cost of production for season of 1891. American Harvester Co. Papers. 
Mss w, box 2. 
Estimates of the volume of production for 1891 were: 
Harvester Mower Reaper 
McCormick 24 000 29 000 1 800 
Deering 21 000 26 000 800 
Wood 11 500 26 000 2 100 
Aultman 8 350 16 500 750 
Warder 6 100 18 700 750 
Total 70 950 116 300 6 200 
The quotas show clearly how the McCormick and the Deering companies dominated 
the harvester trade in America. 
In Canada the merger of the leading implement manufacturers was completed in 
1891. The next year the Massey-Harris Company declared its output to be 41 474 
units. Denison 1949, 135. It is unclear which implements that output included, but 
even as such it reveals that the Canadian company was gaining steam. 
20 Butler to Lankester 11.26.1890. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
21 Butler to Lankester 1.21.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
22 Butler to Lankester 2.17.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
According to Butler, the Johnston Harvester Co. was practically in the hands of a 
receiver and they were trying to find a buyer for the concern. 
23 Tour of Inspection... Mss 3b, box 11; Report of the state of Deering Company, 
1890. Mss w, box 2. 
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8.1.2. Only the strongest survive 
The collapse of the American Harvester Company marked the 
beginning of renewed competition. The two giants, McCormick and 
Deering, increased their sales efforts and expanded their volume, 
and the weakest companies had to give way.24 
The literature dealing with this period is full of stories of furious 
rivalry, even open warfare, between salesmen of the various 
companies. Cyrus McCormick, grandson of the inventor, tells in his 
book how the salesmen tried to outdo their rivals: donating funds 
for a new church, arranging picnic parties or special delivery days 
for the harvesters, where machines were lined up on the street, 
bands were playing, banners fluttered across the street and finally a 
grand dinner was served. Even more dramatic encounters took place 
when two or more firms fought for the customer. Even after the 
price was set as low as possible, and a deal made, competing agents 
could haul away the rival machine during the night and replace it 
with their own. Nor were fights uncommon. McCormick tells an 
example of the price war, how a fanner was so poor that he was 
unable to buy a hammer and a wrench. Eager agents sold him a 
binder even though he did not have grain to cut: the tools he needed 
were in the tool box. Equally illustrative is a story of price cutting 
between two rival agents to the point when the price of the machine 
had dropped to half, and the farmer decided to buy both of them.25 
Cut-throat competition was also noted by the leaders of the 
harvesting business, such as Cyrus McCormick Jr. and John J. 
Glessner.26 Yet was competition really as fierce as has been claimed, 
or just a myth constructed for the sake of the International Harvester 
Company to convince the court in the case where it was accused 
of constituting an unlawful trust? 
It is certainly true that the change to branch-offices, long-term 
credit for farmers, and after-sale service involved heavy capital 
investment, which the smaller manufacturers could not meet.27 
24 At least St. Paul, Seiberling, Winona and Easterly failed during the 1890s, and 
Morgan, Whitely and Wood encountered severe economic difficulties The 
International Harvester Co. 1913, 62; Benson 1936, 13-14; Schonberger 1964, 56; 
Butler to Lankester 5.11.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
25 McCormick 1931, 95-107. Cyrus McCormick's book is full of interesting stories of 
the old harvester men. These tales he had collected from interviews with the old 
agents. The reliability of these narratives is questionable, but however, numerous 
writers have cited his information as evidence of competition. See for example 
Schonberger 1964, 62-63 and Eckles 1953, 81-84. 
26 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 50-62. 
27 In the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. Hearing 
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Prices of the McCormick Company's machines in the Commission 
Agency Contracts remained on the same stable level from 1893 to 
1899.28 Indeed, the stable price level points rather toward fixed 
prices agreed between the manufacturers, as the jurors in the 
International Harvester case surmised.29 Similarly, the key figures for 
the McCormick Company in Table 11 show an increase in net sales, 
except in 1893. Profits also almost doubled from 1892 to 1899; 
consequently the Company was able to pay considerable dividends 
to its shareholders. 
There undoubtedly was serious rivalry; whether it was harder than 
during previous decades, is another question. Companies tried to 
beat each other in field tests and trials, as before, but perhaps some 
intensification and transformation can be seen.30 Even prominent 
firms like the McCormick Company had to extend credit to farmers 
by an extra year, but that was due to the crop failure in 1894 and 
not to unforeseen competition, as Schonberger claims.31 Besides, the 
same method was also used in the foreign trade.32 All the companies 
offered longer terms to their clients than before, and even sent out 
special circulars on how to handle difficult customers.33 
In 1890, the Canadian Harris Company brought out an 'open-end' 
Before Circuit Judges Sanborn, Hook and Smith, at St. Paul, Minn., Nov. 3-5, 1913. 
Oral argument of Wm. D. McHugh. 4-5. 
28 In the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company et al. Defendants. 
Volume V. Testimony of Witnesses for the Defendants. p. 264.280. 
For example the price of a 5-ft cut binder with a carrier was $91 in 1893 and in 
1899 exactly the same. The fixed price for the customer in 1892 was $145. Since 
the agent's commission was the difference between the net price and the sale price 
there was in principle a good chance for profitable trade. 
29 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 59-60. 
30 Now one manufacturer could challenge its competitors to drive a machine against 
a pole, or lock the cutter bars at the outer ends with a chain and then drive the 
horses in opposite directions, as Champion did. Attention Farmers. On Mon. June 
25 there will be a Mower Test at Aplington. Flyer 1900. Mss 5x, box 2; Champion's 
Challenge to McCormick, Oral, W. Va., July 16, 1900. Flyer. Mss 5x, box 2. 
According to the McCormick Company, however, the importance of these trials was 
very low, and it paid only minimal attention to them. E.K. Butler to Percy Lankester 
5.11.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. Finally the leading companies declined to send their 
machines to fairs any more. Warder, Bushnell & Glessner to McCormick Co. 
8.30.1898. Mss 2x, box 316. 
31 Schonberger 1964, 62. Schonberger refers to the letter of E.K. Butler to M.D. 
Harter 1.11.1894. "This (extension of credit) prevents anyone from buying any other 
machine and insures the sale for the second year, thus putting the purchasers on the 
shelf for the two years away from the competition." Ibid. 
32 Butler to Lankester 7.17.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
33 William Deering Company. Circular, 4.4.1892. 
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binder, which for the first time enabled the cutting of grain with 
any length of straw. Its value was not recognized in America, but it 
became a necessity in Europe where straw was used for bedding 
and even for feed.34 The open-end binder, and the low-down binder 
of A.driance, Platt & Co. from 1891, forced the McCormick Company, 
as well as the others, to react,35 as had happened before in the 
history of harvesting machinery. 
There still remains the question of the failed firms. During the 
1890s some smaller factories went bankrupt, and even the Walter 
A. Wood Company encountered difficulties after the founder of the 
business died in 1892. Should we blame acute competition for these 
failures, or were there other reasons? The episode of the American 
Harvester Company revealed the overall condition of the harvesting 
machinery factories: the largest had up-to-date machinery and 
organization in their plants, while the poorer ones had to rely on 
handfitting and other old-fashioned methods. When these factors are 
combined with the overall depression that hit the country in 1893 
and to the crop failure the following year, we might find the solution 
for the bankruptcy of some of the factories, especially when we 
know that the demand for harvesting machines was so high during 
the early 1890s that the McCormick Company was not able to supply 
34 Denison 1948, 117. 
35 E.K. Butler to Lankester 7.8.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. McCormick had obtained a 
low-down Adriance for experimentation and was developing an open-end machine 
too. 
The Adriance low-down binder forced the McCormick Company to buy the patents 
for it and the Company began to produce "the Bindlochine", its own copy of the 
same. Consequently, Adriance, Platt & Co. brought a case against the McCormick 
Company and forced it to stop the production and foreign sales of the Bindlochine. 
Although the McCormick Co. was not able to produce a low-down machine of its 
own, it owned the patents and gained as royalties $5 for each machine that Adriance 
sold in foreign countries. Besides, it planned to open a new plant in Canada to make 
the Bindlochine, but because of the limited demand abandoned the idea. The 
Bindlochine is not mentioned in the pamphlet of 1894. Butler to Ackerman 
11.5.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460; The Open Elevator. McCormick Pamphlet, 1894. Mss 
5x, box 1; Butler to Lankester 4.25.1892, 5.30.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461; Butler to 
Freudenreich 12.12.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461; Butler to Lankester 4.28.1893. Mss lx, 
LPCB 461; Butler to H.T. Mot & Co. 4.17.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461; Butler to Lankester 
5.31.1893, 7.17.1893, 8.12.1893, 10.24.1893, 11.7.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461; The Farm 
Implement News. Vol. XIV. No. 13. 3.13.1893. p.25. 
Experiments with the open-end binder began in 1891. Butler to Lankester 7.8.1891. 
Mss lx, LPCB 460. Development of the new binder took more time than was 
anticipated and was also costly to the factory. The new machine demanded the making 
of from 150 to 175 new patterns and the Company was forced to build "the whole 
number without the forms, jigs and dies such as we use in turning out machines 
regularly". Butler to Lankester 1.19.1892, 4.25.1893, 7.15.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
The new open-end binder was introduced finally in 1894. The Open Elevator. 
McCormick Pamphlet, 1894. Mss 5x, box 1 
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all the machines ordered.36 
It was, however, clear that the large companies could stand the 
hard years better than the smaller ones, and when the Wood 
Company ran into problems, after the mid-1890s there remained only 
two major firms in the field.37 Even these firms held serious 
discussions on a merger of their interests.38 
The division of the harvester industry into two categories became 
more and more evident during the 1890s. The McCormick and the 
Deering companies wrestled in their own class; behind them the 
36 Butler to Freudenreich 6.22.1891 and Butler to Lankester 7.8.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 
460. 
Butler boasted that the McCormick Company in 1891 had 40 000 binders on the 
market and would have sold 60 	 000 if they had had them in time. Ibid. 	 The 
lucrative situation in 1891 and 1892 tempted the McCormick Company to produce 
a record number of machines the next year, in the midst of the depression. Even 
such a prominent firm was unable to borrow money, either from America or in the 
international financial markets. The impact of the recession were soon felt in the 
McCormick Company too. Its sales and profits dropped temporarily in two successive 
years, as can be seen in Table 11. It also had to curtail its production by about 30 
000 machines from 1893 to 1894, and there still remained over 15 000 machines 
unsold from 1893. By 1894, however, the McCormick Company was able to sell about 
a thousand machines more than it manufactured. Schonberger 1964, 41-44; 
Statements showing machines manufactured and sold, 1884-1898. inc. Mss M/I, 
box 18. 
37 See for example the International Harvester Co. 1913, table 6, page 86. Of the 
capital stock of the International Harvester Co. $26 321 657 went to McCormick, 
$21 362 555 to Deering and to the next largest, Champion, only $3 372 186. 
38 Negotiations on a possible sale of the Deering company opened in July 1897. 
These dealings also throw some new light on the market situation. The capitalization 
of the McCormick Company was estimated at $17 million. It became evident that 
McCormick really was holding its prices over the other companies. McCormick's $135 
for time sales against Deering's $100. Harold McCormick to Nettie McCormick 
7.13.1896. Mss 3b, box 17. 
In August Cyrus Jr. asked Nettie's approval for the purchase of the Deering company. 
The idea was to increase the capital stock of the McCormick Co. by selling the new 
stock to a syndicate to be formed. The capital stock was planned to be divided 
between the following persons: 
Nettie McCormick 	 5752 
Cyrus Jr. 	 6978 
Harold McCormick 	 5160 
Stanley McCormick 	 5160 
R (Rockefeller?) 	 4980 
Anita McCormick 	 3500 
Mary Virginia McCormick 3000 
E.K. Butler 	 230 
Eldridge Fowler 	 200 
R possibly means John D. Rockefeller, whose daughter Edith was married to Harold 
McCormick. Cyrus Jr. to Nettie McCormick 8.4.1897. Mss 3b, box 17. 
Nettie McCormick, nevertheless, took a conservative view on the matter. She 
suggested careful moves and expressed concern how "we can meet them in economy 
in making reapers. By paying too much we lose our justification for buying." 
(spacing Nettie McCormick). Nettie McCormick to Butler 9.22.1897. Mss lb, box 24. 
Although Cyrus McCormick III explains the collapse of the plan by the difficulties to 
find financing for the operation, it is obvious that the real reason was Nettie 
McCormick's resistance. McCormick 1931, 109. 
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Milwaukee Company, the Champion line, the Walter A. Wood 
Company, the Plano, Adriance, Platt & Co., the Johnston Harvester 
Co. and D.M. Osborne fought for survival.39 
From this perspective the American harvester markets had actually 
stabilized from the 1880s to the 1890s. This view does not deny the 
competition which certainly existed, but the fight for supremacy 
was transferred to the new level of a battle between two virtually 
equal rivals.40 
On the northern horizon the Canadian Massey and Harris 
companies, which had fought a bitter struggle over supremacy in 
Canada, united their forces and merged in 1890.41 In Europe and in 
Australasia, Massey had already shown its teeth. The World 
Columbian Exposition, held in Chicago from May to October 1893, 
opened a new channel for Massey-Harris to demonstrate its strength 
right before the eyes of its American competitors. It secured the 
largest floor area, for carloads of machinery. The Company's central 
office was panelled with fifteen Canadian soft and hardwoods and 
decorated with the flags of over fifty countries where Massey-Harris 
machinery was in use. Despite all these efforts, the Massey-Harris 
Company failed to win the awards, because of active and even 
scandalous maneuvers by the McCormick Company, which wanted 
to secure the leading position at any price in its home town.42 
39 Estimates of the key figures of the members of the American Harvester Co. Mss 
w, box 2; The International Harvester Co. 1913, 126-132. 
40 G.L. Keith to Nettie McCormick 5.16.1891. Mss 3b, box 12. 
Philipps distinguishes three effects of the stabilization of the markets: It decreased 
the importance of spatial competition so that producers were freed from searching 
for a favorable location in relation to the market; Second, many small firms which 
had manufactured on contract for local markets disappeared when the means of 
transportation were improved; Third, companies began to tidy and develop their 
organizations. Phillips 1956, 11-12. 
41 Phillips 1956, 12 chart 1, 43; Kuuse 1974, 275. 
The origins of harvester making in Canada were based on American ideas and patents. 
Canadian manufacturers bought patent rights or simply copied the American machines 
outright. They could produce for their own protected markets and expand their 
territory without foreign competition. On the other hand, the American companies 
reaped home royalties and escaped paying the imports duties imposed on the 
machines. Phillips 1956, 39-40. 
42 Denison 1948, 131-133. Howard Schonberger gives a more detailed picture of 
the events at the Chicago fair. Schonberger 1964, 66-82. The Chairman of the 
Executive Committee of Awards at the Columbian Exposition, John Boyd Thacher, 
decided before the World Fair that each exhibit was to be examined on the floor of 
the implement annex and awards would be given without field trials. Suddenly, two 
months after the opening of the fair he notified the harvester companies of field trials 
to be held in five days at Wayne, Illinois. All the leading companies, except 
McCormick Co., refused to go to tests at such short notice. The foreign companies 
were exempted from the field trials. The exemption gave rise to vigorous protests 
from the American exhibitors. The struggle expanded to a quarrel over the invention 
of the orginal reaper. 
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Closely connected to the threat from the Massey-Harris Company 
was the question of tariffs. Canada had protected its implement 
industry with high tariffs since 1847. Initially, duties were 10 
percent, but were raised in 1858 to 20 percent and further to 35 
percent in 1883, which was the highest level the implement tariff 
ever reached, practically closing Canada to foreign competition.43  
The U.S. raised tariff walls at least as high, to safeguard its own 
growing industry. The Morrill Tariff Act of 1861 raised the average 
tariff rate on dutiable imports to 47 percent and it remained above 
40 percent until the First World War.44 Under the McKinley Tariff 
of 1890, the duty on imported agricultural implements was set at 
45 percent. The proposed Wilson Tariff of 1893 placed agricultural 
machinery on the free list, however, because it was able to meet 
foreign competition with superior quality and low prices. This action 
raised a wave of objection from the American manufacturers, who 
demanded a reciprocity proviso in the bill, with the intention of 
excluding the Canadian makers from the American markets. This 
action was directed towards the Massey-Harris Company; the 
American companies were afraid that the Canadian giant would use 
the United States as dumping ground for its surplus machines.45  
The American manufacturers were not on the alert for 
Massey-Harris without cause. It acquired a controlling interest in the 
Johnston Harvester Company at Batavia, New York, in 1910 and also 
in the Deyo-Macey Engine Company at about the same time,46 
whereas U.S. companies did not open factories in Canada before the 
turn of the century because of difficulties in obtaining adequate 
patent protection, Canadian tariffs, and because of uncertainty 
regarding the permanence of the Canadian market. At the height of 
the quarrel over the low-down binder with Adriance, Platt & Co., 
the McCormick Company planned to open a factory of its own in 
Canada to circumvent the possible negative outcome; that plan was 
never fulfilled, but it did establish in 1892 in Winnipeg a warehouse 
of its own to handle the increased trade.47 The Deering Company 
43 Phillips 1956, 10-11, 42-43. 
44 Hughes 1987, 369-370. 
45 Schonberger 1964, 90-95. 
46 In the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company et al., Defendants. 
Volume XIII. Testimony of the Witnesses for the Defendants. p. 184; The 
International Harvester Co. 1913, 49; Phillips 1956, 12, chart 1 
47 Cyrus Jr. to Nettie McCormick 11.22.1892. Mss 3b, box 13; The Wilkinson Plough 
Co. to E.K. Butler 10.9.1893. Mss 3b, box 14. The Wilkinson Plough Company offered 
to make from 500 to 1000 Bindlochines for the sum of $40 each. This letter shows 
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was the first to buy a site for a factory in Canada, in 1900, which 
later became the location of the International Harvester Co. of 
Canada.48  
8.2. From Russia to Iceland 
8.2.1. The giant knows no boundaries 
Researchers have often seen the depression of the 1890s, which 
began in 1893, as a turning-point in the foreign trade in harvesting 
machines. According to these explanations, because of the 
depression of the 1890s, firms had large numbers of unsold 
machines, and acute competition forced them to seek foreign 
markets.49  
Mira Wilkins, on the other hand, found the Sherman Antitrust Act 
to be an indirect reason for the extension to foreign lands. This Act 
forbade agreement between companies, but not mergers. 
Consequently, firms which survived the depression and competition 
grew powerful, and expanded into giant corporations which had 
good prospects for foreign business too.5° 
The explanations that have attracted researchers were already 
mentioned in the contemporary press, which has perhaps affected 
later interpretations, although in the implement magazines there was 
no sharp increase in the number of articles.51 It is understandable 
how far-reaching plans the McCormick Company had made for the production of the 
low-down binder in Canada. If they licensed a Canadian company to build 
Bindlochines, it would keep the patents out of the hands of the Massey-Harris 
Company. Butler to Lankester 10.7.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
48 Phillips 1956, 42; Schonberger 1964, 99. 
49 Manning 1961, 10; Schonberger 1964, 106, 114-117; Carstensen 1984, 115. 
Carstensen is more careful in his statement, saying that McCormick "presumably was 
ready to look at undeveloped markets". 
50 Wilkins 1970, 71-72. 
51 The following excerpts are titles from the Farm Implement News: 
"How can foreign trade be established?" 5.11.1893. No.19. 
"The condition of the American farm implement trade on the continent of Europe 
may be reviewed as follows:". 9.28.1893. No.39. 
"Now is the opportune time for pushing foreign trade". 11.29.1893. No. 47. 
"Review of the agricultural machinery trade in Russia". 3.29.1894. No. 13 
"Increasing interest in foreign trade". 4.5.1894. No. 14. 
Common to all the articles is their instructive style. They advised exporters to avoid 
unreliable European agents, to investigate the situation on the ground, and be readier 
for business. Equally striking is the very literary nature of the articles compared with 
the everyday nature of the foreign trade for example of the McCormick Company. 
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that the press tried to find solutions for the hard times, and 
encouraged firms into foreign business; but in the harvester business 
there was no dramatic turn abroad. Most of the American harvester 
companies had tried their wings on foreign fields for years before 
the depression of the 1890s. Foreign trade was a long process, which 
needed careful investigation of the market, the kinds of machines 
needed, and familiarity with the agents and the legal environment. 
There was no room for hasty decisions if one wanted to succeed. 
Besides, competition at home prevented the industry from investing 
capital on overseas operations, as Benson has shown.52 
For some of the smaller companies, Europe had, according to the 
McCormick Company, become a dumping ground where they sold 
their unsold stock of machines. The McCormick Company did not 
move in that direction; it had far-reaching plans for Europe and did 
not want to spoil its chances with such tricks.53 McCormick was 
continuously receiving new applications for agencies all over 
Europe,54 but moved cautiously. Butler continued his yearly trips to 
Europe and tightened his grip on Mot & Co., the French agent, who 
was also selling Johnston machines.55 McCormick had established 
agencies in all the Scandinavian countries except Finland,56 and 
52 Benson 1936, 14. 
53 Butler to Maszewski 2.28.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Butler stated strongly to the 
Company's Russian dealer that it would not follow Wood or other companies in price 
cuts; moreover, "We will venture to say that neither Wood nor his representative 
had the slightest margin of profit when they were through the season. Furthermore, 
they have established a low price, which they cannot well raise." 
Butler to Lankester 2.3.1892. Mss lx, LPCB. The price question was repeated in 
several letters. In this letter Butler expressed his ideology in his characteristic manner: 
"It matters not what Wood's people choose to do about fixing prices on their 
machines. We cannot allow their figures to govern us." 
54 See for example Butler to Lankester 3.3.1891 and 8.24.1891. Mss 1x, LPCB 460. 
S.C.A. Holth from Norway applies for an agency, as does A.O. Wolthuis from 
Groningen in Holland. 
55 Butler to Cyrus Jr. 10.5.1891. Mss 8c, box 11. 
56 In 1892 Adolf Petersson from Helsinki applied for an agency. His letter was 
transferred to the care of Percy Lankester instead of George Freudenreich in Odessa, 
who otherwise was in charge of Russia. Butler thought that Lankester had better 
possibilities to take care of Finland. Butler to Adolf Petersson 2.2.1892 and Butler to 
Lankester 2.2.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
In 1893 also Johannes Preetzmann from Albo (Åbo) wanted McCormick machines for 
sale. Butler to Lankester and to Johannes Preetzmann 8.25.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
A similar inquiry came from Emil Rehnberg in Helsinki. Butler to Emil Rehnberg and 
Butler to Lankester 10.19.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
Although McCormick's machines were not sold in Finland, it was not an unknown 
brand name. In his article on the Chicago World Fair in 1893, Edv. Björkenheim 
reported in detail on the latest models of the Company, but noted that it was not 
represented in Finland, unlike Walter A. Wood. Teknikern No:87, 1994. 
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continued these operations.57 The significance of European trade was 
growing, although its economic value was not yet very important, 
in such a measure that the McCormick Company in 1892, amidst its 
domestic hustles, was prepared to develop special models and the 
new open-end binder for the European markets.58 
The McCormick Company saw great prospects in Germany. From 
the very beginning, Germany was excluded from Lankester & Co.'s 
own sales area, and operated by McCormick with Lankester as 
salaried manager. In this role, either in 1891 or early in 1892 
Lankester appointed Max Paulsen as salaried representative to 
Germany.59 After his trip through Europe, Butler planned to open 
shipping facilities and storage space in Hamburg, where machines 
could be supplied to various agents; he was on the look-out for a 
possible enlargement of business in Germany, and this was achieved 
during the next spring, when Paulsen was installed in temporary 
headquarters at Bremen.60 In 1893, the German trade gained further 
promotion when headquarters sent a special German-speaking 
salaried agent to assist in sales.G1  
After his first full year as a McCormick's agent in Germany, Max 
Paulsen wanted to handle the trade on his own account. This 
57 See for example Butler to Lankester 12.3.1891. Mss 1x, LPCB 460. 
58 Butler to Lankester 4.25.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
"...we have laid very much more important matters aside to rush this through, to 
keep you to the front and in the lead of all competitors. It is a matter of pride with 
us, rather than money". 
In the hectic years of 1891 and 1892, the home markets were much more important 
to the McCormick Co. than foreign fields. 
59 Germany was a virgin land to the McCormick Co. and Butler was very careful with 
all aspects. This comes out for example in the case of a German emigrant farmer 
who wanted to buy and send a binder to his brother in Germany. This would be a 
chance to conquer new territory in the Coblenz area. Butler to Lankester 2.13.1892. 
Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
Butler to Lankester 1.26.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Butler used in this letter the name 
Max Poison (sic). 
60 Butler to Lankester 12.13.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. This plan was one of the first 
steps to open the old problem of extra machines and repairs. 
The key position of Germany in McCormick's European activities becomes evident 
from the following passage in Butler's letter:"All your remarks concerning the pushing 
of this German trade has been duly noted and approved. We only wish we had a 
better man now, ready to go there at once." Butler to Lankester 12.28.1892. Mss lx, 
LPCB 461. 
For the temporary headquarters at Bremen see Butler to Lankester 5.3.1893. Mss 1x, 
LPCB 461. 
61 Butler to Lankester 5.22.1893, to Max Paulsen 6.1.1893 and to C.H. Fincke 
6.30.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
Expert was C.H. Finke's. His salary was set at $100 a month. His purpose was not 
merely to assist the trade but to build it up. He was the man Butler had sought some 
months earlier. Fincke repeated his trip to Germany the next year. Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 5.7.1894. Mss 2x, box 243. 
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Lankester was not ready to accept. He regarded the German business 
as very slow, and explained that the demand still needed to be 
created and farmers had to be taught the advantages of the machines. 
This case also illustrates the basic approach of E.K. Butler toward 
expansion in new areas; the Company should sell in the beginning 
only as many machines as it was able to set up, service and to deliver 
spare parts for. For future sales, it was imperative to show the real 
abilities of the machines to farmers and make them satisfied. Butler 
was equally strict concerning the agents. The McCormick Co. would 
not sell to any agent unless his intentions and background were 
known. Butler accepted the move of the agency from Bremen to 
Hamburg, however, which was both a waterway and railroad 
junction.62 
The same careful but steady extension of the European business 
is typical of the McCormick Co. throughout the 1890s. In France it 
promptly exploited the economic difficulties of Mot & Co., and 
confirmed a sole contract with the agent. Mot & Co. was a rare 
example of an agent which was able for some time to fight 
successfully with the manufacturers.63 In Hungary, Butler also 
proposed a salaried representative to reelace Müller & Weitz, whose 
reputation and standing were sinking. Operations were extended 
to Bohemia in 1893, where Pomerath & Co. of Prague began to 
represent McCormick.65 McCormick machines also found their way 
to Switzerland and inquiries for them came even from Iceland.66  For 
62 Lankester to McCormick Co. 9.9.1893. Mss 2x, box 227. 
Paulsen was not satisfied with his salary of $900 and wanted it raised to $1200, but 
had to be satisfied with $1100. Ibid and Butler to Lankester 9.29.1893 and 10.24.1893. 
Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
Paulsen was regarded as an energetic young man. This description seems to have 
been accurate, for he contracted with a new subagent in Schleswig for the sale of 
40 machines. Butler to Lankester 11.21.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
63 Butler to Cyrus Jr. 10.5.1891. Mss 8c, box 11; Butler to Lankester 1.7.1892. Mss 
lx, LPCB 460; Butler to Lankester 3.4.1893 and 11.14.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
64 Butler to Lankester 12.13.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
65 Butler to Lankester 5.19.1893, 9.29.1893 and 11.7.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461; 
Lankester to Butler 9.9.1893. Mss 2x, box 227. Lankester also held negotiations with 
Umrath & Co. of Prague, but was not satisfied with their small order. 
66 the case of Iceland the initiative came from McCormick's side. It had sent a 
questionnaire to Bendix about sales possibilities in Iceland. Bendix was not positive, 
but promised to investigate, and half a year later Stefan Johnson from Iceland was 
ready to take an agency there. Butler, however, decided to sell there through Bendix. 
Brodr.Bendix to McCormick Co. 5.10.1894. Mss 2x, box 235; Butler to Stefan 
Johnson 12.5.1894. Mss lx, LPCB 462. 
In Switzerland Lankester was forced to sell machines outright to a farmers's 
co-operative to prevent Deering from getting the sale. Nevertheless, McCormick also 
had an agent in that country. Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.30.1894. Mss 2x, box 
235. 
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the Scandinavian countries the McCormick Company had made 
contracts at the turn of the decade. Bröder Bendix continued in 
Denmark, and Andersson and Mattson in Sweden, but in Norway 
the agency was transferred from Werner to the Amerikanske Maskin 
Compagniet.67 
Finland was a totally new territory for McCormick: the Company 
had received numerous inquiries, and some machines had been sold 
to a Finnish retailer. In 1893, Andersson & Mattson extended 
operations to Finland, but Bröder Bendix was also ready to expand 
to Finland. Only in 1896 was the McCormick Co. ready to make a 
contract for agencies in Finland, a further illustration of McCormick's 
cautious foreign trade policy. 
In Russia, George Freudenreich had for some time disappointed 
Butler with his sharp criticism, obstinacy and inefficiency. From time 
to time Butler sent Freudenreich bitter comments over his doings, 
and demanded that he follows directions from Chicago.G9 In 1892, 
Butler expressed for the first time the idea of replacing Freudenreich 
with a younger and more energetic agent.70 
By the end of 1893 the McCormick Company had fulfilled its 
strategy of expansion in western Europe. It had appointed agencies 
in practically every European country, including Iceland. Now the 
time was ripe to turn its sights on Russia. In 1894 Butler extended 
67 Butler to Lankester 12.28.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461; Lankester to McCormick Co. 
9.14.1893. Mss 2x, box 227; Butler to Lankester 10.7.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461; 
Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.25.1893 and 12.19.1893. Mss 2x, box 227; Lankester 
to McCormick Co. 10.27.1894. Mss 2x, box 235. 
68 McCormick Co. to George Freudenreich 3.14.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. The first 
two mowers were bought by P. Sidorow from Helsinki for the sum of $73.80; 
Lankester to McCormick Co. 9.30.1893 and 12.14.1893. Mss 2x, box 227. Lankester 
made his investigations in the normal manner and found all the Finnish agents 
economically in very poor condition. "The parties we are in negotiation with are all 
financially weak, and we have had to pay for our experience of dealing with those 
kind of people in such remote places, for if they do not pay you, it is only throwing 
good money after bad to sue them at such a distance"; Butler to Lankester 11.7.1893. 
Mss lx, LPCB 461; Lankester to Butler 10.25.1893. Mss 2x, box 227; A.W. Jakobson 
from Viipuri asked for McCormick machines for sale but the Company was ready to 
give the agency only if Jakobson would be ready to buy at a carload, that is 40 
machines. Butler to A.W. Jakobson 12.10.1894. Mss lx, LPCB 462; In 1896 Edward 
Ackerman finally appointed Francke & Hackman from Viipuri to represent the 
McCormick Co. in the eastern part of Finland. Ackerman to McCormick Co. 
10.6.1896. Mss 2x, box 282. 
69 Butler to Freudenreich 1.21.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. An illustrative dispatch of 
the relations between Odessa and Chicago is the following remark of Butler:"You are 
there, and paid to fight our battles for us... If you are going to represent us in that 
country you will have to brace up and help us out of difficulties rather than to lie 
down when your agents make complaints...The like never occurred from any known 
land other than under your management." Ibid. Butler to Freudenreich 12.8.1891. 
Mss lx, LPCB 460; Butler to Freudenreich 1.5.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
70 Butler to Lankester 12.13.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
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his annual trip for the first time to Russia. After extensive traveling 
and a detailed survey of the potential of the market, Butler decided 
to open a new warehouse in Odessa. Thus far, Freudenreich had 
conducted the trade under his own name; Butler now wanted to 
manage it directly under McCormick's name. He decided to send a 
young and aggressive assistant, George W. Tracy, to help 
Freudenreich in Odessa.'' The new warehouse was the answer to 
Freudenreich's repeated requests. Finally he had the possibility to 
carry a stock of machines and spare parts. This warehouse was also 
the start for McCormick's own retail business in Russia and was its 
first foreign capital investment. 
In the beginning of the 1890s, the McCormick Company had taken 
very decided steps to expand its foreign business. Nevertheless, 
there was no sudden rush abroad after the depression of 1893 and 
the crop failure of 1894. Consequently, it is evident that the 
decisions on and preparations for expansion had been made before 
the depression. In the foreign correspondence of the McCormick 
Company, the only remark concerning the effects of the depression 
was Butler's remarks on shortage of storage space;72 neither did 
McCormick's competitors take any drastic actions to enlarge their 
foreign operations. One new move came in 1892, when the Deering 
Company sent its representative Charles H. Haney to Europe to find 
responsible agents and outlets for the Company's goods. During 
several succeeding trips, Haney also inspected possibilities on the 
other continents.73  
As a result of the steady and determined development of the 
foreign organization, France was transferred in 1895 from Mot & Co. 
to the more energetic Wallut & Hoffman. In Germany, Max Paulsen's 
status changed from that of salaried agent to an independent agent 
71 Manning 1961, 10; Schonberger 1964, 115; Carstensen 1984, 125-127. 
Before Butler's journey, Freudenreich had a plan to form a syndicate together with 
Richard Garret & Sons of England, the Eckert Manufacturing Co. of Germany and 
Weissmann & Co. of Russia to sell agricultural machinery of various but not 
overlapping lines in Russia. Freudenreich to McCormick Co. 2.3-15.1894. Mss 2x, 
box 235. This plan is an illustrative example of how far Freudenreich had slid from 
the McCormick ideology. 
Butler was very positive on the future prospects in Russia;"There is a better 
opportunity there than here, or anywhere in the world, so fas as our judgement goes, 
for an increased profitable business. Everything is ripe for it. The country is no more 
uncertain than ours." Butler to Tracy 12.13.1894. Mss 1x, LPCB 462. 
72 Butler to Lankester 11.7.1894. Mss lx, LPCB 462. "Meantime there is no special 
hurry on our account, except the fact that we shall be badly in need of storage after 
the 1st of January." 
73 The District court of the United States for the District of Minnesota...Testimony 
of Witnesses for the Defendants. p.134-135. 
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working on his own account.74 In Russia, too, the McCormick 
Company tightened its grip on the business. George A. Freudenreich, 
who had worked in Russia since 1880 as McCormick's salaried agent, 
was now replaced by his assistant, George Tracy, and the Russian 
agency resembled the American branch houses, with its salaried 
manager and a warehouse.75 
Although General Manager E.K. Butler had kept a keen eye on the 
foreign affairs throughout his career, he clearly put more energy into 
this field after the American Harvester Co. episode. Nomination of 
the new agents and the replacement of Freudenreich were only the 
beginning of a larger change. The pros and cons of the jobbing 
business have already been discussed; as the McCormick Co. 
intensified its foreign business, the negative sides became 
increasingly evident. 
For some time, Butler had received requests to open McCormick's 
own branch houses in Europe. The jobbers would not risk ordering 
large numbers of machines, and consequently they often fell short 
of them during the season. In the same way they were short of spare 
parts. In the face of intensifying competition, the cost of the 
machines was one more factor working against jobbers. After his 
journey through the Scandinavian countries, Edward Ackerman was 
convinced that "the margin on each machine does not admit of a 
middleman's profit". The only way to avert loss would be to deal 
directly with each country. Ackerman also raised doubts concerning 
Percy Lankester and his real intentions.76 
74 Lankester to McCormick Co. 1.22.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. Mot & Co. had 
contracted with the English Hornsbys to sell the rest of their French stock while 
Hornsby was closing their French house; Butler to Lankester 3.11.1895. Mss 1x, 
LPCB 462; Max Paulsen to McCormick Co. 8.9.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 12.23.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; Butler to Lankester 3.23.1897. Mss 
lx, LPCB 463. 
75 Dismissal of Freudenreich was a lengthy process. The McCormick Company did 
not want to lose Freudenreich's experience, and requested Tracy to keep him in a 
good humor and meanwhile to learn Russian and all possible aspects concerning the 
business. Power of attorney had to be transferred from Freudenreich to the 
McCormick Co. in the name of Tracy. The transfer of power occurred fairly well, 
although Butler was prepared to send Lankester to assist in the case of open conflict. 
Freudenreich left Odessa in fall 1895. Butler to Tracy 1.31.1895, 3.8.1895 and 4.10. 
1895. Mss lx, LPCB 462; Butler to Freudenreich 3.13.1895. Mss lx, LPCB 462; 
Carstensen 1984, 127. Butler was not satisfied with the doings of Tracy either. He 
sent the Company's reliable foreign traveler Edward Ackerman to put some more 
"stamina" into him. Butler to Lankester 2.7.1895. LCBP 462; Lankester to McCormick 
Co. 3.2.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. 
In the agreement between Tracy and McCormick his salary was in 1898 set at $2400 
plus traveling expenses. The contract would be canceled "for just cause by the said 
Cyrus H. McCormick". Agreement between Cyrus H. McCormick and George W. 
Tracy. 3.17.1898. Mss 2x, box 299. 
76 Emil Müller to Butler 7.2.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; Bröder Bendix to McCormick 
Co. 6.15.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; Max Paulsen to McCormick Co. 8.9.1895. Mss 2x, 
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The first moves toward establishing McCormick's own direct 
presentation in Europe were taken in Hungary, where the sales and 
reputation of the Company had been falling for some time.77 At the 
end of 1897, Butler proposed setting up McCormick's own office in 
Budapest the next spring, and also communicated this idea to 
Lankester.78 The following year McCormick sent its representative 
to take over the Hungarian business. Due to his late arrival, he 
decided to retain the Company's old representative for the coming 
season, during which he could familiarize himself with the local 
conditions and agents.79 
The greatest change in the McCormick Company's organization 
was triggered by the announcement by E.K. Butler in the beginning 
of 1898 of his intention to retire from the McCormick Co. Cyrus Jr. 
saw the timing of Butler's retirement as most opportune for 
McCormick's. The years of the great fights within and outside the 
Company were over, and McCormick's organization and factory 
were in good shape. The place where Butler's loss would be most 
felt was in the European business. Butler's plans to leave the 
Company did not prevent him from conducting the sales as 
heretofore. He made his annual trip to Europe, settled his accounts, 
and left the Company on November 1st, 1898.80 
box 263; Edward Ackerman to McCormick Co. 10.6.1896. Mss 2x, box 282; 
Ackerman to McCormick Co. 5.3.1897. Mss 2x, box 287. Ackerman found out that 
Lankester had bought spare parts from some other manufacturer and delivered them 
to his agents as "will fit McCormick machines". Ackerman repeated his demand for 
direct sales in 1897 after his round trip among the European agents. 
77 Emil Müller to Butler 7.2.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; Lankester to McCormick Co. 
12.16.1896. Mss 2x, box 283; Butler to Ackerman 5.18.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
Butler instructed Ackerman that during 1898 something was going to happen in 
Hungary. Until then, Lankester had time to unload the machines; Ackerman to 
McCormick Co. 10.4.1897 and 10.6.1897. Mss 2x, box 287. Ackerman worked directly 
under Butler in his journeys throughout the world. He helped to set up the machines, 
handled them in trials and was the Company's eyes and ears. 
78 Butler to Ackerman 10.22.1897, to Lankester 10.23.1897, 11.16.1897, 12.11.1897 
and to Ackerman 11.2.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. One of the biggest reasons for taking 
the business in their own hands was too high prices. In this connection Butler also 
anticipated the future of the German trade and planned to make the Hungarian office 
the main office for nearly all of Europe. Ackerman did not agree with Butler over 
the site of the general agency. He advised Butler to place it either in Hamburg or in 
Bremen. According to him, all the other companies had their own houses in Germany, 
from which they delivered their machines. Besides, he warned Butler not to depend 
anymore on Lankester in the Hungarian question, since he had "done his best to put 
obstacles in our way..." Lankester had lost both Finland and Hungary. Ackerman to 
McCormick Co. 11.28.1897. Mss 2x, box 287. 
79 The man sent to Budapest was W J. Stillman. Stillman to McCormick Co. 2.4.1898, 
5.27.1898. Mss 2x, box 314. 
80 Cyrus Jr. to Nettie McCormick 1.13.1898. Mss 3b, box 19. Cyrus immediately 
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The retirement of E.K. Butler opened the way for a reorganization 
of the Company. The post of General Manager was discontinued, 
and his tasks were divided between the McCormick brothers and 
new departmental managers. Cyrus McCormick continued as the 
President of the Company, while his brother Harold McCormick 
replaced E.M. Fowler as Vice-President and Secretary; the youngest 
brother, Stanley McCormick, was elected a director and the Assistant 
Secretary of the Company. One of the new departments was the 
Foreign Department under William C. Mundt. The factory stayed 
under the Superintendency of H.B. Utley.81  
Many of the basic features in the development of American 
business life which Alfred Chandler has described, became apparent 
in the McCormick Company too. Although it remained a family 
owned enterprise, and its top managers were family members even 
after the reforms in organization, the middle managers, on the other 
hand, were clearly professionals. Directors of the various 
departments took part in the decision making and planning of the 
corporation's future. In that sense the McCormick Company did not 
differ from other large companiesS2. Only its top managers also 
owned the stock which was becoming uncommon as enterprises 
grew and diversified their activities. 
In the foreign field, Butler's resignation had immediate effects. The 
old cautious policy was put aside and McCormick's began to seek 
new growth on the foreign market too. The Company had become 
increasingly dissatisfied with its long-serving European manager, 
Percy Lankester, who had represented the Company but also 
handled his own machine trade in parts of Europe as a jobber. In 
November 1898, Cyrus Jr. informed Lankester of the retirement of 
Butler and of the changes in the foreign organization: the Company 
would not continue Lankester's contract as a salaried agent after the 
end of his current contract period; he could, however, carry on his 
informed his mother of Butler's plans. The reason for Butler's retirement was probably 
partly burnout, under the high pressure during the long years in the McCormick 
ranks since 1879. Partly, the reasons are also to be found from his family. He wanted 
to give more time to his sons, who were approaching their adult years. Cyrus 
explained to his mother the various possibilities of how the situation should be 
handled. The resignation was, nevertheless, peaceful and Butler even at this moment 
was a McCormick man. He did not want to cause any harm to the company; Manning 
1961, 15. 
81 President's annual report to the stockholders, July 13th, 1899. Mss Mit, box 18; 
Organization of the McCormick Reaper Works, "staff'. Mss 2c, box 29; Manning 
1961, 15-16. 
82 Chandler 1977, 9-10, 145-148. 
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Importance of 
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Historical Society 
of Wisconsin). 
own jobbing business in England.83  
During the 1890s there is a visible change in the McCormick 
Company's approach to its foreign business. After the failed merger 
83 Cyrus Jr. to Lankester 11.4.1898. Mss lx, LPCB 464. Cyrus justified his decision 
on extension of the foreign business and the increased expenditures resulting thereof; 
Lankester to Cyrus Jr. 11.19.1898. Mss 2x, box 306. Lankester only asked from what 
date Cyrus wanted to discontinue the existing arrangements. He also asked if the 
company could inform the European agents that "the expansion of the British trade 
requires my undivided attention"; The day of termination of Lankester's services was 
settled to be April 1st, 1899. Cyrus, nevertheless, asked for Lankester's support also 
in the future, especially because he planned to open an office in Hamburg. Cyrus Jr. 
to Lankester 12.12.1898. Mss lx, LPCB 464. 
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attempt the American harvester market was divided into two groups, 
the two giants fighting in the first class for supremacy. That fight 
was soon extended also to overseas and intensified in the middle of 
the 1890s. The McCormick Company extended its agencies to nearly 
every possible grain and dairy producing country, although mostly 
the incentive came from the agents themselves. McCormick's 
strategy began to change hand in hand with the growth of the 
foreign sales. The old jobbing house system proved to be unsuitable 
in the new circumstances and the foundation for the Company's 
own presence in Europe was set up at the end of the decade. On 
the other hand, the key business ideas remained unchanged; the 
best advertisement was the satisfied customer. It did not expand to 
such areas where it was not able to handle the setting up of 
machines, service and spare parts. The McCormick Co. continued 
its strict price policy. It did not trust bad customers and tried to 
minimize thereby the possible risks. On the other hand, the 
structures of agriculture began to change at the turn of the century. 
In western and northern Europe the supply of labor declined and 
wages began to grow84. When machine prices simultaneously sank85, 
there were incentives for increased machine demand. 
8.2.2. The fight over the European markets 
During the 1880s the McCormick Company had fought over the 
foreign markets mostly with the Wood, Osborne and Champion 
companies and with a couple of English firms. At the end of the 
decade, the Canadian Massey Co. cast its nets in the same waters. 
The Deering Company entered the game with new strength from 
1892 onwards. The vigor of the American manufacturers to extend 
business in Europe is understandable, since in most west and north 
European countries mechanization of agriculture was under way or 
was beginning.86 
In France, both Whitman & Barnes and Aultman, Miller & Co. 
opened their own houses in 1892. Butler, nevertheless, did not 
expect any great harm to result, and was satisfied with the 
Company's situation. There was good reason for his satisfaction, 
since the French agent had been able to sell almost all of his mowers. 
84 For Britain see Collins 1989, 213-214, for Finland information can be obtained in 
Maanviljelyshallituksen kertomus 1898, 157-160. 
85 Heikkonen 1989, 280 table 24. 
86 Heikkonen 1983, 26-27, 81-83, 85-86. 
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In the Scandinavian countries and in Germany, reaper sales were 
now also expanding. Butler assumed that the Wood Company was 
losing its grip in Germany.S7 In 1895 the trend in Central Europe 
remained the same: McCormick was taking the lead, while the Wood 
Co. was losing ground. In Germany, the business was still divided 
between McCormick, Deering and Wood. Competition centering 
around the Deering and the McCormick companies became more 
apparent after the mid-1890s,89 and in 1896 Lankester was no longer 
sure if Paulsen would be able to fight the Deerings to such an extent 
as he claimed.90 
In spite of increasing sales, the Scandinavian countries were a 
difficult area for McCormick's. Especially Deering, Johnston and 
Morgan had in Denmark a good standing, which was reinforced by 
the defeat of McCormick's at some trials.91 In Norway the same 
competitors had a strong hold on the business, in addition to 
Aultman and Adriance. According to Lankester's information, Wood 
had sold less than 400 machines against over 800 the previous year, 
Johnston 110 against 150 the previous year and Aultman about 25. 
McCormick's own order was for 300 mowers and 20 binders,92 
which meant that its share of the business had developed quite well, 
if we keep in mind that McCormick's had established itself in 
Norway only three years earlier. In Sweden the field was in the 
hands of the Wood Company.93 The next year Lankester reported 
matters to be in satisfactory shape in that country. In 1895 he had 
to ask for a reduction in freights because of keen competition from 
87 Butler to Lankester 1.7.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Butler was sure that neither of 
the houses would get rich; "...if they get enough profit to pay his (manager) salary 
alone and the rent of the building they will be in great luck."; Butler to Lankester 
& Co. 7.15.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461; Butler to Lankester 7.18.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 
461. 
88 Louis Kypke to McCormick Co. 6.18.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. Louis Kypke was 
one of the McCormick Company's foreign experts; Max Paulsen confirmed Kypkes 
details and reported he had won new agents from Wood, Deering, Osborne and 
Adriance. Also the Milwaukee company had emerged in the German business. Paulsen 
to McCormick Co. 6.21.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; Deering had sold some 300 machines 
in Germany during 1895. Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.23.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. 
89 Paulsen to McCormick Co. 3.10.1896. Mss 2x, box 270. 
90 Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.16.1896. Mss 2x, box 283; Also McCormick's 
agent, D. Wachtel from Breslau informed Lankester of the increasing pressure of 
Deering and Osborne but also reminded him that the Wood company still had its 
good old connections in the continent. D. Wachtel to Lankester 4.29.1897. Mss 2x, 
box 288. 
91 Lankester to McCormick Co. 9.14.1893. Mss 2x, box 227. 
92 Lankester to McCormick Co. 9.22.1893. Mss 2x, box 227. 
93 Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.25.1893. 2x, box 227. 
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Deering," which was also tightening its grip on Norway.95 
When McCormick's travelling foreign agent Edward Ackerman was 
sent to inspect the Scandinavian countries, his comments were 
crushing. According to him, neither in Denmark nor in Sweden had 
the McCormick Company reached its share of the business, which 
was still in the hands of the Wood Company.96 In Norway the local 
McCormick agent, Amerikanske Maskincompagniet, had to admit 
that Deering was outselling it.97 In fact, Ackerman stated that only 
in a few places was competition harder than in Scandinavia, where 
it was reaching the point of survival. He blamed the Company itself, 
but also the lazy agents, for a lack of energy in the situation.98 
The difference between the reports from Ackerman and Lankester 
throws more light on the relations between the agents and the 
Chicago administration. Ackerman reported in a very sharp manner 
on the state of the business in Scandinavia, whereas according to 
Lankester, the same situation was satisfactory. He could state that 
Andersson & Mattson had sold almost all of their machines and 
"matters are all in good shape in Europe notwithstanding the 
drought... "99 For Lankester, it was enough when the agents sold all 
the ordered machines; Ackerman, on the contrary, as a Company 
man, was fighting for supremacy of the markets. 
In Finland, the McCormick Company had done only minor trade 
before 1896. When Ackerman visited Sweden, he noticed that a 
considerable number of machines were sold in Finland each year, 
but he complained that McCormick's was not getting its share. He 
therefore asked for time off from Chicago to make a visit to 
Finland,10° which he carried out during the fall of 1896. Finland was 
a great surprise to him. McCormick was hardly known in the 
country, while Deering had sold over 600 mowers in the coastal 
town of Vaasa alone. Besides, the Wood Company had also done 
considerable trade, and a number of others were represented. 
94 Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.27.1894. Mss 2x, box 235; Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 1.22.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. 
95 Lankester to McCormick Co. 3.2.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. 
96 Ackerman to McCormick Co. 8.21.1895. Mss 2x, box 268; Still in 1898 Wood was 
holding its strong position in Sweden. Lankester to McCormick Co. 4.1.1898. Mss 
2x, box 306. 
97 Amerikanske Maskincompagniet to McCormick Co. 2.6.1896. Mss 2x, box 270. 
98 Ackerman to McCormick Co. 5.15. and 6.13.1896. Mss 2x, box 282. In his letters 
Ackerman warned of Deering Co. which was doing all it could to capture the trade. 
99 Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.17.1896. Mss 2x, box 283. 
100 Ackerman to McCormick Co. 5.15.1896. Mss 2x, box 282. 
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Competition was as acute as anywhere in Europe and did not admit 
of middlemen's profits. Lankester, on the other hand, had not 
mentioned anything about Finnish prospects or difficulties.101 
In Austria-Hungary McCormick's still had a promising business in 
1894. The Wood and the Adriance companies were the only ones 
whose trade amounted to anything at all. Lankester could boast of 
selling in these countries more than all the other makers put 
together. i°2 McCormick's problems with its Hungarian agent was 
soon reflected in its sales too, and consequently Deering and 
Osborne became more active.103 Osborne's increasing activity was 
felt all over Europe: it opened new branch houses and advertised 
its products very vigorously.104 In Romania both Osborne and 
Milwaukee encountered a severe setback when their agent went 
bankrupt in 1898.105 
In Russia the picture was not as bright, in spite of the Company 
having its own agent. McCormick's travelling expert, A.C. Danner, 
reported during his trip that there were large regions where 
McCormick's name was totally unknown, while the Wood Company 
had done a large amount of business. With a proper drive, he 
anticipated almost unlimited prospects in Russia.106 
Competition among the American harvester companies in the 
European harvesting machine market was going through the same 
process as in the United States. Smaller manufacturers tried to find 
room for their production in Europe, but were wiped out step by 
step by the McCormick and Deering companies, fighting for 
supremacy there as at home. Overall, American harvesting machinery 
had almost totally conquered the European field. During the 1890s 
there was a continuous demand for mowers, reapers and binders. 
Consular reports also confirm the trend that has become visible in 
the case of McCormick's. Companies sent abroad experienced men 
101 Ackerman to McCormick Co. 10.6.1896. Mss 2x, box 282. Ackerman noticed 
also that Osborne's machine was copied and manufactured in quite large numbers; 
Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.10.1896. Mss 2x, box 283. 
102 Lankester to McCormick Co. 5.7.1894. Mss 2x, box 243, 
103 Emil Müller to McCormick Co. 7.2.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. In Hungary were 
represented, in addition to McCormick's, at least Wood, Harrison, Samuelson, 
Johnston, Adriance, Brantford, Massey, Deering, Osborne, Hofherr and Zimmerman 
& Cervinka. 
104 Lankester to McCormick Co. 4.14.1896. Mss 2x, box 272. Lankester figured that 
Osborne's program incurred a good deal of expence and it would need a large trade 
to pay it. 
105 W. Staadecker to McCormick Co. 2.20.1898. Mss 2x, box 314. 
106 A.C. Danner to McCormick Co. 6.21.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. 
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to establish agencies and experts to assist the agents and farmers, 
but the long-term credit which was seen as essential for trade, was 
still missing.'" 
This overall picture of the market situation in Europe, which has 
been put together from the fragmentary McCormick correspond-
ence, can be defined more precisely using accounts material of the 
same Company supplemented by official statistical material. 
Figure 3. Exports of the main agricultural implements and 
machines from the U.S., 1870-1904. 
Organization of the McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. 1901 
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(Cyrus McCormick) 
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dept.  
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Source: The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the U.S., 1870-1915. 
The value of exports of agricultural machines never reached two 
percent of the total exports of the United States before 1902. From 
that perspective, the importance of agricultural machine exports was 
minimal. If the same phenomenon is compared with total production 
of agricultural machinery in the U.S., exports increased from 4.5 
percent in 1889 to 11.9 percent in 1899 and reached 20.5 percent 
107 Reports from the Consuls of the United States. No. 123. 1890. p. 649; Consular 
reports. Commerce, manufactures, etc. No. 154. 1893. p. 314.315; Consular reports. 
Commerce, manufactures, etc. No. 195. 1896. p. 609-611. 
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in 1904.108 That meant a considerable growth, and a clear shift of 
interest towards foreign trade in the whole line of business. The 
largest proportion of exports consisted of harvesting machinery and 
plows, as can be seen in Figure 3. Harvesting machinery, however, 
increased its share during the 1890s and at the end of the decade 
clearly formed the largest section of agricultural machinery 
exports.109 Machines were mostly sold to Europe, where England, 
France, Germany and Russia were the central sales areas.11o 
Figure 4. U.S. exports of harvesting machines, by continent, 
1890-1905. 
• Mower/ Reaper D Plows • Other 
5 000 000 
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Source: The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1890-
1905. 
If these general data are compared with the McCormick 
Company's activities, they coincide very closely. Table 8 shows that 
between 1884-1898 over 19 percent of the Company's foreign 
business was done in Russia, with France and England coming next 
with 16 and 13 percent respectively. 
108 The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the U.S., 1869-1915; Statistical 
Abstract of the U.S. 1897-1917; Heikkonen 1989, 134-135. 
109 The Moline Plow Company, which was one of the largest plow makers in the 
U.S., after its first careful attempts in the 1870s, began to export its products to 
Argentina and Denmark in 1892 without any great success. Thomas 1976, 72-73. 
110 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1870-1917; The Foreign Commerce and 
Navigation of the United States, 1891-1915; Heikkonen 1989, 136-138. 
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Table 16 Total exports of harvesting machines, U.S., and the 
McCormick Company, 1891-1902. 
Year Total 
export 
of 
the U.S. 
($) 
Total 
sales 
of 
McCormick 
($) 
Total 
sales 
of 
McCormick 
(machines) 
McCormick's 
foreign 
sales 
(machines) 
Exports 
as % of 
total 
sales 
1891 1 579 976 7 386 102 170 666 4 243 3 
1892 2 372 938 8 787 887 202 350 
1893 2 873 897 7 598 245 179 643 
1894 3 261 892 6 002 714 143 143 (72 465)a)  (5 156)a)  (7)a)  
1895 3 659 735 8 580 123 206 488 (99 542) 10 851 (8 843) 5 (9) 
1896 3 212 423 8 126 821 129 100 (98 773) 15 200 (10 191) 12 (10) 
1897 3 127 415 8 945 504 151 885 (122 956) .. (13 915) .. (11) 
1898 5 500 665 12 511 934 208 346 (161 713) 30 217 (23 885) 15 (15) 
1899 9 053 830 13 799 537 266 849 (213 808) 46 359 (33 806) 17 (16) 
1900 11 243 763 15 554 122 312 128 48 923 16 
1901 9 943 680 18 580 458 402 362 62 813 16 
1902 8 818 370 18 650 498 432 100 71 294 17 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1891-1903; Machine Records. Mss 3x, 
box 26. a Figures in parentheses are from an unnamed statement of 
11.16.1899. Mss 3b, box 21. They do not include machine attachments, 
which explains the difference between the sources. The normal practise of 
the McCormick Company was to calculate them as machines. Exceptions 
have produced a number of materials which have been difficult to include 
in this study, but, as in this case, offer valuable new information. 
Table 16 shows a definite increase in the foreign trade of the 
McCormick Company. This confirms the picture that has been drawn 
on the basis of the McCormick correspondence. The significance of 
foreign sales was visible, reaching in 1899 about 16 or 17 percent 
of total sales, equivalent to over $2 million." 
111 The figures in Table 16 do not agree with the information in Table 13, but this 
difference can be explained by the use of different source material. At the same time 
it demonstrates how difficult it is to construct a reliable picture of McCormick's 
foreign trade. 
222 n THE FOREIGN TRADE GROWS IN IMPORTANCE, 1890-1898 
Table 17. Foreign sales of the McCormick Company by main market 
areas, 1891-1902. 
Number 
Year Russia France Germany England S.Am.Oceania S.Afr. Others 
	 Total 
1891 1 231 187 231 1 044 371 371 135 673 4 243 
1895 2 741 1 434 997 1 483 1 171 497 648 1 880 10 851 
1896 4 784 1 728 1 529 1 655 715 2 604 382 1 803 15 200 
1898 3 690 9 358 3 506 3 430 3 618 2 648 478 3 489 30 217 
1899 5 870 16 752 6 098 5 059 4 782 1 570 377 5 851 46 359 
1900 9 522 19 616 7 183 722 2 872 2 143 368 6 497 48 923 
1901 13 327 15 907 16 066 4 993 2 183 1 287 221 8 829 62 813 
1902 10 896 16 286 14 069 6 277 4 892 2 900 621 15 353 71 294 
Year Russia France Germany England S.Am Oceania S.Afr. Others Total 
1891 29 4 5 25 9 9 3 16 100 
1895 25 13 9 14 11 5 6 17 100 
1896 31 11 10 11 5 17 3 12 100 
1898 12 31 12 11 12 9 2 1 100 
1899 13 36 13 11 10 3 1 13 100 
1900 19 40 15 2 6 4 1 13 100 
190 21 25 26 8 4 2 0 14 100 
1902 15 23 20 9 7 4 1 21 100 
Source: Machine Records. Mss 3x, box 26. 
Table 17 confirms that in the 1890s Europe was the most important 
foreign territory.112 
 Within Europe, England, the first country where 
the McCormick Company had begun to sell its machines, was still 
in the forefront of business, but was losing its position to Russia, 
France and Germany. Trade in France and Germany, in particular, 
grew considerably towards the turn of the century. 
The development of the harvesting machine trade can also be 
examined by looking at what kinds of machines were sold in 
different countries. In the early 1890s the agriculture in England was, 
if we can trust the McCormick data, the most advanced. In 1891, 
McCormick still sold more binders there than in all the other 
European countries together. Its share of binders stayed at the same 
level throughout the decade; only a few reapers were sold, but the 
112 The Machine Records of the McCormick Company are not quite consistent with 
the figures in the Statement No.5. Profits on foreign machine business, Mss M/I, 
box 18, which are used later on in this study. The difference is not, however, very 
notable and follows the overall trend. In the case of France the difference is largest. 
Machine Records inform of 16,752 machines sold in 1899 and Statement No.5 of only 
10,883 pieces. The growth rates are, nevertheless considerably close to each other, 
about 56 percent in the former and about 60 percent in the latter material. 
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sales of mowers increased, which reflects the changes in the 
structure of agricultural production. On the other hand, in Russia, 
reapers were clearly the machines most in demand, although mower 
sales also increased at the turn of the century. The Northern 
European countries were a mower region. Especially in Scandinavia, 
binder trade was minimal, and only at the end of the 1890s did 
growth begin in Denmark. In Germany the same phenomenon can 
be seen on a larger scale.13 In this way machine sales followed and 
directly reflected the state and demands of agriculture in various parts 
of the world. In Scandinavian countries, production was directed 
towards dairy products. This was visible also in machine sales; most 
of the machines sold in that area were mowers. France, eastern 
Germany and Russia were main grain growing regions and the 
harvesting machine trade was concentrated in these areas. 
Nearly the only way to test the reliability of the Machine Records 
of the McCormick Company is through its correspondence with its 
agents. In 1893, machine sales in France seem to have been on the 
same low level as two years before, only 195 machines altogether, 
but for 1894, Mot & Co. ordered 768 machines, of which 575 were 
mowers. Max Paulsen started in Germany with 185 machines, Bröder 
Bendix in Denmark ordered 258 and Amerikanske Maskincompagniet 
400 mowers for Norway, which means that at that phase Denmark 
and Norway had overtaken Germany, where business was still only 
beginning.14 
The Machine Records and the machine orders found in the 
McCormick correspondence are consistent, although they do not 
exactly coincide. The realized sales of reapers and mowers in 1895 
in Denmark were 400 and 150 machines respectively, and the 
advance order for the same country 300 and 125. Max Paulsen 
ordered 725 machines for 1895, of which 125 were binders. That 
exceeds the figures found in the Machine Records.15 The difference 
in the figures is on average not significant, and may be explainable 
by the duration of the fiscal year, which ended in the McCormick 
Co. in May. "6 If dealers ordered more machines after that, they were 
113 Machine Records. Mss 3x, box 26. 
114 Butler to Mot & Co. 4.17.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461; Lankester to McCormick Co. 
9.9., 14.9., 10.25. and 11.14.1893. Mss 2x, box 227 
115 Machine Records, 1895. Mss 3x, box 26; Bröder Bendix to McCormick Co. 
9.29.1894. Mss 2x, box 242; Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.27.1894. Mss 2x, box 
235. 
In the case of Russia see for example Funch, Edye & Co. to McCormick Co. 3.16.1896. 
Mss 2x, box 276. For Sweden see Andersson & Mattson to McCormick Co. 
12.18.1896. Mss 2x, box 270. 
116 Collections of the McCormick Co. year ending May 1st 1892. Mss 2c, box 29. 
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not included in that year's sales. Besides, the Machine Records 
record only materialized actual sales; an agent might order a larger 
lot of machines than he was was able to sell. 
The McCormick correspondence fills in gaps and at the same time 
confirms the Company's official accounts for 1897, which are 
missing from the records. For Denmark, Bendix ordered 1000 
machines, Wallut & Co. for France 3250.11  According to these two 
examples, the trend in machine sales shows continued growth. In 
France the effects of the change of dealer can also be seen. 
According to the calculations produced by the McCormick 
Company, the total output of harvesting machines (binders, reapers 
and mowers) in the world in 1899 was 503 000 of which U.S. 
manufacturers furnished 443 000 machines; that left only 13.5 
percent for the rest of the world. The competition of English 
companies had diminished to only 13 000 machines, and the largest 
makers outside the U.S. came from Canada.1i8 This information has 
to be approached with some caution, at least concerning the world 
data. Estimates made in the McCormick Company with regard to the 
situation in the United States seem to follow the figures collected 
for the case against the International Harvester Company. "9 
In the United States McCormick was unquestionably the largest 
manufacturer of harvesting machines. Its total output was about 160 
000 machines, compared to Deering's 132 000. Consequently, 
McCormick's net profits in 1899 were $4 677 733, and Deering's 
$3 375 294. The value of McCormick's production plant (land, 
buildings and machinery) was estimated probably at the end of 1900 
at $4 087 266, and Deering's at $3 99 868. Behind the two giants 
came Champion, Plano, Milwaukee, Wood and Osborne with 37 000, 
32 500, 24 000, 20 000 and 17 500 machines respectively. The 
division of the American harvester industry into two categories had 
become more visible throughout the 1890s. This division was also 
transferred to the world markets, of which the McCormick Company 
controlled about 32 percent and the Deering Company about 26 
percent.120  
117 Bröder Bendix to McCormick Co. 1.18.1897. Mss 2x, box 294, Butler to 
Ackerman 6.28.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
118 Undated estimate of the harvesting machine output of the world found in the 
McCormick collection. Mss la, box 113. 
119 The Internationa Harvester Co. 1913, 64.65. The offical figures give 62,203 
binders as McCormick's production against 65,000 by the company estimates. 
120 Undated estimate of the harvesting machine output of the world found in the 
McCormick collection. Mss la, box 113; Comparative statement showing the value 
of the McCormick and Deering Companies. Mss Mil, box 1. 
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Table 18. Profits of foreign trade of the McCormick Company in 
its central trading areas in 1899 ($). 
Country Proceeds 
of machine 
sales 
Cost of manuf. Expense 
selling 
Profits on 
machines 
$ $ 	 % $ 	 % $ 
Russia 284 199 104 717 37 46 504 16 132 978 47 
Germany 213 232 95 493 45 14 402 7 103 337 48 
France 542 071 261 676 48 50 427 9 229 967 42 
England 168 372 90 383 54 15 126 9 62 863 37 
Denmark 78 747 35 927 46 5 196 7 37 623 47 
Total 1 754 288 796 297 45 159 128 9 799 030 46 
Source: Statement No.5. Profits on foreign machine business. Mss M/1, box 
18. 
Table 18 shows the main grain growth areas in Europe. Denmark is 
taken as an example of a small Scandinavian country. Although the 
figures displayed are only for one year, it is evident that foreign 
business was profitable for the McCormick Company and in all 
probability for other manufacturers too.121  Profits from the business 
seem to have been higher than in the domestic trade. In 1899 
domestic sales yielded 38 percent profit, compared with 46 percent 
from foreign business. On the other hand, profits from the home 
field were 42 and 41 percent in the two earlier years. However, 
foreign trade seems to have offered good possibilities at the turn of 
the century, if we can rely on the surviving data. 
Machines for the English markets seem to have been the most 
expensive ones and for Russia the cheapest to produce. The 
difference between these two extremes can be explained by the 
more sophisticated machinery sold in England. In Russia reapers and 
mowers were the machines most in demand, while in England 
Information concerning the situation in the U.S. is confirmed by the McCormick 
correspondence. Butler notified Lankester that the Osborne company "do not cut 
much figure in the Reaper and Binder world, in the States" and the Aultman & Miller 
company has even no organization in America. They, however, had started their 
factory but in a very feeble way. Of the Wood company Butler was not able to give 
any details. Butler to Lankester 1.14.1898. Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
121 Value of Deering Company's sales in 1902 in Europe was $1,261,789. Total 
expences were $139,497 or 11.05 percent on sales. If this figure is compared with 
McCormick's expences in Table 18, it looks like the McCormick Company was more 
efficient than its archrival. Selling in Foreign Market 1919, 147. 
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binders and reapers were the main articles.122 On the other hand, selling 
expenses were considerably higher in Russia than in other European 
countries. Distances in Russia were huge and demanded extensive 
travelling. Besides, farmers were, on average, uneducated and experts 
were needed to set up and advise on the use of the machinery. 
However, total profits from Russia were above the average profit rate, 
while England remained clearly below. One factor for the situation in 
England may have been the contract with Percy Lankester, who was 
a salaried European main agent for the McCormick Company, but still 
kept the British Isles on his own account. 
8.2.3. Conducting the European trade 
The daily functions and difficulties of an exporting company were 
very varied. To limit a study of an emerging multinational 
corporation to the level of the organizational development would 
belie the real size and range of its everyday operations. 
Although the McCormick Company, like its competitors, sent 
special agents and experts to assist the European trade, the fight in 
practise was lost or won by the agents. It was crucial to find reliable 
and active agents who were ready to push the machines on the 
market. On the other hand, they must follow instructions from the 
manufacturer, which in many cases caused problems. One of the 
most common complaints concerned prices. Competitors sold their 
machines well under McCormick's prices, and agents wanted to 
lower them. In this respect the McCormick Company was firm, as 
has been stated before: it was unwilling to fight with prices. 123 
The Deering and Wood companies were repeatedly accused of 
cutting prices; Lankester even maintained that their object was to 
undersell everybody else and force their machines out by price 
alone.124 
 The Plano and Milwaukee companies also resorted to the 
same policy, at least in Hungary.125 
 At least in one case the other 
122 The new foreign manager of the McCormick Company, William C. Mundt stated 
that "the machines for Russia embody, as you know, fewer special features than any 
other foreign lots..." Mundt to Couchman 4.10.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 465. 
123 See for example Butler to Lankester 2.3.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 460; Bröder Bendix 
to McCormick Co. 6.15.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; Lankester to McCormick Co. 
11.16.1896. Mss 2x, box 272; Still in 1898 Butler repeated his message to Lankester: 
"They (competitors) appear to think it is necessary to make the prices do business. 
We find it is necessary to keep the price where there is a little money in it for 
ourselves..." Butler to Lankester 1.14.1898. Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
124 Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.18.1897. Mss 2x, box 288. 
125 Stillman to McCormick Co. 3.16.1898. Mss 2x, box 314. 
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companies allied against the Wood Company, which had reduced 
its prices:126 the agents of the competing machines held meetings 
where they tried to agree over the prices, but were unable to come 
to any conclusion.127 One side of the question was the dumping of 
old machine stock in the foreign countries at extremely low prices. 
The McCormick Company accused the Wood Company, especially, 
of such activities.128 Verification of this statement is difficult and at 
least information from Norway 
Table 19. Unit prices of the mowing machines of Walter A. 
Wood Co. in Norway (kroner), 1873-1900. 
Year 	 1873 
	
1875 	 1885 
	
1898 	 1900 
1-horse 	 380 	 - 	 260 	 200 	 210 
2-horse 	 440 	 440 	 280 	 230 	 230 
Source: Tveite 1980, 26. 
does not give any direct answer to this question in the absence of 
comparative material. Machine prices of the Wood Co. certainly 
sank, but that could have been merely the result of a similar 
development as in the U.S., where prices fell rapidly during the 
1880s because of streamlining in the production systems and 
increased competition. Prices in general in this period were also 
falling. 
Table 20 shows the development of mower prices of various 
companies in Finland. Although this material reveals information only 
from one country, where McCormick,s began to sell its machine 
relatively late, it does not reveal any dramatic differentiation as to 
prices. These data have been gathered from agents' catalogs, 
however, prior to bargaining and therefore do not necessarily show 
final consumer prices. 
126 Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.22.1896. Mss 2x, box 283. The other makers had 
an informal meeting where the opinion was that Woods should be left to pursue 
their own tactics. Only Hornsby did not follow the decision. 
127 Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.13.1899. Mss 2x, box 344. 
128 Butler to Agar, Gross & Co. 2.8.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
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Table 20. Mower prices of different companies in Finland, 
1890-1902. (In Finnish marks) 
Manufacturer 1890 1891 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 
Turun Buckeye (2) 450 450' 360'  
(1)  375 350' 280' 
Turun Palmcranz (2)  440 440' 270' 
(1)  350 350' 
Vesteråsin Buckeye (2)  450 .. 
(1)  375 
Buckeye (2)  .. 450 360' 350' 350' 
(1)  .. 375' 300' .. .. 280 
Osborne (2)  .. 340 340 345 340 
(1)  .. 270 265 275 270 
Deering (2)  .. 350 345 345 340' 300 
(1)  .. 280 275 275 270' 275' 
Karkkila Osborne (2)  .. 340 
(1)  .. .. 265 .. .. 
Wood (2)  .. 400 .. 360' .. 345' 
(1) .. .. 300' .. 275' .. 290' 
Thor (Swedish) (1)  .. 280' 280' .. 
McCormick (2)  .. 340 360` .. .. 340 
(1)  .. 270e  275 .. 270 
Adriance,Platt (2)  .. 360 
(1) •. 275 
Stoddard (2) 325' .. 300' 
Aultman (2) .. 340 
(1)  .. .. .. .. 270 
Herkules(Swedish) (2)  .. 340 
(1)  .. 270 265 
Toveri(amer.) (2)  .. .. 340 
(1)  .. .. .. 270 
Plano (2)  .. .. 345' 
(1) .. 275' 
Mowers are either one-horse (1) or two-horse (2) machines. One-horse mo-
wers are with a 3.5 foot cutter bar and two-horse machines with a 4.5 foot 
cutter bar. The following symbols refer to various Finnish machine dealers: 
a=Victor Forselius, b=Carl Jacobsen & Co., c=Johannes Preetzmann, d=Suo-
malainen Maanviljelyskauppa-Osakeyhtiö, e=Emil Björkell, f=Laurell & Aker-
berg, g=Oy Agros, and unmarked = P. Sidorow. 
Source: Sidorow 1890, 1895, 1896, 1897; Forselius 1891, 1894, 1896, 1897; 
Jacobsen 1895, 1897; Preetzmann 1896, 1898; Suomalainen Maanviljelys-
kauppa-Osakeyhtiö 1899; Björkell 1896; Laurell & Åkerberg 1900; Oy Agros 
1901. 
The question of prices was complex. A jobber negotiated wholesale 
prices for himself as low as possible, and the factory for its part 
lowered them to allow the jobber to lower his prices to his own 
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agents or to farmers. In Germany and in Denmark this policy did 
not work out, and angry customers sent their complaints even 
directly to the Chicago headquarters.129 In Denmark, Bröder Bendix 
allowed their agents so small a commission that it did not pay to 
promote the trade; moreover, their mower prices were 15 to 25 Kr. 
higher than their competitors'.130 High prices were one of the factors 
that forced McCormick to consider its own branch house in Hungary 
and to send there its salaried representative.'31  
In their relations with the foreign jobbing houses, factories had 
to be very tactful.132 The McCormick Company normally made only 
one-year contracts,133 since agents were independent jobbing houses 
which represented many lines of machines, and in the case of Mot 
& Co. in France for some time even other harvester companies. 
Signing a contract and keeping good relations was more problematic 
with some agents than with others.134 According to McCormick's 
business ideology, if an agent was not satisfied, it was better to let 
129 Max Paulsen in Germany was claimed to hold his prices too high. Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 12.23.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; this claim was repeated many time 
during the following years. High prices placed the subagents at a disadvantage towards 
Deering Co. Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.16.1896. Mss 2x, box 283; D. Wachtel 
to Lankester 4.29.1897. Mss 2x, box 288; Also K. Martin from Offenburg in Baden 
complained of the high prices of Paulsen which made his business diffult, while the 
same machines were sold considerably cheaper both in France and in Switzerland. 
K. Martin to McCormick Co. 12.11.1897. Mss 2x, box 294. In his later letter Martin 
asked if it would be possible to buy the machines through Lankester if Paulsen would 
not lower his prices. K. Martin to McCormick Co. 1.14.1898. Mss 2x, box 314. 
130 Ackerman to McCormick Co. 6.13.1896. Mss 2x, box 282; On the other hand, 
Bröder Bendix stated that Deering and Osborne are doing all they can to gain territory 
from them and sell their machines $10.15 lower than they were able to do. Bröder 
Bendix to McCormick Co. 1.18.1897. Mss 2x, box 294. In these two testimonies the 
dilemma between the views of an agent and the manufacturer becomes clear. Both 
wanted to gain business but in some cases in a different way. Ackerman wanted to 
increase McCormick's sales to Denmark because it was his task to do so. Bendix, on 
the other hand, wanted to have the biggest possible coverage for his business. 
131 Butler to Ackerman 11.2.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
132 Relations between the McCormick Co. and its agents are reviewed from the side 
of the company to see how a giant corporation managed its business relations. This 
approach certainly does not give a neutral view but reveals new information. 
133 The McCormick Company's ideology saved it from many problems. For example, 
in Norway when the agent retired and negotiations with his successor were becoming 
complex, the one year contract left the company's hands open to make a deal with 
a totally new partner. Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.25.1893. Mss 2x, box 227. 
134 The Danish Bröder Bendix reserved a considerable amount of McCormick's time 
with its continuing complaints over prices, freights, repairs or some points in the 
machines. See for example Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.27.1894. Mss 2x, box 
235; Lankester to McCormick Co. 5.15.1896. Mss 2x, box 283; Ackerman to 
McCormick Co. 5.24.1896. Mss 2x, box 282; Bendix also began to sell Aultman's 
Buckeyes in Sweden when McCormick denyed to add also Sweden to their territory. 
Lankester to McCormick Co. 4.14.1896. Mss 2x, box 272; Lankester to McCormick 
Co. 5.6.1897. Mss 2x, box 288. 
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him go: a dissatisfied agent merely makes every one else dissatis-
fied.13s 
To make an agent loyal and active, he should have so many machines 
for sale that he would not think about competing brands; on the other 
hand, the manufacturer should make sure that he would not need to 
carry over machines to the next year.t36 Under the pressure of 
competition, however, it was sometimes better to carry over some 
machines than let competitors conquer new areas: "our business is a 
chance business. We have got to keep you supplied with machines to 
take care of a good crop, to prevent any getting away from us; if there 
comes a poor crop we must carry them over",137 
Closely connected to this question was the problem of distri-
bution. The McCormick Company did not have its own warehouse 
in Europe. This caused its agents many problems, as has already 
been seen; it was a disadvantage in competition, since some other 
manufacturers, like Deering and Johnston, had established depots in 
their European general agencies.i38  
If a jobber did not fulfil his terms or was not efficient enough, he 
would soon be reminded and could even be dismissed.139 The 
McCormick Company kept a close eye on its foreign affairs. Its 
General Manager made yearly visits in Europe. Its European manager 
monitored and managed daily activities, and could also test agents' 
information;140  but behind his back worked the travelling foreign 
135 Butler to Lankester 9.29.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
136 Butler to Lankester 5.3. and 7.17.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
137 Butler to Tracy 2.8.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463; Also Edward Ackerman underlined 
the necessity to have a large stock of machines. This way the shortage of machines 
would not open doors to competitors; Lankester to McCormick Co. 7.20.1898. Mss 
2x, box 306. 
138 Bröder Bendix to McCormick Co. 6.15.1895. Mss 2x, box 263; In 1898 the 
McCormick Co. sent 850 machines and one lot of repairs to Hamburg in the care of 
Max Paulsen to be left in the Government warehouse until wanted by the European 
agents. Each of the dealers took care of himself by his contract with the company. 
The only matter Paulsen had to take care of was to handle advance freight and 
handling and storage charges. Butler to Paulsen 4.28.1898. Mss lx, LPCB 464; Butler 
informed the agents of these extra machines which were to be used when an agent 
had sold out all of his own stock. Butler to Bendix 4.28.1898. Mss lx, LPCB 464. 
139 Mot & Co. in France had caused the McCormick Co. over the years a considerable 
amount of harm and extra work. Butler to Lankester 10.24.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461; 
Ackerman to McCormick Co. 7.6.1896. Mss 2x, box 282. After the continued 
complaints and difficulties with Bröder Bendix in Denmark Ackerman began to keep 
an eye on other parties too; Butler to Agar, Cross & Co. 5.11.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 
463. 
140 Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.22.1896. Mss 2x, box 283. Wallut & Co. from 
France had instructed Lankester that a number of machines would remain unsold. 
Lankester asked Wallut to spare him some of them but hurriedly got a negative 
answer. 
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agent, Edward Ackerman, who reported on his investigations directly 
to the Chicago headquarters.14t The salaried agents, such as George 
Freudenreich, were also under close supervision: if they no longer 
provided good service, they were dismissed. "Nothing personal can be 
allowed to enter into McCormick's affairs either on that side of the 
water or on this.."142  Step by step the Chicago management also began 
to incorporate foreign trade as an organic part of the Company. For 
this purpose officials sent to Lankester the same forms as the general 
agents used in America, and sales accounts were put in line too.143  
The terms of the contracts were different for each agent. Those 
who were able to sell more also received larger discounts. Percy 
Lankester was especially privileged among the agents.'44 
Another sensitive question for the manufacturer related to quarrels 
over sales territories. Every now and then an agent could not resist 
the temptation to sell machines in another's area;145 sometimes, as 
in Germany, even the main agent might ignore the border.146  
Manufacturers also had to be very careful in situations where two 
dealers were fighting over representation, as was the case in Finland.'4' 
141 See for example Ackerman to McCormick Co. 11.28.1897. Mss 2x, box 287. 
142 Butler to Freudenreich 3.13.1895. Mss lx, LPCB 462. 
143 McCormick Co. to Lankester 9.30.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
144 Butler to Lankester 11.2.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. Lankester payed in 1892 for 
a binder $95 and for a mower $30. For the normal repairs he got a 40% discount. 
Goods were to be payed one-half in three months and the other half in six months. 
Max Paulsen had to pay for the same machines in 1893 $105 and $35 respectively. 
Lankester to McCormick Co. 9.9.1893. Mss 2x, box 227; To Bröder Bendix, the price 
was already considerably higher, $115 and $36. Besides it must be kept in mind that 
at that time Paulsen was still a salaried agent of the McCormick Co. Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 9.14.1893. Mss 2x, box 227; In Norway prices were still higher, $125 
and $38. Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.25.1893. Mss 2x, box 227. 
145 Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.23.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. Dufour of Metz 
reported that Mot & Co. had sold 15 machines into his territory and demanded a 50 
Fcs indemnity per machine; 
146 D. Wachtel to Lankester 4.29.1897. Mss 2x, box 288. D. Wachtel claimed that 
Max Paulsen had nominated two new agents on his territory in Silesia; Franz Richter in 
Döbeln and Krätzig & Söhne in Jauer. He also stated that most of the agents with whom 
Paulsen had made contracts were only second class men; Lankester, however, did not 
take too seriously Wachtel's protest. To him Paulsen was a larger and more prominent 
agent and that was more important. Lankester to McCormick Co. 8.4.1897. Mss 2x, box 
288. 
147 Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.1. and 11.30.1897. Mss 2x, box 288; Ackerman 
to McCormick Co. 10.4., 10.13. and 10.16.1897. Mss 2x, box 287. Preetzman from 
Turku and Francke & Hackman from Viipuri had represented McCormick's in Finland 
but because of the continual quarrels the McCormick Co. decided to give the agency 
to Carl Jacobsen & Co. from Helsinki for 1898. See for more details Heikkonen 1989, 
272-275; Preetzman had also violated Francke & Hackman's territory which aroused 
Lankester's disapproval. Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.8.1897. Mss 2x, box 288. 
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The crucial point for successful business was the machine itself. 
It had to satisfy both the customer and the agent. There were of 
course many ways to affect sales and to make one's own product 
more alluring. In America shows and tests were losing their 
significance, but in Europe they maintained their role.148 
 The nature 
of the trials did not change; their results were widely publicized; 
judges in the tests were bribed and results decided beforehand149 
The true significance of the trials becomes clear in Norway, where 
the local Wood agent threatened the McCormick dealer with a 
lawsuit for wrongly advertising the results of a machine test at Utah 
Agricultural Station in the United States! 150 
 An equally illustrative 
example is the way Cyrus Jr. informed his mother of success in 
trials.151 Manufacturers did not send their ordinary implements to 
trials, but special machines built for the show. McCormick's even 
went so far that it sent to one test their normal mower which was, 
however, constructed with special bearings and other mechanisms 
to minimize the friction.'52  
To boost their sales all the companies published posters, 
showcards, catalogs and newspaper advertisements. It was of great 
importance that catalogs were translated into various foreign 
languages.153 Foreign-language material was used also in the U.S.A., 
148 In 1900 manufacturers agreed not to exhibit their machines at fairs of any kind 
in the United States and not to furnish their agents with machines to be exhibited 
or printed matter to be circulated at such fairs. The agreement was signed by Warder, 
Bushnell & Glessner Co., McCormick Co., the Plano Co., the Milwaukee Co., the 
Aultman, Miller & Co., the Walter A. Wood Co., the Adriance, Platt & Co., Deering 
Co., the Osborne Co. and the Johnston Co. January 1900. Mss MI!, box 6. 
149 Results of the trials in Europe were regarded as so important that Cyrus Jr. himself 
wrote about them to agents. Cyrus Jr. to Lankester 9.30.1891 and to Koefoed & 
Haugberg's Maskinudsalg 10.10.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. 
Ackerman to McCormick Co. 7.6.1896. Mss 2x, box 282. This example comes from 
Norway where the first prize was intended for the Massey Harris Co. but their machine 
could not finish its part of the field and consequently lost the competition; 
Maskincompagntet to Edward Ackerman 9.2.1897. Mss 2x, box 294. Ackerman to 
McCormick Co. 9.14.1897. Mss 2x, box 287. In the machine trial in Norway also in 
1897 the McCormick Co. was victorious. The second prize went to Osborn, the third 
to Massey, and Adriance, Deering and Plano came next in consecutive order. 
150 Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.25.1892. Mss 2x, box 220; The suit was decided 
in favor of the McCormick's agent. Butler to Lankester 1.29.1894. Mss lx, LPCB 462. 
151 See for example Cyrus Jr. to Nettie McCormick 7.9.1895. Mss lb, box 31. In 
this case the question was of a trial in Budapest where McCormick won the first 
prize, Wood the second and Deering the third. 
152 See for example Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.27.1894. Mss 2x, box 235 and 
4.1.1898. Mss 2x, box 306; There were many classes of fair finishing like State Fair 
finished and County Fair finished machines. Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.18.1897. 
Mss 2x, box 288. 
153 Bröder Bendix to McCormick Co. 4,17.1896. Mss 2x, box 270; With catalogs 
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especially in the Mid-Western states, where there was demand for 
Norwegian, Swedish and German printed material.154  The 
McCormick Company also used direct personal letters to farmers in 
their advertising. The 'personal' quality of the letters was 
questionable, for they were printed in different colors and typefaces 
to prevent farmers from the same locality from recognizing the 
system. Even the agent's name was ready signed below.155 Extensive 
advertising was also a means to hide one's own problems.156 In 
normal cases manufacturers furnished their agents with catalogs, but 
Wallut & Co. and Bröder Bendix, at least, printed their own 
pamphlets for which the McCormick Company provided only the 
covers.i57 The English copies of the catalogs were first sent to 
European dealers for translation, and then printed in the United 
States.1" 
The message in the catalogs was obvious. Superb American 
machinery was conquering the world like the "Ship of Progress" on 
McCormick's catalog cover in 1897, steaming with the flags of the 
United States and the McCormick Company at the mast and the latest 
model of a binder as the figurehead. Likewise, on the cover of 
Deering's pamphlet, its harvesting machines were running "Around 
the World on a Harvester" and on the back cover a family is looking 
at heaven where Deering's machines are running in clouds 
resembling a group of angels.159 
Especially during the 1890s the American hegemony and 
missionary approach towards the foreign countries become visible. 
American machines were presented in exotic environments. The 
Deering "Pony" reaper was depicted in Finland drawn by reindeer, 
there seems to have been variation as to the place of printing. In many cases the 
McCormick Co. took care of the whole process but in some cases it sent only catalog 
covers to the agents. Butler to Wallut & Co. 11.30.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463; D. 
Wachtel to Lankester 4.29.1897. Mss 2x, box 288. 
154 W.S. Krebs to McCormick Co. 2.2. and 2.5.1898. Mss 2x, box 313. Krebs was 
the general agent in Minnesota. 
155 McCormick Co. to Paulsen 3.30.1898. Mss lx, LPCB 463; Mundt to Carl Jacobsen 
& Co. 1.20.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 464. 
156 Lankester to McCormick Co. 2.25.1896. Mss 2x, box 272. Lankester connected 
Wood's broad advertising campaign with its difficulties in the U.S. which the company 
wanted to keep out of the publicity. 
157 McCormick Company to W.V. Couchman 2.16.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 464. 
158 Couchman to McCormick Co. 9.19.1900. Mss la, box 115. 
159 McCormick Company. Catalog 1897. Mss 5x, box 3; Deering Company. Catalog 
1895. Mss 4z, box 3. 
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in Argentina binders were attached to oxen and in Asia Minor to 
camels. The primitive Finnish brush harrow and a skeletal horse 
were contrasted against the achievements of modern technology. 
The same tendency can also be found in the travel books of 
American industrialists. Frank A. VANDERLIP, in his experiences 
from his journey around the world originally published in 1902, 
describes in the same manner superior American locomotives in 
Europe or steamdiggers in Siberia. In Europe, Vanderlip saw endless 
possibilities for American commercial and technical genius.160 
Another appealing technique was to use in catalogs the testimonies 
of well-known farmers or pictures of famous persons. In its 1898 
catalog, Deering showed Prince Otto von Bismarck examining his 
fields and a Deering binder. Lord Salisbury, Premier and Foreign 
Secretary of England, was presented in the same manner.161 
In most cases, in order to suit foreign fields machines had to be 
adjusted or totally new kinds of machines built. When Massey-Harris 
introduced an open-end binder for the European trade, all the other 
manufacturers had to follow suit. Something similar happened when 
Deering began to sell its machines furnished with roller bearings162 
and McCormick introduced its right-hand cut machine.163  
Competitors' machines were kept all the time under a close eye, 
160 Deering Company. Catalog 1895. Mss 4z, box 3; Saving the World from 
Starvation. The Miracle of Modern Farm Machinery. Pioneered by Cyrus McCormick 
and Perfected Now by the Worldwide "Harvester" Organization. International 
Harvester Company of America. s.a. Pam Ca-392. State Historical Society of Wisconsin 
Library collections. 
In 1899 the McCormick Company ordered its agent in Russia to arrange photographs 
of its machines with "men of note" and of interesting harvesting scenes. Besides, 
Tracy should secure photos of primitive native methods of harvesting. The importance 
of the question emerges from the following comment:"We want to secure these 
photographs this year without fail, even though it may be necessary to make repeated 
attempts, and at a considerable expense." McCormick Co. to Tracy 4.12.1899. Mss 
lx, LPCB 465; Vanderlip 1976, 18-19, 31, 37-38, 91. Keijo Virtanen has in his study 
found similar attitudes; a positive approach towards western and northern Europe 
but air of patronage towards eastern and southern Europe. Virtanen 1988, 341, 345, 
348, 357. 
161 Deering Company. Catalog 1898. Mss 4z, box 3. 
162 Also the Massey-Harris Co. was in the game with its binder with roller bearings. 
Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.16.1896. Mss 2x, box 283; Bröder Bendix to 
McCormick Co. 9.1.1897. Mss 2x, box 302; Maskincompagniet to McCormick Co. 
4.8.1898. Mss 2x, box 314. 
163 Lankester to McCormick Co. 2.25.1896. Mss 2x, box 272. In the right hand 
machine the cutter bar was on the right side of the machine. In harvesters it had 
been traditionally on the left side but in mowers on the right side. McCormick's 
machine met with strong resistance from its competitors but also some of its dealers 
did not like it; Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.10.1896. Mss 2x, box 283. The 
Massey-Harris Co. offered also both left and right hand machines. 
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even tried out in practise, and practicable parts could be copied. 6`4 
This was, however, a delicate matter. The Massey-Brantford open-end 
binder infringed McCormick's knotter patent; the Company let 
Massey carry the machines over to England, and brought a case there 
to prevent their sale, having first caused Massey considerable work 
and expense.165 McCormick faced a similar action from Adriance & 
Co.'s  
McCormick was not, however, afraid of copying in Europe by the 
small factories. As has been stated before, it took patents in only a 
few countries, and did not spend too much energy on the rest.167 
There were, nevertheless, a considerable number of small machine 
shops that either imitated the original machines or used the brand 
names.
168 
The encounter with Adriance reveals the difficulties raised by the 
introduction of a totally new kind of machine. A small company had 
great difficulties to convince customers of the benefits of the 
machine, under pressure from the other makers,169  
In addition to these major changes, agents sent in a yearly list of 
new requirements for their machines.10 Sometimes this information 
164 Butler to Lankester 7.8.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Wood's single apron binder 
was considered as a failure but Adriance's machine was found interesting; Butler to 
Lankester 11.14.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461; Butler to Lankester 1.29.1894. Mss lx, 
LPCB 462; Deering's binder was doomed in the same class as the Wood's 
machine:"neither grand success nor an entire failure...sufficient to keep them pegging 
along and determined to make it go whether it will or not..." Butler to Lankester 
3.11.1895. Mss lx, LPCB 462. 
165 Butler to Lankester & Co. 2.24.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. Butler regarded this 
action as "a pretty good joke". 
166 Butler to Freudenreich 12.12.1892 and 4.3.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461 
167 Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.23.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. Lankester warned 
the McCormick Co. not to make an agency contract with the Erste Maschinenfabrik 
in Budabest who was known to begin to manufacture reapers and mowers by itself. 
168 Lankester to McCormick Co. 2.14.1896. Mss 2x, box 272. In Switzerland one 
manufacturer advertised his mower as the "Cormick" mower. This action had alarmed 
McCormick's Swiss agent; Umrath & Co. of Prague was also thought to imitate 
imported machines. D. Wachtel to McCormick Co. 4.29.1897. Mss 2x, box 288; In 
Germany and in Austria-Hungary Lankester had to register the trade mark "Daisy" to 
prevent its use and still more important prevent other makers registering it and using 
it against the McCormick Co. Lankester to McCormick Co. 10.27.1894. Mss 2x, box 
235. 
169 Butler to Lankester 10.24.1893. Mss lx, LPCB 461. "Adriance & Platt will make 
slower progress in fighting the battles alone on this Bindlo type of machine than they 
would if we were priviledged to go in there and help them along." 
170 R. Wallut & Cie. to McCormick Co. 10.2.1896. Mss 2x, box 270; Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 11.16.1896. Mss 2x, box 272; Bröder Bendix to McCormick Co. 
9.24.1897. Mss 2x, box 294. 
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could be alarming. McCormick's Norwegian agent criticized the 
Company because its mowers were too heavy, and frustrated farmers 
from Russia sent instead of a testimonial a long letter of 
complaints."' To assist in fixing and setting up the implements, all 
the companies sent an increasing number of experts to Europe."' 
It was equally important to furnish agents with a sufficient stock of 
spare parts; McCormick's simply refused to send its machines 
without an accompanying repair set.13  
The McCormick Company was as strict in its credit policy as over 
prices. It favored cash sales and especially warned George Tracy in 
Russia against long-term credit. Everything should be due and 
payable not later than October and November.14 Agents complained 
about McCormick's inflexibility, and asked for longer payments15  
An example of the difficulties which harvester companies encountered abroad was 
the draft animals. In many places in Europe, like in France, oxen were still used and 
the McCormick Company had to modify its machines to suit oxens slow movements. 
Mundt to Wallut & Co. 4.25.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 465. 
171 Amerikanske Maskincompagni to McCormick Co. 2.6.1896. Mss 2x, box 270; 
Benjamin Rednopp, Abraham Fehr, Bernhard Martens, Franz Rednopp, Julius 
Kasper, Peter Fahr and Jakob Friesen to the McCormic Co. 4.11.1900. Mss la, box 
115. Russian farmers complained that due to various and continuous breakages they 
had after six years finally put their McCormick binders aside and gone to work in 
the old way. 
Complaints came also from other places in Russia. A,Birnbaum to McCormick Co. 
7.29.1900 and Itschkoff to McCormick Co. 4.14.1900. Mss la, box 120. 
172 Butler to Lankester 3.3.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460; Lankester to McCormick Co. 
7.9.1896. Mss 2x, box 283; Lankester to McCormick Co. 8.4.1897. Mss 2x, box 288; 
J.A. Palmer to the Aultman, Miller & Co. 9.16.1897. Mss 2x, box 297. 
To fmd good experts was a big problem. They were expensive to send and results 
seem to be meager, while to fmd a man who could speak European languages other 
than English and at the same time would be able to handle both the sales and repairs 
of the machines was not easy. Butler to Freudenreich 12.12.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461. 
173 Butler to McCormick Co. 3.23.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463; Also Johannes Preetzman 
from Turku in Finland tried to buy machines without repairs which were, however, 
sent to Hamburg to wait for his order, with all the extra charges incurred on same 
added. Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.1.1897. Mss 2x, box 288. 
174 Butler to Tracy 1.31.1895. Mss lx, LPCB 462. 
175 Bröder Bendix to McCormick Co. 6.15.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. Bendix stated 
that Deering and Osborne allowed even from two to three years' credits to farmers. 
Terms were not the same for all agents; for example, Andersson & Mattson of Sweden 
made their payments on September 1st, November 1st and January 1st, and received 
a a 35 percent reduction on spare parts. The Finnish agent, Carl Jacobsen & Co., had 
to pay for his goods 1/4 at sight, 1/4 on July 1st, 1/4 on August 1st and 1/4 on 
September 1st, and was granted only 33 1/3 percent off repairs. Bigger houses like 
Wallut & Co. in France were allowed a 50 percent discount on repairs, and paid for 
their machines 1/4 on September 1st, 1/4 on October 1st, 1/4 on November 1st and 
1/4 on December 1st. If an extension in payments was needed, the McCormick 
Company charged interest for that period. Lankester to McCormick Co. 4.14.1896. 
Mss 2x, box 272; Couchman to Stanley McCormick 5.16.1900. Mss 2c, box 84. 
Lankester to McCormick Co. 5.15.1896. Mss 2x, box 283. 
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but for the Company it was only continuation of its domestic policy 
also to overseas businesses. Although it had extended its credits to 
farmers, McCormick's actively tried to minimize credit sales and 
preferred cash sales. 
One of the almost daily activities which caused constant problems 
to McCormick was the shipments. Even in the early 1890s, foreign 
agents themselves or Percy Lankester still usually took care of their 
own freights through shipping agents.176  The basic rule of the 
McCormick Co. for freights followed the same lines as in credits: 
"...we do not deliver our machines in foreign countries. We deliver 
them in New York, and when so delivered they are the property of 
the consignee, and must be insured at his risk, not ours."177 
The shipping business deserves its own investigation, and 
consequently in this study it is discussed only insofar as it directly 
concerned McCormick's. One such instance concerns disputes over 
freight rates.178 Shipping costs were a crucial factor in competition 
between dealers. If one could obtain his machines cheaper than the 
other he could either reduce his prices that much or put the 
difference in his own pocket.179 On the other hand, if the machines 
were late, a dealer could lose his customers and consequently he 
might cancel his order to the manufacturer due to the delays.'8° 
176 McCormick Co. to Lankester & Co. 1.13.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. One of the 
shipbrokers normally used was Henry W. Peabody & Co. in New York; Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 3.5.1894. Mss 2x, box 243. 
177 Butler to Freudenreich 6.22.1891. Mss lx, LPCB 460. Nevertheless, the Company 
had to forward the goods to the ports and see that they reached the agents. Normally 
the machines were sent through New York, but also Boston and Newport News were 
used. Step by step McCormick's began to deal directly with shipping agents to get 
better contracts and cheaper rates. McCormick Co. to Lankester 2.16.1893. Mss lx, 
LPCB 461. Henry W. Peabody & Co. to McCormick Co. 1.20.1894. Mss 2x, box 240; 
Butler to Lankester 11.7.1894. Mss lx, LPCB 462; Butler to Wallut & Co. 3.9.1897. 
Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
178 If a shipping company noticed that it was necessary to send the goods via a 
particular route, they were very stiff in their rates, e.g. when the McCormick Company 
tried to send cargo by direct steamer to Copenhagen. Competition between harvester 
manufacturers over freights raised the prices in some years to a high level. Rates 
were naturally also higher to more remote harbors. To Copenhagen and Christiania 
(Oslo) charges were the same but to Malmö in Sweden already more. To Copenhagen 
and Christiania rates were 15/- for 40 cubic feet and to Malmö 6/- or 7/. more. Likewise 
to Odessa in Russia rates were 16/- and to Taganrog 18/6. Henry W. Peabody to 
McCormick Co. 1.27.1894. Mss 2x, box 240. The alternative route was to send the 
goods via Hull to Copenhagen. That would have taken only a few days longer. Henry 
Peabody to McCormick Co. 2.16.1894. Mss 2x, box 240. Henry Peabody & Co. to 
McCormick Co. 12.5.1894. Mss 2x, box 235. 
179 Lankester to McCormick Co. 1.22.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. 
180 Carl Jacobsen & Co. to McCormick Co. 5.18.1899. Mss 2x, box 336. The late 
shipments had caused Jacobsen & Co. considerable loss and it refused to take the 
ordered machines because they would arrive after the selling season. 
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One of the practical problems was the timing of shipments. Often 
the goods needed to arrive in harbor at a specified moment, because 
of transhipments or navigation problems, e.g. in the northern 
ports.i81 If the machines reached the port warehouse too soon, 
charges were incurred.1S2 Mostly, the shipments were too late. 
Railroad companies in America might have failed in their 
responsibilities, or a dispute with a shipping agent could delay the 
machines. If the competitors delivered their machines earlier, it was 
a great advantage, as was the case in France.183 Wallut & Co. finally 
tired of the endless delays in freights and recommended that 
McCormick's should send its own agent to New York to take care 
of its foreign shipments.'84 
Insurance of the cargo was normally undertaken by the 
manufacturer in the name of the receiver. Sometimes agents wanted 
to insure their machines themselves. Normally insurance was taken 
"to cover all goods shipped by them or for their account". The goods 
Bröder Bendix did not entirely decline to take the machines coming too late for the 
season but expressed its dislike in a very sharp way. Bendix to McCormick Co. 2x, 
box 336. McCormick's tried to reduce expenses by fmding shorter and cheaper 
routes: in Germany some of the machines were shipped to Hamburg, but those which 
were intended for the South of Germany went to Rotterdam and thence up the Rhine. 
Similarly, shipments to Finland were forwarded through Hamburg instead of Hull. 
Lankester to McCormick Co. 1.22.1895. Mss 2x, box 263. Lankester to McCormick 
Co. 12.16.1896. Mss 2x, box 283. Jos. Spiero of Hamburg offered a rate of 23/- from 
New York via Hamburg to Turku. 
181 Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.23.1896. Mss 2x, box 283. For example the 
Finnish navigation opened in 1896 not until the middle of April. 
182 Lankester to McCormick Co. 12.31.1896. Mss 2x, box 283; Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 3.23.1898. Mss 2x, box 306. 
183 Lankester to McCormick Co.7.9.1896. Mss 2x, box 283; Butler to Wallut & Co. 
3.9.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463; Wallut & Co. McCormick Co. 2.25.1898. Mss 2x, box 
304; The same complaint came from Max Paulsen in Germany. Paulsen to McCormick 
Co. 2.25.1898. Mss 2x, box 313. 
184 Wallut to McCormick Co. 4.22.1898. Mss 2x, box 304; The McCormick 
Company's shipping department was incable of handling all the foreign orders and 
in 1898 the company was forced to ask the agents to make their orders earlier. Local 
agents should be ready to take the machines as early as in December and January. 
McCormick Co. to Lankester 10.21.1898 and to Paulsen 10.25.1898. Mss lx, LPCB 
464. 
It remains unclear, when exactly the company's own shipping agent was sent to New 
York. Eugen Manning explains in his seminar work that C.F. Gregory, who was the 
agent, was sent during the winter of 1895-1896 for the first time and after the third 
year was located there permanently. Manning has got his information from William 
C. Mundt's reminiscences for Cyrus III's "the Century of the Reaper". Manning 1961, 
12; Wallut & Co., however, still in 1898 asked the McCormick Co. to send its 
representative to New York and the question was raised again during the next year 
by the new European manager, William Couchman. Couchman to McCormick Co. 
5.2.1899. Mss 2x, box 343. 
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were valued at invoice and 10 % added until declared.1S5 The broken 
packings also caused the agents trouble, when machines arrived in 
their hands in bad shape, often with many parts missing. It was bad 
advertising for the Company, which was responsible for breakages.'86 
Increasing complaints forced the McCormick Company in 1899 to 
organize a special department for packing foreign machines.187 
One of the normal points in the foreign trade were tariffs and 
customs regulations. Customs authorities could cause unpleasant 
surprises. McCormick's machines were held up by the English 
customs officers because according to the English directives every 
English name had to be followed by the place of origin, and on the 
binder frame arm the word "McCormick" was not identified as from 
Chicago, while in the mowers it was cast on the frame.'88 
These examples describe minor troubles caused by individual 
officers which, nevertheless, demanded energy and time. The 
obstacles put up by governments were in a totally different class. 
Earlier in this study, we have already seen how countries tried to 
protect their production with tariffs. In Sweden, duties were on an 
ad valorem basis: on all harvesting machines, at 10 percent of the 
net invoice value. In Denmark they were levied on weight and were 
$4.50 on mowers, $6.00 on reapers and $8.50 on binders.189 
In Russia, in the 1880s, the government passed quite severe tariffs 
to protect domestic agricultural implement manufactures. These 
ordinances did not lead to the desired outcomes and in 1897 the 
convention of Russian landowners recommended that certain types 
of agricultural implements should be placed on the list of duty-free 
articles. This recommendation was put into effect, including 
harvesting machines, from September 1st, 1898 to December 31st, 
1903.190  In practise, the interpretation of the rules by the Russian 
Custom House depended largely "upon the whims of the officials".191 
185 Funch, Edye & Co. to McCormick Co. 3.5.1896. Mss 2x, box 276. 
186 W. Staadecker to McCormick Co. 6.23.1898. Mss 2x, box 321; Lankester to 
McCormick Co. 7.20.1898. Mss 2x, box 306; G.I. Zappoff to McCormick Co. 5.2.1900 
and Agababoff and Tochoff to McCormick Co. 7.12.1900. Mss la, box 120. 
187 McCormick Company to W.V. Couchman 4.10.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 465. 
188 Lankester to McCormick Co. 6.30.1894. Mss 2x, box 235. Although this rule 
sounds quite curious, it restricted import of the machines until the name of 
McCormick was obliterated from the binder arm of every machine. 
189 Couchman to McCormick Co. "in reference to our business in Sweden" 6.17.1899 
and "in reference to our business in Denmark 6.17.1899. Mss 2x, box 343. 
190. Consular reports. Commerce, manufactures, etc. No. 205. 1897. p. 271-273; 
Queen 1941, 155. 
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President McKinley was an advocate of freer trade with foreign 
countries. In 1899 he submitted reciprocity treaties with seven 
European countries to the Senate for ratification. The treaty with 
France provoked serious discussion and the ratification was 
postponed because of opposition in the Foreign Relations 
Committee. Because of the opposition, the tariff question was 
dropped during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, 
who was elected after the assassination of McKinley, and not taken 
up again until Franklin Roosevelt's administration.192 
191 McCormick Company to W.V. Coachman 4.10.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 465. 
192 Schonberger 1964, 193-209. The French tariff was crusial also to the McCormick 
Company while the duty for the agricultural machinery was roughly $30 per long 
ton (1016 kilograms) on 15 francs per kilogram. The negotiated reciprocity treaty 
would have lowered the rate to 9 francs per kilogram. The difference in one binder 
which weighed about 1500 pounds would have been $9. This difference was in the 
favor of the European manufacturers who enjoyed the lower rate. Therefore it was 
natural that also the McCormick Company sent its most able lawyers to assist the 
fulfilling of the reciprocity treaties. Even Cyrus McCormick Jr. himself with other 
manufacturers personally visited the Senate. Ibid, 194-195, 205-206. 
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• Emergence of a 
Multinational 
9.1. The Company in transition 
9.1.1. Establishment of branch houses in Europe 
The wave of change began to sweep with all its strength at the turn 
of the century over the McCormick Company's foreign organization. 
The European general agent, Percy Lankester, was the first to 
encounter it. His appointment was discontinued and he continued 
as a normal jobber. The McCormick Company's new touch in the 
foreign trade was also felt in Hungary, where it sent its own 
representative. The biggest changes, however, were still to come. 
In December 1898, Cyrus Jr. informed Lankester that the Company 
was going to open its own office in Hamburg. He also asked for 
Lankester's support for the new European manager, William V. 
Couchman. Nominally Couchman's duties began on January 3rd, 
1899, but he did not leave America until the beginning of February. 
All the European agents were informed of the change, and requested 
to communicate directly with him instead of the home office.' 
Couchman's position was from the very beginning totally different 
from Lankester's. He was not only responsible for the whole of 
Europe, including Russia, but he was also provided with the 
necessary powers.2 Couchman was sent to Europe to make a profit 
and he must have felt the pressure on his shoulders. When he came 
to Hamburg he found a letter waiting for him from Cyrus 
McCormick, with instructions to inspect the Odessa agency and to 
see if it was time to replace Tracy.3 By April, Couchman had visited 
Russia, and sent a positive report on Tracy, and arranged for all 
1 Cyrus Jr. to Lankester lx, LPCB 464; President's annual report to the 
stockholders. 7.13.1899. Mss 3b, box 21 and Mss M/l, box 18. Couchman had formerly 
been McCormick's general agent in Marshalltown, Iowa; Cyrus Jr. to Carl Jacobsen 
& Co. 1.25.1899 and to Wallut & Co. 1.26.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 464. 
2 Cyrus Jr. to Tracy 2.4.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 464. 
3 Cyrus Jr. to Couchman 2.4.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 464. Although Cyrus Jr. admitted 
Russia to be one of the most difficult agencies in Europe he noted, however, that "it 
has appeared to us that he (Tracy) has not shown marked ability or efficiency in the 
management of the Odessa agency..." 
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matters to go through his hands in Hamburg.4 
Couchman continued his energetic management of the business 
with a trip to Copenhagen, Malmö, Stockholm, Turku and Helsinki. 
His journey reflects the potential these areas were expected to offer. 
Nothing could escape Couchman's critical eye. For the first time 
McCormick's European trade was in the hands of a professional 
manager used to large-scale business. Couchman was dissatisfied 
with the Swedish sales, and wanted to open a new agency in 
Stockholm. In Denmark he noticed the good standing of Bröder 
Bendix. In Finland the intentions of Russia to incorporate Finland 
and take away its liberties, together with poor crop prospects, were 
causing severe problems for the business.' 
After his numerous travels to visit all the main agents of the 
McCormick Company,6 Couchman had evidently made up his mind 
how to continue the European business. Jobbers had introduced 
McCormick's machines in Europe, but were becoming less effective. 
Now was the opportune time to take the business into the 
Company's own hands. The first plans for supplanting Lankester 
were made by July.7 In Lankester's new contract for the coming 
season his territory covered only Great Britain.8 In April 1900, 
Couchman sent the would-be British general agent C.H. Burlingame 
to London, and asked him to inform Lankester of the intentions of 
the McCormick Company to open its own branch house in Britain 
and to start negotiations over the terms of the change.9 Lankester 
4 Mundt to Couchman 4.10.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 465. 
5 Couchman to McCormick Co. 6.16.1899, 6.17.1899 in reference to our business 
in Denmark, 6.17.1899 in reference to the trade in Finland and 6.17.1899 in reference 
to our business in Sweden. Mss 2x, box 343. 
6 Couchman was again in Scandinavia in September and traveled from there at once 
to France. He obviously wanted personally to get to know all the details and problems 
of the agents and the various countries. Couchman to McCormick Co. 9.5.1899. Mss 
2x, box 343. 
7 	 Cyrus Jr. to Couchman 7.3.1899. Mss Mil, box 5. The first possibility was to raise 
Lankester's prices to the same level as the other agents' and urge him to push harder. 
Couchman could have taken the British business under his control or a new man 
could be sent to England. The last alternative was to appoint some other firm to 
continue Lankester's business. Cyrus decided, however, to send a special traveler to 
investigate matters without letting Lankester know. 
8 Couchman to McCormick Co. 10.3.1899. Mss 2x, box 343. 
9 Couchman to Burlingame 4.1.1900. Mss 2x, box 362. The McCormick Company 
was very determined in its decision to open its own branch but, on the other hand, 
wanted to be as frank as possible with its long-time agent. 
Lankester demanded as compensation for his goodwill an amount representing one 
and a half year's average net income, for the stock in hand $5000, for repairs $8000 
and rights over the leasehold of the warehouse. Lankester to Couchman 3.29.1900. 
Mss 2x, box 362. 
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had no real chance in the negotiations. McCormick was ready to pay 
$10 000 for his goodwill instead of the $30 000 that Lankester asked 
for. An agreement was made on McCormick's terms and Lankester's 
entire business was transferred to the McCormick Company.10 
E.K. Butler had already sent a Company representative to open 
McCormick's own branch in Budapest. He was unable to accomplish 
his plans until 1899, when the power of attorney was transferred 
to him." Plans were made for the rest of Europe too. In fact by the 
fall of 1899 the McCormick Company had a scheme ready for drastic 
reorganization and had even listed the names of the men who were 
to be placed in the new branch houses.12  
The question of the German representation rose to the surface 
when a German manufacturer proposed opening a joint venture for 
the production of mowers in Germany. The invitation was politely 
refused, but it opened their eyes to the growing significance of 
Germany in the machine trade.'3 In June 1900, the company's 
representative was already picking up information in regard to the 
German business and was in fact looking for desirable new agents 
for the McCormick Company. Soon thereafter Couchman decided to 
notify the McCormick Company's German agent Max Paulsen that his 
contract would be discontinued, and asked Cyrus Jr., who was visiting 
the Paris Exhibition, to come to Berlin to decide the location for the 
German office. Couchman raised for the first time the question of 
establishing a limited-liability subsidiary company in Germany." 
Burlingame had previously worked for the Osborne Company in South Africa. He was 
presumably Osborne's traveling representative in the same manner as Edward 
Ackerman was for the McCormick Company. Mundt to Postin 12.7.1899. Mss lx, 
LPCB 466. 
10 McCormick Co. to Couchman 4.28.1900. Mss la, box 118. Couchman to 
McCormick Co. 5.5.1900. Mss M/I, box 6. Couchman and Burlingame had investigated 
all the potential warehouses in London but had to acknowledge Lankester's to be 
the best possible. In the agreement Lankester had to promise not to engage in the 
agricultural machine business for five years, and be willing to give his assistance to 
Burlingame. 
11 Couchman to Harold McCormick 10.5.1899, Stillman to Couchman 9.23.1899 
and 10.2.1899. Mss 2c, box 84. 
12 Harold McCormick to Couchman 10.26.1899. Mss M/I, box 5. 
13 Andreas Schilli & Co. to McCormick Co. 5.1.1900. Mss la, box 119; The 
McCormick Co to Andreas Schilli & Co. and to Couchman 5.12.1900. Mss la, box 
118. 
14 Couchman to McCormick Co. 6.8.1900. Mss 2x, box 367; Cyrus Jr. to McCormick 
Co. 6.19.1900. Mss M/I, box 7; Couchman to Max Paulsen 6.23.1900. Mss la, box 
115. 
Couchman paid $6000 to Paulsen for all claims and damages under the contract, and 
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The founding of a subsidiary was Couchman's idea. One of his 
main arguments was to make McCormick's name more visible than 
before and at the same time to evade the control of the German 
authorities and taxation. For these reasons, most of the American 
companies were incorporated as limited companies in Germany. 
Taking the business into McCormick's own hands also demanded 
planning the methods of running the organization in the future. 
Couchman wanted to continue business with big dealers, but he 
also sought direct contacts with small local agents. The American 
system of doing direct business with farmers he was not ready to 
introduce in Europe, nor did he anticipate it in the near future.15 
The McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. m.b.H. was incorporated 
on September 7th, 1900, with a capital stock of 200 000 marks.'G 
Cyrus Jr. had traveled to Berlin as requested to make the final 
decision over the location and formation of the Company. When the 
remaining questions in Germany were settled, Cyrus continued his 
journey to Russia, where he wanted to hold discussions with the 
Company's long-established agent in Moscow, Liphart & Co., and to 
examine the prospects for opening another branch in Russia. After 
took back from Paulsen his repair stock and twine. Thereafter the company's own 
agent, Mr. Hutmacher, had exclusive control over McCormick's business in Germany. 
Couchman to Hutmacher 10.9.1900. Mss 2x, box 367. 
15 Couchman to McCormick Co. 6.29. and 7.13.1900. Mss la, box 115; Couchman 
to Cyrus Jr. 8.20.1900. Mss M/I, box 7. The other possibility would have been to 
register as a branch or 'filiale', which would have meant filing the yearly balance 
sheet of the American corporation with German authorities in addition to a separate 
sheet for the German branch. The income tax would then be calculated upon the 
profits shown by the American corporation on the basis of the proportion of profits 
made by the German company. Besides, it was totally at the German officials' 
discretion whether they would grant a license to do business. 
The business could also have been run in the name of a German representative, 
leaving McCormick's name aside. The third possibility was to organize a joint stock 
company under German law. In that case the McCormick Company should appoint 
a board of directors and council, and submit the books of the corporation for 
inspection by the German officials. 
The limited stock company or Gesellschaft mit Beschrenkter Haftung was the simplest 
method for the foreigner. It was not taxed on its profits, but individual stockholders 
were taxed on their holdings of stock. For foreigners there was practically no taxation 
because the tax law predated the laws authorizing the formation of limited companies 
and consequently, no provision had been made in the law to cover these companies. 
It was also easy to organize. The articles of the incorporation had to be drawn up, 
stating the purpose, name and domicile of the company, the amount of capital stock, 
holders of the stock and proportion of their interest, and the name of the responsible 
manager of the business. 
According to Couchman, of the American companies at least Luxor Prism, National 
Cash Register, American Bicycle, Columbia Phonograph, American Radiator and 
Photographic Supply were incorporated as limited stock companies. 
16 Draft for the articles of incorporation the McCormick Harvester Machine Co. 
m.b.H. Mss M/I, box 7; The International Harvester Co. 1913, 168. 
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investigating the matter, Cyrus planned to establish a general agency 
at Samara on the Volga some time in the future. Agricultural 
prospects and resources in Russia made an immense impact on 
Cyrus, but he also noticed its weaknesses, the inefficient native labor 
and the risky credits." The Russian question was settled by 
establishing another branch house at Riga for the Baltic Provinces. 
Riga was selected because of its lively port.18 
The agents in Switzerland did not please Couchman either, and 
Couchman resolved to take the Swiss trade into McCormick's hands, 
and placed the man intended for Riga there instead. He had found 
his agent not to be the right man to handle the large northern 
Russian region. Couchman's decision meant that he let Russia wait 
for another year, and allowed Tracy to take care of all of Russia 
while he was looking for a suitable man for Riga.t9 
While Cyrus McCormick visited Russia, his younger brother Stanley 
made a trip through Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In 
Denmark, Bröder Bendix made a good impression on Stanley, with 
their active appearance. Bendix claimed to be the leaders of the 
business, with Deering coming next. His pleasure changed to distress 
in Norway and in Sweden. McCormick's machines could not 
compete with their rivals' lighter machines, and consequently in 
Norway McCormick was in third place after Deering and Wood. In 
Sweden the situation was about the same, except that here the local 
manufacturers were also becoming a real threat to the American 
companies.20 
17 McCormick's had not been satisfied with Liphart & Co. and consequently Tracy 
had curtailed its territory by appointing new agents. Liphart & Co. was, however, 
the strongest name in the agricultural world in Russia and the McCormick Company 
could not afford to let them go. Another difficulty in Russia was caused by the Siberian 
trade. It had been allocated to Storvell & Co. at Veronesh, but practically all the other 
agents also sold in Siberia whenever possible. The dilemma with Liphart & Co. was 
resolved in a new meeting at Berlin, attended by Cyrus Jr., Emil Liphart, Couchman 
and Tracy. Emil Liphart was not allowed to have back the areas which he had lost, 
but he was compensated for the loss with one percent more on the business of the 
new agents.Cyrus to Stanley McCormick 7.31.1900. Mss 2c, box 84; Cyrus to 
McCormick Co. 8.23.1900. Mss 2x, box 362. Cyrus to McCormick Co. 8.23.1900. Mss 
la, box 117. 
18 Cyrus to McCormick Co. 8.23.1900. Mss 2x, box 362. 
19 Couchman to Stanley McCormick 9.19.1900. Mss 2c, box 84. August Mury, in 
German-speaking Switzerland, had done good work, but Bucher-Manz was selling at 
too low prices and was therefore "giving our machine the wrong reputation in 
Switzerland." Couchman to McCormick Co. 9.21.1900. Mss la, box 115. 
20 Stanley McCormick to Cyrus Jr. 9.3.1900. Mss la, box 119 and Mss 2c, box 84. 
In Norway, from the estimated number of 2210 machines sold in 1900 Deering's 
share was 600, Wood's 450 and McCormick's 350. In Sweden the total business was 
about 10 000 machines, of which Deering and Wood sold about 2500 each, 
McCormick coming next with about 1200. The Swedish companies sold together 
about 2000 machines. 
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Couchman sought new efficiency for the sales by appointing new 
agents. He opened negotiations for an agency in Holland and made 
a contract with Boeke & Huidekoper in Groningen. New agents were 
also appointed in Greece, in Alexandria for Egypt and Sudan, in 
Spain and in Constantinople. Couchman wanted to establish several 
agencies, for he anticipated "that they will have a tendency to create 
a demand for machines and that we will be known to the trade 
when that time comes".21 In accordance with his principles, 
Couchman curtailed in Sweden the territory of the Company's 
present agent, Andersson & Mattson, due to their inefficiency, and 
nominated three new agents!' 
The McCormick Company's sudden moves raised anxiety among 
the agents, who could no longer be sure of their status. Couchman 
began to use a technique of alternately cajoling and enticing the 
agents. In Sweden he had used hard measures to improve sales. In 
Denmark his travelling agent noted the good shape of the business, 
but Couchman, nevertheless, let them know of his actions in 
Germany to make it clear to the Danish agent that McCormick agents 
had to push the business in order to keep their contract. In Italy 
the nervous dealer wanted to make a five-year contract, but had to 
be content with the normal one-year one.23  
New efficiency was needed, and it was sought for by sending new 
travelers and experts to Europe to fight over markets in highly 
competitive regions such as Scandinavia and England. It was, 
nevertheless, not too easy to find able men, and when found they 
were either reluctant to move abroad or their families refused to 
follow them. In some cases the American general agents did not let 
their best men go.24 The status of the foreign trade had clearly 
21 Mundt to Couchman 10.3.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 465; Couchman to Stanley 
McCormick 5.16.1900. Mss 2c, box 84 also la, box 115; A Few Points in Connection 
With Our Foreign Business. 6.4.1900. Mss 3b, box 24 also 3b, box 24. These two 
reports contain Couchman's estimation of the standing of the various agents. A detail 
worth mentioning was that either in May or in June 1900 Edward Ackerman erected 
the first binders ever set up in Spain. 
22 Couchman to McCormick Co. 7.10.1900. Mss 2x, box 367; Four letters from 
Couchman to McCormick Co. concerning Olsson & Larsson of Gefle, Eric Björkland 
of Stockholm, Joseph Carlander of Sundsvall and Andersson & Mattson 10.12.1900. 
Mss 2x, box 367. 
23 Shapiro 1958, 13-15; Couchman to McCormick Co. 6.8.1900. Mss 2x, box 367. 
24 Mundt to Couchman 11.4.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 465; Couchman to McCormick 
Co. 2.6.1900. Mss 2x, box 363.  Pressure of competitors was felt hard in Scandinavia, 
where Edward Ackerman so far had been the only traveler to visit. Now a totally 
new approach to the business was to sweep over the northern countries too. 
Couchman informed Lankester that he was going to send some help from the 
manufacturer, as the Deering Company had done for some time. Couchman to 
Lankester 2.23.1900. Mss 2x, box 362. 
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changed among the decision makers of the McCormick Company. 
Couchman also began negotiations with the home office to stop 
holding a stock of machines in Hamburg. At first sight his demand 
seems strange, since reserve machines had been for many years one 
of the demands of the agents. Couchman stated, however, that when 
a large stock of machines was held, there remained always some 
machines unsold, since machines had to be adapted for various 
countries and it was impossible to know just what would be wanted. 
Now that he was on the spot, he could keep in close touch with 
agents and could send exact orders to the factory.25 Accounting 
systems and better control over the production which had been 
extended to Europe too offered Couchman tools to follow the 
demand and supply accurately. 
Adapting the machines to conditions in various parts of Europe 
had been discussed at the highest level in the McCormick Company 
for years. It looks as if in spite of frequent complaints no concrete 
changes had occurred, since so far there had been nobody in the 
organization to look after them. Foreign business had been under 
E.K. Butler, together with a thousand other things. Couchman 
returned to the question with new energy. He immediately 
understood how essential it was for the business to provide 
machines appropriate to local conditions. For the first time the 
McCormick Company received direct and reliable information on the 
state of agriculture in the European countries. Couchman also 
investigated the complaints over the quality of the machines, and 
found them in many cases well-founded. Branch managers and 
general agents were also asked to send a list of complaints. 
McCormick's machine inspection department had been under too 
heavy pressure or simply had not performed its functions properly. 
Couchman was able to list numerous defaults: in the "Daisy" reaper 
the rake arms hit together at the top, the chain tightener crank bent 
In the letter of Mundt to Couchman 3.13.1900. Mss 1x, LPCB 466 is a list of the 
state of travelers and experts to some countries. The question is continued in 
Couchman to McCormick Co. 3.24.1900. Mss 2x, box 362, in which Couchman 
evaluates the traveler candidates. 
In June 1900 Couchman had under him 24 men in Europe, either branch house 
managers, travelers, or experts, who covered practically the whole of Europe. A Few 
Points in Connection With Our Foreign Business. 6.4.1900. Mss 3b, box 24; 
Couchman to McCormick Co. 6.8.1900. Mss 2x, box 367; Mundt to Couchman 
4.5.1901. Mss lx, LPCB 467. 
25 Couchman to McCormick Co. 11.15.1899. Mss 2x, box 343. There was one more 
reason not to hold machines in stock in Hamburg: some European countries (France 
especially) levied an extra charge on machines imported from America through 
Germany. 
The McCormick Company accepted Couchman's proposal without any delay. Mundt 
to Couchman 11.28.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 466. 
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and the spoons on the pitman were too weak owing to softness of 
the malleable iron. The mower, too, suffered from the spoons 
breaking. Besides, painting of the machines should have been more 
attractive.26 
After his first full year as the European manager, William 
Couchman was able to report amazing progress in sales. The German 
branch alone had made a net profit of $100 000,27 and the new 
management had shown its efficiency compared with the jobbing 
houses. In 1899, Cyrus Jr. expressed his satisfaction at having sent 
Couchman to Europe, and in the next year's President's annual report 
he was able to tell of a steady growth of the European business.2 
In three years the McCormick Company had almost eliminated 
jobbing houses from its European business, and absorbed their 
profits. It had sought for an aggressive new drive in its sales by 
appointing new agents and increasing the number of its experts and 
travelers. Through these moves the McCormick Company was able 
to increase its share of the European markets. The elimination of 
big dealers29 also provided an opportunity for direct contacts with 
local agents and thereby for closer control of the business. On the 
other hand, branch houses also considerably raised the costs of 
conducting the foreign business,36  
26 Couchman to McCormick Co. 7.8.1900. Mss la, box 115; Couchman to 
McCormick Co. 8.13.1900. Mss la, box 117; Hutmacher to Couchman 9.8.1900. Mss 
la, box 116. 
Couchman told, for example, how in Germany land was cultivated in ridges which 
gave a corrugated effect to the fields and was very difficult for working the machines. 
In Poland the situation was still worse and one of the first questions was to begin 
to educate farmers to make their fields suitable for the machines. This comment 
correlates with the analyses of Paul A. David on the situation of agriculture in Britain. 
David 1971, 145.175. 
27 Couchman to Cyrus Jr. 12.8.1900. Mss M/I, box 7. 
28 President's annual report to the stockholders, 1899. Mss 3b, box 21; President's 
annual report , June 1901. Mss M/I, box 18. 
Sales of harvesting machines (binders, mowers, reapers, headers, shredders, corn 
harvesters and rakes) in 1899 was 29 417 the next year 36 913; and in 1901 already 
47 375 machines. 
29 Not all the big wholesalers were eliminated. In France R. Wallut & Co. continued 
its jobbing business and in 1902 placed a large order for machines for 1903, about 
16 000 altogether. The Implement Age 1902, vol. XX. 
30 Cyrus Jr. to McCormick Co. 6.191.1900. Mss M/I, box 7; Couchman to Cyrus Jr. 
12.8.1900. Mss M/I, box 7. Show rooms, offices and repair facilities in the Berlin 
office alone cost about $4000 per year. The high costs soon paid themselves back 
in growing orders for machines. Couchman told Cyrus how two local German dealers 
had been very reluctant to order new machines; after visiting McCormick's new 
warehouse their eyes had been opened to the real size of its business and both 
gentlemen were thereafter more than eager to renew their contracts. 
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The achievements of Couchman were also reflected in his position 
in the McCormick Company's organization. In 1902, McCormick's 
had in America 65 salaried general agents reporting to the central 
office at Chicago. Under the general agents worked about 12 000 
local or subagents and about 2000 travelling salesmen. General 
agents were required to make reports every month to the main 
office. These statements covered, for example, hirings and firings, 
numbers of machines received and sold, accounts paid and notes 
collected. Apart from these mandatory reports, general agents were 
almost totally independent of Company control. There was no 
method of controlling the relations between a general agent and his 
subordinates; nor was there any other means than the dismissal of 
the general agent to supervise the conduct of his business.31  
As has been shown in previous chapters, foreign business had 
been directly under the home office. This custom had long traditions. 
As a former general agent, Couchman could not accept this 
treatment. "I cannot see why I should handle this office in any other 
different manner than I would a general agency..."32 Consequently, 
Couchman began to increase his powers step by step. He conducted 
the negotiation of the transfer of Lankester's business and made the 
final decisions concerning this. His standing was further 
strengthened when the home office transferred all transactions 
between agents, shipments from Hamburg to agents, and other 
similar European matters, entirely under his authority.33 By these 
actions Couchman had reached a position similar to that of the 
American general agents and considerably raised the status both of 
the European business, and of course also of himself. 
In the beginning of 1901, the McCormick brothers began to plan 
a new change in the Company organization and were looking for 
candidates to be placed in charge of the new departments. The 
superintendent of the reaper works was allocated an assistant, and 
collection, twine, purchasing, transportation, accounting, advertising 
and order and shipping departments were separated, each under its 
own manager. The legal, patent and experimental departments were 
merged, and most important for the foreign trade, this was finally 
separated as a distinct unit. From now on, the domestic department 
took care of the United States and Canada; the foreign department 
was put under W.C. Mundt, who had under his charge Mexico, 
31 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 327-328. 
32 Shapiro 1958, 4. It has not been possible to find the letter which Shapiro refers 
to. 
33 McCormick Co. to Couchman 7.24.1900. Mss la, box 118. 
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South America, Cuba, Africa, Australia and New Zealand; but 
Couchman had overall responsibility for the business in Europe. 
Mundt was only his local representative at home office, and 
Couchman was not responsible to him, their positions being of a 
co-ordinate nature.34 
Figure 5. Organization of the McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Company, 1901. 
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Source: Organization; McCormick Reaper Works, "Staff'. Mss 2c, box 29; 
Officials of the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. Mss Special Re-
ports File, box 14; President's annual report, June 1901. Mss M/I, box 18; 
The International Harvester Co. 1913, 334-335. 
At the turn of the century, the McCormick Company's activities 
reached all parts of the agricultural world. It had received new 
inquiries for agencies from South Africa and even from Japan and 
India.35 Although the two latter countries were mere curiosities, that 
was not the case with Australia and New Zealand. 
34 Cyrus Jr. to Harold McCormick 1.19.1901. Mss 8c, box 11; The International 
Harvester Co. 1913, 330-335. This information comes from the statements of Stanley 
McCormick, Mr. Bentley and G.W. Perkins 6.27.1902. 
35 Mundt to Couchman 2.27.1900. Mss lx, LPCB 466; Mundt to the Kan Sain 
Trading Co. 4.25.1900. Mss lx, LPCB 466 and to F.W. Horne 5.2.1900. Mss lx, LPCB 
466. Especially Horne from Yokohama had anticipated a large sale for agricultural 
machines in Japan; McCormick Co. to Abdool Tayab in India 8.17.1900. Mss la, box 
118. 
Charles B. Harris from the U.S. Consulate in Nagasaki let McCormick know that it 
was not worth while looking for trade in Japan. Harris to McCormick Co. 7.27.1901. 
Mss la, box 120. 
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In 1892, when the McCormick Company's salaried representative 
Edward Ackerman left Oceania, McCormick's harvesters were the 
leading machines in the Colonies. Nevertheless, competitors had 
intensified their operations and Massey-Harris especially had invested 
in its marketing efforts, trying to oust its competitors from the 
Colonies with legal actions by preventing the sale of any open-end 
binder but their own. This action forced at least the McCormick and 
the Osborne companies to a joint effort to oppose it.36 
When the reorganization of the European trade was in full swing 
in the mid-1890s, Butler thought of sending Ackerman to control the 
Australian activities as well. McCormick's old rivals were getting the 
best of it and time was ripening for a change of agents in that area. 
The local agents complained about the McCormick Company's 
business strategy to sell only for cash, whereas its competitors' agents 
simply acted on behalf of the makers.37 Under the pressure of growing 
competition, the McCormick Company faced the same problems in 
the Colonies as in Europe. Since there was no representative of their 
own to oversee the trade on the spot, difficulties began to 
accumulate. Agents were short of goods in the best sales period and 
there were frequent defects in the machines. In spite of these 
complaints, Butler regarded Europe and South America as more 
valuable, and finally did not send Ackerman to the Colonies.38 
In 1900 McCormick's finally sent a salaried representative to 
Australia to reverse the downward trend. He could only report how 
McCormick's machines had dropped in a decade from the lead to 
fourth place in the trade. In Australia the harvester companies were 
for the first time successful in reaching an agreement in 1902 over 
sales areas and prices.39 
36 Butler to Ackerman 7.18.1892. Mss lx, LPCB 461; D.M. Osborne & Co. McLean 
Bros. & Rigg 2.3.1896. Mss 2x, box 282; McLean Bros. & Rigg to McCormick Co. 
10.27.1897. Mss 2x, box 298. 
37 Butler to Ackerman 9.14.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463; McLean Bros. & Rigg to 
McCormick Co. 1.22.1897. Mss 2x, box 298. Strongest competitors were 
Massey-Harris, Wood and Hornsby. 
38 McLean Bros. & Rigg Limited to McCormick Co. 12.17.1897. Mss 2x, box 298; 
Butler to Ackerman 3.12.1897. Mss ix, LPCB 463. 
39 W.P. Postin's promising start in the Colonies collapsed for personal reasons, and 
he had to return home. He was succeeded by Fred Hewetson, who had earlier visited 
the area. William Mundt could only regret that the Company had not sent earlier its 
own man to look after its interests. In 1900 Massey-Harris sent to the Colonies 13 
000 tons and Deering from 1500 to 2000 tons of goods, while McCormick's shipments 
amounted only to 1450 tons. Mundt also asked Postin to investigate if there would 
be room for opening a sideline in drills, plows and other machines, if the Company 
decided to open its own branches in Oceania. Mundt to Postin 5.14.1900. Mss la, 
box 118 and 12.14.1900. Mss lx, LPCB 467. Mundt to Hewetson 4.8.1901. Mss lx, 
LPCB 467; Schonberger 1964, 170-171. 
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The first McCormick machines had been sent to South Africa in 
1882, but since then no special efforts had been made to expand 
its business there. Smuts & Koch at Malmesbury remained their 
reliable agents from the very beginning, and not until 1894, when 
Edward Ackerman visited these colonies, did he appoint three more 
agents. After the first orders they did not renew their orders; in 1898 
a more prominent dealer replaced them and McCormick's could 
express its satisfaction with the situation.40 As can be seen in Table 
10, trade in South Africa did not rise to considerable amounts during 
the span of this study. 
Neither did the trade meet the expectations of the McCormick 
Company in South America. Agar, Cross & Co. of Glasgow, Scotland, 
were McCormick's main agents for Argentina. They had made use 
of the experts and travelers that the manufacturer had sent to help 
their business, but the expected large sales did not materialize, and 
Agar, Cross & Co. even declined to take new machines for 1898. 
Irritated, E.K. Butler sent them a biting letter in which he threatened 
to replace them: "...as the agency for our line of manufacture does 
not go begging in any country, we can afford to be more than fair 
with you, and tell you now in advance that you had better be making 
your plans to get something that suits you better."41  
Argentina was the most important selling area in South America, 
Uruguay coming next, and McCormick's could not afford to neglect 
these countries. Ackerman was once again sent to oversee the 
business there. In spite of Butler's warnings, Agar, Cross & Co. 
retained its agency, and increasing demand for headers in South 
America forced the McCormick Company to add this to the 
Company's line of machines.42 In 1899 Ackerman was able to report 
having sold all the machines,43 but as can be seen in Table 10, 
40 McCormick Co. to Smuts & Koch 8.5.1882. Mss lx, LPCB 456; Mundt to Postin 
12.7.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 466; Mundt to Cyrus Jr. 9.4.1900. Mss la, box 118. 
41 Butler to Agar, Cross & Co. 5.11.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463; Butler to Ackerman 
6.28.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. Edward Ackerman had visited Argentina, and Agar, 
Cross & Co. had let him make an order for 300 binders and for a couple of hundred 
mowers. Butler's anger was further aroused when he learned that Agar, Cross & Co. 
was buying twine from outside sources and was selling repair parts which were made 
in England after its own patterns. Butler to Ackerman 3.12.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
42 The problems were settled when Agar & Co. explained the situation in Argentina. 
They were unable to sell machines at $176, since Massey-Harris, Buckeye, Wood and 
Osborne sold at $140. Besides, the locus plague had harassed farmers for so many 
seasons that they were unwilling to invest on machines. Agar, Cross & Co. to 
McCormick Co. 4.16.1898. Mss 2x, box 290; Butler to Ackerman 10.22.1897. Mss 
lx, LPCB 463; Mundt to Ackerman 8.2.1899. Mss lx, LPCB 465; Mundt to Cyrus 
Jr. 9.4.1900. Mss la, box 118. Ackerman was told to keep a close watch on the 
machines and report on their working. 
43 Cyrus to Ackerman 2.3.1899. Mss 1x, LPCB 464. 
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business with South America remained at a minimal level compared 
with McCormick's European trade. 
9.1.2. Expansion has its limits 
The recession that hit the United States in 1893 turned to an upswing 
in 1897. Prices of farm products began to rise again and prosperity 
returned to rural areas. The editors of 'Farm Machinery' could rejoice 
that "at last the footing has been knocked from under the chronic 
calamity howler... the evidence of a complete return of prosperity 
is full, corrobative, unambiguous of tone, and unmistakable as to 
By 1900 the 
McCormick Company 
was once again a 
family-owned and 
managed company 
which had, 
nevertheless, hired an 
army of middle 
managers. Together 
with the Deering 
Harvester Company 
it fought for the 
supremacy of the 
harvester markets. 
(McCormick 
Collection. State 
Historical Society of 
Wisconsin). 
258 n EMERGENCE OF A MULTINATIONAL 
conclusion".44 
Impacts of the boom were soon also felt in the harvester industry. 
From Table 11 can be seen that McCormick's sales reached an 
all-time peak in 1897 and continued their growth, with net profits 
growing 31 % from the previous year. At the same time the two 
market-leaders had entered into negotiations over the purchase of 
the Deering Company by its arch-rival. Negotiations broke off after 
a couple of months because of the difficulties to obtain funding for 
the merger. There are, however, good reasons to point also to 
improving sales as an explanation for the failure. The economic 
boom reopened attractive prospects, and perhaps the McCormicks 
considered it possible to crush their competitor with sales. 
The McCormick Company's financial standing remained good 
throughout the 1890s. Its net profits sank from 1893 to 1894 by 
about $500 000, but the following year it could inform its 
shareholders of a dividend of profits of $2 500 000. As Table 11 
shows, its investments increased during 1897, the first year after the 
recession. Simultaneously its borrowings also rose from a very 
minimal $150 000 in 1895 to $1 550 000 in 1896, peaking at $3 
400 000 in 1899, which of course strained its economic standing. 
On the other hand, the Company's sales began to increase in 1897, 
and Butler could report an unprecedented demand for mowers.45  
MI these facts tell of increasing activity, and in fact just at this 
time the McCormick Company began the modernization and 
enlargement of its production plant. Parts of the old factory were 
torn down to make way for more efficient additions.46 In 1895 a 
five-story paint and packing building was erected, a year later the 
new knife shop, in 1898 a new warehouse was erected and the 
older one was extended. In 1897 the old grey iron foundry was 
pulled down and replaced by a new one with a capacity of 20 000 
tons per year. In 1899 Cyrus McCormick Jr. instituted a new program 
of plant expansion which involved the building of a new twine mill. 
It was finished in 1900 and thereafter the McCormick Company 
could guarantee prompt delivery of twine. Besides, a new foundry 
with a capacity of 30 000 tons a year was completed in 1900. 
Technological improvements were combined with the spirit of 
44 Hughes 1987, 280-282; Shannon 1945, 292-295; Farm Machinery 4.13.1897 in 
Schonberger 1964, 127. 
45 Butler to Ackerman 6.28.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. According to Butler, 
McCormick's had produced 77 000 mowers, 57 500 binders and 6000 reapers; An 
undated statement showing the key figures of the McCormick Co. in 1895-1899. Mss 
3b, box 16. 
46 Butler to Lankester 7.20.1897. Mss lx, LPCB 463. 
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getting out as large an output as possible. "The predominating motive 
of the entire organization... was the attainment of as great a volume 
of completed machines as was humanly possible as this was seen to 
be a great factor in the financial predominance of the McCormick 
interests."47 
From the above, it becomes obvious that the McCormick 
Company's aim was, by increasing its output and on the other hand 
by cutting production costs, to raise its profits and thereby turn the 
situation to its benefit. Table 11 shows an uninterrupted growth of 
net sales, although in 1899 profits began to decline. The 
exceptionally good seasons of 1897 and 1898 encouraged harvester 
companies to increase their output to their utmost levels.48 The 
modernization of the McCormick's factory was carried out at an 
opportune time. Nevertheless, more orders for machines came in 
than the Company could supply. In the midst of the worst rush, 
there broke out the Spanish-American War, which scared Nettie 
McCormick. She demanded in vain that Cyrus Jr. cut production, 
and then requested General Manager Butler to stop it and store all 
the machines if not sold for cash. For the first time Cyrus Jr. heavily 
attacked his mother, who had to back off. The factory was thereafter 
run at full speed to the end of the season. The President of the 
Company could claim in his report to the stockholders that 
unprecedented demand had exhausted the capacity of the plant.49  
47 Johnson 1927, 28-43. Mss Special Reports File, box 12. Machinery in the whole 
factory was driven by a 1200 horsepower engine. Transmission of power to various 
sections and parts of the large complex caused many problems, since all the 
departments were linked with the main transmission. It was almost impossible to 
work overtime except in some departments when others were inactive. Also, trouble 
at one point of the chain meant a complete interruption of power for every point 
beyond. Later, the power problem was partially solved when additional power 
machines were introduced in various parts of the factory. Gas lights were replaced 
by electric lighting in 1893 and telephones were installed in the departments over 
the two next years. R. W, Drake to R.O. Johnson 10.1.1931. Mss Special Reports File, 
box 13; A.A. Halverson to Johnson 9.26.1930. Mss Special Reports File, box 13. 
In addition to the new buildings and power machines the McCormick factory was 
equipped with the newest technology. The screw top jig significantly increased the 
accuracy of work. Efficiency and saving in production costs were achieved for 
example by a 4-spindle drill which permitted one operator to take care of several 
tools. Numerous other improvements followed, but perhaps most important for the 
success of the McCormick Company was the high precision in its products reached 
by intensive jigging. M.B. Edgerton to R.O. Johnson 10.10.1931. Mss Special Reports 
File, box 13. Edgerton, who was an old employee from McCormick's engineering 
department, states that although the firearms industry had used jigging of parts for 
decades, the birth of jigging in the implement industry should be located at the 
McCormick works; Edgerton to Johnson 10.13.1931. Mss Special Reports File, box 
13. 
48 The Farm Implement News 11.10.1898. 
49 President's Annual Report for the Stockholders 7.13.1899. Mss 3b, box 21; 
Schonberger 1964, 130-132. 
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McCormick's competitors had also enjoyed record sales and 
consequently began to enlarge their factories too. In the fall of 1898 
the Deering Company had six buildings under construction. The 
Plano Company was enlarging their old plant and had two new 
buildings under construction. Everybody expected the next season 
to be even better than the one before. In spite of some warning 
remarks, harvester companies expanded their volume. McCormick's 
raised the number on its payroll from 2471 in 1898 to 3702 in 1899.5°  
Bad weather conditions during the next winter and spring spoiled 
all the expectations. Demand for the harvesting machines died out 
because of the collapse of the wheat crop. As a consequence, the 
McCormick Company ended the season of 1899 with over 42 000 
machines in hand, though there had been a shortage of mowers.51  
Indications of better harvests in 1900 were still promising in April. 
McCormick's anticipated a rush of orders, and problems in finding 
storage for the 50 car loads of machines that it was building daily. 
But instead, the prospects weakened hand in hand with deteriorating 
weather conditions. Finally Cyrus Jr. decided to apply the brakes on 
June 1st, and also began to reduce the workforce. In spite of the 
enlargements, the McCormick Company was soon short of storage 
room. It sent to its general agents a hurried demand for early orders 
and shipments. "Storage capacity in Chicago being limited, the 
importance of making shipments early in the season is apparent, 
and we think fully understood by all".52 Deering had encountered 
similar experiences, and was already looking with apprehension at 
the increase in the cost of material for the next year. Similar ideas 
were circulating at McCormick's too. Material costs had increased 
five dollars on a binder and about one dollar and a half on a mower 
over the cost of 1899. Cyrus Jr. considered reducing prices, but 
decided to keep them as they were, since "a reduction of $5.00 
would not materially increase our trade, as our agents have been 
trained so many years in the belief that whatever prices we fixed 
our competitors would go just so much lower". This comment opens 
50 The Farm Implement News 8.25., 9.14. and 10.13.1899; Schonberger 1964, 133; 
President's Annual Report to Stockholders 7.13.1899. Mss M/I, box 18. This report 
has partly survived. Parts of it can be found also in Mss 3b, box 21. 
51 Untitled estimate of machines manufactured, sold and carried over 11.17.1899. 
Mss 3b, box 21; President's Annual Report to the Stockholders 7.13.1899. Mss 3b, 
box 21. 
52 Mundt to Couchman 4.25.1900. Mss la, box 118; Cyrus Jr. to Harold McCormick 
6.4.1900. Mss 3b, box 24; McCormick Co. to general agents 11.14.1900. Mss M/I, 
box 7. 
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a totally new insight on the business ideology of the McCormick 
Company.53 
Since McCormick's had carried over 13 920 machines from 1898, 
it had 42 619 unsold machines at the end of 1899. In 1900 the 
Company had to carry over 35 200 machines. This forced 
McCormick's to erect a new warehouse for 400 carloads of goods 
and to began planning a similar warehouse for 1901. Other 
manufacturers were in not much better shape. Deering constructed 
a five-story brick warehouse for its surplus machines and the 
Milwaukee Company followed somewhat later.54 The overall 
assessment of the state of the harvester industry in 1901 was 
hopeless. Aultman, Miller & Co. was practically insolvent, the 
Minneapolis Company was in the hands of creditors, the Plano 
Company had paid no dividends for years, the Milwaukee Company 
was seeking a purchaser and Warder, Bushnell & Glessner faced 
steadily decreasing profits.55 
Although the standing of the harvester companies had 
deteriorated, at least the McCormick and Deering companies 
nominally managed the situation well. McCormick's total profits 
increased continuously from 1900 to 1902 and Deering experienced 
a similar development except in 1901. The figures in Table 21 differ 
somewhat from the information in Table 11, which shows a slight 
decline from 1898. Gaps in the source material do not, however, 
allow a closer comparison and study on their reliability. 
53 Cyrus Jr. to Harold McCormick 10.12.1900. Mss la, box 117; Unsigned letter 
from the home office to Cyrus Jr. 9.7.1900. Mss la, box 118; Cyrus Jr. to Harold 
McCormick 1.25.1901. Mss 2c, box 29. 
54 Untitled estimate of machines manufactured, sold and carried over 11.17.1899. 
Mss 3b, box 21; Schonberger 1964, 136. 
55 The International Harvester Case. A compilation of public statements and court 
documents in connection with the government's investigation of the International 
Harvester Company and its anti-trust suit against that company, covering the period 
from May 20, 1907, to May 28,1920. p.18 
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Table 21. Total profits, cost of product, average prices and 
number of machines manufactured in the McCormick Harvesting 
Machine Company and the Deering Harvester Company ($), 
1900-1903. 
Total profits' 
	
Cost of 	 Average 	 Number 
product 	 price 
	
manufactured 
McC 	 Dc 	 McC De 	 McC De MCC 	 De 
1900 4 893 988 3 987 616 371 312 281 574 
Harvester 47.2 53.2 104.3 104.5 
Mower 16.8 18.7 36.5 35.5 
Reaper 25.7 32.4 56.7 53.6 
1901 5 270 559 3 087 150 399 735 263 767 
Harvester 46.5 50.2 99.1 98.9 
Mower 16.8 18.4 36.8 34.7 
Reaper 27.2 32.1 59.4 52.8 
1902 5 464 922 4 455 010 503 517 370 107 
Harvester 49.6 48.1 99.1 99.1 
Mower 16.6 17.9 36.1 34.7 
Reaper 26.6 31.4 54.4 52.9 
The statement showing total profits is from a different archival entity than 
the one showing net profits in Table 11. Total profits also include depre-
ciation, sundry adjustments, and construction and selling expenses deduc-
ted. 
Source: McCormick Harvester Machine Company and Deering Harvester 
Company. Comparative statement of net sales for seasons 1900, 1901 and 
1902. Mss 2c, box 31; Comparative statement of cost of product manufac-
tured and sold for seasons 1900, 1901 and 1902. Mss 2c, box 31; Deering 
Harvester Company. Comparison of profits for the three seasons 1900, 1901 
and 1902 showing variations in selling prices, selling expenses and cost of 
production on the basis of the figures of McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Company. Mss 2c, box 31. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the figures in Table 21 are only 
indicative, they come from the same entity and are in that sense 
usable. McCormick 's output was significantly larger than Deering's; 
its efficiency was higher, since it was able to keep a higher outsale 
price than Deering's. 
This does not, nevertheless, tell the whole truth. In Table 10 can 
be seen how the McCormick Co. extended its investments by over 
$5 million from 1896 to 1898, reaching almost $22 million. This can 
be explained by the erection of the new buildings and renewal of 
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its machinery. To make the investments possible, the McCormick 
Company had to borrow increasing amounts from outside sources. 
In 1900 it had to use $7 742 705 borrowed money; the next year 
$8 192 705; and a year later $10 592 705. These funds were for the 
most part borrowed from local sources in Chicago but also from 
banking houses in New York and Boston.56 It is obvious that 
investments increased the state of indebtedness of the McCormick 
Company at the turn of the century. 
What then was the role and significance of the foreign trade in 
the light of the information presented above? Mira WILKINS explains 
how many American companies failed during the depression, but 
those who survived grew mighty and expanded into giant 
corporations. On the other hand companies saw the foreign markets 
as a way to get rid of their surplus goods.57 
Developments in the harvester industry confirm the first argument. 
At the end of the 1890s there remained only two large firms in the 
harvesting machine industry, and some smaller ones, which could 
not compete with their superiors. Wilkins' latter observation may 
have been true in the industries where identical products could be 
produced and sold both in America and in Europe; this was the case, 
for example, for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, which sold 
uniform goods throughout the world.58 Products in the harvester 
trade were diversified according to the markets where they were 
sold. The standard American machines did not suit the foreign 
conditions, which varied from country to country. Goods had to be 
adjusted to local conditions, which of course reduced the 
possibilities of selling American-style surplus machines. Machines for 
the foreign trade needed costly jigs and patterns of their own. This 
fact alone reduced the validity of this statement. 
As the American harvester trade was concentrated into two 
categories, competition between the remaining companies intensified 
but there were also signs of efforts to find a common base.59 As has 
been earlier shown, there was competition; but was it so acute that it 
forced some of the companies to find new markets abroad? 
56 Comparative statement of money borrowed and sources from which borrowed. 
4.7.1902. Mss 2c, box 30. 
57 Wilkins 1976, 71-72, 
58 Carstensen 1984, 23-26. 
59 All the main harvesting machine companies at the turn of the century held 
meetings to discuss, for example, the fixing of prices, production quotas, presentation 
in fairs, form of contracts or canvassing. Mayer and Daniels to Harold McCormick 
8.18.1900. Mss 3b, box 24; Daniels and Perkins to (Harold ?) McCormick 
12.22.1900. Mss MI!, box 6. 
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As can be seen in Table 16, McCormick's foreign business 
expanded from about five thousand machines in 1894 to at least 
about 34 000 five years later. There is a clear jump in sales after 
1897. From 1897 to 1898 foreign sales grew by 71 percent, while 
the domestic trade showed a growth of 31 percent. On the other 
hand, the volume of the foreign business was so modest that even 
a small addition in volume produces a high percentage growth. 
Foreign trade increased every year from 1894 to 1902, but its share 
of the total trade remained all the time less than 18 percent. All the 
above tells only about steady growth and about the expanding 
interest in foreign business, but fails to give reasons for it. 
Alfred D. Chandler has explained this evolution on the same 
grounds as in the domestic market. Big enterprises had to expand 
abroad to maintain their cost advantages of throughput. Loss of share 
to a competitor not only increased one's production costs but also 
decreased those of one's competitor. Besides, in the 1890s the 
volume of trade had grown to such an extent that small agents were 
no longer able to manage. Furthermore, products had become too 
complicated and specific for an independent agent to put up and 
service them properly.60 
The Supreme Court of the United States, on the other hand, 
regarded the saturation of domestic markets as a central reason for 
foreign expansion. It stated that there had been no growth in the 
number of binders, reapers and mowers sold annually in the United 
States during the five years preceding 1902. Besides, there was not 
even any further growth to be expected.6t 
The McCormick Company had, nevertheless, developed its foreign 
business since the time Butler got it under his thumb. Sales increased 
steadily year after year at the same rate as the Company was ready 
to invest on it; and when it then really decided to expand also on 
that front, the decision was put into effect with the same 
determination as on the home field. The McCormick Company 
anticipated profits in the expanding foreign business, which was not 
as developed and as competitive as the domestic trade. If we can 
trust the sample year of 1899, the profits were very lucrative indeed, 
as Table 18 shows. 
Keeping this in mind, it should actually be asked why McCormick's 
did not invest earlier and more intensively on foreign sales. Certainly 
60 Chandler 1988, 41.42. 
61 Supreme Court of the United States. Brief for Appellants. No. 757, 1914. 
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there was will and vigor for it.62 The American harvester manu-
facturers fought in the Paris World Fair in 1900 as if they were for 
the first time in Europe. In a way that is true. Only a couple of them 
had established their own branch offices, while the majority still 
worked through jobbing houses. The situation closely reflects the 
attitudes toward foreign countries among the companies. This 
appears, for example, from William Couchman's statement: he 
considered Europe "practically virgin soil for the increase of 
business". Trade was well developed only in England and partially 
so in France and in Germany. Charles H. Haney, inspector of the 
foreign sales of the Deering Company, had similar opinions. 
European jobbers wanted to make quick returns and after the sale 
of a machine their interest ceased.G3  
The American consuls reported on the situation in Europe in 
largely the same light, although there were also differences. In 
Austria-Hungary modern agricultural implements had been widely 
introduced and their number was steadily expanding. The harvesting 
62 The McCormick Company prepared carefully and in good time their display for 
the Paris World Fair in 1900: they needed to secure at least the same amount of 
awards as the Deerings. McCormick's application for a space in the agricultural 
pavilion was not granted, however, whereas the Deerings obtained an outstanding 
location and were commissioned to furnish the official historical agricultural exhibit. 
As counterattack, the McCormicks showed an exhibit of 26 models, and in addition 
they erected an additional building to house thirteen full-sized machines. Both 
companies tried to influence the decisions of the jurors, brought over an 
experimental auto-mower and an army of experts to assist in the field trials. In spite 
of their efforts to defeat each other they were favored with the same number of 
awards. R. Wallut to Stanley McCormick 6.23.1900 and to Cyrus Jr. 6.25.1900. Mss 
la, box 120; Cyrus Jr. to Harold McCormick 6.28. and 6.30.1900. Mss la, box 117; 
Stanley McCormick to McCormick Co. 7.24. and 9.3.1900. Mss la, box 119; Stanley 
McCormick to Cyrus Jr. 7.28.1900. Mss la, box 119; Stanley McCormick to 
Couchman 11.23.1900. Mss la, box 118; Benson 1936, 15-16. 
Cyrus McCormick was made a member of the Legion of Honor with the rank of 
officer, as was William Deering. McCormick Co. to Couchman 1.24.1901. Mss lx, 
LPCB 467. The McCormick Company began an intensive campaign against the 
Deerings when James Deering was appointed Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur while 
Stanley McCormick was excluded from the list. Cyrus Jr. to Wallut 4.22.1901. Mss 
la, box 121. 
Witnesses in the International Harvester case underlined in their testimonies the 
importance of the Paris World Fair in awakening the interest of the McCormick 
brothers in foreign business. This is somewhat strange, however, since at least Cyrus 
Jr. had made frequent visits to Europe ever since his first trip to the Derby show in 
1878. He must have had a good understanding of the foreign business, for he was 
in direct contact with the Company's agents throughout his career. In the District 
Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United States of America, 
Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company and others, Defendants. Appendix to 
Defendants' Brief Evidence as to certain points abstracted and topically arranged. 
Vol. II. Testimony of H.F. Perkins, 31. 
63 In the District court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, petitioner. IH et. al., Defendants. Volume XIII. Testimony of 
Witnesses for the Defendants. Testimony of Charles H. Haney. p. 134-136 and 
testimony of William V. Couchman. p.190. 
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machine trade was almost entirely in the hands of the American 
companies. A similar situation was found in Belgium, too, where 
English and German makers, however, also had some share of the 
imports. Other agricultural machines and implements were mostly 
of English or German manufacture. France was considered by the 
consuls to be an important and well developed agricultural country 
in terms of machinery. As a whole the American makers dominated 
the French agricultural machinery trade; in fact the strongest 
competitor for an American manufacturer was another American 
maker.64 
At the turn of the century Germany was a rapidly growing 
industrial power, whose strength was felt in the agricultural machine 
trade also. The McCormick Company had noticed this danger, and 
founded its first subsidiary in Berlin; but they had to react quickly 
before it was too late.65 Germany was known for the quality of its 
products. The plows, harrows, cultivators, and drilling, threshing 
and potato-digging machinery in use were of domestic origin. 
German firms like Heinrich Lanz or H.F. Eckert were concerns with 
large resources which were able to turn out excellent goods, even 
if modeled after American patterns. According to consular reports, 
only the McCormick Company, because of its investments in that 
country, was able to compete profitably with them in the harvesting 
machine business.G6 On the other hand, Paul Sack of Land-
maschinenfabrik Rudolf Sack made in 1893 and Heinrich Lanz as late 
as 1902 a trip to America to learn new production methods. 
According to Fritz BLAICH only the harvesting machine trade 
remained at the turn of the century in the hands of foreign 
manufacturers.67 
Russia was understood to be a great future market for American 
agricultural machines. The McCormicks had noted the possibilities 
it offered and in Odessa they had their own office. Consequently, 
once again only American harvester machines could compete with 
German and English machines. Many other American goods like 
64 Markets for Agricultural Implements and Vehicles in Foreign Countries. 1903, 
1.4, 8, 10-11, 18-20. 
65 In the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company and others, 
Defendants. Appendix to Defendants' Brief. Evidence as to certain points abstracted 
and topically arranged. Vol. II. p. 51. 
66 Markets for Agricultural Implements and Vehicles in Foreign Countries. 1903, 
23-24. 
67 Blaich 1984, 70. 
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plows were superior in quality, but due to inefficient marketing 
strategy had lost markets to their European rivals. 
Superiority of the American harvesting machines became visible 
also in the machine test held by the Finnish agricultural societies. 
In 1897 all the tested machines were American and in later tests 
American machines were regarded to be better suited to the Finnish 
conditions than the Swedish ones.G9 In this light the quality of the 
American machines gave them a great advantage over their European 
competitors. 
From the above it can be deduced that in the agricultural implement 
trade, only the harvesting machine companies had organized their 
European trade in a proper way. They had sent their travelers, experts 
and agents to Europe; they had appointed reliable local dealers to take 
care of the business, which they kept under constant control. On the 
other hand, the European trade and agriculture were perhaps not quite 
as undeveloped as Couchman and Haney had found. In the 1890s, most 
of the machines were still sold to large estate holders; when the smaller 
farmers began in increasing numbers to buy machines, manufacturers 
were forced to extend credit to them and educate them in the use of 
complicated new machinery.70 
The European experience and research partly confirm the 
statements of the harvester men. In Sweden the estate owners were 
the first to adopt new harvesting machines; interest began to arise 
among smallholders during the 1890s.7' Finland experienced a 
similar development, but a decade later than in Sweden. In Finland 
mowers were the most popular agricultural machines: in 1900 there 
were about 20 000 of them and ten years later 57 000.72 In Germany 
the interest of farmers in the harvesting machines began to grow 
only in the middle of the 1890s.73  
Information on the distribution of agricultural machines has been 
difficult to obtain, but even the fragmentary material shows how 
68 Ibid. 39-41, 46-47. 
69 Grotenfelt 1911, 102-103. 
70 In the District court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, petitioner. IH et. al., Defendants. Volume XIII. Testimony of 
Witnesses for the Defendants. Testimony of Charles H. Haney. p. 137-138 and 
testimony of William V. Couchman. p.197. 
71J Kuuse 1970, 47-54. 
72 Maataloustiedustelu Suomessa vuonna 1910. Edellinen osa: Maanviljelys. SVT: III: 
9. Maatalous. Helsinki 1916. 89-94, Viita 1964, 195. 
73 Blaich 1984, 71. 
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reaping and mowing machines spread widely first in England, where 
by the 1870s they were no loner rarities. In other parts of Europe, 
harvesting machines were sold on a large scale only at the turn of 
the century. This means that the harvester manufacturers really had 
a large market waiting for them in Europe, an opportunity which 
they also used. The simultaneous, rapidly growing demand in 
Europe, combined with the highly competing and saturating markets 
in the U.S.A., offers the most feasible explanation for harvester 
companies' interest in the European markets at the turn of the 
century. 
Table 22. Stock of harvesting machines and mowers in several 
West European countries, 1861-1910. 
Year England France Germany Norway Finland 
1861 10 000 18 000 
1862 - - - - - 
1871 40 000 
1874 80 000 
1875 - - - 1 300 - 
1882 - 35 000 20 000 - - 
1890 - - - 12 100 - 
1892 - 62 000 - - - 
1895 - - 35 000 - - 
1900 - - - 31 500 20 000 
1907 - - 301.325 49 200 - 
1910 - - - - 57 000 
Source: Dovring 1965, Table 58, p.644; for Norway Collins 1969, Table III, 
p.75; for Finland Maataloustiedustelu Suomessa 1910, 12 and Viita 1964, 
195; for Germany in 1907 Blaich 1984, 72. 
The McCormick Company had correctly foreseen the development 
on the European markets. It began to exploit the growing trade, but 
it is obvious that competition at home prevented it from diverting 
as much of its energy and capital to overseas activities as it wanted 
to. In 1902 the total property of the McCormick Company was 
estimated at $29 461 481.' At the same time it had to use over ten 
million dollars of borrowed money, representing about a third of 
74 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 95-96; Benson 1936, 14. 
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the total value of its property. This points toward the explanation 
that the McCormick Company was on the brink of indebtedness; its 
returns were good, but through its investments it was falling into 
debt at an accelerating rate at the same time as the home markets 
were getting saturated with machines. This explanation is 
substantiated by Alexander Legge, General Manager of the 
International Harvester Company, who comments that there was in 
the McCormick Company a constant pressure for further expansion 
of the business, but the McCormicks were short of the necessary 
funds. "They had really passed the danger line in the amount of 
borrowed money they were using". That forced the McCormick 
Company to consider expanding the working capital by putting out 
a bond issue on the same lines as Studebaker and J.I. Case had 
done.75 
The cost of raw materials was a factor working against the 
expansion of foreign business. The managers of the McCormick 
Company warned the McCormick brothers of hasty decisions before 
the question of raw materials was settled. The manager of the 
purchasing department had found strong fluctuation in prices, and 
suggested the building of their own steel mill and blast furnaces. 
Otherwise, large-scale foreign business was not based on safe 
ground. The project would have required at least $7 000 000, which 
turned out to be too much for the McCormick Company.' 
The transfer from business through the jobbing houses to their 
own branches in Europe increased McCormick's expenditure too. 
In the jobbing trade, the jobber normally bought the machines for 
cash in New York against shipping documents, or in some cases on 
credit on all or part of the shipment. The responsibilities of the 
manufacturer ceased at that point. After the change to its own 
branches, the expenses were heavy. Thereafter, McCormick's had 
to pay ocean freights, import duties, storage costs and expenses of 
handling and selling. That included the warehouses, numerous 
experts and travelers who were needed to assist farmers to set up 
and repair the machines and train them in their use. In his testimony 
75 In the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company and others, 
Defendants. Appendix to Defendants' Brief. Evidence as to certain points abstracted 
and topically arranged. Vol. II. Testimony of Alex Legge, 3132. 
76 Ibid 21.22, 27. Testimony of Herbert F. Perkins. 
Actual prices of pig iron were: 
1895 
	
$ 12.00 Chicago per gross ton 
1896 	 10.75 
1897 
	
9.80 
1898 	 10.30 
1899 	 15.75 
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at the International Harvester case, William Couchman suggested that 
once the McCormick Company had made the decision to go abroad 
it had no other options than to continue its investments and take 
advantage of the extension of that business. "If you have to stop, 
you simply have plowed for somebody else to reap".77 
On the other hand, the risk McCormick took was not as big as it 
may look at first sight. The Company knew the benefits and limits 
of the jobbing houses and it was well aware that it could not expand 
its trade without its own direct investments. Practise showed in a 
few months what the firm's own able management could do. 
Incomes began to grow, and the Company saved the agent's 
commission. Productivity and throughput of the foreign machine 
production line was with great certainty raised in line with the rest 
of the business. Besides, Couchman had brought new accuracy to 
the orders which reduced the stock in hand. 
McCormick's main competitors had encountered similar 
experiences. Deering had no established, regular business in Europe 
before 1892, when it sent Charles H. Haney abroad to inspect and 
develop the foreign business. Deering conducted its foreign 
operation in a similar manner, through jobbing houses, with all the 
weaknesses arising therefrom, as did the McCormicks. He also 
confirmed Couchman's claim about the high expenses of the branch 
houses, which actually prevented the Deerings from expansion in 
that direction. In his testimony Haney also corroborated how difficult 
it was to sell abroad machines designed for American conditions. A 
whole army of experts had to follow the machines from country to 
country. Besides, machines had to be fitted to different animals as 
a means of propulsion, varying from horses, mules, oxen, buffalo, 
and camels to cows.78 
The McCormick Company had begun its foreign business early on 
in its history but both it and the Deering Company began to invest 
seriously on it only in the 1890s, when they were also competing 
for supremacy over the American markets. The development in Table 
23 indicates that, 
77 In the District court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, petitioner. IH et. al., Defendants. Volume XIII. Testimony of 
Witnesses for the Defendants. Testimony of William V. Couchman. 195-198. 
78 Ibid 134-141. Testimony of Charles C. Haney. 
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Table 23. Foreign sales of the McCormick and Deering 
Companies, 1898-1902. 
McCormick 	 Deering 
Year 
Number oft 
	
Number of $a) 	
machines 	 machines 
1898 1 864 280 - 1 414 892 - 
1899 2 347 249 - 2 155 709 - 
1900 3 134 351 40 677 2 594 955 31 611 
1901 4 222 377 48 549 2 750 634 30 525 
1902 4 336 558 51 241 3 488 250 35 628 
Source: In the District court of the United States for the District of Min-
nesota. The United States of America, petitioner. IH et al., Defendants. Vo-
lume XIII. Testimony of Witnesses for the Defendants. Testimonies of Char-
les C. Haney and William V. Couchman, 179-180, 199-200. 
a) The dollar values also include sales to Canada, which are omitted from 
the number of machines because of the accounting practises of the com-
panies. 
'The figures showing machine sales of the McCormick Company in Tables 
11 and 23 do not coincide. Table 11 is based on the Company's own Machi-
ne Records and therefore should be considered as reliable. The information 
in Table 23 was produced in a hurry by Company officials at the request 
of the court, and does not include sales to Canada (which also explains the 
difference between the figures). 
although the McCormick Company was also in the lead on foreign 
fields, this difference was not significant until after 1900. Establishment 
of the branch houses after 1900 increased McCormick's efficiency 
compared to Deering's, which held to its old jobbing-house business. 
The other harvester manufacturers followed in the footsteps of 
their bigger competitors. The Milwaukee Harvester Company 
operated only through the dealers as did the Johnston Harvester 
Company. In 1895, on the other hand, D.M. Osborne & Co. already 
had branches in Vienna, Odessa, Bremen and in Buenos Aires.79 The 
Massey-Harris Company, too, sold almost exclusively through its own 
branch houses.80 
79 The Milwaukee Harvester Co. Catalogs 1900, 1901. Mss 4z, box 16; The Johnston 
Harvester Co. Catalog 1896. Mss 4z, box 14; D.M. Osborne & Co. Catalog 1895. Mss 
4z, box 18. The Milwaukee Co. had 28 agencies abroad in 1900. The Johnston Co. 
had its European office in Paris but this was not in the list of its branches. 
80 In the District court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, petitioner. IH et. al., Defendants. Volume XIII. Testimony of 
Witnesses for the Defendants. Testimony of Thomas Findley, vice-president and 
assistant general manager of the Massey-Harris Company, 185-187. 
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The McCormick Harvesting Machine Company had found its limits 
at the turn of the century. The McCormick brothers, who took 
charge of the Company, pushed aside the old cautious policy of the 
Company and enthusiastically made large investments in their 
attempt to overpower the Deerings. If they had expected large 
returns from the Company's foreign sales, they had soon to give up 
such hopes. The situation of the McCormick Company deteriorated 
further when Deering began its investment program. The manager 
of the purchasing department of the McCormick Company had 
warned the McCormicks of the necessity to guarantee a fluent supply 
of raw materials and possibly even to erect a steel mill of its own. 
Deering had become aware of the same problem; while the 
McCormick Company had to abandon its plans for lack of capital, 
the Deering Company began to integrate vertically backwards by 
purchase of iron ore and timber properties, coal lands and a 
controling interest in a steel plant in Chicago. The Deerings aimed 
at total self-sufficiency in raw materials, which would reduce their 
material costs.'' 
9.2. The great merger 
At the turn of the century harvester manufacturers found themselves 
in a desperate situation. In an endless series of efforts to overcome 
each other, they had finally reached deadlock. The McCormick 
Company had trimmed its marketing organization both in domestic 
and in foreign markets to a nicely working machine which could 
easily fight its competitors. The Deerings, on the other hand, had 
anticipated the forthcoming structural changes in the industry. Their 
answer to the McCormick's sales force was integration backwards 
by acquisition of raw material sources. 
This chain of events corresponds with the findings of Naomi 
LAMOREAUX, who noted that manufacturers who produced large 
quantities of homogeneous goods tried to reduce unit costs to a 
minimum and at the same time protect themselves against price cuts. 
In times of depression they tried to expand, at the expense of 
weaker competitors.'" 
81 In the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company and others, 
Defendants. Appendix to Defendants' Brief. Evidence as to certain points abstracted 
and topically arranged. Vol. II., 24; McCormick 1931, 112-113. 
82 Lamoreaux 1988, 28. 
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In 1902, the two giants were in a situation where neither was 
able to destroy the other. The markets in America had for some time 
shown signs of saturation. In spite of that, manufacturers tried to 
intensify their operations by cutting production costs and prices; 
what they could not change was the seasonal character of 
agriculture. It restricted the selling period to only a few months a 
year before the harvest. For the rest of the year the money invested 
in branch houses, warehouses and in machines and repair stock lay 
idle. Continuous problems also arose from the yearly disruption of 
production. Factories closed their doors when the orders were 
completed. Something had to be done also in that respect. 
The first attempt to merge the interests of the harvester 
manufacturers ended up in disaster; nor did the negotiations 
between the McCormick and Deering companies lead to much better 
results. Nevertheless, the harvester companies held discussions every 
now and then on the possibilities to reach agreement on machine 
prices and production quotas. These meetings never ended in any 
permanent results.83 
Beneath the surface, however, hopes for a solution to the 
competition survived. Various persons offered their help to arrange 
a consolidation of the harvester manufacturers. It had become 
obvious even to outsiders that business conditions were 
deteriorating.84 Over 75 000 agents were needed to clear out the 
yearly output, and the heavy sales expenses began to cut into 
manufacturers' profits. Especially the McCormick Company's sales 
expenses had been larger in proportion to business done than those 
at Deering, but in both companies the relation of sales expenses to 
sales had steadily risen from 1898 to 1902.85 
The preconditions for renewed discussions for a settlement of the 
problems of the industry were now available. At the end of 1900, 
83 A.E. Mayer and H.L. Daniels to Harold McCormick 8.18.1900. Mss 3b, box 24. 
This meeting was attended by the Adriance, Deering, Johnston, Milwaukee, Osborne, 
Plano, Warder, Wood and McCormick Companies. Three questions were considered: 
prices, canvassing and salaried contracts. An understanding was found on special 
canvassers, who were not allowed to enter the field prior to March 1st, 1901. There 
was discussion of setting binder prices at $95.00 cash and $100 with time, but no 
understanding was reached; Mayer and Daniels to Harold McCormick 10.12.1900. 
Mss M/1, box 7; Mayer and Perkins to Harold McCormick 12.22.1900. Mss M/I, box 
6. 
84 See for example R.L. Ardrey to Cyrus Jr. 8.5.1898. Mss 2c, box 30 and W.F. Abbot 
to Cyrus Jr. 4.3.1900. Mss 2c, box 30. 
85 Deering Harvester Company. Explanatory statement of variation in profits in 
seasons 1898 to 1902 (inclusive). Mss 2c, box 31; McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Company. Explanatory statement of variation in profits in seasons 1900, 1901 and 
1902. Mss 2c, box 31; International Harvester Company. Exhibit L. Mss 2c, box 
31. 
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the Deerings and the McCormicks hold frequent negotiations over 
a possible merger; the Deerings suggested an equal share for each 
company in the new company, which the McCormick family was 
not ready to accept. Cyrus Jr. also discussed the situation with his 
mother and uncle, who proposed taking in outside capital and 
absorbing the Deering Company. 
The mutual suspicions prevented the reaching of any agreement 
on a combination in discussions between the McCormicks and the 
Deerings. Finally, through the aid of John D. Rockefeller Jr., 
negotiations were transferred to New York under the auspices of 
the house of J.P. Morgan. Under the guidance of George Perkins an 
understanding of the terms of the consolidation was arrived at and 
the contract was signed on July 28th, 1902. The stock of the 
International Harvester Co. was set at $120 000 000 of which 42.6 
percent went to the McCormicks, 34.4 percent to the Deerings, the 
Plano's share was 5.2 percent, the Champion's 3.7 percent and J.P. 
Morgan & Co. got 14.0 percent. Financially the new giant was agreed 
to be sound.$' 
The formation of the International Harvester Company had drastic 
impacts on the harvesting machine industry. Together the five 
merged companies manufactured about 90 percent of the grain 
binders and 80 percent of the mowers built in the United States at 
the time of the consolidation. Within a couple of years after its 
organization the International Harvester Company enlarged its 
activities by the purchase of D.M. Osborne & Co., Aultman, Miller 
& Co. and the Minnie Harvester Company. At the time of the merger 
in 1902, International Harvester went into negotiations with 
numerous other firms, like Massey-Harris, the Acme Harvester Co. 
and the Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Machine Co., for the 
86 Diary of Cyrus Jr. 11.23., 11.27. and 11.30.1900. Mss 2c, box 84. 
87 The International Harvester Company merged the McCormick Harvester Machine 
Company, the Deering Harvester Company, the Plano Manufacturing Company, the 
Warder, Bushnell & Glessner (Champion) Company and later on also the Milwaukee 
Harvester Company. Cyrus McCormick was elected President of the corporation, and 
James Deering, Harold McCormick, W.H. Jones (Plano) and J.J. Glessner (Champion) 
Vice-Presidents. In the voting trust of the new Company were Cyrus McCormick, 
Charles Deering and George Perkins. Of the eighteen directors ten represented the 
merged harvester companies, while the rest were from the banking world. F.H. 
Kennedy to Cyrus Jr. 10.23.1901. Mss 2c, box 30; Notes and supplemental notes 
on sundry transactions of McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. Mss 2c, box 
31. No date. 5-9; Opinions of the Judges in the case of the United States v. the 
International Harvester Co. et. al. 1914, 5-7; Report on the Agricultural Implement 
and Machinery Industry 1938, 6-7; Kramer 1964, 290-297; Marsh 1985, 39-42; 
McCormick 1931, 113-118. 
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purpose of bringing them into the combination. 
The International Harvester Company was not only a market 
leader, but due to its horizontal integration, was also the party that 
dominated them. Through its organization, the stockholders of the 
Company had sought for economies of scale and reduced sales 
expenses. These hopes did not materialize immediately. On the 
contrary, the binder and mower sales of the International Harvester 
Company declined during the first ten years after its formation.89 
The decline can partly be explained by the diminishing of 
competition and partly by saturation of the domestic markets. 
From the very beginning the Company leaders tried to rationalize 
its operations and productions. Manufacture of the harvesting 
machines at the Milwaukee plant was transferred to the McCormick 
plant. At the Milwaukee plant the production of gasoline engines, 
cream separators and tractors was started. Production of the Plano 
Company was shifted to the Deering plant while the Plano factory 
was thereafter used for the manufacture of manure spreaders and 
wagons. The purchase of the D.M. Osborne Co. had already brought 
in a line of tillage tools and marked a clear change in the ideology 
of the Company. Through horizontal integration it had achieved all 
the gains available in the harvester industry at home, to increase its 
profits any further, it had to look for new lines. Acquisition of the 
Weber Wagon Co. in 1904 opened the way for the manufacture of 
farm wagons, which was further reinforced by the contract with 
Bettendorf Axle & Co. to sell the output of steel gears. In addition, 
the International Harvester Company purchased from the Kemp 
Manufacturing Co. its plant for the manufacture of manure spreaders, 
and made contracts with the Parlin & Orendorff Co. and with the 
Oliver Chilled Plow Co. for selling their plows in Canada. 
Furthermore, it made an arrangement with the American Seeding 
88 Report on the agricultural implement and machinery industry 1938, 7. The D.M. 
Osborne Co. was acquired by the International Harvester Co. on 1.15.1903. for $3 
200 000. It also had an important line of tillage implements and a binder twine and 
cordage works. The Minnie Harvester Co. was a successor of the Minneapolis 
Harvester Co. Its stock was purchased for $945 000 and transferred to a subsidiary 
company of International Harvester, the International Flax Twine Co., on 9.30.1905. 
Aultman, Miller & Co. became bankrupt in 1903, and was thereafter reorganized as 
the Aultman & Miller Buckeye Co. Its plant and property were transferred to 
International Harvester in 1905. The value of the company was estimated at $555,928. 
The International Harvester Co. 1913, 136-140, 143-145; In the District Court of the 
United States for the District of Minnesota. The United States of America, Petitioner, 
vs. International Harvester Company, Defendants. Defendants' answer to petition. p. 
29-35. 
89 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 64-65, 181-182; In the District Court of 
the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United States of America, 
Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company, Defendants. Defendants' answer to 
petition. p. 47-49. 
276 n EMERGENCE OF A MULTINATIONAL 
Machine Co. for the sale of its seeding machines.90 
By these actions the International Harvester Company had 
extended its operations to totally new lines, which made it a full-line 
company. At the same time, the Company expanded upon backward 
vertical integration, by acquiring iron ore and coal mines, 
timberlands and railroads. New operations were organized under 
subsidiary companies. Of the new companies, the Wisconsin Steel 
Company's capacity developed beyond the needs of the International 
Harvester Co. In addition to the net profits gained by these new 
acquisitions they also assured for the Company the quality and 
quantity of supplies as needed. The integration forward to the 
marketing of the products did not dramatically change the existing 
situation. Like its predecessors, the International Harvester Company 
exercised full control over the distribution of the machines down 
to the dealer and in the case of credit sales even to the purchaser.91  
Technically the International Harvester period brought with it 
great opportunities in the production of harvesting machines. 
Machines were made more uniform, and the experimental 
department of the Company could learn from past failures. 
Practically all of the binders and mowers were rebuilt by 1910. The 
Plano mower, which was regarded as decidedly inferior was rebuilt 
twice, while the Champion mower was entirely redesigned; nor did 
the McCormick and Deering machines escape modifications. It was 
estimated that the rebuilding of both machines amounted to at least 
$100 000 each.92 
Development in the harvesting machine industry was, never-
theless, nothing new or exceptional. On the contrary, it can be seen 
as a continuation of a long trend from the 1870s. As machines 
became more complicated, their manufacture demanded advanced 
production technology and consequently also larger capital than 
small firms could afford. The same phenomenon was also found in 
other fields of the agricultural machine industry: the number of 
producers was reduced, the remaining big companies sought 
economies of scale and developed into full-line giants following the 
example of the International Harvester Company. Deere & Co. 
extended its operations from the manufacture of plows to wagons, 
90 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 141-145; Eckles 1953, 104-106. 
91 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 148-149, 267-268; Eckles 1953, 107-109. 
92 In the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United 
States of America, Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company, Defendants. 
Appendix to defendants' brief evidence as to certain points abstracted and topically 
arranged. p. 179-186; Vol. XIII. Testimony of Witnesses for the Defendants. p. 
317322. 
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drills, manure spreaders and even to harvesting machines. The 
Moline Plow Co. had a very similar history: it began as a plow maker 
but later on added other tillage implements, drills, wagons, etc. to 
its lines. The International Harvester Co.'s third competitor was the 
Emerson-Brantingham Co., also a plow manufacturer that expanded 
to new lines of agricultural machines.93  
In this way the agricultural machinery industry reflected the overall 
development in the American economy. As Alfred Chandler has 
shown, the first step on the road to a modern industrial enterprise 
was the emergence of professional middle managers. The process 
that had its birth in the 1850s and 1860s in the railroads and 
transportation sector spread by the end of the century to other 
industries. The new managerially administered enterprises developed 
into giant corporations either by way of horizontal integration, 
which meant a merger of competing firms, or by vertical integration, 
to incorporate raw materials and to marketing. The large mergers of 
the 1890s came in two waves. During the first wave, between 1890 
and 1893, 51 holding companies were formed. The first large merger 
movement began after the depression of the 1890s had ended, with 
at least 212 consolidations taking place from 1898 to 1902. The 
International Harvester held a notable position among the big 
enterprises. In 1909 its relative size according to its assets entitled 
it to fourth place in the ranking list of the companies.94  
In the domestic trade and manufacture of harvesting machines, 
the formation of the International Harvester Company marked a 
clear break from the previous period. It had reached a clearly 
dominant position in the American markets. However, during the 
antitrust suit brought against it by the Justice Department in 1912, 
the defendants maintained that the purpose of its formation was to 
collect capital for expansion of the foreign trade.95 Cyrus McCormick 
Jr. testified that "another purpose was to help in regard to the foreign 
manufacture, the development of the business was such that it was 
evident that some capital would be required and this was the method 
of getting it."96 
93 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 50-55, 188-189; In the District Court of 
the United States for the District of Minnesota. The United States of America, 
Petitioner, vs. International Harvester Company, Defendants. Statement, brief and 
argument for defendants. p. 42-43. 
94 Chandler 1977, 86-87, 120.121, 315-316, 331-333; Chandler 1987a, 5, 23-25, 
29-32. 
95 Kramer 1964, 299; Marsh 1985, 48. 
96 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 70. 
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To some extent, this statement was true. The International 
Harvester Co. began a similar expansion abroad as on the domestic 
front. Osborne & Co. m.b.H. was organized in Germany in 1903; 
the brand name of Osborne was probably saved because of its 
long-established reputation, in spite of the fact that it had already 
been merged with International Harvester about half a year earlier. 
It could also have been a strategy to keep many nominally competing 
lines in the eyes of the customers in order to give a picture of 
continued rivalry. The same phenomenon was repeated in England, 
where the Deering Harvester Co., McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Co. and Osborne-Plano Co. were organized in 1904. Two years later, 
however, their business was taken over by the International 
Harvester Co. of Great Britain.97 The International Harvester clearly 
wanted to continue the establishment of branch houses and 
subsidiaries which McCormick had started. 
What clearly separates the International Harvester Company epoch 
from earlier periods in terms of foreign business was its expansion 
to the production of machines also abroad. In 1903 it erected a large 
factory at Hamilton, in Canada. The International Harvester Co. of 
Canada was incorporated under the laws of Ontario with a capital 
stock of $1 000 000, to stem the growth of the Massey-Harris 
Company.98 
The American manufacturers had dominated the harvesting 
machine sales since their emergence in Europe. Only a couple of 
English makers had offered noteworthy resistance, but even they 
were more or less copies of the American machines. In most 
European countries small firms, dependent on the local markets, had 
also appeared. In Sweden the domestic producers of agricultural 
machines were exceptionally active: historically there were long 
traditions in the mechanical industry in Sweden. Consequently, by 
the beginning of the 1860s numerous implement makers had 
emerged, such as Kockums, Överum, Munktells, Thermaenius and 
Akers. In addition to these companies, towards the end of the 
century, there sprang up numerous specialized new companies, in 
such a measure that total imports of agricultural machinery were 
reduced to less than half of Sweden's total demand. In 1890 Sweden 
was already a net exporter of agricultural machines. Of the new 
manufacturers, Westerås mekaniska verkstad and Arvika mekaniska 
verkstad made mowing and harvesting machines." 
97 Ibid. 146.147, 168. 
98 Ibid. 146-147 
99 Kuuse 1970, 91-92. 
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In the case of Sweden it is interesting to note that simultaneously 
with growing exports, similar kinds of machines were imported in 
great numbers from America. Jan Kuuse has found that the American 
high-technology machines were aimed at the large estate owners; 
the domestic manufacturers copied the advanced American 
machines and adjusted them to local needs. Although the quality of 
the Swedish factory products was not comparable with that of the 
American implements, they found their markets because of their 
cheaper price and suitability for Swedish conditions. On the same 
grounds, the Swedish machines also found their way to other 
Scandinavian countries, and to Russia too. Consequently, Kuuse 
argues that the Swedish technology was a mediator of the more 
advanced American technology in Northern Europe, adapting it, 
developing it for local needs, and mediating it forward to its 
neighbors. 10° 
It was therefore no wonder that the International Harvester 
Company began to show signs of concern about the situation. The 
continued rivalry in the top management of the Company almost 
paralyzed all decision-making in the International Harvester Co. 
before the Board of Directors authorized Cyrus McCormick to 
exercise supreme power in 1904. Only after that settlement was the 
foreign business also reorganized. All the sales in Great Britain, 
western and southern Europe and northern Africa were consolidated 
to Deering's Paris office. Northern and eastern Europe and Asia were 
concentrated to McCormick's Hamburg office, under William 
Couchman. Couchman had recognized the growing pressure that 
the Swedish companies offered; to stem it he organized in 1904 a 
separate subsidiary in Stockholm and a year later one in Denmark, 
but was unable to meet the competition. In the situation the 
International Harvester Co. had either to abandon profitable markets 
or to extend its activities to production. Finally in 1905 a small 
factory primarily producing mowers was purchased in Norrköping. 
This move turned out to be a great success. Two years after its 
acquisition Aktiebolaget International Harvester Co. returned a profit 
of 17.4 percent on invested capital.10' 
The Company management did not expect effective local 
competition in Germany, France and England. Only one German 
manufacturer had in 1905 shown some success. The Swedish 
situation was regarded as a special case, but otherwise International 
100 Ibid. 92-99. 
101 Carstensen 1984, 132, 139-140, 146; The International Harvester Co. 1913, 
146-147; Kuuse 1974, 334; McCormick 1931, 132-133. 
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Harvester was reluctant to open new plants abroad while it had 
sufficient capacity in existing factories to meet demand; but the 
market worked against the Company. International Harvester 
continued McCormick's policy and replaced jobbers with its own 
sales force. Consequently, jobbers who were also manufacturers of 
agricultural machines began to produce harvesting machines as well. 
Contrary to all expectations, it was in Germany and France that 
competition grew most alarmingly. In Germany alone, in 1908, 
nineteen firm were making mowers and two more reapers also. 
Once again the Company management was forced to make decisions 
under external pressure. That same year, the Board of Directors 
approved plans to erect plants in France, Germany and Russia. Two 
years later Compagnie Internationale des Machines Agricoles at Croix 
in France and International Harvester Co. m.b.H. at Neuss in 
Germany were partly completed. In 1910 the International Harvester 
acquired an old air-brake factory at Lubertzy near Moscow and 
converted it into a harvesting machine plant. When in 1909 the 
Company finally also extended its credit policy by accepting farmer's 
papers in all European markets, its foreign business had moved into 
a totally new epoch compared with the previous period. toe 
102 The International Harvester Co. 1913, 146-147, 150-152, 165-166, 174; 
Carstensen 1984, 153-154, 156, 163-164; McCormick 1931, 133. 
In July 1912 the International Harvester Co. had the following foreign subsidiaries: 
Company 	 Location of plant 
	 Business 
or business offices 
Compagnie Internationale 	 Croix, France 	 Manufacturing 
des Machines Agricoles 
Compagnie Internationale 
	
Paris, France 	 Marketing 
des Machines Agricoles 
de France 
Deutche International 	 Berlin, Germany 	 Marketing 
Harvester Co. m.b.H. 
International Harvester 	 Neuss, Germany 	 Manufacturing 
Co. m.b.H. 
International Harvester 	 Moscow, Russia 	 Manufacturing 
Co. in Russia 	 and marketing 
Aktiebolaget International 	 Norrköping, Sweden 	 do 
Harvester Co. 
Aktieselskabet 	 Christiania, Norway 	 Marketing 
International Harvester Co. 
Aktieselskabet 	 Copenhagen, Denmark Marketing 
International Harvester Co. 
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London, England 
Vienna, Austria 
Zürich, Switzerland 
Hamilton, Canada 
Hamilton, Canada 
Hamilton, Canada 
Melbourne, Australia 
Christchurch, New 
Zealand 
Manila, Phillipine 
Islands 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
Building 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Purchase of 
fiber 
Table 24. Sales of International Harvester ($m), 1903-1912. 
Year Domestic + 
Canada 
Foreign 
(A) 
Total 
(B) 
A as % of B 
1903 (39.8) (12.2) (52.0) (23.5) 
1904 33.6 (34.4) (15.3) (49.7) (30.9) 
1905 40.0 (36.2) 13.2 (16.9) 53.2 (53.1) 24.8 (31.8) 
1906 46.7 (42.0) 15.7 (20.2) 62.4 (62.2) 25.2 (32.5) 
1907 51.9 (46.4) 19.0 (24.5) 70.9 (70.9) 26.8 (34.5) 
1908 47.6 (41.8) 19.0 (24.8) 66.6 (66.6) 28.5 (37.2) 
1909 56.2 (50.1) 20.6 (28.1) 76.8 (78.2) 26.8 (36.0) 
1910 65.2 (56.5) 24.2 (34.2) 89.4 (90.7) 27.1 (37.7) 
1911 69.3 (56.9) 28.5 (42.3) 97.8 (99.2) 29.1 (42.7) 
1912 77.5 (64.0) 36.2 (50.9) 113.7 (114.9) 31.8 (44.3) 
Source: Kuuse 1974, 307 table 66; Figures in the parantheses are from Ap-
peal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. 
p. 1751. Defendants' Exhibit 85. 
International Harvester 
Co.of Great Britain (Ltd.) 
International Harvester 
Co. Gesellschaft m.b.H. 
International Harvester 
Co. A.G. 
International Harvester 
Co. of Canada (Ltd.) 
Oliver Chilled Plow 
Works of Canada (Ltd.) 
Eastern Building Co. 
(Ltd.) 
International Harvester 
Co. of Australia (Ltd.) 
International Harvester 
Co. of New Zealand (Ltd.) 
Macleod & Co. 
Salango Export Co. 	 Ecuador 	 Fiber 
production 
Source: The International Harvester Co. 1913, 165-166. 
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This becomes obvious also in Table 24, which shows a marked 
increase in the volume of the International Harvester Company's 
foreign business and especially on the proportion of foreign sales 
compared with the total sales. 
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In the present study Cyrus Hall McCormick and his life-work, the 
McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, have been taken as 
examples of an emerging American multinational company. On the 
basis of the evolution of this sample enterprise, a model has been 
produced in Figure 6 which describes the various stages of its 
development. This model is of course simplified, and shows only 
the main features which have been discussed in detail in the text. 
The development of McCormick's foreign trade can be divided 
into two phases; firstly Cyrus McCormick's strictly private foreign 
sales, separate from the Company; secondly, the Company business 
phase from the beginning of the 1880s. During the first stage, which 
began in 1851 at the Crystal Palace World Fair, Cyrus McCormick 
mainly relied on European manufacturers, to whom he sold 
production rights, whereas in America he had only recently given 
these up. 
Reasons for the extension of sales abroad in the first stage have 
been difficult to identify. However, it is obvious that they were 
closely bound to the person of Cyrus McCormick. He had foreseen 
the chances implied in the possible success at the World Fair; the 
triumph at Crystal Palace, which warranted him the fame of the 
invention of the reaper, was rapidly materialized in America, but he 
anticipated money in Europe, too, and responded immediately to 
these opportunities. 
A characteristic feature of the first stage of McCormick's foreign 
business is the unsystematic approach to business. Cyrus McCormick 
let the business continue under its own weight, reacting only to 
external impulses but not actively directing them. His machines at 
first attracted great interest and dominated the market. His European 
manufacturers were, however, unable to produce the quality 
required. Besides, McCormick's competitors had also discovered the 
European market and soon outdid him there. McCormick's reaper 
was too expensive and heavy for the European farmers. In addition, 
the capacity and production technology of McCormick's Chicago 
plant was too limited to meet even American demand, and Cyrus' 
foreign trade with its special requirements led to continuous quarrels 
with his younger brother Leander. Manufacture of the European 
machines demanded totally new patterns and was too costly at the 
time of handfitting. As a result, Cyrus McCormick's foreign enterprise 
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C.H. McCormick 
1831-47 
Chrystal Palace 
- European constructers 
Salaried agent 
in Europe 
1831 1851 1863 
gradually died off after the mid-1860s. Mechanization of the 
American farm was still in its infancy, and new territories opening 
up for agriculture further increased demand at home. The time was 
not yet ripe for large-scale foreign business. 
Especially so when the state of European agriculture is taken into 
consideration. In Europe, the demand for harvesting and mowing 
machines was strictly concentrated among the wealthy, upper-class 
land-owners. In the terms of Paul E. David, the threshold size for a 
farm where it was profitable to buy a harvesting machine was still 
very high. A key factor affecting the use of harvesting machines was 
availability of farm labor: as long as labor was abundant and cheap, 
there was no incentive for capital-intensive and labor-saving 
machines. In Britain, the first marketing area for reapers, this relation 
changed slowly towards the end of the 19th century, and 
consequently the demand for harvesting machines began to grow, 
although even there the scythe was at the same time only replacing 
the sickle. On the Continent, the situation was more complicated. 
Both in France and Germany there were both large holdings but also 
areas of small farms. Russia was one of the leading grain producers 
of the world, but had a surplus of labor as did France and Germany. 
Figure 6 Main stages in the McCormick Company's foreign trade. 
Cyrus McCormick's private business 
McCormick & Gray 
1847-48 
McCormick, Ogden & Co. 
848-49 
C.H. McCormick & Co. C.H. McCormick & Bros. 
1849-50 	 1859-66 
C.H. McCormick 	 I C.H. McCormick 
1850-59 	 1866-74  
C.H. & L.J. McCormick 
1874-79 
Bro. 	 McCormick Harvesting Machine Co 
1879-1902 
1874 [1878_ 	 11883_ _1'1888 	 1899 T 	 r1905 
European trade 
dies off 
The McCormick Co. business 
Victory at European Salaried Trade transfered First 
Bdstot show main agent European to McCormlc Co. production plant 
commisston 
agents 
manager own branches In Europe 
OH Co.) 
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Why did Cyrus McCormick nevertheless continue his faltering 
business in Europe? He had reaped his greatest public victories in 
Europe, was decorated with high honors around Europe and 
consequently had found a place in European high society. In that 
respect business was more for his ego than profit. Besides, the 
business did not cause him great losses. It was handled through 
independent agents, who bought machines f.o.b. in London or New 
York. In addition, Burgess & Key and other contractors paid him 
royalties on every implement manufactured and sold. The aim of 
McCormick's first foreign enterprise was therefore more or less to 
keep his name in the limelight. 
The next stage of McCormick's foreign enterprise was bound to 
and backed by many internal changes in the Company. Cyrus 
McCormick was among the first to put the hire-purchase system to 
large-scale use in America, by offering long-term credit to his 
customers. McCormick's reapers were sold at first through 
independent commission agents, but already at the end of the 1870s, 
jobbing houses were replaced by the Company's own branch 
houses. The trade had grown beyond the scope of small agents and 
besides, the machines were too complicated and deserved better 
service than agents were able to offer. 
Although keeping a close eye on all the functions of his company, 
Cyrus McCormick's emphasis was increasingly on the structural level 
of the business. He was more and more engaged in organizational 
questions, fighting his endless patents wars or traveling with his 
machines from one show to another. In the long run this, combined 
with the totally conflicting business strategy of his business partner 
and brother Leander, led to an open conflict and finally to the 
formation of the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company in 1879. 
In 1880 Leander McCormick was fired as Superintendent and a 
professional manager was hired for the first time to oversee 
production. This event began a new era in the McCormick Company; 
a managerial approach to business. It began to use night shifts, new 
order and discipline was brought in and for the first time gauges, 
patterns and jigs appeared in the factory. Also cost accounting 
emerged for the first time in the business practises of the Company.' 
It is difficult to find a clear answer to the question, why Cyrus 
McCormick decided to return to Europe at the end of the 1870s. 
The development of technology was a necessary prerequisite for the 
next stage in McCormick's foreign business. The new wire-binder 
opened a chance for a new breakthrough in Europe. However, the 
1 Hounshell 1987, 179-180. 
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beginning of the second stage of foreign enterprise was also a result 
of Cyrus' personal interest. In 1877 he sent two machines to the 
Liverpool Agricultural Show, and appointed a new agent, but was 
hit by setbacks. The Show was a total loss and the new agent died. 
Yet something remained. His son Cyrus Jr. had accompanied the 
binders to Britain and had learned a hard lesson. Machines no longer 
sold on their own weight, but needed a careful preparation of the 
market. 
1878 was crucial for the future of the foreign business. Cyrus 
McCormick sent his trusted man in good time before the Royal 
Agricultural Society's show to Britain and nominated a new agent. 
Once again, Cyrus Jr. decided to attend the show. All the necessary 
preparations were taken into account, and as a result the McCormick 
binder reaped the gold medal. But had these investments been made 
for the sake of the foreign trade or because of the Paris World Fair, 
where Cyrus Sr. was decorated with the Cross of the Legion of 
Honor? The answer inclines more on the side of a thirst for honors. 
Nothing crucial had yet changed in the production plant. The 
McCormick Company was not able to meet the demand, and Leander 
opposed extension of production. Besides, the technology was not 
yet ready to meet the changes necessary for machines for the 
European markets. Nevertheless, the name and fame of McCormick 
had returned to Europe. 
New important decisions followed. McCormick extended his 
operations to Australia and New Zealand and his own salaried 
representatives were sent to Russia. These moves were not of a 
corporate action, but Cyrus McCormick's private initiative. Foreign 
trade was under his supervision, although correspondence and its 
daily functions were transferred to the Company's officers. Foreign 
incomes were, nevertheless, of some importance for the Company 
because they were carefully calculated on the revenue side, and were 
expected to cover some old debts. On the other hand, this example 
shows the haphazard nature of accounting practises, where 
corporate matters were mixed with Cyrus's personal accounts. 
George Freudenreich can be regarded as McCormick's first salaried 
representative abroad. He took care of the Russian sales which were 
regarded as promising for the future. The whole of western Europe 
was left under Percy Lankester's jobbing house; but there was no 
visible plan for the running of foreign affairs. Only in the midst of 
the depression and labor problems did General Manager E.K. Butler 
in 1886 make an investigation trip to Europe. Thereafter, foreign 
business was put directly under his supervision and Lankester was 
nominated as the Company's salaried European main agent. In these 
actions McCormick's was a latecomer; its main American competi-
tors had founded their own agencies in Europe several years before. 
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In a position to oversee the entire field of business, E.K. Butler 
developed the foreign trade as a part of overall company business. 
When he anticipated good potentials for earnings on a foreign field 
he showed the green light for extension of activities. When the 
domestic trade was more plausible, the foreign had to give way until 
the end of the 1890s. New accounting practises became visible 
behind his decisions. Machines for foreign markets needed fitting, 
and in many cases totally new patterns, which increased the cost of 
manufacture at a time when the Company was seeking economies 
of scale. As long as the foreign demand did not surpass the 
production costs it caused, it was more profitable to invest in 
domestic trade. Consequently, what appeared to be the McCormick 
Company's stubborn approach towards the frequent request of its 
foreign agents to provide machines suited for local conditions, in 
fact was part of a carefully calculated overall company strategy. 
However, Butler extended McCormick's operations rapidly to all 
agricultural areas of importance. New agents were appointed, but 
they all remained under Lankester's supervision. The Company's first 
investment in property abroad was its warehouse in Odessa in 1894. 
Butler's annual trips to Europe culminated in the decision to establish 
the Company's own branch houses. McCormick's old European 
agent, Percy Lankester, was first released from the charge of the 
European business and reduced to a normal jobber, and finally his 
business was entirely turned over to McCormick,s. Lankester was 
replaced by McCormick's own European manager, who was sent to 
Hamburg. William Couchman's actions proved this decision correct 
and he soon gained large autonomy for his operations. Expansion 
culminated in 1900 in the founding of McCormick's first subsidiary, 
the McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. m.b.H. in Berlin. By 1902, 
when the largest harvester manufacturers merged their interests, 
McCormick had extended its branches to all the key agricultural 
areas and places where competition necessitated it. 
Underlying reasons for McCormick's expansion abroad during the 
1880s seem to be factors connected to preservation of the market 
share and keeping the name in the limelight. The events in the 
Pacific indicate that at least in the harvester business the whole 
world had already at that stage become one market area where rival 
companies could not afford to give up their achieved share of 
markets. In that competition the McCormick Company did not invest 
on its own facilities, nor did it actively develop the trade. It only 
more or less passively reacted to the impulses of its competitors, or 
request for agencies from various countries. Jobbing houses were 
for it a safe way of doing business and showing the Company flag; 
sales f.o.b. did not bind its hands to long credits as was the case in 
the U.S. 
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Explanations for the rapid extension and change of the strategy 
in foreign business are in the 1890s at least as manifold as during 
the previous decades. In her model of the evolution of a 
multinational company, Mira Wilkins describes how companies first 
appointed independent agents to represent them abroad; this stage 
was followed by a salaried export manager, who was replaced in 
the third stage by a branch house or a distribution subsidiary, and 
eventually by a finishing, assembly or manufacturing plant in the 
final stage.2 
When operations are examined from a general level, there is a 
danger that everything seems to fit into the frames of the sought 
model. Keeping this reservation in mind, it can be stated that the 
foreign business of the McCormick Company followed the outlines 
that Mira Wilkins has drawn; in other words, the McCormick 
Company was a typical representative of an American enterprise. 
Wilkins' explanation describes only the various stages in the 
evolution of a multinational, but not the underlying reasons, nor 
why it succeeded to outdo its competitors on both sides of the 
Atlantic. When it comes to Wilkins' argument of selling the surplus 
abroad as a sign of a modern enterprise on its way to becoming 
multinational, the McCormick Co. did not in this part fit into her 
outlines. For a start there was surplus only in a couple of years. 
Secondly, harvesting machines had to be adjusted to the foreign 
special conditions, which required refitting and in many cases 
special patterns. Consequently, in this trade, economies of scale 
were not easily available. During the depression of the 1890s, 
McCormick's certainly had a large number of machines in store; but 
even then it did not resort to dumping them abroad at low prices. 
If the McCormick Company did not send its surpluses to external 
markets, what then was the reason for the expansion of its business 
during the 1890s? Mira Wilkins offers domestic competition and the 
division of markets between giant corporations as an explanation for 
this growth. She states that they "were in a position to do more 
abroad".3  
The harvesting machines companies tried to merge their interest 
for the first time in 1890. After the failure of this attempt, renewed 
competition and recession forced the smallest companies out of the 
field, and the two largest manufacturers, McCormick and Deering, 
came to dominate the market in America. Domestic markets had so 
far continously expanded but in the 189Os there was no more virgin 
2 Wilkins 1970, 45-46. 
3 Wilkins 1970, 72. 
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land for farmers. Simultaneously, falling machine prices forced 
manufacturers to improve their productivity to maintain their profits. 
As a consequence, more machines at lower prices poured onto the 
saturating U.S. markets. 
In that light it really looks as if foreign trade was merely an 
extension of domestic competition, as Wilkins argues. Only in 1892 
did the Deering Company send its first traveling agent abroad; by 
that time McCormick's had firmly established itself in the foreign 
market and could easily fight its arch-rival. For smaller companies, 
foreign markets might at first have offered rescue from domestic 
competition, but in the long run they were unable to hold their 
position there either. 
Manufacturers were forced to seek new markets, but they still had 
to resolve the problems in manufacturing and marketing. Foreign 
branches were expensive, but without after-sale service capacity and 
repair service there was no chance of durable business. On the other 
hand, competition at home curtailed possibilities for investments 
abroad. Besides, productivity was further curtailed by production 
cuts after each season when factories closed their doors and 
dismissed their workers. This problem was settled only after the 
formation of the International Harvester Company, which extended 
its functions to new lines. 
But an eye should once again be cast on the state of agriculture 
in the importing areas too. The success of the harvester companies 
was closely connected to the state of agriculture in the receiving 
countries. In that respect especially the European countries differed 
considerably from each other. Britain was the country where 
agriculture first began to mechanize and was, consequently, up to 
the 1890s, the main marketing area for harvesting machine 
companies too. Especially at the turn of the century in many west 
and north European countries mechanization began to spread also 
among the peasantry. For machine manufacturers it meant growing 
demand. This phenomenon partly explains the eagerness of the U.S. 
harvesting machine manufacturers to intensify their efforts in Europe 
at the turn of the century. But how was it possible that the American 
companies conquered the European markets so easily? 
American manufacturers regarded Europe as an undeveloped 
market with great resources. The American manufacturers had long 
years of bitter rivalry behind them at first in the United States but 
in Europe too. Only the English companies could compete with the 
American makers up to the 1880s, when they too were driven out 
of the market. Other European manufacturers had only local 
significance. In the highly competing harvester markets the U.S. 
companies, due to their large domestic markets, were able to reach, 
at least in some measure, economies of scale. Large production series 
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and careful calculation of costs made it possible to lower the prices 
to such a level which the European or other competitors were not 
able to follow. Thus, English manufacturers were known for their 
high-quality products and use of iron in their machines. Until the 
1880s, American makers, on the contrary, used wooden frames in 
their harvesters. When the foreign business was still limited to small 
amounts, English makers were able to compete, but once the 
American factories began to produce all-iron machines, they could 
benefit from their size and lower machine prices. 
An integral part of the American companies' selling effort was 
aggressive marketing. The McCormick Company, like its competi-
tors, tried to create demand where it did not exist. Machines were 
sent from one agricultural show and test to another all across Europe. 
The jurors of the tests were put under pressure and even bribed. 
Sales catalogs were translated into European languages; flyers, 
showcards and other advertising material was sent to European 
farmers. European customers were also introduced to the written 
testimonials of satisfied customers. Sales spheres were split into 
smaller entities by appointing new agents, as in Germany; agents 
were required to travel around in their areas in good time during 
the winter, and to show reluctant farmers the necessity of the new 
machinery; and at harvest time they had to haul machines to harvest 
grounds to show them in action. Besides, almost every year 
McCormick's developed new models which were adapted to the 
special conditions prevailing in various areas. In addition, it extended 
to Europe its after-sale service, including traveling experts. 
But there was one key element in the U.S. harvester trade which 
was not transfered abroad during the time period under 
investigation. Cyrus McCormick Sr. was one of the first to introduce 
the hire purchase system into the American business traditions. In 
the United States, credits to farmers were finally extended up to 
three years and harvester companies were engaged in direct sales 
with farmers. In its foreign trade the McCormick Co. stayed strictly 
on f.o.b. terms and declined extending credits to farmers. 
In the present study have been outlined the reasons for and 
development of the foreign trade of the McCormick Company. Now 
it is time to look at the context in which the Company operated; 
the emergence of American large companies and their development 
into multinational enterprises. Was the McCorcmick Co. a 
multinational company and did it follow the prevailing trends in 
American business life? 
Alfred D. Chandler has in his works described the main features 
and stages of the development of the American business enterprise. 
With some variations, the McCormick Company fits relatively well 
into Chandler's model. Although the McCormick Co. never was a 
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single unit firm operated by an individual, it was also clearly 
transformed in the beginning of the 1880s into a professionally 
managed corporation with a hierarchy of salaried executives, and 
with distinct operating units. Ownership and management were 
separated from each other during E.K. Butler's time as the General 
Manager. After his resignation, the corporate management was 
nominally in the hands of the McCormick brothers, but the 
professional middle managers took charge of the daily activities of 
the Company and took part in the corporate decision-making too. 
In the chandlerian sense4, the McCormick Co. invested in 
product-specific marketing and distributing, and finally its own 
branch houses replaced the wholesalers. In addition, the Company 
invested considerably in production facilities and organization of 
work to achieve advantages of scale. As a result, there emerged 
during the 1890s a new kind of competition, where the two leading 
companies were able to meet the domestic demand. This was one 
of the prerequisites for international operations in Chandler's 
model.5 
This concept is closely connected to Chandler's idea of 
throughput. Increased throughput forced manufacturers first to 
replace independent agents with their own sales force and finally 
led to the extension of operations abroad. To Chandler, foreign 
trade and the emergence of a multinational enterprise were an 
extension of domestic business. He does not give any explicit 
answers as to, why American companies began to operate overseas, 
but describes how it was accomplished. 
Mira Wilkins, on the other hand, has concentrated in her works 
almost entirely on the multinational enterprise. She defined the four 
stages through which firms turned into multinationals. These phases 
can be identified also in the evolution of the McCormick Co. It began 
to sell through independent agents, appointed salaried personnel in 
the next and founded its own branch houses in the third. 
McCormick's can be said to represent new technology as well; in 
its final years it expanded abroad to reach new markets, it had from 
the 1880s on, at an accelerating rate, substituted capital for labor, 
and finally it also felt the pressure of the domestic economic 
conditions. Morover, the foreign market was only complementary to 
the McCormick Co. too. The Company was well aware of the 
prospects of the markets through its travelling agents and the 
4 Chandler 1990, 29-32. 
5 Ibid. 30. 
6 Chandler 1988, 31-34, 41-42. 
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personal visits of its highest management in Europe. It followed 
keenly the political and legal development in its market areas, and 
invested very carefully and only in familiar conditions. 
The McCormick Company is connected to the evolution of 
American business life at the turn of the century in yet another way. 
Decision-making is an art of its own. It has been, and still is, at the 
same time the most difficult but also the most important part of 
business activities. The decisions and the strategy selected depend 
on the personality of the manager, on the education and experience 
he has behind him. It was therefore no wonder, when the old 
General Manager of the McCormick Co., E.K. Butler resigned, that 
his conservative and careful strategy which aimed at the maximizing 
of profit per produced unit was replaced by the strategy of growth. 
Instead, profits were sought from economies of scale and the amount 
of throughput was emphasized. This phenomenon was common in 
other branches of American industry too. 
Thus the McCormick Company seems to fit into the outlines 
defined as characteristic of American multinational enterprises by 
Alfred D. Chandler and Mira Wilkins. It certainly had its own 
peculiarities bound to the branch of industry, but as a whole it can 
be seen as the first stage of an emerging harvester multinational. In 
the sense of Mira Wilkins, it was the marketing stage in the evolution 
process. By that time the McCormick Co., by investing in branch 
houses and in a subsidiary of its own, had become a multinational 
company. Although it was still a matter of marketing organization, 
investments were direct foreign investments, which numerous 
researchers regard as the determining feature of a multinational. 
Besides, the Company developed many of the basic strategies and 
approaches so typical in the next stage, the International Harvester 
Company period, when activities were expanded to overseas 
production plants too. 
The American multinational enterprise has been regarded as a 
unique phenomenon in history. Nevertheless, European foreign 
investments preceded their American counterparts by decades. 
Among Continental companies, the German were particularly active 
before World War I. Lawrence D. FRANKO even states that the total 
number of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries of Continental 
enterprises outnumbered those of American firms. European 
companies became multinational in a similar way as did American 
firms: after obtaining oligopolist advantages in technological 
innovation, they began by exporting. European innovations were, 
however, frequently first uprooted to the U.S. and commercialized 
there. American firms innovated new, labor-saving, highly 
income-elastic products. Continental companies, on the contrary, 
rarely pioneered in these sectors, but operated in synthetics and 
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luxury products.' 
Both American and European companies used similar strategies in 
their expansion abroad. In the first stage, European enterprises too 
founded their marketing organization, normally independent agents. 
Only after that did companies establish their own branches, and in 
the same way as American companies, thereafter production plants. 
This was the case with the German firm Siemens & Halske, that in 
1900 had 42 offices in Germany, 37 in other European countries, 
and 38 overseas. A similar development can also be found in the 
German corporation AEG.8 
Did the manoeuvres of the harvester companies described above 
simultaneously affect the development of agriculture? What was the 
role of a giant corporation like the McCormick Company? Was it a 
Schumpeterian innovator that changed structures in agriculture? 
The reaper and its later modifications were important to the 
development of agriculture. Harvesting, always laborious, became 
considerably lighter and faster, thereby decreasing the risk of 
spoiling. Nevertheless, McCormick's was hardly able to increase 
mechanization to an important extent; the factors affecting in the 
opposite direction were too strong. However, it introduced and 
made known an important implement, and in that respect it had 
important long-term effects on European agriculture. Especially once 
it, and especially the International Harvester, had become a market 
leader, it could to some extent dictate what kinds of machines were 
available for farmers. 
In the 1960 and 1970s, the mechanization of agriculture attracted 
innovation theorists to test their ideas. They produced models on 
diffusion of innovations from one country to another, from center 
to periphery and from large estates to smallholders. These works 
offered valuable new information on the mechanization of 
agriculture. We know now when the first threshers or reapers 
appeared in Britain, Sweden or in Finland; and we also know who 
were the first to adopt new implements. 
Diffusion of innovations can be approached from the other side 
of the mirror, too, as has been done in the present work. Is the 
innovation theory relevant any more, if it is approached from the 
side of the innovator or entrepreneur? Can we see centers and 
peripheries even then? What are the early adapters like? 
When in 1851 Cyrus McCormick introduced his reaper to 
European farmers in England, he was not thinking about foreign 
7 Franko 1976, 3, 8-10, 24, 75, 77. 
8 Hertner 1988, 146-151. 
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sales. The World Fair offered him new opportunities which he was 
ready to use. In that respect England was hardly a center area, 
although farming there was the most advanced in Europe. After 
Crystal Palace, the question was of earning plain money wherever 
possible. Here slowly growing demand and fast growing supply met 
each other. Early adapters were normally wealthy estate owners, 
who, for the sake of curiosity or need, purchased the first machines. 
On the other hand, Gould P. Coleman has shown that adaptability 
of an innovation depended upon the cropping system, the size of 
the farms, the prevailing soils and climate and accessibility to 
markets. In the 1860s, these factors in England were favorable. In 
that respect the present study without doubt confirms the basic 
concept of diffusion of innovations. 
But is this approach of any relevance? If the question is 
approached from the manufacturer's side, he did not see any 
traditional centers. He sold his products wherever he could find 
demand. At first Britain offered the best markets; thereafter the focus 
of activity moved for a while to the Pacific and then again to Europe. 
In this process it is impossible to define any center in the manner 
used in theories of diffusion of innovation. 
It is self-evident that wealthy people can always acquire new things 
first; thereafter they rapidly become common as the price sinks 
below a certain level. That was the case with the harvesting 
machines too. What is interesting and of value, however, is to figure 
out the timing and evolution of this process in different countries. 
It explains the state of development in terms of demand in sample 
areas, but totally omits the supply side. As we have seen, this has 
been a severe shortcoming, since manufacturers were active in 
creating demand and consequently were an important factor 
affecting the diffusion of innovations. In previous works, this effect 
has normally been totally excluded or underestimated.10  
9 Coleman 1968, 183. 
10 See for example Coleman 1968, 175. According to Coleman the most important 
factors in the adoption process were experiences of neighbors. In addition, persuasion 
of salesmen and information in the agricultural press played a secondary role. 
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Figure 7. Emergence of various types of harvesting machines in 
Europe. 
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Figure 7 shows the outlines of the diffusion of various kinds of 
harvesting machines in Europe. In the case of Europe it is impossible 
to draw the kind of curves that Jan Kuuse has constructed for the 
United States, where old-fashioned machines were rapidly replaced 
with newer ones, although not all of the farmers even there were 
capable of such investments. In Europe adoption of new agricultural 
technology was not as uniform. There were big regional differences 
between and also within countries. Old and new implements could 
be used side by side, as was the case in Russia where domestic 
manufacturers began to produce hand-rake reapers, while their 
foreign competitors were already selling twine-binders. Similar views 
could be met also on the Finnish fields during the 1950s and even 
the 1960s. 
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